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ABSTRACT 
The following research focuses on trade union organisations, and in particular trade 
union officialdom in Egypt. The study examines the extent to which trade union 
officials at the various levels of the trade union hierarchy are reacting to reforms 
instigated by structural adjustment policies. The adoption of structural adjustment and 
economic reform measures as proposed by the World Bank and IMF have resulted in the 
government's withdrawal of some of the benefits and privileges it accorded to workers. 
Public sector workers are particularly affected by these changes, thereby posing a 
challenge to trade union officialdom, since the bulk of trade union membership is within 
the public sector. Trade union officials are reacting to the reform measures by trying to 
balance their role as representatives of workers' interests and their role in administering 
state policy. Whereas in the past these two roles were reconcilable, however, with 
liberalisation of the economy and the adoption of structural adjustment measures that is 
no longer tenable. Trade unionism has been weakened by the incorporation of union 
officials within government corporate structures, making it more difficult for trade union 
officialdom to challenge the reform measures adopted by the government. Rather, trade 
union officials are opting for `co-operation' both with the government and with 
management in enterprises, to the cost of workers. In enterprises, trade union officials 
emphasise that the interests of work and workers are inseparable. At the level of the 
confederation and general unions, union officials present themselves as working to keep 
workers' rights, but also as partners with the government in its drive for growth. By so 
doing trade union officials are de-politicising trade unionism, and instead focus on 
economic gains. Union officials are redefining their role away from workers. Trade 
union action at the various levels is not based on what workers want or demand, but 
rather on what trade union officials want, in the belief that workers do not truly know 
their interests. As a result, trade union action has promoted the interests of union 
officials rather than that of the workers. Trade unionism has become in a sense a shell 
without a content. However, there is evidence that there are pressures to democratise 
trade unionism and make it more responsive to worker demands. These pressures are 
from within the worker base, from trade union officials particularly at the enterprise 
level who are affilited to political parties, and from external forces like the Islamists. 
However these forces have their limitations, particularly in the face of institutionalised 
sectors that are capable of reproducing themselves and promoting their interests. 
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NOTE ON USAGE OF TERMINOLOGY 
In the research I use the terms `unionist', and `unionists' to mean trade union officials. 
This usage of the term is based on its utilisation in Egypt, where the term for unionist 
is niqabi. Unionised workers are 'edw niqabi, trade union member. In the case of 
unionised workers who are known as activists (but not trade union officials), they are 
sometimes referred to as `unionist', however, that is not the general usage of the term. 
I have adhered to the general usage of the terminology as in Egypt: `unionist' for trade 
union officials; and `trade union members' for unionised workers. 
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Introduction: Trade Unions, Bureaucracy, and State 
Bourgeoisie 
Introduction: 
Structural adjustment policies of the World Bank are implemented in a number of 
developing countries, more often than not they have the air of a prescription, with 
governments having little choice about how to implement them. Many countries can 
restore their credit worthiness, and hence finance development plans through World 
Bank/IBRD loans, by implementation of World Bank policies. While economic 
reform programs have been carried out in the past, the structural adjustment reforms 
proposed by the World BankAMF differ in a significant respect from previous reforms 
in developing countries, as it aims to `rationalise' the intervention of government in 
the economy. Good Governance has come to be redefined as efficient governance. In 
practice this has meant cutting back on a number of social welfare/support programs 
that benefited the poor and unprivileged. World Bank policies of structural 
adjustment, however, have a negative impact on large sectors of the populations of the 
countries concerned. In Egypt, the impact of structural adjustment has been 
particularly harsh on workers. On the one hand, promotion of economic liberalisation 
and privatisation is subjecting many workers in public sector enterprises to 
redundancy. On the other hand, the government has gone back on a decades-old 
commitment to guaranteed and secure employment, effectively meaning an increase in 
unemployment, and job insecurity for the employed. Such a situation poses a 
challenge to trade unions, but the response of trade unions is governed by how trade 
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unions have developed in Egypt in the past, particularly the impact of the Nasser era 
on trade unions. 
Following is an examination of World Bank policies, and the implications for workers 
and trade unions of such policies in Egypt. 
Trade Unions in the World Bank Report 
The World Development Report (WDR) for 1995 centred on the issue of workers in 
an "integrating world". The report sums up world bank ideology concerning the 
direction of economies, particularly developing or `emerging' economies. There is a 
focus on the need, indeed the necessity, of liberalisation of the economy and a 
reduction in state intervention in the management of the economy. This, it is 
indicated, is the best way forward for all concerned, for governments as it is perceived 
that state-run economies are not efficient in the long-term, for industry as productivity 
responds to real indicators from the market, and for workers as their wages would 
increase. The World Bank report focuses on growth in the economy, and the best 
strategies to attain `sustainable growth'. Market based economies are capable of 
growth that is sustainable, "whereas inward-looking and centrally planned strategies 
have generally failed to bring sustainable gains to all workers" (WDR: 16). 
According to WDR, some policies governments pursued in the past had a negative 
impact on labour demand. Aiming to attain greater growth, governments encouraged 
the development of industry at the expense of the agricultural sector. State 
intervention led to the development of policies that have a "pro-industry, anti- 
agriculture bias" that resulted in a number of `distortions' in the labour market. 
Policies have been put in place that are "biased against labour demand within 
agriculture; and regulations designed to make formal sector employment more 
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attractive to workers" (WDR: 31). It is believed that a market-oriented economy can 
reduce the negative consequences of labour regulations that resulted in the creation of 
a dual labour market (WDR: 34). The issue though is not simply a choice between 
state intervention and free markets, rather it is a choice of which public interventions 
bring about most efficient growth and most benefit to workers. The core issue is, 
according to the World Bank, increasing the productivity of capital and of labour, not 
"increasing the amount of capital and numbers of workers" (WDR: 17). Sound 
investments, in both capital and human resources, are essential for growth. 
The recommendations of the World Bank extend beyond governments making internal 
reforms, governments must pave the way for globalisation and international 
integration of world economies. Two features of international integration are capital 
mobility and international migration. It is estimated that by the year 2000 only about 
10% of world labour will not be integrated in the world global labour market (WDR: 
50). According to the World. Bank report adequate policies make the difference 
between the winners and the losers in world globalisation (WDR: 62-68). Protectionist 
regulations and policies can no longer be maintained in an increasingly and inevitably 
integrated world economy. On the contrary, the World Bank perceives as necessary an 
increase in developing the competitiveness of economies (WDR: 51). 
The dynamo of international integration is export-led growth, be it in manufactured 
goods or services. Trade in services is increasing and integrating the world together 
(WDR: 54). Export-led growth is essential to balance international trade. Internal 
trade of manufactured goods is "the first avenue by which most countries feel the 
impact of economic integration" (WDR: 51). Governments that fail to adopt the 
proposed policies expose their countries to being `losers' in the new global system. 
4 
The countries that have fallen behind are those that did not expand export 
manufacturing, and still rely on export of primary goods. The Middle East and Sub- 
Saharan Africa are in this category (WDR: 52). In a World Bank regional report on 
Arab countries, it is believed that the impact of the Uruguay Round on Arab countries 
will be negative, largely a consequence of lack of commitment on the part of Arab 
regimes to reduce tariffs, a Protectionist policy (World Bank, 1995a: 10). 
The World Development Report maintains that governments have an important role to 
play in the new world system. While governments should not directly intervene in the 
economy, they nonetheless have an important regulatory function to carry out. For 
example, anti-Protectionist policies and securing the adequate investment 
environment must be implemented by governments. Governments need to assure 
investors "that the chances of success are high enough to offset the risks" (World 
Bank, 1995a: 14). Governments should also keep a balance by "convince[ing] labour 
that the future will be bright enough to compensate for short-term losses in 
employment and wages" (World Bank, 1995a: 14). While the report points out that 
governments must protect `social interests', it is arguable that an examination of the 
reality of implementation of World Bank structural adjustment programs has been 
capable of addressing such `social interests'. 
Place of 'labour' in World Bank formulation 
It is recognised that the period of transition during the process of liberalisation of the 
economy does bring about hardship, especially to workers. The hardship is deemed to 
be a consequence of inefficient policies. The pro-industry, anti-agriculture bias in 
many developing countries has allowed the existence of dualism in the labour market, 
with a minority of workers in relatively privileged conditions in the formal sector, and 
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a majority of workers in the informal sector. Among the unprivileged majority are 
small farmers, and workers in the urban informal sector, whose numbers are 
increasing (World Bank, 1995a: 15). Among the policies deemed to have benefited a 
minority of privileged workers are, "a dominant public sector, protected industry, bias 
against agriculture, distorted education system, [and] unenforced labour standards" 
(World Bank, 1995a: 15). Also, dualism in the labour market "has distorted incentives 
and encouraged rent-seeking" (World Bank, 1995a: 1). 
In the WDR, it is recognised that reform will result in losses in the short run for 
workers, primarily in the form of loss in wages, and for some unemployment. As 
reform proceeds, however, and inefficiencies are removed, the conditions of workers 
improve (World Bank, 1995a: 3). From the point of productivity, workers "become 
more productive as the goods they produce increase in value" (WDR: 54). At another 
level, reforms benefit workers as consumers, as they can buy products cheaply, made 
possible due to international trade (WDR: 54). While the WDR recognises that 
inequalities will persist, workers would be worse off without reform. 
The approach of the World Bank in dealing with labour is economistic, where labour 
is dealt with primarily as a cost factor. The focus on productivity of capital and of 
labour is the key to successful, efficient and sustainable growth, rather than increase in 
labour per se. Another focal point is flexibility of labour markets. Investments in 
training and retraining of the workforce is one of the areas the World Bank highlights, 
in order to respond to the constantly changing needs of the economy and labour 
demand. The World Bank philosophy in this respect is that old, inefficient labour 
regulations that `overprotected' formal sector workers, are to give way to new 
regulations that "guarantee some standards of fairness in labour relations yet preserve 
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the flexibility of labour markets" (World Bank, 1995a: 1). Government involvement in 
labour regulations should focus on policies to regulate child labour, working women 
and minorities, minimum wages, safety standards at work, and conditions of work. 
Thus, the onus on determining labour requirements falls on enterprises or business 
activity. It is for this reason, the WDR argues, that trade unions have an important role 
to play, that of countering the power of employers. 
Trade unions in the World Bank report 
The role of trade unions, as per the World Bank report, is very important in protecting 
the attainment of the rights of workers, as well as acting as a counter balance to 
employers. The role of trade unions is deemed pivotal for the protection of workers' 
rights in a free-market system. Central to the World Bank understanding of the role of 
trade unions is the changing relationship between trade unions and the state. Unions in 
many countries are politicised, which results in "excessive intervention and regulation 
as governments try to pacify workers and gain support for state-controlled unions" 
(WDR: 79-80). Free, independent trade unions are capable of representing workers in 
a market economy. Not only are such unions capable of `responsible' collective 
bargaining, they are "mostly democratic institutions" (WDR: 85). The regional report 
for Arab countries indicates that unions are "becoming more active in the face of 
deteriorating labour market" (World Bank, 1995a: 17). The success of such effort has, 
however, been limited because unions are not truly independent, and collective 
bargaining is "overly politicised" (World Bank, 1995a: 17). 
Unlike government intervention in setting wage levels which, according to the World 
Bank tends to create labour market distortions, the process of collective bargaining 
between unions and employers is perceived to be effective. The reason for this is that 
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"the pressures created by competition push unions and employers to seek ways to 
increase productivity rather than fight over rents" (World Bank, 1995a: 17). While the 
report recognises the significance and success of national and industry-level 
agreements, the World Bank gives preference to decentralised bargaining, at the local, 
branch level (WDR: 83). 
The report points out that in some countries, trade unions represent the relatively 
privileged workers, more often than not a fraction of the workforce (WDR: 80). This 
is partly linked with dualism in the labour market. Trade unions have sometimes tried 
to advance the condition of workers who are unionised at the expense of workers who 
are non-unionised. While it is believed that in a market economy trade unions operate 
independently of government dictates and interferences, so it is believed that workers 
have the right of freedom of association, either to join a union or not to join a union at 
all (WDR: 82). 
An issue that comes under examination in the report is that of the role of trade unions 
in improving productivity in firms. The report suggests that unions, by helping 
train/re-train workers to encourage job rotation and flexibility, are thus a positive 
influence (WDR: 80). The attainment of efficiency seems to be a critical factor. What 
seems to be happening is that many unions are forced to `co-operate' with 
management, otherwise they may be marginalised. What the World Bank advocates is 
that by improving the productivity of enterprises both capitalists and workers benefit. 
Increased productivity is translated as better wages and benefits to workers. Thus, the 
interests of capitalists and workers are not contradictory. This, however, is not the 
case. The greatest benefit of such productivity enhancing activities is to the enterprise, 
not the workers. The report points out that labour and management in enterprises 
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sometimes get together or co-operate, which is -a desirable outcome. In discussing a 
particular case of workers in Brazilian firms where quality circles were introduced, the 
report points out that "labour, keen to ensure continued competitiveness, did not insist 
on past privileges but instead co-operated with management in this process" (WDR: 
83). This is not `co-operation', but rather a coercion to co-operate and it reflects that 
by focusing on `productivity' workers are disadvantaged. 
One of the issues raised by the WDR is that trade union action can sometimes be 
negative, or `monopolistic', by which is meant that trade unions "[improve] wages and 
working conditions for their members at the expense of capital holders, consumers, 
and non-union labour" (WDR: 81). While the report rightly argues that as a result of 
this so-called `union wage effect' the difference in wages between unionised workers 
and non-unionised workers is exacerbated, three major factors are overlooked. First, 
and most significantly, trade unions are organisations that are supposed to look after 
the interests of workers, not for the interest of capital holders or society at large. 
Second, due to the situation that is existing of economic crisis world-wide, unions 
often are undercutting the wages of workers for the sake of workers remaining in their 
workplace. Indeed, trade unions are not in the position of making the kind of wage 
increases discussed above, increasingly they are making deals with management to 
accept wage cuts in return for workers to remain in employment. Third, the principle 
of unionism is solidarity. It is not the unions who are paying non-union workers, the 
union wants all workers to join the union. 
One may best summarise the attitude of the World Bank to trade unions is that the 
latter are perceived as "agents for labour, organising large numbers of workers into a 
single entity whose collective bargaining power matches that of the employer" (WDR: 
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79). The choice of the term `agent' sets the. context in which the World Bank 
envisages the role of trade unions, because it reflects a fundamentally economistic 
sense, whereas trade unions `represent' workers, economically, socially, and 
politically. Further indication of this is the statement that "a key principle in industrial 
relations is to ensure that the parties engaged in bargaining absorb the costs of their 
action rather than shift them to third parties" (WDR: 82). This carries tones of 
business unionism, which emphasises that trade unions are partners in management, 
and that `responsible' unionism takes that into account. The key to understanding the 
role of trade unions as per the World Bank, is that by focusing on the economic and 
integrative objectives/goals, trade unions are rendered basically as defensive 
organisations. 
Structural Adjustment and Trade Unionism in Egypt 
The present research examines the impact of the economic reform and structural 
adjustment program on trade unions in Egypt. The reforms in the economy pose a 
challenge to trade unionism as it has existed since the late 1950s, under a `socialist' 
populist regime that nationalised production. Trade unions were deprived of much of 
their power in return for security of employment and protective legislation for 
workers. The structural adjustment program has resulted in a situation where many of 
the benefits that had been accorded to workers by the state are being withdrawn. The 
research examines trade union responses to these challenges. The discussion covers 
both the impact of reform on the trade union structure and organisation, as well as the 
question of how trade unions are re-defining their role in a market, private sector led 
economy. 
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The implementation of structural adjustment policies in Egypt is redefining the role of 
the state in society. One of the issues examined is the development of the Nassente 
state, and the degree to which it was as `socialist' as it claimed to be, and how trade 
unions developed within that system. The move toward liberalisation of the economy 
during the Nassente and post-Nasserite eras, while sustaining a "populist" front, is 
also discussed. Specifically, the research examines the way the state is structured 
within these contradictions and how trade unions could deal with the contradictions. 
The study examines the extent to which unions are able to reconcile their role as 
workers' representatives, and their role in administering state policy. This becomes 
very clear under the changes that are taking place in relation to conditions of 
employment and other legislation related to public sector enterprises in Egypt, notably 
with regard to law 203, the new unified labour law, and the new trade union law. 
Another issue raised is how workers themselves perceive the changes that are taking 
place in the enterprises, notably the idea of privatisation, and in what ways the public 
sector is important to them. Most important is how workers perceive workers' 
representatives' reactions to the changes. By contrast to the narrowness of the `formal' 
trade union apparatus, there is an examination of other forms of workers' 
representation and worker action outside of the framework of the official trade union 
organisation. The research also establishes that liberalisation and structural adjustment 
do not have the same impact on all workers, which contributes to the understanding of 
how relevant trade unions are to different workers. Women workers receive particular 
attention in the research because they were among the groups that gained much from 
the state policies of the 50s and 60s. Increasingly, however, many of their "rights" are 
being eroded. Trade unions have provided little support to them in the transition. 
11 
In addition to the discussion of the impact of reform on the level of enterprises, it is 
important to shed light on the impact of the transition to a market-economy at a wider, 
more macro level. The implementation of SAP is marginalising large sectors of the 
population and pushing larger numbers into poverty. The study also sheds light on 
how, in the absence of real solutions to people's problems and the failure to integrate 
them in the `new order', the alternative that emerges and which is gaining in strength 
is the Islamist `solution', and the study reviews the extent to which it is viable or 
successful. 
Methods 
The subject of the current research, the impact of structural adjustment on trade 
unions in Egypt, is a complex issue. Structural adjustment per se is a multi-faceted 
field that combines economic, political, and social considerations. A fundamental 
consideration in undertaking this topic is that it is a study of a subject in flux. The 
implementation of some structural adjustment measures had started in Egypt from the 
late 1980s, while other measures are still in process. The pace of change is 
unpredictable in some cases. This is clear in the process of privatisation of public 
sector enterprises. From 1991, the year Law 203 was issued paving the way for 
privatisation of enterprises, to the end of 1995, three enterprises had been `privatised'. 
The pace of privatisation led many researchers, for example Posusney, to argue that 
labour was acting as an obstacle to privatisation. From January 1996 to the end of 
December 1996, a period of twelve months, twenty enterprises were `privatised'. 
Another factor complicating the process is that the issue of trade unionism and public 
sector reform is a politically sensitive topic in Egypt. The costs of reform are high, and 
thus officials, junior or senior, do not disclose all information they may posses or 
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simply minimise them, or give the `official newspaper' view of events. This is 
particularly the case in a highly bureaucratised and authoritarian political culture, as in 
Egypt. However, a wealth of information and resources can be obtained through 
`inside contacts'. On the other hand, information from labour activists and others 
opposed to reform are equally problematic. The other side of the existing authoritarian 
political culture in Egypt is mistrust. As in the earlier case, once one is able to break 
through the mistrust, also a wealth of information and resources become available. 
Another factor that affects research based on the political culture is that of the 
centrality of "Government". Some views in support of reform or SAP are not views on 
the merits of SAP per se but rather they are a stand for the government. Likewise, 
opposition to reform is sometimes simply opposition to the government. 
At times, the issue is raised of the difficulty that women researchers face in Arab or 
Islamic countries. In the course of this and other research in the `male-dominated' 
world of industrial enterprises, the researcher has found this to be an over- 
exaggeration. The issue was raised by an American woman researcher who carried out 
work for her doctoral dissertation on state-labour relations in Egypt, Marsha Posusney. 
It is more likely that it is difficult for a foreigner to carry out research in Egypt. One 
may add that she has been back in Egypt to do more research since she finished her 
doctoral research. 
In researching the topic of the study, a number of resources were utilised. These 
included an examination of the literature on the subject, material from newspapers 
and periodicals, and interviews. Although the literature on the research topic is 
limited, there is a number of very exhaustive studies in the subject area of the politics 
of labour in Egypt. No study on the working class in Egypt can overlook two major 
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studies, Amin Ezz El-Din's Tarikh Al-Tabaka Al-Amela Al-Mesreyya (The History 
of the Egyptian Working Class), and Joel Beinin's and Zachary Lockman's Workers 
on the Nile. The former study is a detailed account of the working class from the 
formation of a working class in Egypt during the nineteenth century to 1970, the end 
of Nasserism. The study is rich in details. The second study, Workers On The Nile, 
is an analytical examination of the working class from 1882 to 1954. The study 
examines the interlocking relations between class and nationalism. The doctoral 
dissertation of Marsha P. Posusney Workers Against The State: Actor, Issues And 
Outcomes In Egyptian Labour/State Relations, 1952-1987 covers a period of the 
history and politics of the Egyptian working class that is very important but which 
had received little attention. Together with the study by Raouf Abbas Hamed, these 
works are indispensable sources of historical reference to the study of the working 
class in Egypt. 
The works of Bianchi and Waterbury are equally essential to an understanding of the 
labour movement in Egypt. The works of Robert Bianchi (1989) Unruly 
Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt, and his article "The 
Corporatisation Of The Egyptian Labour. Movement" (1986) examine the 
corporatisation of the Egyptian labour movement. His works analyse the relationship 
between the `State' in Egypt and other representational organisations, among which 
are trade unions. John Waterbury (1993) carries out in Exposed To Innumerable 
Delusions: Public Enterprises and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and 
Turkey a detailed study of the political economy of the public sector in the four 
countries. The author examines the rationale for the selection of SOEs as instruments 
of the ISI strategy of state, the nature of the crisis that necessitated the reform of 
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SOEs, and the various interest groups within that public property regime and how 
they resisted the impending change and erosion of their `entitlements'. 
In addition to the works cited above and others used throughout the research, one 
source of information that was very useful was the newspapers. The subject matter of 
research, as indicated earlier, is unfolding, and for this reason newspaper items and 
articles provided up to date information. Opposition papers were particularly useful 
since they provided good coverage of worker protests and activities of committees or 
groups working against privatisation and problems resulting from SAP. Such 
material is not available in the `government' press. The most useful of the opposition 
papers were Al-Ahali, A1-'Arabi, Sawt Helwan, Al-Shaab, and Al-Wafd. In addition, 
Al-Hayat newspaper was also used. It is an Arabic newspaper printed in London that 
is known for its objective reporting of Arab affairs. Official papers used for reference 
were Al-Ahram, and A1-Akhbar. 
The bulk of the research was based on interviews, carried out between July and the 
end of October 1994. A few interviews were also carried out in February and March 
1997, for the purpose of updating. The bulk of the interviews were carried out in two 
public sector enterprises, with management, trade unionists, and workers. The two 
enterprises were Al-Sharkia Eastern tobacco company, and E1-Nasr Company for 
Glass Manufacturing. The two enterprises are affiliated to the Holding Company for 
Thermal Industries. An interview was also conducted with the president of the 
holding company. A research licence was required to carry out the research at the 
enterprises. In each of two enterprises I visited two different locations. The 
interviews with management were carried out in their offices. As for the unionists, 
the meetings were usually carried out in any place that was relatively quiet, usually in 
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the administrative building and in one case in the trade union office. Often, there was 
more than one unionist in a meeting. Access to the workers was restricted, so that I 
always had to meet them accompanied and often during the interview there was a 
supervisor nearby. 
In addition, interviews were also carried out with unionists in two political parties, 
Tagamuu and the Nasserite Party. The interviews at Tagamuu were very fruitful 
because members of the labour secretariat at the Tagamuu Party were always present, 
often with workers, often to try to solve a problem. It thus served to highlight the 
actual problems encountered in the process of reform and privatisation. In addition, 
the head of the labour secretariat at Tagamuu is a very active unionist and has been 
involved in the establishment of workers' defence committees and other 
organisations that aim at the protection of the trade union and workers' rights. The 
labour secretariat at the Nasserite Party is less active than the Tagamuu counterpart, 
although the head of the labour secretariat is also a labour and union activist. 
In addition to the above mentioned, interviews were also carried out with the 
President of the General Union for Engineering Industries at the ETUF, the director 
of the privatisation team at the PEO, as well as a former President of the BOM of a 
public sector company and a current one, and the director of a research institute. 
The method for referencing the interviews is by first writing the name of the person I 
was interviewing, the location, and the date. Particularly in the case of the interviews 
with the unionists, often in a single meeting several unionists would be attending and 
several would be interviewed, but the interviews were referenced by the name of the 
original person I was interviewing for ease of reference. 
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The `Development Information Centre' at the USAID mission in Cairo is an 
extremely rich source of material relating to privatisation in Egypt. Perhaps it is 
because USAID is involved with a privatisation project jointly with the PEO. 
Trade Unions in Egypt 
An examination of trade unions in Egypt points out that they combine some of the 
characteristics of trade unions in developing countries, and some of the Soviet-model 
trade unions. At the crux of the matter is the question whom do trade unions represent, 
and the extent to which the answer to this question explains the function and role of 
trade unions. This consideration is relevant to trade unions in Egypt historically, but it 
is a particularly pressing concern at the current era. At the early stages of the 
development of the trade union organisations they were organised and perceived as 
separate trade organisations to protect the interests of the members of the individual 
trades. Later, with the rise of the nationalist movement and the Nasser era, the 
interests of the working class were perceived to be inseparable from the interests of 
society as a whole. Indeed, any discussion of class interests was deemed unnecessary 
at best, unpatriotic at worst. There were brief periods when it was possible to organise 
along lines of class interest. While there is absolutely no doubt that a working class 
has been in existence in Egypt for a long time, it has not always been recognised as an 
independent class with its own interests 
The reality of trade unionism in Egypt reflects some of the observations of the World 
Bank in the WDR, but differs significantly in others. Conditions such as the relative 
under-representation of the workforce by trade union organisations, and the over- 
representation of the formal sector are clearly depicted in the case of Egypt. It is the 
views of the World Bank on the role of trade unionism under reform that differ 
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substantially from the case of trade unionism in Egypt. In the World Bank report, it is 
indicated that the relationship between trade unions and the state, even in those 
countries where the trade union movement has been controlled by the government, 
will change in the direction of greater independence of the trade unions. This, it is 
explained, is because trade unions will act as the force that protects workers' rights 
vis-a-vis employers thereby countering the power of the later. The reality in Egypt is 
otherwise. On the one hand, with regard to the relationship between trade unions and 
state, all evidence is that the relationship remains much the same. It is not possible to 
say that trade unions have become more independent, nor that the regulatory role of 
the government has decreased. Partly, this is a combination of two factors, the state is 
still using trade unions to control workers, and the trade unions are primarily 
interested in their survival as organisations. In addition, until liberalisation extends to 
include political liberalisation as well, trade unions will remain corporatised. 
Are trade unions truly representative of the working class ? 
Trade Unions in Egypt are marginal organisations to workers in more than one way. 
Numerically, the unionised sector of the workforce in Egypt is relatively limited, 
estimated by some researchers at 30% of the workforce in Egypt (Adly in Abdalla: 
173). This figure, however, is an overestimation. The unionised workforce in 1991 
was calculated at 3.3 million workers (ETUF: 111). The total labour force in 1990 was 
estimated at 14.5 million (Al-Qudsi: APPTABII. XLS). By simple calculation, 
unionised workers constitute about 23% of the labour force in Egypt, leaving more 
than 11 million workers non-unionised, or `unorganised', and hence practically 
unprotected. The WDR argues that labour regulations in Egypt, among other 
countries, have contributed to the growth of the informal sector, creating "a two-tier 
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system that overprotects formal sector employees and under-protects informal sector 
ones" (World Bank, 1995a: 15). The trade union organisation, as it exists, exacerbates 
this condition. Rather than promoting the interests of workers at large, organised 
labour "has promoted its own consumption at the expense of productivity and has 
impeded technological innovation in order to protect jobs" (Waterbury, 1993: 235). It 
is interesting to observe that often in discussing the size of the working class in Egypt, 
the focus is on workers in the formal sector. For example, Ibrahim cites studies that 
estimate the growth of the working class from about 300 thousand workers in 1952 to 
about 800 thousand workers in 1968 (Ibrahim in Abdalla: 35-6). This indicates that 
non-organised labour is under-examined, and thus its political and economic might 
underestimated, though these may be `potential' rather than felt. 
Trade unions represent only a part of the working class, as indicated above. Although 
there was a change in the composition of the organisation, it is still dominated by the 
`traditional' unions. The composition of the trade union organisation has changed 
since the 1970s to reflect a change in the structure of production in Egypt. The 
services sector expanded, while industry and agriculture declined. Industry constituted 
28% of GDP in 1970, compared with 22% in 1993, agriculture accounted for 29% in 
1970 and 18% in 1993, while for services the change has been from 42% in 1970 to 
60% in 1993 (WDR: 166). An examination of the size of union membership by 
industry reflects "the precipitous decline in the relative importance of manufacturing 
workers and their replacement by government service and transport workers as the 
largest component of the labour movement" (Bianchi, 1989: 131). For example, one 
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of the traditional strongholds of Egyptian industry, Spinning and Weaving, decreased' 
in membership from 13% of the unionised workers in 1976 to 7.7% in 1991 (ETUF: 
107-111). At the same time, the percentage of unionised workers in the Construction 
industries among the unionised workers has increased from 7.8% in 1976 to 15% in 
1991 (ETUF: 107-111). 
The change in the composition of the trade union organisation by industry is not 
reflected in the leadership of the ETUF, which still comes from the `traditional' public 
sector industries, such as textiles, chemicals, and petroleum. Since the establishment 
of the ETUF in 1957, three of the seven presidents of the ETUF have come from the 
textile industry including the current president, one from petroleum, one from 
chemicals, one from agriculture, and one from insurance (Emam in Abdalla: 214). It is 
argued, however, that the unionisation of `civil servants' and `public employees' and 
their inclusion in the trade union organisation was a strategic decision. It is argued that 
"when unionization became a semi-official enterprise, unions of government 
employees were regarded as key instruments for penetrating and deradicalizing 
working class associations" (Bianchi, 1989: 132). 
The trade union organisation has a distinct public sector bias. In 1991, the private 
sector constituted 25% of the membership of trade unions (ETUF: 113). The 
industries that have the largest number of private sector workers are, tourism and 
hotels (87%), land transport (78%), agriculture (61%), construction (35%) (ETUF: 
1 
The numbers of workers in the Industry registered some fluctuations, but has 
remained basically stable. The decrease is in the percentage of unionised workers in 
Spinning and Weaving per total of all unionised workers. 
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113). A partial explanation for this is that the public sector has in the past hired most 
skilled labour, but it can no longer do so. The increase in the private sector may also 
be because "most new jobs are in low-productivity, low-wage services and 
agriculture" (World Bank: 6). The improved wages of the private sector contributed to 
its expansion. According to the World Bank, this pattern of investments reflects a 
reluctance by the private sector to invest much, indicating "lack of progress with 
reform" (World Bank, 1995a: 6). 
Trade unions at the branch level represent all employees at the enterprise, production 
workers as well as clerical workers. Thus branch unions do not represent `workers', 
they represent `employees'. I believe this distinction is significant because it implies 
that the `enterprise' is the object of trade union activity, and not the worker per se. The 
worker as part of the enterprise is the responsibility of the trade union. The twist, 
however, is that where this brand of `enterprise unionism' exists, the enterprise is not 
merely a unit of production, but also a `social' unit. The ETUF perceives multiple 
unionism within an enterprise to be a weakness of the trade union organisation, which 
leads to the breaking up of the trade union movement (ETUF: 92). Consequently, the 
public sector is very important for trade unions in Egypt, and one of the challenges 
with reform is how to adjust to being a private sector dominated organisation. 
On a number of counts, trade unions are increasingly marginal organisations to the 
working class. While the WDR insists on the importance of unions in the future as 
they will be needed by workers to secure workers' rights, there is evidence that the 
case in Egypt is not so. The reason for this is that trade unions in Egypt are 
bureaucratic organisations, and as such their foremost objective is their survival as 
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organisations. This, however, is an effect rather than a cause. It is not merely a 
problem of structure, it is basically a problem of ideology. 
The following section examines how the establishment of the ETUF in 1957 was 
significant to the development of trade unions into their present situation. 
Corporatisation of the trade union movement 
Trade unionism in Egypt can best be understood by placing it in the framework of the 
`revolutionary' changes in society of the Nasser era. Labour played a significant role 
in the ideology of the ruling Junta. The ideology of the regime towards labour evolved 
over the first few years of the revolution, though there were some early indications on 
the nature of the relationship between labour and state. For example, within a month 
of the coup in August 1952, Decree 22 was issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
for the formation of a committee to examine the possibility of implementation of a 
unified labour law2. Labour legislation was introduced that supposedly addressed 
many of the concerns of the labour movement, the most important of which was the 
establishment in 1957 of a confederation, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
(ETUF). Other `revolutionary' changes were the provisions made for the participation 
of workers in decision-making at the level of the enterprise through the scheme of 
workers' participation in management first introduced in 1961, and on a broader 
societal and political level by the participation of workers in the People's Assembly, 
half the members of which were peasants and workers. It is important to note that all 
these changes were carried out in the context of social harmony, the culture of 
2 The Unified Labour Law came into existence much later, in 1959. 
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productivity, and workers' control. The institutionalisation of trade unions was cast in 
`revolutionary tones', whereas it was not really so. 
Trade unions in Egypt were transformed from pluralist to corporatist organisations, 
the process being patticularly significant between the years 1959 and 1964 (Bianchi, 
1986: 431). In the discussion of the corporatisation of the trade union movement in 
Egypt, the following definition of corporatisation is used: 
`... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non- 
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
representative categories in exchange for observing certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports' 
(Bianchi, 1986: 429). 
The combined effect of the Trade Union law of 1964, and the Unified Labour Law of 
1959, strongly affected the corporatisation of the trade union movement (Bianchi, 
1986: 431). The ETUF was structured as the highest level in the trade union hierarchy, 
a single confederation. At all levels of the trade union organisation, the principle of. 
single unions was adhered to. Thus, there is one union committee at the enterprise 
level, one general union per industry, and one confederation, namely the ETUF. 
Henceforth, one of the features of the Egyptian trade union organisation is its 
pyramidal structure. At the base of the structure are the enterprise level trade union 
committees, at the middle level the general unions which are industry based, and at the 
top-most level the ETUF. 
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The specific role of trade unions, and their responsibilities were explicitly set out by 
legislation. A `social contract' was made, whereupon the government guaranteed 
workers secure employment, adopted full-employment policies, and promoted 
workers' participation in industrial enterprises. In return, the independence and 
autonomy of trade unions was curtailed, so that there were "bans against inciting class 
antagonisms, organising work stoppages, trying to overthrow the political system, 
[and] using force to recruit union members" (Bianchi, 1986: 432). During the Nasser 
era it was compulsory for unionists to be members of the Arab Socialist Union. Thus, 
the trade union organisation in Egypt has almost become a semi-state organisation 
(Adly in Abdalla: 179). Indeed, organisationally, the ETUF is linked to a number of 
governmental bodies. The ETUF is not independent from the Ministry of Labour, and 
it has representatives in a number of other ministries and governmental authorities. 
Such a heavy presence of the ETUF in governmental and formal state agencies leads 
to the loss of autonomy of the trade union organisation and "dependence on state 
authority" (Emam in Abdalla: 216). 
The corporatisation of trade unions, and the militarisation of society in the 1960s had 
an impact on the trade union movement, particularly on intra-union relations. These 
led to splinters within the organisation concerning the role the military played in 
public life in Egypt, including the `domain' of the unions. There was conflict between 
"the trade union organisation and the federation on one side, and strife at the base 
level on the other side as there was conflict between trade union committees, the ASU 
committee of twenty, and the elected members in the BOD" (Emam in Abdalla: 206). 
The conflict that became clear in the trade union organisation revealed that the 
corporatisation of the movement was successful in co-optation of trade union 
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leadership selectively, and in particular at the top-most level of the organisation. The 
significance of this situation is that it highlights the `allegiance' of trade union 
leadership to the government. 
During the Sadat era the situation was exacerbated. Sadat moved in the direction of 
liberalising the economy, with a focus on `productivist strategies' rather than the 
`distributive policies' under Nasser (Bayat: 76). By drawing back some of the reforms 
of the Nasser era, the Sadat regime alienated itself from workers. It is argued that 
precisely because of this, under Sadat corporatist tendencies in the trade union 
structure increased, as evidenced by the issuing of the trade union laws of 1976 and 
1981. As Sadat "lacked grassroots support within the working class [h]e therefore 
needed the support of the leadership of the labour movement to carry out his new 
policies" (Bayat: 77). Consequently union leadership were increasingly a "self- 
recruiting elite with broad powers of consultation in economic policy-making" 
(Bianchi, 1989: 129). This was especially so with the introduction of indirect election 
of union officials at the middle and higher levels of the organisation. The increased 
corporatisation of the trade union movement and the association of the top leadership 
of the organisation with the ruling regime and interlinkages with it, resulted in further 
isolation of the top leadership from the workers the organisation represents. The 
ETUF leadership became " more encapsulated by the state bureaucracy and more 
insulated from rank and file pressures" (Bianchi, 1986: 439). 
The corporatisation of the trade union movement has led on the one hand to a 
distancing between the trade union organisation as a whole from workers, and on the 
other hand to increased friction within the trade union organisation as some union 
officials came to be incorporated in the state. The bureaucratisation of the trade union 
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organisation had a significant effect on this outcome. The bureaucratisation of the 
movement was both a consequence of corporatisation of trade unions, and a cause of 
further corporatisation. The following sections examine the relationship between state 
bureaucracy and the' development of a state bourgeoisie, with interests entrenched in 
the interests of the state. Henceforth, the research discusses the `embourgeoisment' of 
the trade union leadership, and its impact on workers and the challenges to the trade 
unions posed by structural adjustment reforms. 
Bureaucracy and the state bourgeoisie 
The aim of this section is not an examination of the social roots of the 1952 
revolution, but rather how the group that came to power in 1952 established its 
hegemony by utilisation of the bureaucratic apparatus and the impact of this on trade 
unions. The `revolutionary' coup d'etat of 1952 did not introduce radical changes to 
the state bureaucratic apparatus. Rather, after the removal of some undesirable 
persons, the regime utilised the existing structures to address the needs of government 
(Emam: 83). One may argue that this is because when the Free Officers seized power 
in 1952, they did not have a clear political or economic ideology. Instead, the regime 
"adopted the method of administrative procedures that rely on the state as a social 
institution and henceforth on bureaucracy in accomplishing the revolutionary agenda" 
(Emam: 83). Thus, when the free officers came to power, they needed to strengthen 
the state bureaucracy apparatus. The bureaucratic apparatus, however, retained its pre- 
Revolution bourgeois character which came to represent "the basic foundation for the 
new bureaucratic structure" (Emam: 87). 
What the regime did was that it shifted the base of the bourgeoisie. Prior to the 1952 
revolution the bourgeoisie was primarily a rural bourgeoisie. The land reforms enacted 
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during the Nasser era diminished the importance of the rural bourgeoisie (Amin: 50). 
This has been possible because of the weakness of the latter. The rural bourgeoisie 
was politically acquiescent to the British presence in Egypt, was antagonistic to 
independent popular action, and most important, it was riddled by internal divisions 
(Amin: 36-8). It was not only the weakness of the `old' bourgeoisie that led to the rise 
of ä state bourgeoisie. It is pointed out that, "a state bourgeoisie could come into 
existence is generally seen as the result of a kind of class vacuum brought about by a 
feeble private entrepreneurial class, a tiny proletariat, and a dispersed peasantry" 
(Waterbury, 1993: 177). Thus, the regime that came to power consolidated its power 
by relying on the bureaucratic apparatus, and of course, the military. The urban 
bourgeoisie the regime strengthened and helped perpetuate became a state-dependent 
bourgeoisie. 
The state bourgeoisie, came to include all the technical and administrative state 
apparatus. This `civil apparatus' expanded from 195 thousand in 1952 to 2.1 million 
in 1980 (Ibrahim in Abdalla: 16). Free state education initiated as part of the 
achievements of the 1952 `revolution' contributed significantly to this expansion. An 
interesting observation made about the state bourgeoisie in Egypt is that it "is not a 
class but merely bourgeois" (Waterbury, 1993: 177). Thus, the `new' middle class, the 
backbone of which is the state bourgeoisie, differs from the `old', pre-Revolution, 
middle class in that it includes "a considerable section of the craftsworkers, and the 
upper income tranches of employees and workers of the public and private industrial 
sector" (Ibrahim in Abdalla: 20). Thus while the state bourgeoisie is not a class, it 
represents an espirit de classe, to use the term by Waterbury. 
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As the Nasserite state became increasingly involved in the management of the 
economy, both in productive and distributive activities, the productive and distributive 
bodies became part of the state bureaucracy, and consequently the state bourgeoisie. 
State bourgeoisie extended to include not only the senior management of state 
enterprises, but also some labour leadership. In a study on Mexico, the `bureaucratic 
or governmental bourgeoisie' includes "`not a few labour leaders"' (Waterbury, 1993: 
177). The same applies to the trade union organisation in Egypt. Insofar as it is 
corporatised, it is part of the state bourgeoisie, specifically the topmost positions. The 
trade union organisation, in specific the topmost echelons of the organisation, is a 
state-dependent, state bourgeoisie. This throws into doubt whether one may speak of 
the trade union organisation, especially the topmost level, as a working class 
organisation. In addition, the power of the lower levels of the organisation to carry out 
their role as representatives of the working class are severely curtailed as a 
consequence of the corporatisation of trade unions. The presence of a dependent state 
bourgeoisie that comprises trade union leadership, combined with a corporatised trade 
union organisation that is in a number of ways marginal to the workers it represents, 
has paved the way for the utilisation of trade unions by the state to control workers. 
State bourgeoisie, state autonomy, and class conflict 
One issue that needs to come under examination is that of the relative autonomy of 
state from control by class forces. During the previous discussion, it became clear that 
the elaborate bureaucratic state apparatus that the Nasserite regime came to rely on to 
carry out the social and economic functions of state was bourgeois in character. This 
was the case even after nationalisation and the creation of a public sector, which led to 
an ideological contradiction in a 'public' sector that is managed by a state bourgeoisie 
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(Emam: 88). The result was that management of enterprises was not merely an 
economic entity, it was an arm of state and thus, a political entity as well. Trade 
unions were acted upon by both management, and the state. Trade unions thus were 
`transmission belts' between management and state on the one hand, and workers on 
the other hand. In this relationship, trade unions played a passive role of `distributor'. 
In a discussion of trade unionists, Waterbury points out that "... leaders who are 
political eunuchs are granted the sole right to distribute "the gains of the revolution. " 
Dissidents, if not illegal and thus subject to arrest, get the police, vigilantes, arrests, 
disappearances, and martyrs - but no goods" (Waterbury, 1993: 237). 
It is the case, however, that over time bureaucracies develop their own interests. For 
example, in the regional study of the WDR it is recognised "old policies have created 
an oversized public sector with established vested interests that is hard to cut back" 
(World Bank, 1995a: 21). Similarly, John Waterbury examines senior management of 
public sector enterprises, and points out that senior management has a vested interest 
in public sector enterprises (Waterbury, 1993: 12). One of the methods through which 
the state bourgeoisie, comprised of a number of bureaucratic bodies, manages to 
reproduce itself is that it "exploits the control over state assets to convert public into 
private wealth" (Waterbury, 1993: 12). It is thus that vested interests are established. 
The upper echelons of bureaucracies have been able to benefit mostly, thereby 
creating a gap between the upper hierarchies of the bureaucracies and the lower ones 
(Emam: 93). The reproduction that is taking place is carried out at the individual level 
rather than at an institutional level, meaning that the concern is not with reproduction 
as a class, rather "what really may be at stake is an assured way of life, a bourgeois 
standard of living and consumption" (Waterbury, 1993: 188). 
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This line of analysis is applicable to trade unions in Egypt. The bureaucratisation of 
the trade union organisation in Egypt has allowed the "embourgeoisment" of the 
senior levels of the movement, particularly the ETUF. That the senior levels of the 
organisation have benefited in terms of wealth and political status is beyond a doubt. 
It has become an established tradition that ETUF presidents take the post of Minster 
of Workforce/Labour, and the president of the ETUF is usually given a post in the 
ruling National Democratic Party. However, the reproduction of the state bourgeoisie 
is dependent on retaining a position in the state bureaucratic apparatus. 
A form of Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy operates in the case of trade unions in 
Egypt. The organisation becomes an end in itself (Munck: 112). The basic argument 
of this theory is that trade union leaderships become oriented to fulfilling the 
`institutional needs' of the organisation rather than focusing on fulfilling the needs of 
the workers. Related to the concern of the survival of unions as institutions, the trade 
union leadership runs the organisation on an oligarchic basis. Eventually, trade union 
leaderships ideologically drift apart from the workers whom they represent (Hyman: 
15-16). This has been proven already to be the case of trade union leadership in Egypt. 
Other studies on trade unions with oligarchic tendencies have also pointed out that 
trade union leadership often "are essentially agents of capitalism within the working 
class" (Munck: 113). Some theorists argue that the `Iron Law of Oligarchy' can be 
tempered by the `law of democracy', based on "the process of accountability which 
prevents trade union leaders becoming too distanced from their membership" (Munck: 
112).. This is not the case in Egypt. 
The pyramidal structure of trade unions and the system of indirect election of the 
middle and top level of the organisation has rendered trade unions in Egypt 
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undemocratic, with very little accountability except the good will of the unionists. 
Indeed, in dealing with some `dissatisfied' unionists the government uses promotions 
and conferring benefits to such unionists, leading to a separation between them and 
the trade union organisation, and often leading such unionists to concentrate on 
pursuing their personal interests (Emam in Abdalla: 217). The government deals 
similarly with dissent among the rank and file. The government resorts to a number of 
means in dealing with labour dissent: force or containment. Among the most striking 
examples of the latter, is the policy that was adopted with one of the leaders of the 
workers' strike in the iron and Steel company in August 1989, which was violently 
crushed resulting in detention and deaths of workers. The Labour leader was 
`contained' by offering him a position in the People's Assembly, and membership in 
the ruling National Democratic Party, both of which he accepted (Adly in Abdalla: 
177). The `Iron Law of Oligarchy' thrives in this environment. 
The following section highlights the consequences of the integrationist tendency of 
trade unions, including how this led to the rise of a number of challenges that could 
threaten trade unionism as it exists today. 
Egyptian trade unionism and the integrationist thesis 
Due to the relationship discussed above between management, state, and trade unions, 
and which makes trade unions act as transmission belts between state/management 
and workers, unions as organisations are forced to maintain an unantagonistic, non- 
confrontational relationship with management/employers. Michels' theory of the Iron 
Law of Oligarchy arguably defines the source of power of management/capitalist as 
both an economic and a political power. The theory presents an instrumentalist view 
of trade unions, wherein the workers whom the trade unions represent have a 
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negligible, if any, role to play in the affairs of the union (Hyman: 29). This may not be 
exactly the case. While the oligarchic tendency of trade unionism in Egypt are 
overwhelming, one factor that may have increased significance in the future is that of 
worker protest. Spontaneous worker strikes are well documented, mainly occurring in 
public sector enterprises. Strikes have been far from representing labour `militancy', 
instead they were very defensive. Such labour protests were not "of a regime- 
threatening kind" (Waterbury, 1993: 240). Rank-and-file spontaneous action may be 
of a limited success in public sector enterprises, primarily because the importance of 
the latter is in its distributive role, not its productive role. In a market economy where 
enterprises are productive, strikes or work stoppages have a more immediate impact 
on management/employers. But, trade unions in Egypt by emphasising economic 
gains and co-operation with management, undermine the impact of such worker 
protest 
The crucial factor in the analysis of the integrationist tendencies of trade unionism is 
the distinction between the economic and the political powers of trade unions. In the 
Nasser era, trade unions in Egypt basically relinquished political power, in return for 
job security for the membership and "a constant stream of material benefits" 
(Waterbury, 1993: 236). In Marxian analysis, without political vision, trade unions 
may find they are focusing on the `effects' rather than the `causes' of capitalist 
oppression (Hyman: 10). By focusing on their economic role, unions become 
economistic and are integrated within capitalism. Economism of trade unions leads to 
the development of sectionalism, and the emergence of a trade union consciousness 
rather than a working class consciousness. As Lenin pointed out "`trade-unionist 
politics of the working class is precisely bourgeois politics of the working class, "' 
32 
(Hyman: 13). By focusing on the economic and integrative objectives/goals, trade 
unions are rendered as defensive organisations. 
In Egypt, unions represent the workforce that is privileged, by virtue of protection by 
labour legislation, and benefits such as comprehensive health care and insurance. 
However, much of the `privileges' the unionised workforce benefited from is under 
threat because of the economic reform program, a major component of which is 
privatisation of public sector enterprises. On the one hand, with privatisation some 
public sector workers will be dismissed, and on the other hand, the workers who 
remain will no longer enjoy security of employment (Posusney, 1995: 32-3). In 
addition, workers in enterprises will have to contribute to any social security plans 
they benefit from, such as health care. The result for unionism is that the state reneged 
on part of the `bargain' with trade unions, specifically, that the state no longer 
guaranteed secure employment and material benefits. In the meantime, the state 
conceded some sort of union independence by legalising strikes in the new Labour 
law, which was more of a cosmetic measure than actual change. By an examination of 
union responses to the reforms taking place, what emerges is that trade unions have 
adopted many of the characteristics of business unionism. 
According to business unionism, trade unions are economistic. The focus is on the 
immediate concerns of workers, the economic rights of workers and conditions of 
work. The economistic nature of business unionism makes it fit in the overall 
framework of the World Bank on trade unionism and the place of labour in the World 
Bank's strategy for reform. A central theme of business unionism is that of partnership 
between trade unions and management, the `growing together' of union bureaucracies 
and management. Both managers and unionists recognise the need for co-operation. 
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Such behaviour is seen as `responsible' unionism, since the interests of labour and of 
business are complementary rather than contradictory (Hyman: 20-1). One thus finds 
that unionists, particularly at the level of the ETUF, are increasingly calling for 
`responsible' trade unionism. For example, on the issue of government intervention to 
block the nominations of `undesirable' candidates in trade union elections, the ETUF 
"tried to persuade the government to stop nullifying unacceptable candidates and 
instead to invest greater resources in the socialisation of a younger generation of 
"responsible" union officials in the Confederation's newly established Workers' 
University" (Bianchi, 1986: 442). 
Underlying the philosophy of business unionism in Egypt, is the utilisation of trade 
unions to control workers. The process of reform is thus confronting trade unions with 
a very problematic situation. On the one hand, trade unions need to survive as 
organisations, and the adoption of a business unionism approach which is a reformist 
position, allows them to continue as organisations to play a role in enterprises and at 
the wider national level through the confederation. On the other hand, the co-operation 
between trade unions and state/management in the face of threats to the privileges of 
the membership of unions, is creating tensions within the trade union organisation, 
and between unions and labour, tensions trade unions cannot ignore. The policy of 
trade unions has been to try to juggle these two often conflicting demands. 
The role of the ETUF may seem a bit confusing, at one and the same time supporting 
government action in principle or at least submitting to it, but the ETUF eventually 
objects to how such action is applied. It is not infrequent that the ETUF agree in 
principle with government action/proposals, but the stance of ETUF changes when 
much pressure is exerted upon it from the lower levels of the organisation. For 
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example, the ETUF seems to be adopting a one step forward, one step backward 
approach regarding privatisation. Thus, while the ETUF supported the issue of Law 
203, it objected to how the law was implemented. In December 1992, the president of 
the ETUF, under pressure from some members, held a General Assembly meeting at 
the ETUF and "passed a resolution condemning privatisation and called for legalising 
strikes if any workers did lose their jobs as a result of public sector diminution" 
(Posusney, 1995: 20). The ETUF recognised it was not possible to go back on the 
trend toward privatisation and reform of the public sector enterprises, including the 
dismissal of workers as part of the reform process, instead the ETUF "came to 
redefine their raison d'etre as winning the best terms for workers who would be 
displaced or reclassified" (Posusney, 1995: 20). There was more than just recognition 
of the fact of dismissal of workers, the ETUF was part of a national committee to 
design packages for `redundant' labour, ranging from early retirement schemes, 
training and retraining, as well as severance payments for setting up small enterprises. 
The ETUF, however, condemned the dismissal of workers, but it "made no effort to 
mobilise the membership behind these implicit threats" (Posusney, 1995: 20). 
Business unionism is often set in the context of the `growing up', and `maturity' of 
unions. Part of the `maturity' of unions is that unrealistic idealism must be replaced by 
co-operation with management. In effect this means unions develop closer ties with 
the business community. In 1989, the ETUF issued a joint statement with the Egyptian 
Businessmen's Association outlining some guidelines on economic reform and the 
public sector. This meeting was kept from the public until it was leaked by an 
opposition party paper in April 1989. The ETUF and the Businessmen signed the 
statement in May 1989 (Badawi in Abbas: 52-3). This was a reversal of an earlier 
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ETUF position regarding the Businessmen Associations, when in 1986 the ETUF 
condemned what it defined as "the developing close relationship with the EBA 
[Egyptian Businessmen's Association] and the government's economic planners" 
(Posusney, 1995: 15). The ETUF feared that such a relationship would threaten 
workers' established rights. Yet, three years later the ETUF and the EBA signed a 
joint statement for reform in the public sector. 
Despite the adoption of `business unionism' by trade unions in Egypt, the relationship 
between unions and state remains to a great measure unchanged. The limitations on 
trade union independence in the past in return for benefits to the unionised workers 
and consultation of trade unions, specifically the ETUF, in any policies that pertain to 
workers, have been replaced by limitations on trade union action in the name of 
partnership with management. The policy of co-operation with state and management, 
and the consequent self-imposed limitations on independent trade union action, has 
led to the emergence of challenges to unions from within the trade union organisation, 
and from labour. 
Challenges to the trade union movement 
One of the challenges that is confronting trade unionism currently, is the extent to 
which the membership supports trade unions. The experience of unionised workers 
with trade unions concerning reform has not been positive. Despite protests from 
workers and some unionists concerning the sale of some public sector enterprises and 
their transfer to the private sector, no action was taken to prevent such sales (Emam in 
Abdalla: 208). In other instances, trade union officialdom has carried out actions that 
were condemned not only by workers, but also by other unionists. When it became 
known that the ETUF signed an agreement with the EBA, a `Committee For The 
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Defence Of The Public Sector And National Industries' was set up by workers in the 
Helwan industrial suburb, as a response to the agreement. Needless to say, this action 
resulted in some divisions within the ETUF. In another instance, a `National 
Committee to Combat Privatisation' was formed in November 1993. It included 
unionists, some of whom were from the ETUF, as well as unionists from all industries 
nation-wide. The `National Committee to Combat Privatisation', issued a "Solidarity" 
letter on privatisation and the negative impact of economic reforms on workers. It is 
suggested that this may have prompted the government to delay passing the new 
labour law (Posusney, 1995: 25). 
While the role of the ETUF in addressing the concerns of workers at the public sector 
enterprises is negligible, and at times even antagonistic to worker demands, the ETUF 
is even more marginal to workers in the private sector. It is not an uncommon 
occurrence for workers to relinquish union membership in order to remain in the 
company (Emam in Abdalla: 213). While workers may not be too concerned with 
their union membership, they are keen to maintain their position in the public sector 
enterprises. Thus, when the Minister of the Workforce'requested the names of workers 
in private sector companies to bypass state employment, "thousands of workers 
submitted collective resignations, " in order not to miss the opportunity of state 
employment (Ibrahim in Abdalla: 41). This occurred in 1992 in Tenth of Ramadan 
city, which is one of the new industrial zones in Egypt. The workers concerned 
requested that they be "rehired as temporary employees so they could remain on the 
list" (Posusney, 1995: 26). The action of the workers came as a surprise to both the 
government and the employers, and the former "accused the workers of laziness for 
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seeking less demanding positions, and of selfishness for refusing to yield their spots 
on the waiting list to others who lacked employment" (Posusney, 1995: 26). 
The bureaucratic stronghold the trade union organisation has, particularly at the level 
of the ETUF, enabled it to withstand the challenges it faces from `dissident' unionists, 
and from its labour membership. The separation between union officialdom and 
workers has rendered trade unions separate from the workers' movement (Emam in 
Abdalla: 217). The real challenge to trade unions in Egypt comes from the Islamist 
movement. Perhaps this is an indication of the extent of the integration of the trade 
union organisation, that the most serious threat to it comes from outside it. 
The Working Class and the Islamist Movement 
The riots of January 1977 were very significant in depicting the discontent of the 
underprivileged or marginalised sectors of society with economic reform. In response 
to pressures from the IMF, subsidies on basic goods, such as bread and sugar, were to 
be cut by 50%. Within the day on January 17, "the first gatherings and other 
expressions of popular protest erupted, followed by two days of the most widespread 
collective outrage witnessed in Egypt since the burning of Cairo on January 26,1952" 
(Beinin in Lockman: 248). The protest was not simply directed against the removal of 
subsidies, it resulted from a general feeling of a drop or decline in the standard of 
living of the "popular masses", as a consequence of the implementation of the 
economic reforms of 1975 and 1976 (Beinin in Lockman: 253). 
The significance of the January 1977 riot is that it was a predominantly working class 
movement with presence of branch level trade unionists (Beinin in Lockman: 251). 
This movement was condemned by senior trade union officialdom. In addition, the 
Left distanced itself from the movement, prompting the scathing criticism that "the 
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Left was reformist, limiting itself to supporting the demands of the masses and 
defending the legitimacy of their actions , whereas the actual movement and 
consciousness of the masses were revolutionary" (Beinin in Lockman: 253). The 
January 1977 riots demonstrated how the workers who formed the backbone of this 
movement, were `betrayed' by the official union apparatus, and by the `Left'. This 
depicts the failure of the `Left' and the trade union organisation to represent workers. 
Since the 1970s the force of the Islamists has been felt in Egyptian society, but in 
recent years it has gained in strength. While the Islamists have historically played a 
role throughout the modern history of Egypt, the Islamic movement as it exists at 
present, and since the late 1970s, is somewhat significant for the working class. 
Though this movement does not operate along class lines, and indeed its membership 
extends to include upper class, middle class, and working class membership, it is 
largely a movement of the dispossessed, and as far the working class is concerned, no 
other movement or political organisation comes near the Islamic movement in 
representing them. It is argued by some that a considerable proportion of the urban 
poor are from the working class (Shaaban in Abdalla: 31). The left which prides itself 
in its support for the working class is poorly presented or rooted in the working class 
(Adly in Abdalla: 176). Indeed, the achievements of the left in addressing the needs of 
the working class are humble. The strength of the Islamic movement is that it is a 
strong political and cultural opposition movement that is at the same time a popular 
movement. 
The true challenge to trade unionism in Egypt now is two-fold: that because there are 
so many marginalised workers who do not belong to the trade union structure, 
increasingly as it exists the trade union organisation is a marginal organisation. 
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Second, there seems to be a real threat that the political movement of Islamists is 
incorporating the urban poor and workers and thus workers are joining the social and 
political movement of the Islamists, which claims to support the interests of these 
marginalised workers' more than the trade union organisation is. The irony of the 
matter is that again, the Islamists movement claims to speak for all, that no separate 
class interests are pursued, but rather the interest of all that is undivided. 
The Islamist movement and its relation to the workers' movement has some of the 
features of social movement unionism. As evidenced by the fieldwork carried out for 
this research, some of the `dissident' unionists are resorting to the wider movement of 
the Islamists. Social movement unionism aims to combine a workers' movement with 
an existing wider social movement (Munck: 117). While it is the case that the 
objective of social movement unionism is to strengthen one or both `converging' 
movements, in the case of Egypt it is the failure of the trade union movement to 
address the interests of workers that has led to the search for the Islamist alternative. 
Yet, in the face of such a challenge, it seems to be the case that trade unions remain 
sectional, and are concerned with addressing the needs of the organisation, rather than 
that of the membership. While it is not possible to discount the efforts of the unionists 
who do try to represent the interests of workers, they are isolated and powerless to 
face or challenge the oligarchy of trade unions. At the same time, the scenario of a 
trade union movement carried out under the umbrella of the Islamists will not lead to 
an independent trade union movement, simply because the Islamist movement does 
not recognise that the working class has interests that are separate from, and 
sometimes in contradiction to the interests of other sectors in society. In either case, it 
is workers who lose. 
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Overview of the Thesis 
The following section gives an overview of the issues discussed in each chapter in the 
thesis. 
The development of trade unionism in Egypt 
The chapter starts out by examining the development of the working class in Egypt, 
with specific emphasis on a working class for capital. The stages in the development 
of workers' collective organisations, from guild to union, is examined. A number of 
political and ideological forces helped shape the development of unionism in Egypt, 
mainly nationalism. A relatively strong and independent trade union movement 
developed with the development of capitalism and capitalist social relations of 
production. The movement, however, had its weaknesses. Although the trade union 
movement lent the Free Officers their support for the July Revolution, the power of 
trade unions was soon curtailed. The new regime cut the support of unionists from 
underneath them by providing workers (and unionists) with many of their long- 
standing demands. However, by the mid-1960s the corporatism began to crack at all 
levels, the political, economic and social. 
Liberalisation and globalisation: Trade unions at a cross road 
The failures of Nasserism led to the liberalisation of the economy, albeit gradually and 
under different names. It was not possible, however, to embark on a full-fledged 
liberalisation program because of the social costs involved. The structural adjustment 
program introduces reform that had, already been started by the government. It 
provided the government with the chance to basically complete what it had started 
earlier. The benefits of the program could be nationalised, and the negative 
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consequences of its implementation blamed on. the World Bank and IMF. However, 
liberalisation and globalisation are forces that divide workers rather than unite the 
working class. A public, a private and a Gulf market absorbed Egyptian labour. The 
different interests of'workers could no longer be addressed within the unitary trade 
union organisation. Thus just as there is a strong pressure for democratising trade 
unions because of the different interests among workers, the corporatist pressures 
remain and are strengthened by the state, to control labour. 
Public Enterprise Reform Between The World Bank And The Egyptian 
Government 
The reform of public enterprises is one of the cornerstones of the structural adjustment 
program. The measures to reform it involve high costs for public enterprise workers. 
The reforms are presented as inevitable. In preparation of the reform, Law 203 was 
issued in 1991 that transformed public enterprises to business sector enterprises. It is 
meant as a transition phase to privatisation of the enterprise. The law provided 
management in enterprises an opportunity to carry out reforms. The logic used was 
that ownership and management could be separated, so while public enterprises were 
publicly owned they were managed by the logic of the private sector. Another measure 
used to adjust the structure of public enterprises, especially the financial structure, was 
the re-arrangement of public enterprises in holding companies. A labour law was 
proposed that would be in line with a market oriented economy, allowing dismissal of 
labour, but at the same time allowing strikes, although this was under extremely 
restrictive conditions. In the measures proposed, labour was made to pay the price of 
reform, but it was assured that without the reforms the situation would be worse. The 
process brought to light the problems within the trade union organisation since the 
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latter justified the reforms. Trade unions did not take an active step in trying to protect 
the rights of workers. 
The impact of restructuring on workers 
Workers are impacted by structural adjustment reforms at two levels, in the workplace 
and in their livelihood. Within enterprises, the impact of reform has been a drive to 
`rationalise'. The reforms made workers more vulnerable. Furthermore, adjustment 
measures at the macro level included cut backs in subsidies, which led to a decline in 
the standard of living of workers. However, at the same time that the government is 
pursuing these reforms that are having a negative effect on workers as part of the 
underprivileged, the government is being generous with the bourgeoisie. At the same 
time as workers are being marginalised by the policies adopted by government, the 
regime is integrating the bourgeoisie as a partner in development. Many unionists are 
opposed to this situation but there is no objection to it from the `official' union 
organisation. In the void created by the state policies, and in the absence of workers' 
support for the trade unions, Islamist organisations are filling the void. In particular, 
through the charitable associations and private voluntary organisations, Islamists are 
providing workers as part of the underprivileged with services the state has 
withdrawn. 
Trade unions and structural adjustment: partners in change? 
The trade union hierarchy is facing a challenge presented by structural adjustment. At 
all levels of the organisation, trade unions are trying to redefine their role. Foremost, 
trade unions are defending themselves as organisations. In so doing unions at the 
various levels of the organisation are presenting themselves as partners in the process 
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of change, with government and with the management in enterprises. At the higher 
levels of the organisation the unions argue that without reform, the situation of 
workers would be worse. In enterprises unions are promoting the view that the 
interests of work and workers are one and the same. By presenting themselves as 
`partners' unions are promoting their interests as organisations. The issues they 
address relating to workers are very narrow, and do not address such vital issues to 
workers as unemployment. This has distanced workers from the organisation. 
However, there are attempts by `dissenting' unionists to oppose SAP and public sector 
reform. While these efforts are increasingly visible, they are nonetheless fragmented 
and have been primarily motivated by varying political agendas, leftist, Nasserist, or 
Islamist. 
Conclusion: Trade unions, workers, and structural adjustment 
Trade union organisations have narrowly defined interests. Rather, trade unions are 
responding to the challenges posed by structural adjustment by refusing to 
democratise, and continue being state dependent. As a result workers are voicing their 
demands and protesting through largely spontaneous movements that are almost 
completely outside the trade union organisations, and sometimes against them. 
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Chapter Two: The Development of Trade Unionism 
in Egypt 
Introduction 
The current chapter aims to examine the historical development of the trade union 
movement in Egypt and its relationship to the wider labour movement, and the 
state. Two main lines of research are to be followed. First, the extent to which the 
trade union movement was a class struggle, and degree of efficiency thereof. 
Second, an attempt will also be made to highlight the features that have prevailed 
and characterised the labour/trade union movement. The analysis carried out links 
the different phases in the development of the trade union/labour movement with 
the various stages in the development of capitalism in Egypt. Specifically, the 
approach adopted points out that the macro economic developments form the 
boundaries within which the labour movement develops. Yet, within these 
boundaries there are political, social, and cultural factors that ultimately shape the 
labour movement. 
The Tawa'if/Guilds of Egypt: 
Guilds had been in existence in Egypt long before Mohammed Ali came to power. 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century the production of goods in Egypt was 
carried out by craftworkers, organised in Tawa'if and Asnaf, guilds and trades'. At 
I 
It is worthwhile to note that guilds were sometimes referred to as 'niqaba', the 
term used for `union'. 
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the turn of the 19th century in Egypt there were about 64 guilds (Ezz El-Din, 
1987: 27). It was possible to have more than one guild for the same trade, by 
country of origin or religion, such as the Armenian jewellers' guild, and the 
Jewish jewellers' guild. Furthermore, there was a hierarchy within guilds, where 
some guilds/trades were considered of a higher standing than others. For example 
the silk and cloth traders were among the distinguished guilds, while among the 
less notable guilds were "sweets sellers, cooks, fishmongers, and alcohol vendors" 
(Hamed: 22). 
The production system was based on a hierarchy of expertise, with "masters" at 
the top of the hierarchy and apprentices at the bottom. Within each guild, order 
was maintained by the master, or shaykh. It was also the responsibility of the 
shaykh to protect the rights of members. Guilds, however, played a very important 
role not only in the protection of their members, but also in society at large. The 
importance of guilds can be fully understood by examining their functions in 
society, and not only for the member craftworkers. Prior to Mohammed Ali, 
society was divided into `rulers' and `ruled', where "the former enjoyed the spoils 
of power while the rest of society operated under its own traditional institutions 
almost independently of the rulers" (Safran: 27). Under that system, the guild was 
the basic `unit' in towns, as was the village in the countryside (Safran: 28). In 
towns, guild shaykhs played a bigger role in the political, economic, social, and 
religious life of the townspeople than did the rulers. Guild shaykhs were the link 
between the rulers and the people. Indeed, the guild was a central `institution' in 
society. It was an administrative tool of government, particularly in the collection 
of taxes (Hamed: 22). 
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It is significant to note that guilds did not act as pre-cursors of workers' 
organisations. Perhaps even more important, guilds did not play a role in the 
transition to capitalism in Egypt. From the point of view of capitalist development, 
the guild system as it existed in Egypt was not capable to accumulate capital and 
gather enough force to generate an `industrial revolution' in Egypt. The guild 
system was considerably weakened under the rule of Mohammed Ali and his 
successors. The development of capitalism in Egypt was shaped by two major 
factors: direct intervention by the rulers through reform measures, and integration 
in the world economy at a very early stage through cotton production. The result 
for Egypt was that capitalist social relations did not develop at the same pace as 
did capitalism. 
Stage One: Emergence of the Working Class and Capitalist Social 
Relations 
The first stage in the discussion/development of the working class in Egypt may 
be considered by some to be rather extended. I take as a starting point the coming 
to power of Mohammed Ali in 1805 and the end of WWI as the end of the 
formative stage. As in all histories it is not possible to be rigid about starting or 
ending dates as there is some overlapping. Since the objective of the historical 
background is to examine collective action by workers and their representatives, 
and not simply an institutional history of trade unions, one has to start the analysis 
with the Mohammed Ali era. The reason behind this is that some of the reforms 
that were carried out during the rule of Mohammed Ali and of his successors had a 
direct impact on the formation and character of the working class in Egypt. 
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There are differences among researchers as to when a working class emerged in 
Egypt. According to Gamal El-Banna the three factors that led to the formation 
of a working class in Egypt are: the abolition of serfdom; the presence of a guild 
system the mode of' production of which was different from that of the capitalist 
system; and the establishment by Mohammed Ali and Ismail Pasha of industrial 
enterprises (El-Banna, 1995: 35). El-Banna indicates 1863 as the beginning of the 
emergence of the working class, with the beginning of the rule of Ismail Pasha. 
His justification is that "it is reasonable to imagine the existence of a working 
class since that date that was free of the problems that riddled work/labour relations 
in the Mohammed Ali era" (El-Banna, 1995: 43). Amin Ezz El-Din, like most 
analysts of the working class in Egypt, takes 1882 as a starting point for the 
emergence of an Egyptian working class. While he recognises the significance of 
the Mohammed Ali era in paving the way for the emergence of the Egyptian 
working class, Ezz El-Din identifies the period from 1882 to 1914 as the period in 
which the working class was formed (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 38). This analysis is 
largely based on the interpretation that abolition of serfdom/free movement of 
peasants and the establishment of what may be called* `large' industrial enterprises 
are necessary conditions for the formation of a working class, in specific an urban 
working class. 
In the present research I argue that an Egyptian, urban, wage labour force came 
into existence in Egypt during the rule of Mohammed Ali, but it was a 
`conscripted' workforce, and was not able to become the core of the labour 
movement until much later toward the end of the nineteenth and early in the 
r 
twentieth centuries, a point of view that is not particularly new. It was at the end of 
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the nineteenth century that a working class for capital was in existence. However, 
not only did the basis for the emergence of a working class exist during the rule of 
Mohammed Ali, but perhaps more important is the fact that the reforms 
undertaken by Möhammed Ali and continued by his successors have contributed 
significantly to the characteristics of the working class, and in the direction of the 
labour movement/labour activism. The major reforms during the formative stage 
of the working class are discussed below. 
Reforms of Mohammed Ali and his successors: 
The reforms initiated by Mohammed Ali were truly revolutionary. The Egypt he 
came to rule was primarily an agriculture-based economy geared at local 
consumption. The objective of Mohammed Ali was to turn the Egyptian economy 
into a surplus producing economy, to finance his development plans for the 
country. It is argued that Mohammed Ali was motivated by a belief that political 
strength was based on economic strength (Kassem: 7-8). This point is very critical 
in the understanding of the development of capitalism in Egypt. Many of the 
reforms carried out by Mohammed Ali, including industrialisation, were not 
geared at capital accumulation. It is important to note, for example, that as a result 
of the monopoly of Mohammed Ali on external trade, no commercial bourgeoisie 
capable of capital accumulation emerged in Egypt. Thus, while some conditions 
came into existence that helped create a working class, other factors existed that 
delayed the emergence of capitalist social relations. 
Reforms in agriculture 
After Mohammed Ali came to power, over a period of years he became the de- 
facto proprietor of agricultural land in Egypt. This was carried out by seizure of 
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the land and its distribution to individuals who, in return for paying taxes to the 
government, had the right of usage of the land. It was in 1858, under Sa'id Pasha 
that the right of usage of the land could be inherited. Through the 1858 decree it 
became possible for individual beneficiaries of the land to rent the land for a 
maximum of three years, or sell the right of usage of the land. However, it was not 
until 1883 with the enactment of the Civil Law (Al-Qanoon Al-Madani Al Ahli) 
that owned land could be referred to as private property, to be disposed of in any 
form by the owner with no restrictions (Ezz EI-Din, 1987: 23). 
The pattern of land ownership was toward the creation of large land holdings and 
the fragmentation of the small ones, which led to the emergence of an agrarian 
Egyptian bourgeoisie. Wage labour in the land was limited, and instead these 
"large estates were usually worked by peasants who received a plot of their own in 
return for labour service, or were rented out to small tenants" (Beinin and 
Lockman: 9). The landowners were little more than absentee landlords and thus 
very little investments were made in the land to enhance its productivity. These 
factors combined led to the further deterioration of the already poor situation of 
the peasants. They were thus forced to go to urban centres in search of 
employment (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 25). Thus, one of the key factor in discussing the 
issue of the emergence of private property in agricultural land is that it resulted in 
making many peasants available for wage employment in urban areas. The 
movement of the peasants to urban centres in search of employment plays an 
important role in labour relations during the first stage in the development of the 
labour movement in Egypt, as will be shown below shortly. 
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Industry 
It was with Mohammed Ali that wage labour started in Egypt. He established 
industrial enterprises that could be referred to as `large' and `modern'. In order to 
strengthen the army, Mohammed Ali initiated his modernisation campaign. It is 
argued by some that his industrial policy was basically geared to "feed" the army 
(Ezz El-Din, 1987: 27). In addition, the army was the major consumer of the 
goods produced by the "Pasha's factories". While there is no doubt that to a great 
extent industry during his rule did cater to the needs of the army, such as the 
Citadel Arsenal and ammunition factories, there was a civilian component in the 
industrialisation effort as well. There was a beginning of diversification of 
industry, albeit it was centred around agricultural products, ranging from textile 
production, processing of agricultural goods such as oil distilleries, and sugar 
production (Kassem: 33-6). Industrialisation under Mohammed Ali was monopoly 
industrialisation, and no infringements were tolerated, and where they occurred 
they were punishable by "flogging, hard labour, or death" (Safran: 30). Some work 
was carried out in the homes of workers, in particular employing women and 
children. The same `rules' that applied to monopoly industry were adhered to with 
the home workers. 
It is estimated that there were about 40,000 workers in all the factories during 
Mohammed Ali's era, out of a total wage labour force of 260,000 in Egypt 
(Kassem: 53). They were wage-earners. Yet, in spite of the existence of wage 
labour, it is not possible to claim that a working class had come into existence for 
a number of reasons. First, the owner of capital had almost total control over 
workers, by controlling their effort/labour and lives. Second, the recruitment of 
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workers was not on a contractual basis, it was virtually a conscription as in the 
army where workers were collected by force from their villages and sent to the 
factories (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 29). Third, though these were wage workers, in fact 
the wages were used to control the workers, so that sometimes wages were held 
back or delayed to ensure that workers did not run away. Fourth, they were not 
wage labourers for capital - the aim of production was not the accumulation of 
capital but provisioning of the state. 
By the end of the 1830s and 1840s Mohammed Ali's political and economic 
power was broken, and much of his `modernisation' effort particularly in industry 
began to decline. In fact, it was only during the rule of Khedive Isma'il that state 
investment in industry resumed (Mabro: 11). The period from 1849 to 1882 is 
considered to be a transitional period, during which Egypt moved into a stage of 
economic liberalisation and integration into the world economy, based on the 
freedom of the movement of goods and of work (Hamed: 40-1). The transition to 
capitalism in Egypt was enhanced by the influx of foreign capital. Foreign capital 
entered Egypt via two methods. First, through loans to finance the development of 
the country's infrastructure, both from governments and from foreign 
companies/banks. The most notable example was the digging of the Suez Canal. 
Egypt incurred huge debts, and failure to re-pay led to direct European control 
over the Egyptian economy, which encouraged further investments. Second, it was 
through investments by foreigners, both in industry and agriculture, but mainly in 
agriculture, "which helped the integration of Egyptian agriculture into the world 
economy" (Mabro: 22-3). 
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The integration of Egypt into the world market was characterised as dependent 
capitalist development. It was primarily an agrarian capitalism that developed in 
Egypt, revolving around cotton. One of the interesting features of the development 
of capitalism in Egypt was that though the land-owning bourgeoisie was Egyptian, 
"the country's economy as a whole was by 1914 largely controlled by foreign 
interests ... [where] credit, foreign trade, and shipping were almost entirely in non- 
Egyptian hands" (Beinin and Lockman: 9). Likewise for industrial enterprises and 
transport companies/public utilities, which were owned or managed by foreigners. 
The industrial enterprises were based on agricultural products, for example 
textiles, oil, and tobacco, the latter of which was dominated by the Greeks. Thus 
while the concentration of wealth in the country was distributed between the 
Egyptian agrarian land-owning bourgeoisie and the foreigner investors, the bulk of 
the population became impoverished. Similarly, towns and urban centres 
flourished at the expense of the further deterioration of the villages and rural areas. 
This continued the trend of migration of peasants from rural areas to urban centres 
in search of work. 
Labour relations under dependent, agricultural capitalism 
Employment for the industrial enterprises and the services companies, including 
the public utilities, came largely from among the peasants who migrated in search 
of paid work. Employers resorted to labour contractors, khawlis, to provide them 
with required labour, in return for a fee. Some khawlis were appointed by the 
government. The khawli recruited workers either from villages or from urban 
concentration points of the villagers. The contractor then would agree with the 
workers about length of employment and pay. Workers got paid directly from the 
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khawli. Needless to say, it was an extremely exploitative system. It was, however, 
a practical method for the foreign owners/managers since workers were dealt with 
as the responsibility of the khawli, in payment of wages, in enforcement of work 
discipline, and sometimes in the dismissal of the workers if work so required 
(Beinin and Lockman: 25). The lack of skills and experience of the workers 
facilitated this system. There was a continual supply of cheap unskilled labour, 
mainly from rural areas. 
The rapid expansion in the Egyptian economy, particularly after the British 
colonisation was both a result of foreign investments, and a cause for further 
investments. The growing demands of industry could not be met by the local work 
force alone. The supply of technical, skilled labour came from outside the borders 
of Egypt, mainly from other Mediterranean countries, in particular Greece and 
Italy (Hamed: 45). Like other foreigners who came to Egypt2, these workers were 
in search of better opportunities in Egypt as a result of worsening conditions in 
their countries of origin. The foreign workers occupied the upper ranks of work or 
supervisory positions. Egyptian workers, however, constituted the bulk of the 
workforce. For example, a large Egyptian work force was employed in public 
utilities and transport companies, such as the tramway and railway companies 
(Beinin and Lockman: 37). Tobacco companies also employed a large Egyptian 
workforce. It is no coincidence that it was these sectors that first witnessed 
extensive Egyptian labour activism. 
2 
Among the other nationalities that had considerable presence in Egypt at that time 
were British, French, and Syrians. 
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Poor working conditions afflicted all workers, Egyptians and non-Egyptians. 
Workers received low wages, worked long hours, and had no employment 
benefits. These working conditions provided the basis for collective action by 
workers. The lot öf the Egyptian workers was, however, worse than that of their 
foreign counterparts. There was a differentiation between Egyptian workers and 
non-Egyptians, so that "when the Egyptian held the same job he was often paid 
less than his European counterpart" (Beinin and Lockman: 41). This was 
particularly so with regard to wages and in access to supervisory positions, which 
were occupied primarily by non-Egyptians (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 41-2). Foreign 
workers had an important impact on the labour movement in Egypt during the first 
stage of its development. First, foreign workers brought with them their 
experiences in collective action, from which the Egyptian workers learned. 
Second, the presence of foreign workers and their comparative advantages in 
relation to the local workers became a focal point of labour activism in Egypt, 
particularly as of 1907. 
Workers and their representatives 
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of strike action. Initially the 
strikes were carried out by the non-Egyptian workers, with the Egyptian workers 
at the margins of the strike action, as in the strike of the tobacco workers in 1899. 
The Strike of the Alexandria tramway workers in November 1900 was significant 
in that it was the first strike carried out completely by Egyptian workers. Workers' 
demands revolved around opening promotions to supervisory positions, limiting 
authority of non-Egyptian supervisors, and equality in applying fines against both 
Egyptian workers and non-Egyptians. Workers' demands were largely unmet, and 
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where concessions were made, they were inadequate. The strikes highlighted the 
need for permanent organisations. Unions, though under a different name, 
societies or associations, came into existence with strikes. During the period from 
1899 to 1907 a number of "associations" came into existence, for example, The 
Tobacco Workers' Association (1899), the Printers' Association (1901), the 
Metallurgical Workers' Association (1902), Alexandria Tobacco Workers' 
Association (1902), and the Cairo Lawyer/Legal Clerks' Association (1902). The 
latter indicates that the term was not used exclusively for manual workers. Indeed, 
"niqaba" the Arabic word for unions, was used quite liberally, to the extent that 
"even large landowners referred to their organisation, established in 1921, as a 
niqaba, "(Beinin and Lockman: 100). 
Up to 1907, the unions that were formed were mainly led and "membered" by 
foreigners. Starting in 1907, however, "national", meaning Egyptian, trade unions 
developed. It was around 1907 that a change began to take place. From that date to 
1919 numerous strikes were carried out by workers. It was not only conditions of 
work that motivated the strikes, but also the decline in the standard of living, since 
prices increased significantly during that period (Sa'id: 53). The growth boom 
slowed down significantly. Particularly prone to strike action were the public 
utilities sector, namely tramway workers, railway workers, and workers in ports 
and harbours' (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 56). The new-found strength of the labour 
3 
Workers in that sector were mostly Egyptians, and management was foreign. It 
was also the case that the transport/public utilities sector had attracted a very 
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movement was to a great extent because " of the support it gained from the 
nationalist movement. For example, the National Party, Al-Hizb Al-Watany, in its 
nationalist campaign tried to reach out to various sectors of society, including 
workers and peasants. It founded in 1905 People's Schools, which were night 
schools to eradicate illiteracy and "to teach the poor and workers free of charge" 
(Sa'id: 39). It was also the National Party which sponsored the establishment of 
the Manual Trades Workers Union in 1909. It was the first time that the word 
'niqaba', union, was used in place of the more common `association', and some 
believe that is was an attempt at Egyptianizing the labour unions, "by linking it 
with older, indigenous forms of organisation by the urban working people" 
(Beinin and Lockman: 68). 
An emerging nationalism 
The period preceding WWI can be considered as the beginning of the development 
of the labour movement. It was during this period that the first attempt at forming 
a Workers' Party was made. On 12 July 1908 Al-Abram newspaper ran an 
announcement by Hizb Al-Makased Al-Mushtaraka Lil Omal (Party of the 
Common Goals of Workers) of a public lecture, the subject of which was the 
necessity for Egyptian and foreign labourers to join the party. Another attempt was 
made in 1909 to establish another Workers' party (Sa'id: 60). This period was also 
marked by a number of important strikes. In the strikes, the demands revolved 
around increasing wages, reduction in the number of working hours, and 
considerable amount of investments, and thus it became the core of labour 
activism until it was replaced by the textile sector in the 1930s and 1940s. 
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improvement in the conditions of work. Strikes were held not only to impose 
pressure on management to meet workers' demands, they were also utilised to 
rally support for workers' demands among various sectors in society. From the 
point of meeting the demands of workers, the strikes were not remarkable 
successes, although some demands were met. 
One of the strikes that particularly stands out in the pre-WWI period is the strike 
of the Cairo tramway workers in October 1908. Briefly, the tramway drivers and 
the ticket collectors presented an appeal of several points to the company, all 
geared at working conditions and unjust practices against them. Workers' 
demands were not met and, eventually, the strike was crushed, but the significance 
of the strike is that other sectors of society became drawn into the strike (Sa'id: 
56). To be specific, The Umma Party4 (The Nation) gave some financial support 
to the strikers, and support for their cause was voiced by intellectuals, mainly 
through newspaper articles. In addition, there were demonstrations from the public 
at large in support of the striking workers (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 75). 
The strike was conducted by drivers and ticket collectors only, technicians did not 
join the strike. The latter presented demands of wage increases and a reduction in 
working hours in 1910 in a one day strike. The company conceded to their 
demands. In 1911, representatives of both the technical workers and the drivers 
presented an appeal for basically the same demands that were made in 1908 but 
the company refused it, under the pretext that supervisors were not doing their job 
well enough. The company's refusal instigated a new development in collective 
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action by workers. A delegation representing the striking workers travelled to 
Alexandria to contact Alexandria tramway workers. As a result of this strike, the 
"Declaration of 25 July" was made and the company agreed to refer the case to the 
headquarters in Brussels regarding workers' demands (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 75). 
One may thus argue that during the period preceding WWI, the workers' 
movement was perceived and acted as one of the social forces in society struggling 
vis-a-vis foreign powers. Trade unions were primarily confined to economic 
demands and conditions of work. They had not begun to be concerned with 
political demands, although they were realising their potential for collective action 
and as a pivot for the nationalist struggle. Alongside these positive developments 
for the labour movement, there were, however, serious shortcomings. Partly as a 
result of the pattern of development of capitalism in Egypt, the working class that 
did emerge was not homogenous. The proletarian core which was actively 
involved in the labour movement represented a small section of the working class. 
Even within the proletarian core, the workers were "united by the fact of their 
employment in large-scale enterprises, but divided by their varying origins and 
commitment to industrial life, modes of employment, income levels, degree of job 
security and benefits, and skill levels" (Beinin and Lockman: 39). This 
characteristic of the working class persisted, and had an impact on the 
development of the labour movement. 
4The Umma Party was basically the party of the rich landowners. 
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Stage Two: Capitalism and Nationalism: Workers Engaged in a Dual 
Struggle 
The second stage in the development of the labour movement extended from the 
end of WWI to the 1952 Revolution. This period is an extremely rich one in the 
history of the working class. The struggle of the working class at this stage was a 
dual struggle. On the one hand, the working class was involved strongly in the 
nationalist movement, and on the other hand it was struggling against capitalist 
exploitation. The labour movement `matures' during this stage, so that by the late 
1930s and 1940s an immensely significant development occurs, namely, that trade 
unions play the leading role in directing an independent, assertive labour 
movement. The `duality' of the workers' movement was resolved by the 1952 
"National" Revolution, and it was resolved from above, in favour of the struggle 
for nationalism, and national capital. 
Rising discontent 
The onset of WWI brought about many changes in the labour movement and in 
industry. In December 1914 Britain proclaimed Egypt a protectorate, and severe 
restrictions were imposed on political and `popular' action. On the one hand, 
anyone breaking the strict military laws was arrested, and on the other hand many 
peasants and workers were taken by force to serve the Allied forces. The war 
effort also entailed giving priority to the needs of the army such as grain and other 
agricultural products at very low prices, so much so that food shortages spread 
throughout the country (Hamed: 68-9). The result was that there occurred revolts 
of discontent over food shortages in 1917-18. 
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One of the major consequences of WWI was the flight of foreign capital from 
Egypt. Combined with limitations on trade imposed by the War, there was a rise in 
mass unemployment, a phenomenon that was new in Egypt (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 
98). As a result, unemployment riots spread in Cairo and Alexandria, and 
occasionally there were violent strikes. The increase in the cost of living, 
combined with a virtual freeze on wage increases, forced workers to accept 
employment at very low wages. Unemployed workers carried out strikes 
demanding `food for work' (Sa'id: 59). 
Attempts at reviving trade unionism started after the War. A committee was 
formed in Alexandria to revive the Manual Trades Workers' Union, headed by 
former members of the Union. The committee became particularly active in 
February and March 1919. There was a call for recognition of trade unions, both 
single unions, and the revival of the Manual Trade Workers' Union as a federation 
(Ezz El-Din, 1987: 169). The Alexandria Manual Trade Workers' Union issued a 
declaration entitled `Proposal for Workers Protection Law' on March 2,1919, six 
days before the March 8,1919 Revolution. The demands covered conditions of 
work, working hours and employment benefits (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 172-3). The 
1919 revolution thus occurred at a time when the labour movement was just 
beginning to emerge from its weakness. 
Alliances for nationalism 
The March 1919 Revolution provided an opportunity for workers to express their 
grievances. With the end of WWI, a group of nationalists formed a delegation, a 
Wafd, to travel to Britain to discuss the matter of the independence of Egypt. The 
endeavour of the Wafd to go to Britain failed, which meant that Egypt would 
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remain a Protectorate. The Wafd opposed this ruling. In March 1919 a popular 
upsurge took place precipitated by the exile of the leaders of the Wafd, most 
notably Sa'ad Zaghloul. The upsurge was extensive both in coverage and in 
participation. Workers, students, 'ulema, lawyers, and others participated. At the 
time of the 1919 upsurge there were two movements: the first a movement by al- 
Wafd that wanted an end to foreign rule, and second, the movement of workers for 
better working conditions. In March 1919 the two movements converged (Beinin 
and Lockman: 99). 
Workers joined the revolt on March 9, a day after it started. It started with 
transport workers but was soon joined by others. The strike that particularly stood 
out was the railway workers' strike, which started on March 15, and continued 
until May 2. It developed into a general strike, joined by about 4000 workers 
demonstrating. This strike sparked off other strikes among workers in the 
following enterprises: The Amireya Press on 18 March, the Gas company on 6 
April, the Post, among others. The strike practically brought the country to a 
standstill. Although workers focused on economic demands, such as conditions of 
work and pay, the significance of the strike, however, was that it highlighted the 
power of united workers' action, and thus the potential of the working class in the 
nationalist struggle (Sa'id: 64). 
For workers the political gains from the 1919 Revolution far exceeded the 
economic ones. It also started what would become an alliance between the 
working class and nationalist forces, particularly the Wafd, which was "deemed 
more as a national front than a Party, "(Beinin and Lockman: 101). The point is 
aptly summarised by Beinin and Lockman: 
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The events of 1919 had fused national and class consciousness into one 
composite world-outlook for most Egyptian workers, an alloy which 
was to be reinforced by the course of political and economic life in 
subsequent years. 
(Beinin and Lockman: 105) 
The April-May 1919 period pointed that although the conditions existed that would 
allow total compliance with workers' demands, in fact only partial compliance was 
attained. Workers' most pressing economic needs remained unmet. Partly as a 
consequence of the activities of the workers' movement during 1919, Reconciliation 
and Arbitration Committees were established to look into disputes that had occurred 
between workers and employers. Some concessions were made to the workers, such 
as increases in wages (Goldberg, 1986: 99). However, the relations of power in the 
industrial sphere remained unbalanced, to the disadvantage of workers. 
Industrialisation, the new bourgeoisie, and labour 
The problems caused by WWI were a blessing in disguise for industry. The war 
contributed to a boom in industrial development. It was motivated by the increasing 
demand for goods, and by the relatively low wages. Industries increased to meet the 
consumer demands of the population, and of the British Army. Among the 
industries that particularly flourished during that period were furniture, leather 
products, textile and clothing, and food/nutrition industries (Hamed: 73). The War 
also resulted in the revival of some trades/crafts that were on the wane before the 
War. 
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Investments in industry were carried out by foreign and mutamasirs capital, but 
also increasingly an Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie began to emerge. In 1920 
Tal'aat Harb, a renowned "nationalist" economist founded Bank Misr. The 
agrarian bourgeoisie was the source of the capital of the Bank. At one level, the 
Bank was a `nationalist' project where only Egyptians were allowed to participate. 
At another level, the Bank allowed the largely agrarian bourgeoisie to "diversify 
the sources of its wealth and develop alternatives to foreign control of credit and 
trade" (Beinin and Lockman: 11). The starting capital of Bank Misr was 80,000 
Egyptian Pounds. The Bank contributed significantly to the establishment of 
enterprises in the manufacturing, commercial and service sectors. It established 
large manufacturing enterprises in textiles, oil extraction, cement, and other 
industries. Bank Misr contributed to the development of industrial enterprises for 
many years until it was nationalised in 1960. The success of the Bank Misr 
`projects' had the effect of encouraging further investments in industry, and a 
number of establishments were set up to finance the development of industrial 
enterprises (Hamed: 74-5). 
However, the period of economic prosperity for industry began to abate by the 
early 1920s. The "high profits realised during and immediately after World War I 
were replaced by losses owing to foreign competition and a cotton crisis which 
considerably reduced domestic consumption" (Deeb: 188). As a result, there were 
wage reductions and dismissals from work, which led to agitation among workers 
and to almost daily strikes. This set off an attempt at the re-organisation of the 
5 
It means `Egyptianized'. This refers to foreigners who were residents in Egypt. 
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labour movement to enhance the bargaining power of trade unions (Deeb: 188- 
90). Nevertheless, the gains of the labour movement were limited at that time and 
were the result of political pressure on the newly formed government, rather than 
through the process of industrial bargaining. 
The legal reforms 
To counteract strikes, which were almost a daily phenomenon after WWI, a 
number of laws were issued to contain strike action. Law 37/19236 was an attempt 
at limiting strikes and other collective action. For example article 124 of Law 
37/1923 banned strikes for public employees. Article 274 of the same law 
regulated strikes of workers employed in public utility organisations. Punishment 
was denoted to anyone found guilty of "infringing on liberty of others at work, or 
infringes on the right of anyone to employ or not employ others" (Adly, 1993: 
121), by virtue of article 375 of the same law. Nonetheless, strikes continued. 
In July 1927 a committee headed by Abdel-Rahman Reda, under-secretary of the 
Ministry of Justice, was formed by the Wafd-led government, as a response to 
unceasing strikes. The Ministry of Interior recommended the formation of a 
committee to investigate work relations between workers and employers, and to 
lay the legislative grounds for labour relations. The Reda Committee examined 
documents of the Reconciliation and Arbitration Committees initiated in 1919, 
with a view to establishing both workers', and employers' organisations to 
6That means Law 37 for the year 1923. 
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represent them (Adly, 1993: 121). Two years later the Reda Committee presented 
its recommendations to the Government. 
The report provided the legislative basis of labour relations. It included 
recommendations on work contracts, limitation of working hours to nine (9), 
regulations concerning the employment of women and of minors, arbitration 
committees, the legalisation of trade unions7, and insurance for work related 
illness and injuries. It is worthwhile to mention that the Reda Committee excluded 
agricultural workers. The Egyptian Federation of Industries6, established in 1921, 
opposed the recommendations of the Committee, and the government, under 
pressure from this organisation, ignored the recommendations of the Reda 
Committee with the exception of one, the establishment of a Labour bureau, which 
was affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, a measure adopted in 1930 (Beinin and 
Lockman: 184-5). Although the Reda Committee was an indication of the Wafd's 
concern for workers, a closer examination, however, points out that the core 
demands of workers were not addressed during its government, and much less 
during the reactionary governments that followed it. 
As pointed out earlier, the Wafd merged its interests with the working class. It is 
to be noted, however, that in its support for trade unions, the Wafd perceived them 
7Although unions had been in existence for some time, unions were not officially 
legalised until 1942. 
8 
The membership of the EFI consisted primarily of the foreign companies in 
Egypt. 
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to be as "auxiliary organisations for its political struggle" (Deeb: 189). This trend 
was elucidated in 1924 when the Wafd attained power through a limited form of 
rule. One of the prominent Wafd leaders, Abdel Rahman Fahmi, formed and 
headed a federation, called the General Union of Workers of the Nile Valley, in 
July 1924. An examination of the objectives of this organisation reveals that the 
Wafd wanted to control the labour movement. First, it imposed restrictions on 
strikes, so that for example trade unions would have to get the approval of the 
General Union. Second, it defined the objective of the labour movement as 
"safeguard[ing] the workers' rights and to prevent them from succumbing to 
communist ideas" (Deeb: 191). Third, and most significantly, it stated that 
workers' rights should not infringe on employers' rights, "to prevent the workers 
from demanding more than their rights" (Deeb: 191). This was so that investors 
would not be discouraged. The General Union headed by Abdel-Rahman Fahmi 
was short lived, but it had the effect of alienating some trade union leadership 
from the Wafd. This was particularly the case as it was perceived that the General 
Union was established in order to curtail the `communist influence' on the 
working class (Goldberg, 1986: 67). This pointed to the growing influence of the 
socialist movement in the labour movement. 
The Egyptian Socialist Party was founded in April 1921. Its membership was from 
among Egyptian leftists and members from the foreign community living in Egypt, 
in particular Alexandria. The group of socialists who eventually founded the 
Egyptian Socialist Party had been in the labour movement in Alexandria, and 
called for the necessity to form trade union federations. This group was very 
critical of the Wafd as it saw in its brand of bourgeois nationalism an attempt at 
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controlling trade unions, and utilising labour for narrow self-serving goals (Beinin 
and Lockman: 138-9). This group of socialists established a general federation of 
labour, which in February 1921 was founded in Alexandria as the Confederation 
Generale du Travail (CGT). By 1924, the CGT was the most significant force in 
the Alexandria Labour movement, as was evidenced by its role in the Filature 
strikes in February-March 1924. However, the government crushed the movement, 
especially at the level of the workers. 
Despite the early success of the Party, it was not able to sustain a hold in the 
labour movement. The reason for this was that it was too radical for the workers, 
and the fact that there were `foreign' elements9 in it somewhat alienated workers 
(Beinin and Lockman: 141). Perhaps more detrimental to the Egyptian Socialist 
Party was the fact that a splinter occurred within the Party leadership. As it 
happened the splint ran along ideological, national, and regional lines. On the one 
hand, was the Alexandria based Bolshevik, more radical movement composed 
mainly of the foreign leadership. On the other hand was the Cairo based, Fabian 
movement. The former group maintained strong ties to the worker's movement, 
and in 1922 became the Communist Party of Egypt. The Left, however, had a 
limited role during the 1920s. 
For the labour movement, the 1920s was a period of union activity, but did not 
reach the pitch of 1919. Although the workers in the public utilities such as 
9 
Among the prominent `foreign' members of the Egyptian Socialist Party was 
Joseph Rosenthal, a Palestinian. There was also a heavy Greek presence in the 
Party. 
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tramway workers, gas workers, electricity, and water workers were still `faithful' 
to their struggle traditions, the core of the movement was shifting to other 
industries, such as textiles, and tobacco. Other unions were primarily concerned 
with "narrowly defined union issues" (Beinin and Lockman: 125). Nevertheless, 
the workers' movement had not achieved independence by the close of the 1920s. 
The association between the movement and political forces reveals the existence 
of a relationship of patronage between the Wafd Party and the workers' movement. 
Underlying this relationship was "a conception of the workers' movement as 
lacking legitimate goals and objectives of its own, as essentially one component of 
the national movement embodied in the self proclaimed representative of the 
entire nation, the Wafd" (Beinin and Lockman: 105). In addition, the absence of a 
"down to earth" approach by the socialist leaders among the mass of workers 
delayed the development of a class consciousness among workers. Thus, the 
nationalist movement gained more from workers, than did the workers gain from 
the nationalist movement. 
At the level of the enterprise administratively and legally the position of trade 
unions was ambiguous. Trade unions existed, but they were not officially 
recognised. In fact, this was one of the issues raised by the ILO `Butler' mission in 
1931. The report condemned the `anomalous' situation of unions (Goldberg: 73). 
That situation of unions would remain until the legalisation of trade unions in the 
1940s. The issue the ambiguity of trade unions raises is that collective bargaining 
at the enterprise becomes very limited at best, meaningless at worst. The 
Arbitration and Reconciliation committees set up in 1919 carried out that role by 
examination of complaints from workers against their employers. The 
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recommendations of these committees were, however, not binding (Beinin and 
Lockman: 291). Thus, while the unionists were from among the workers at the 
enterprises, their scope of action at that level was very limited. 
It is important to examine the extent to which the trade union movement was truly 
a working class movement. As has been pointed out earlier, the transport and 
public utilities sector workers in Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez were very involved 
in the labour movement. Other examples include the sugar workers of Kom 
Ombo, tobacco and textile workers. These were primarily workers in the large 
enterprises. Although the industrial and large enterprise sector was continually 
growing, it was only by the late 1930s and 1940s that a considerable base of large 
enterprises would come into existence. Despite the growth in industry, particularly 
between 1907 and 1937, it constituted a growth in the small enterprises. The 
following data reveals that situation: 
As late as 1937, over half of Egypt's industrial establishment 
employed no staff, and 92 percent had fewer than 5 employees. 
Only 3 percent employed more than ten workers, though these 
"large" firms accounted for a total of some 140,000 workers. 
(Beinin and Lockman: 37) 
Also, repair/maintenance work absorbed a considerable amount of labour, about 
one-third of workers in small enterprises (Kassem: 278). However, in the 1930s 
industrial expansion grew at very high rate, partly as a result of a shift to import- 
substitution, and hence the industrial workforce employed in the large enterprises 
increased considerably (Goldberg: 45). 
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Another very important factor was the increasing rural migration to urban areas in 
search of work, due to the continual neglect of rural areas. An indication of the 
extent of the migration was that for the period from 1917 to 1937, while the overall 
population growth of Egypt was 25%, for Cairo it was 66%, and for Alexandria 
55%, indeed, "by 1927,34 percent of the population of Cairo had been born 
elsewhere in Egypt" (Beinin and Lockman: 46). This factor had a significant impact 
on the labour movement, namely, to the migrants employment in industrial 
enterprises and worker activism was a new experience. It is argued by some that this 
is one of the reasons why industrialists, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s, 
founded their enterprises in or near rural areas. It provided a constant flow of cheap 
labour, "in an environment that would inhibit labour organisation that would 
ultimately cause the price of labour to rise" (Goldberg, 1986: 54). Many of the rural 
migrants, particularly the new migrants, were not organised, in great part because 
they maintained a strong link with their villages, and thus identified more with their 
places of origin than their new identity as `worker'. This feature gave the labour 
activism of the 1920s and early 1930s an `urban' flavour. 
Women workers were side-tracked by unions. Women had been in waged 
employment since the time of Mohammed Ali, basically as `home-workers'. With 
expansion of industrial production women became involved in the industrial 
sector, such as in tobacco factories rolling cigarettes. Women workers were to be 
found particularly in the agricultural based industries such as cotton gins. In such 
industries, it was not uncommon for women workers to be hired on a seasonal 
basis (Goldberg, 1986: 45). Women workers were concentrated in the low- 
skill, low-pay jobs. It has already been mentioned that legislation had been issued 
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concerning the employment of women and children. One may argue that this could 
have been a reason why the concerns of women workers were not considered 
worth pressing by the trade unions, because already there was legislation 
`protecting' the women workers. During the 1920s and 1930s the trade unions 
largely ignored women workers. The exception seems to prove the marginalisation 
of women workers from the trade unions, namely in February 1925 Ittihad Al- 
Omal, the paper of the General Union that had been founded by Abdel Rahman 
Fahmi, started a woman's page in the paper. However, it turned out to focus on the 
concerns of middle class working women (Beinin and Lockman: 166-7). It was 
not until the 1940s that there would be a role for women workers in the trade 
unions. 
Last, one issue that is important to highlight is that the increase in the number of 
trade unions, should be tackled with some reserve. Trade unionism at that stage 
was infused more with `trade consciousness' than with `class consciousness'. An 
example of this is given by the apparent frustration expressed in the May 8,1925 
issue of Al-Hissabl° paper regarding trade unions. In an article titled `How Our 
Unions Should Be', the author writes: 
Besides the big unions that are in existence in Egypt now ... we 
find very small unions whose membership does not exceed the 
fingers of one hand, ... such as the union of almond nut crackers, 
and the union of workers who iron clothes. Yes, any group of 
persons working in a particular trade have the right to form a 
72 
union to combine them and to protect their rights, but they 
should not form unions that are completely separated from any 
other union as this weakens them. 
(El-Gebeilly, 1991: 104) 
Besides the fragmentation of the unions, the author of the article also points out 
that some unions combine in their membership both the workers and the 
employers (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 104). This is clearly similar to the guild system, and 
perhaps reflects that unions were perceived as such by many workers. The 
situation changes very much by the mid-1930s and the 1940s. 
The economic depression and workers 
The economic condition of the working class worsened from the end of the 1920s 
and early 1930s due to the Great Depression. The Depression took a toll on 
workers in the form of wage cuts, dismissals, and reduction in benefits. 
Unemployment was rampant. The effect of the Depression exacerbated already 
worsening conditions for workers. Workers protested against price increases, and 
demanded "popular housing projects, hospitals for treatment of workers, and other 
services" (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 417). To a great extent `progress' relating to 
workers' demands had decreased significantly with the ousting of the Wafd both 
from power in 1924 and from parliament in 1928. For example, attempts were 
made to pass a labour law when the Wafd came to power in 1924, but stopped 
after the Wafd government was dismissed a few months later. Efforts were 
10 
The mouthpiece of the socialist wing of the trade union movement. 
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resumed in the parliamentary committee" for `worker and social affairs' since 
1924, but to no avail (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 397-404). Thus it was that with the return 
of the Wafd to power in 1930, hopes were high that workers' demands for a labour 
law would be fulfilled. The return to power of the Wafd12, albeit for six months, 
led to partial fulfilment of worker demands. 
ILO Mission 
The 1930s did not witness too many changes in the organisation of trade unions. 
Workers' demands during that era were concentrated in three areas, passing a 
labour law, legalising trade unions and ensuring their independence, and 
addressing the consequences of the economic crisis workers confronted. The trade 
union movement began to lobby at the international level in order to bring 
attention to the demands of the workers' movement. In an attempt to contain the 
situation, the government invited a delegation from the ILO, and thus the Harold 
Butler mission arrived in 1931 to investigate the situation in Egypt. According to 
the end of mission report, the conditions of the working class in Egypt were 
"appalling". Working hours ranged between 14 to 16 hours a day, wages were 
11 
The majority of seats in Parliament were Wafdist. The mentioned committee was 
headed by a Wafd member of Parliament. 
12 
The Wafd came into and out of power six times from 1924 to 1952, with a total 
of less than seven years. However, the presence of the Wafd in Parliament enabled 
it to play a very active role in the political life of the country even when it was out 
of power. 
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very low, and children less than ten years old were working in inhuman conditions 
(Adly, 1993: 123). 
Among the recommendations of the mission were, the official recognition of trade 
unions, the introduction of compensation payment for work-injuries, the 
separation of the Labour bureau from the Ministry of Interior, the reform of laws 
on the employment of women and of minors, and a reduction of working hours. In 
response to the Harold Butler Mission recommendations, the government carried 
out some reforms, at a rather slow pace, but the government did not address the 
core concerns of the workers' movement. Among the reforms were laws regulating 
the employment of minors and of women, laws 48/1933 and 80/1933 respectively. 
Also, a partial regulation of working hours was enforced, but it was limited to 
industries considered dangerous industries (Law 64/1935). Other reforms included 
issuing law 64/1936 on compensation for work-related injuries, and legislating the 
establishment of a "Consultative Labour Council" in 1938. 
Beginning of an independent labour movement: 1936, a summer of 
discontent? 
A number of factors combined to ultimately cause an `explosion' in the labour 
movement. By the mid 1930s, the workers movement had seen many alliances 
with various political parties, and yet workers' core demands were not met. The 
experience with the Wafd in the 1930s was particularly problematic. In 1931, 
Abbas Halim, the former Prince, founded the Egyptian Labour Party. The Wafd, 
which had been in an ambivalent alliance with Halim, was fearful that it could 
lose its control over the labour movement and thus fought him, and the party was 
disbanded. The Wafd then mended relations with Abbas Halim, and by 1935 
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intensive Wafd lobbying among workers took place, making promises of major 
reforms, both legal and economic (Hamed: 196-7). When the Wafd returned to 
power in 1936, it became clear that it would adopt a gradual approach with regard 
to workers' demands. The sense of disappointment with the Wafd's inability to 
initiate the legal reforms it had promised earlier, combined with a critical factor to 
lead to a series of strikes. Expansion in industrial development was creating a 
workforce solely dependent on wage labour for their livelihood. Thus by the mid 
1930s, and particularly the end of the 1930s these workers "were completely 
dependent on industrial wage labour for subsistence and had no choice but to 
make a permanent place for themselves in the framework of the new capitalist 
industrial system" (Beinin and Lockman: 38). 
By 1936, the condition of much of the workforce was miserable. The government 
did not adopt a comprehensive labour law. It addressed only sectors of the 
workforce, such as women and minors, or "dangerous" industries. A wave of 
strikes swept through Egypt. Workers in the major concentrations of industry, in 
Cairo, Alexandria, and in the Delta Region, carried out strikes, which were 
violently quelled by the government, using the police and army. Such 
developments, meaning only partial concessions on the part of the government, 
and vehement crushing of strikes, elucidated to workers the importance of an 
independent trade union movement, including independence from political parties. 
Many trade union and worker leaders felt betrayed by the events of the summer of 
1936, and as a result efforts began to strengthen the labour movement, including 
discussions for the formation of "a labour federation independent of all political 
parties" (Beinin and Lockman: 225). Thus the stage was set for the next phase of 
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the workers' and trade union movement in. the 1940s. Workers' brought to the 
1940s their past experiences, often floundering ones, of association with different 
political forces to little benefit to the workers' movement. 
The 1940s: "La Belle Epoque" of the labour movement? 
The second World War had a similar effect on industrial development as did 
WWI. The War came as an opportunity for some industries to grow. For a while, it 
even resulted in a general growth in industry. Partly this was a result of a kind of 
protectionism that the War brought about to Egyptian industries because foreign 
goods were no longer competing with the former. In addition, Egypt became the 
regional supplier of the British forces in the Middle East (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 646). 
The industries that benefited during the War were those that were utilised by the 
army, for example some food industries like dried cheese and vegetable 
packaging, spare parts, medical equipment, tires, and lenses, among others (Ezz 
EI-Din, 1987: 646-7). While some industry and some industrialists may have 
benefited from the war, that was not the case for the majority of the Egyptian 
people. 
In the War years, Egypt faced a number of economic problems, not least among 
which was unemployment, and the general decline in the standard of living of 
peasants and workers. The crisis of unemployment resulting from the War was 
unprecedented. It was due to stoppages in a number of industries. For example, all 
German and Italian companies stopped operations in Egypt, because they were 
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considered `enemy' industriesu. This led to dismissals of numerous workers, 
particularly in the small workshops. Most of these workers received no 
compensations for their dismissal. Indirectly, several sectors were effected by the 
War. For example, the decline in international trade contributed to the decline in 
activities in ports and duanes, and it also had a negative impact on the industries 
that relied on imported production inputs, either machinery or raw materials (Ezz 
El-Din, 1987: 630-1). Among the industries that were negatively impacted was the 
textile industry. 
This state of affairs was indicated by the events of September 1939 as the Henry 
Pierre textile factory, and similar Vichey-oriented industries, decided to close the 
factories, whereupon the workers and trade union leaders presented a complaint to 
the Labour bureau. In response to the failure of the government to act on behalf of 
the workers, the General Union of Mechanised Textile Workers, headed by Sa'ad 
Uthman, began a general strike. Some of the General Union leaders went on a 
hunger strike to force the government to interfere to stop the dismissal of workers. 
The strike gained the support of other workers in other factories, so that in the end 
the government was forced to interfere. The government warned the companies 
that if the factories were not opened so workers could get back to work, the 
government would take over the factories. Factories were to operate three days a 
week and pay workers for four days' work, rather than fire workers for the time 
being (Uthman, 1983: 28-33). According to Sa'ad Uthman, this incident 
13 
Although Egypt was not involved directly in the War, by virtue of the Treaty in 
1936 Egypt was considered an ally of Britain. 
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strengthened the General Union of Mechanised Textile Workers, and other unions 
in their demands for legal recognition of trade unions, and other legal reforms. It 
also "liberated some unions from the control and leadership of Abbas Halim, and 
other personalities and political parties" (Uthman, 1983: 33). 
The government dealt with the unemployment situation primarily as a security 
concern, although a multi-ministerial committee" was formed to examine the 
unemployment situation. The recommendations of the committee in 1940, 
however, were not adequate in addressing the issue of worker dismissals. Among 
the recommendations of the committee were: regulations on the numbers and 
wages of Egyptian and foreign workers in all enterprises, the usage of the Arabic 
language in all economic activities to encourage the involvement of educated 
Egyptians, the need for personal identification cards for workers indicating 
residence and trade, and the need to reduce the dismissal of workers to the 
minimum and instead adopting measures such as the reduction in number of 
working days (Hamed: 172-4). 
Legalisation of unions 
In 1940, as a result of pressure from workers, a proposal for a trade union law was 
introduced and was approved by Majlis Al-Nuaab (House of Representatives), but 
it was rejected by Majlis Al-Shuyukh (The Senate). But, when the Wafd 
government came to power in 1942, it issued a law legalising trade unions, law 
14 
Committees to examine the employment situation had been formed as early as 
1931. 
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85/1942. The law, though its issue was considered a victory, was problematic. It 
only gave superficial rights to trade unions. For example, the law excluded some 
sectors of the workforce/ wage earners from forming unions, among whom are 
government employees, employees of local and rural councils, agricultural 
workers'5, and hospital workers and nurses. Also, the law banned the formation of 
a confederation of trade unions (Hamed: 164-7). 
As for the unions that were formed, there was much control over their activities. 
Trade unions that were formed were subject to monitoring by the police. A pre- 
condition for recognition of union was administrative registration at the Labour 
bureaux. This gave the Ministry of Interior the power of administrative control 
over the unions, through the Labour Bureaux affiliated to that Ministry. The 
Ministry of Interior, together with the Ministry of Social Affairs, was also 
involved in the supervision of meetings of the unions, thereby limiting 
considerably the scope of union meetings. Perhaps the worst of all these 
constraints was the provision made in the trade union law for the dismantling of a 
trade union without resorting to courts, only administratively (Adly, 1993: 124-5). 
After the law of 1942 legalising unions was issued the number of unions increased 
substantially. By 1944, the number had reached 210 unions, with a total 
membership of approximately 103,000 workers. The number steadily increased as 
the following table demonstrates for selective years: 
is 
One of the reasons for excluding agricultural workers was to prevent the spread 
of `communist ideas' to the Egyptian countryside. 
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Table 1 
Number of Unions and Membership 
Year Number of Membership 
Unions 
1944 210 102,876 
" 1946 488 95,538 
1949 465 123,005 
1952 568 159,608 
1955 1,155 394,245 
1957 1,361 500,000 
Source: (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 307). 
In the 1940s, as in previous decades, the bulk of enterprises were private sector, 
both foreign and Egyptian. As for numbers of unions by industry, in 1949 the 
biggest number of unions, 94, was in the transportation sector (all transportation 
services and manufacture of transportation vehicles). This was followed by 
food/nutrition industries (45), and commercial activities (46). Some other 
industries were as follows: Spinning and Weaving (30), Manufacture and Dyeing 
of clothes (22), construction sector (32), Public Utilities such as sanitation (25), 
and mechanical and metallurgy (20) (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 304-5). Unions were 
enterprise-based, thus the above distribution does not reflect union membership 
density by industry. Most of the unionisation, however, was in the small scale 
industrial sector. For example, for the year 1943, one third of unions, to be precise 
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96 unions out of 311, were in enterprises employing less than 100 employees. 
Added to this is that "neither the leadership nor the membership of newly formed 
unions possessed any knowledge of trade union principles or practices" (Beinin 
and Lockman: 294). Also, there was a clear regional bias in trade union 
distribution, with the largest concentrations in Cairo, and Alexandria (Ezz El-Din, 
1987: 720). 
The fact that unions were enterprise-based made control of the unions by 
employers relatively easy. There were, besides the enterprise-based unions, 
general trade unions (federations) such as the Cairo Tobacco workers. There were 
attempts at establishing confederations, but they were unsuccessful attempts until 
the 1950s, when Nasser came to power. 
Political organisation of workers 
The revival of the socialist and communist movements in Egypt in the 1940s 
contributed to the strengthening of the labour movement. In September 1945 the 
"Workers' Committee for National Liberation" (WCNL) was established. It was an 
organisation of trade unionists who were members of the New Dawn communist 
organisation. The WCNL was a "political organisation of the working class" (El- 
Shafei, 1993: 22). The WCNL aimed to establish itself as a workers' front for 
nationalism. It was based primarily in Shubra A1-Kheima, one of the bigger 
industrial zones, with a concentration of textile industries", and among its 
16 
It is noteworthy that the textile industry was highly organised, about 66% of all 
textile enterprises were unionised. 
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leadership was Taha Sa'ad Uthman, who had been the president of the General 
Union of Mechanised Textile Workers. Thereby, textile workers established 
themselves "as the vanguard of the working class" (El-Shafei, 1993: 19). 
During that period, another force was trying to control the labour movement, 
namely the Muslim Brotherhood. The organisation was established in 1934. The 
organisation basically called for the need to promote and adopt the principles of 
Islam (Hamed: 207). It was a generalist ideology, and the movement only tried to 
establish links with the labour movement by the end of the Second World War. A 
National Committee for Students and Workers was formed by the Muslim 
Brotherhood to try to infiltrate the labour movement. It is believed that the 
Brotherhood wanted to weaken the workers' organisation in Shubra al-Kheima, 
for what it believed was its destructive `communist' ideology (Hamed: 207). The 
experience of Taha Sa'ad Uthman indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood had no 
clear agenda for the labour movement, rather they were seeking political power. In 
his memoirs, Uthman, who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood at an 
early stage in his life, noted that in the events of 1945 that led to widespread police 
arrests of trade union leaders, the Brotherhood played a role in informing police 
about the whereabouts of some leaders. Furthermore, in April 1945 when the 
General Union for Mechanised Textile Workers was disbanded, it emerged that 
the Brotherhood had reached an agreement with Labour Bureau to form a new 
General Union. This, Uthman argues, contributed to the decision of disbanding the 
former organisation (Uthman, 1983: 178-9). However, the Muslim Brotherhood 
was not a serious contender in the labour movement, unlike the WCNL. 
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The WCNL combined two struggles the- working class was involved in, a 
nationalist struggle, and a struggle against capital. The WCNL was disillusioned 
with the nationalist experience of the past, and called for all the popular forces in 
the country to unite with the working class for Egypt's political, economic, and 
social development. It called for an end to British presence in Egypt, nationalising 
industry, land reforms, political rights for women, among others (Beinin and 
Lockman: 336-7). The WCNL came at a time of increased political openness in 
Egypt, probably a result of the lifting of Martial law. However, the government 
was alarmed by the rise of a number of nationalist movements and cracked down 
on them in December 1945. 
The sequence of events that started in mid-December 1945 unleashed major strike 
waves the government was unable to contain, and which seriously challenged its 
authority. These strikes indicated the strength. of the workers'/trade union 
movement. In mid-December 1945 the army occupied Shubra El-Kheima, 
whereupon the WCNL counter-attacked in January 1946 with a considerable show 
of power, by staging a strike involving all the textile workers in Shubra El- 
Kheima. A second organisation, the National Committee for Workers and 
Students (NCWS) also organised a similar strike, but it resulted in bloodshed. A 
succession of strike waves erupted in July 1946, and September 1947 which were 
violently repressed by the Government, headed then by Isma'il Sidgi17. One of the 
strikes was carried out in September 1947 by 26,000 workers in the Misr Spinning 
and Weaving Company in Al-Mehalla. Workers' demands included control of 
17 He was the conservative chairman of the Egyptian Federation of Industries. 
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working conditions, changes in the company-level trade unions, stopping 
dismissal of workers, among others (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 184-5). In the same 
month, a strike took place in the Filature Nationale Textile company, whereupon 
the Shubra El-Kheima textile workers, in a demonstration of their support, held a 
solidarity strike. 
The ultimate challenge to the Regime, however, was with the April 1948 strikes, 
in which Police (April 5 and 6), and Nurses (April 7) went on strike. These strikes 
brought the King "on the brink of defeat, but he was saved by his declaration of 
war against Israel, on behalf of the Palestinians, whereupon the strikes came to an 
end" (El-Shafei, 1993: 23). The defeat in this War served to undermine the 
regime. 
By 1950 there had been a plan to establish a trade union confederation at the 
national level. This step was championed by a communist organisation, 
Democratic Movement for National Liberation, in the relatively open political 
climate that emerged with the return of Al-Wafd Party in 1950. The Preparatory 
Committee for the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions was established 
in December 1951. It included among its membership both leftist and non-leftist 
trade unionists. The preparatory committee agreed that a congress would be held 
on January 27,1952 to discuss the founding of a General Federation (Hamed: 
136). The history of Egypt would have probably taken a different course had that 
congress met, but it never did meet because on 26 January, 1952 Cairo went up in 
flames, in what is known as the Cairo Fire, the day before the congress was due to 
be held. After the fire, martial law was imposed, and the Wafd was ousted from 
power, for the last time. In May, 1952 the Preparatory Committee was re-formed 
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under the name of the Founding Committee for the General Federation of 
Egyptian Trade Unions, and a congress was scheduled to be held from September 
14-16,1952 to discuss the founding of the Federation (Hamed: 137). However, the 
coming to power Of the Free Officers changed the course of the labour movement. 
In concluding the section on the labour movement at its second stage of 
development one can make the following observations. The predominant feature 
of the labour movement was that it was a dual struggle, for nationalism, and 
against capitalist exploitation. Because a substantial proportion of industry was 
foreign, or mutamasir the two movements converged. By the late 1930s and 
1940s, economic concerns began to overtake the nationalist ones, although the 
latter remained part of the workers' struggle. The effect on the labour movement 
however was significant, as a more independent labour movement began to 
perceive itself as a class for nationalism, rather than as a social force for 
nationalism. Attempts to control the movement by the 1940s were not very 
successful. It retained its independence. There were, however, problems with the 
labour movement. It retained some of the biases discussed earlier, namely that it 
was largely an urban-based movement with limited concern of the women 
members of the working class. For example, in 1946 the Association of Egyptian 
Women workers was established, but it remained for a few years only, after which 
it completely disappeared from the labour action scene. As an organisation, it was 
mainly concerned with issuing of publications basically dictated by leftist 
intellectuals. The association did not carry out any concrete actions to promote the 
rights of women workers (Uthman, 1983: 206). Besides this organisation, women 
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workers received little attention from the wider labour movement, nor did they 
participate in the general unions1e. 
During the second stage in its development, the labour movement became 
increasingly independent. Yet, within the labour movement there were problems 
between trade unionists and the workers whom they represented. Part of the 
problem was the failure of trade unionists themselves. There seemed to be an 
indication that unionists did not fully appreciate the strength of the rural identity of 
most workers (Uthman, 1983: 58). Second, since the labour movement was 
involved in the nationalist struggle, many unionists fell under the control or 
manipulation of `bourgeois' nationalists (Uthman, 1983: 59). This put a distance 
between unionists and workers. To illustrate the point attention is drawn to the 
result of the parliamentary elections of 1945 and 1950. As the Second World War 
was coming to an end there were increasing calls for the participation of workers 
in political life. Worker representatives nominated themselves for seats in the 
House of Representatives in parliament. In the Shubra E1-Kheima district, a 
`working class district' dominated by the textile industry, none of the unionists 
who ran for parliament seats won the votes in the district in either election 
(Uthman, 1982: 18-9,178-83). Thus, though the labour movement by the end of 
the 1940s and early 1950s was on the way to greater independence, it was not 
18 
It must be noted, however, that the program of the Preparatory Committee for 
the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions included equality of pay 
between men and women workers. 
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strong enough to face the suppression imposed by the new government of the Free 
Officers. 
Stage Three: Corporatisation of Trade Union Movement 
The coming to power of the Free Officers in the coup d'etat of 23 July 1952 
resolved the duality of the struggle of the labour movement by settling the issue of 
the nationalist struggle. The strategy of the regime vis-a-vis the labour movement 
was varied, formulated to some extent by the economic direction of the regime. 
Overall, however, it was one of containment of the labour movement. The 
enduring feature of the labour movement during the Nasser era was its 
corporatisation. By the legal reforms addressing workers' demands and by 
reforming and bureaucratising the trade union organisation, the Nasser regime 
impacted the labour movement in two ways. First, trade unions became 
instruments of state in implementing labour policy, thereby trade unions became 
de-politicised. Collective bargaining was meaningless under a system that 
regulated most aspects of employment from hours of work to insurance and 
wages. By their corporatisation trade unions became separated from the workers 
whom they represent. Second, while the Nasser regime managed to curtail the 
labour movement, it could not completely suppress it. Although legal reforms 
addressed the needs of workers, workers were subjected to capitalist relations. 
Even when the state proclaimed `the socialist path to development' in fact it was 
state capitalism. With the deepening political and economic crisis of the regime, 
the conflict between labour and capital became more overt. Thus the 
corporatisation of the labour movement could not resolve the conflict between 
labour and capital, but only managed to contain it for some time. 
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Labour and the coming to power of the Free Officers 
After the Cairo fire of 26 January, martial law was imposed in Egypt. Under such 
conditions, no civilian political force emerged. Combined with the weakness in 
Farouk's regime, this led to a political vacuum (El-Shafei, 1993: 24). The situation 
remained thus until July 1952, when the Free Officers carried out their coup, 
virtually unopposed. By proclaiming adherence to social justice, the rule of 
law/constitution, and purging the country of corruption, the `revolution' won the 
support of many sectors of society. Thus, a few days after the Free Officers seized 
power, delegations of workers and trade unionists went to the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) headquarters to give the support of workers for the 
`Revolution' (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 799). Within weeks the intentions of the regime for 
the labour movement became very clear. 
Among many unionists, the revolution and its leaders in the RCC were genuinely 
perceived to be the beginning of a new era of democratic rule in Egypt. Based on the 
positive feedback some members of the Founding Committee for the General 
Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions received from a meeting with RCC members, 
including Nasser, on July 31 the Founding Committee issued a statement supporting 
the revolution and its objectives. The Founding Committee urged the RCC to return 
Egypt to "parliamentary life as quickly as possible, as well as to repeal martial law, 
and all other legislation restricting democratic freedoms, especially the old labour 
laws" (Posusney, 1991: 46). 
Despite the support the regime obtained from the workers' movement, it is a fact that 
less than a month after coming to power, the new regime ferociously quelled a 
strike in Kafr El-Dawar. On August 13,1952 a strike was held at Misr Spinning 
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and Weaving, a textile factory in Kafr El-Dawar, where workers demanded the 
resolution of some of their earlier demands, including better pay and an end to 
arbitrary dismissals. Perhaps it is noteworthy to mention that the striking workers 
and demonstrators supporting them were chanting slogans of support for the new 
government and its leaders. The reaction of the regime was police intervention, 
and the execution of two leaders of the strike, Mostafa Khamis and Mohammed 
El-Baqary. Some `justifications' were used later to explain the nature of the 
intervention, including that strike was incited by `communists', in other accounts 
by Wafdists. Neither was proven to be the case (Beinin and Lockman: 422-5). 
The events at Kafr El-Dawar left a negative impression among workers, and this 
was an issue of concern with some of the leadership at the RCC. Thus General 
Mohammed Naguib who became the first President of the new `revolution' 
government noted: 
I was keen on gaining the trust of workers and peasants after the 
execution of Khamis and El-Bagary under a state of unstable 
security, so we do not lose [the support of] the largest sector of 
the populace. 
(Ezz El-Din, 1987: 807) 
The events of Kafr El-Dawar, however, were not an "incident", very soon 
afterward it became clear it was a policy of containment of labour. Thus, one of 
the officer members of the RCC, Abdel Menem Amin, became responsible for 
`labour affairs', and in September he "took an office and a military secretariat in 
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the Ministry of Social Affairs"" (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 808). On September 12, the 
RCC declared that the congress that had been scheduled to meet from September 
14-16 by the Founding Committee to discuss the establishment of the Federation 
of Egyptian Trade Unions "would be postponed to an undefined date" (Ezz El- 
Din, 1987: 810). The rationale used to disband the congress and the Founding 
Committee was largely based on security reports which stated that the Federation, 
should it be established, would be a tool in the hands of the `communists' or the 
Muslim Brotherhood, or even the Wafdists (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 810). The labour 
movement at that stage, however, could not confront the force of the Free Officers, 
and acquiesced to their decision to dismantle the Congress for the establishment of 
a Federation (Posusney, 1991: 48). 
At that point it became clear that the RCC had the upper hand in defining the 
agenda for labour. The independence of the labour movement was compromised. 
The `heavy handed' approach to labour was unacceptable both to workers and 
even to the reformists among the Free Officers such as Khaled Mohieldine2. 
Reformists within the RCC tried to moderate the otherwise hard line of the Free 
Officers, calling for "freedom of trade union action and the right to strike" (Beinin 
and Lockman: 431). They were, however, ä minority in the RCC, and eventually 
19 
Labour and employment were the responsibility of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. 
20 
He eventually became, and currently is, the president of the leftist Tagamuu 
Party. 
91 
the power struggle was resolved in favour of the hard line military faction in 
March 1954. 
The crisis of March 1954 demonstrated the extent to which the various factions 
within the RCC tried to use the labour movement to consolidate their power. In 
the end two factors were critical for the success of the `Nasserists'. First, the crack 
down on the Left/leftist forces the regime engaged in since coming to power 
considerably weakened the labour movement. The labour movement was deprived 
of some its most prominent leaders who were imprisoned. Second, many unionists 
gave their support to the Nasser faction in return for economic gains for workers 
and employment security, as well as pledges from the regime "confirming them in 
their positions of trade union leadership" (Beinin and Lockman: 444). This, 
however, was not carried out in a crude quid pro quo fashion. Many among the 
pro-Nasserists in the labour movement saw in him and the RCC "the only viable 
vehicle for achieving the demands of the Egyptian Nationalist movement" (Beinin 
and Lockman: 444). It was thus that the Free Officers tried to incorporate the 
union movement, by both crushing opposing factions and rewarding loyal ones 
(Bayat, 1993: 67). 
The "NEP" and labour: 
When the Free Officers came to power in 1952, the industrial base of the country 
was rather modest. In the period immediately preceding the Revolution, 1951/52, 
the rate of growth of industry was low, partly because of the end of the boom 
period of import-substitution industrialisation in the non-durable consumer goods 
sector. Attaining the highest levels of economic and of social growth was the 
primary consideration of the new government, and in that scheme, industrial 
92 
expansion was the core (Kasem: 316). The development of industry and attracting 
investments to it was one of the major issues addressed by the new government, 
particularly in the area of import-substitution in the durable and intermediate 
productive goods. 'The new government, however, had no well-defined ideology 
on economic policies. This was reflected in the government's industrial policy. 
One week after the `new' government came to power in 1952, the corporation Law 
138/1947 was amended so that the proportion of Egyptian capital in enterprises 
was reduced from 51% to 49% of ownership, extended to "legal parties" as well, 
thereby allowing for the involvement of foreigners in the ownership of enterprises. 
It also stipulated that a minimum of 90% of the workers in companies must be 
Egyptian, which it may be argued was there for the purpose of increasing the 
industrial workforce. The law was well received by the Egyptian Federation of 
Industry: 
"This law seems to want to put to an end - once and for all, we hope - 
to that absolutely unjustified fear of foreign capital... Therefore we 
called for the encouragement of private investments of foreign origin 
to the greatest possible extent, and the authorities have finally 
vindicated us. " (Abdel-Malik: 89) 
Besides the Corporation law, the new regime initiated a series of legislation 
affecting the workforce. On 27 September 1952, a committee was formed by the 
Minister of Social Affairs to examine labour legislation. It was a tri-partite 
committee, with membership from the government, labour representatives, and the 
business community. The goal of the committee was the preparation of a unified 
labour law. The representative of the RCC in the Ministry, however, rejected the 
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idea of formulating a Unified Labour Law, and insisted that the objective of the 
committee was the revision of existing labour legislation (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 814). 
Based on the recommendations of this committee Laws 317,318, and 319 for 
1952 were passed'in December 1952. 
The Individual Contract Law, Law 317/1952, added to workers' benefits that were 
provided in law 41/1944. Among the additions were a bonus at the end of 
employment, an increase in the annual leave, obligatory medical care for workers 
in enterprises employing more than 500 workers, protection of workers against 
arbitrary dismissal, and providing transportation to workers who live in areas 
where there is no access to transportation. While this law addressed many of the 
demands that workers had made earlier, the provision relating to the dismissal of 
workers was problematic. It did not completely ban `arbitrary' dismissals, rather it 
gave workers the right to appeal `arbitrary' dismissal in a court of law (Ezz El- 
Din, 1987: 815). This issue was redressed in 1953, by virtue of decree 165 "which 
made it a very expensive and bureaucratically cumbersome undertaking to dismiss 
a worker without cause" (Beinin and Lockman: 432). 
The second law, Law 318/1952, known as the Conciliation and Arbitration Law, 
was a reform of Law 105/1948. The new law facilitated the procedures in the 
settlement of disputes by establishing a number of conciliation and arbitration 
committees nation-wide. It also made resorting to these committees obligatory for 
all disputes, individual or collective. While this law provided for favourable 
conditions to workers, in relation to the conditions of employment and the 
assurance of settlement of disputes at work, it contained a loophole. Due to the 
vague wording of the law, employers could in fact dismiss workers by declaring a 
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work stoppage, after which they could resume work and hire workers on the 
employers' terms. This ploy was used enough to warrant a modification in the law 
on March 21,1953 when a "Factory Stoppages" committee was formed to 
examine such cases (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 820). 
Another law issued during that period was the Trade Union Law, Law 319/1952. 
Though this law does not deal with conditions of work it was nonetheless 
important in that it increased organised labour. This was made possible by 
facilitating registration of unions, so that instead of administrative registration at 
the Ministry of Social Affairs as per Law 85/1942, unions were recognised upon 
submission of their papers to the Ministry. The law allowed new sectors of 
workers to unionise, such as agricultural workers. It increased union membership 
by stipulating that if three-fifths of the workers in an enterprise are unionised then 
the remainder of the workers of the enterprise become union members 
automatically. This closed-shop system was strictly enforced. The law also 
allowed for deduction of union membership dues from the pay cheques of the 
workers by the employer. Manual workers and clerical workers could not combine 
in one enterprise union. 
The trade union law, nevertheless, was problematic. For example the three fifths 
condition, when combined with the deduction of union fees from the workers' 
salary by the employer, put a distance between trade unions and the rank and file. 
Some unionists also argued that it made unions more easily controlled by 
management (Beinin and Lockman: 433). While the law cut down on the 
administrative aspects and control on formation of unions, it imposed constraints 
on union meetings. It was necessary to have clearance to conduct a union meeting, 
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and the law stated that unions were banned from dealing with political and 
religious matters (Adly, 1993: 145). But, the law made it clear that the formation 
of a trade union federation was possible. 
Regardless of the shortcomings of these laws, they did provide more security of 
employment than earlier laws. The issue of these laws was, however, accompanied 
by a military decree banning all strikes. As a package, therefore, many among the 
workers and trade union leaders accepted the legal changes. Yet, on. examination 
of how much workers gained from `reform from above' compared to the `changes 
instigated from below' as was the case prior to the revolution, one finds that the 
latter is more capable of delivering benefits to workers. This point is illustrated by 
taking the example of wage increases. Although the pre-Free Officer regime was 
not particularly pro-labour, wages for workers increased by about 45% in the 
period from 1946 to 1952. This was achieved "partly as a result of strikes and 
union activities" (Mabro: 153). In contrast, while the government of the Free 
Officers doubled the minimum wage in 1953 to LE 0.250/day, "this law was not 
seriously enforced until the beginning of the 1960s" (Mabro: 153). Thus the 
traditional methods of collective bargaining are capable of providing workers with 
more benefits than the legalisation of workers' demands, perhaps because if the 
law is not enforced then workers lose by recourse to the legal courts to prove their 
rights. It is a lengthy, expensive process, and in addition, laws may contain 
loopholes. The discussion by no means implies that legalising workers' demands 
is not required, quite on the contrary, it means that both legal recognition of 
worker' rights and giving workers the tools to fight for these rights are equally 
important. 
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The government had tried to make industrial investments attractive by making all 
new industries tax exempt for five years (Abdel-Malik: 101). Furthermore, the 
government was willing to become a `partner' in heavy industries and provide 
support if needed to private investors (Kassem: 320). Yet, in spite of all this 
`good-will', as well as the Corporation Law to encourage private investments in 
industry, and the labour laws to stabilise labour, industrial growth was not 
substantial. On the one hand, Egyptian capital was limited, in particular the 
potential of the land-owning bourgeoisie remained unavailable for investments in 
industry. On the other hand, the share of investments by foreign capital in industry 
was insignificant due to bureaucracy and interference by the government in 
enterprises, including private enterprises. Thus, in 1956, the lack of investments in 
industry combined with the Suez crisis set the government's policies in another 
direction. While the period from 1952 to 1956 was known as the private/free 
projects phase, or to borrow the term of Lenin the `NEP' phase, the period 
following the Suez crisis was the period of the planned economy (Kasem: 318). 
The populist basis of the revolutionary government 
Populist regimes in many parts of the developing world, in general, have common 
features: anti-western foreign policy, state-led economic development strategy, 
and the idolisation of the national common cause. At the same time populist 
regimes maintain a potential for grassroots participation. The latter is constrained 
though by the development strategy of the state, which emphasises productivity, 
profitability, and discipline. They are populist because they fall back on the 
masses for support, usually through social reform and nationalist discourse. 
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Political parties were disbanded in January 1953, but in order to maintain "popular 
participation", the RCC established the Liberation Rally 21, Hay'at Al-Tahrir. It was 
formed in January 23,1953 basically as a national fronte. The Rally was basically 
"another arm of the new military government" (Posusney, 1991: 51). Membership 
was practically open to all. The program of the Liberation Rally echoed the 
philosophy of the RCC: establishing national sovereignty for Egypt and The 
Sudan, a commitment to a just social system and equality in education, in 
distribution of wealth, in political rights, social welfare, and a strengthening of ties 
with other states with particular focus on Arab States (Abdel-Malik: 92-3). Since 
it was formed, the Liberation Rally had a considerable role in directing the labour 
agenda, through a labour bureau in the Rally. It is also important to note that trade 
union leaders were `expected' to be members of the Liberation Rally. The extent 
of the importance of the Liberation Rally's labour bureau became clear when it 
established the Permanent Congress of Egyptian Trade Unions as an unofficial 
trade union federation (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 823). 
Under the name of `popular participation' the militarisation of society took place. 
The topmost positions in `popular' organisation were from the military. This was 
the case with the Liberation Rally, the Arab Socialist Union, and even with the 
economic establishments, such as the Economic Agency. Pluralism gave way to 
unitary, hierarchical corporatist structures. Implied in this was a kind of an 
21 
The Liberation Rally proved vital for Nasser in the crisis of March 1954, since 
he won to a great extent due to the support from its membership of workers. 
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agreement or a "`social contract' between the authoritarian state and civil society" 
(Bianchi, 1989: 81). The state thus delivered the `goods' in return for popular 
allegiance. With the beginning of the planned economy this became increasingly 
the case with regard to the labour movement. 
The Planned Economy and The Socialist Path 
The Suez Crisis which started with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 
1956, and ended with the 1956 War at the end of October of the same year, had a 
profound impact on Egyptian internal and external policies. As a quick response to 
the political crisis, but more important due to the economic problems that 
confronted the government over the few years preceding the crisis, the 
Egyptianization laws were issued on January 15,1957. A series of laws, Laws 
22/1957,23/1957, and 24/1957 stipulated that "thenceforth all commercial banks, 
insurance companies and foreign commercial agencies would have to become 
Egyptian corporations owned by Egyptian capital and under Egyptian 
management" (Abdel-Malik: 108). By April of the same year the bulk of the 
British, French, and Turkish banks and insurance companies were Egyptianized. 
The process extended until 1962, but the bulk was carried out earlier. Needless to 
say, the Egyptianization laws targeted foreign bodies. The private sector was still 
in existence, but increasingly with the expanding role of the state in the economy, 
the private sector began to decline. 
22 Although it was sometimes referred to as a party, it was not so. 
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The significance of the Egyptianization " movement was not in the actual 
'possession' of the banks, or the insurance companies, and their assets, but in the 
administrative and bureaucratic apparatus that was created and which gained in 
importance as they became 'tools' of the state's direct role in the economy. A few 
days before the Egyptianization laws were passed, to be precise on January 13, 
two agencies were created: the High Committee for National Planning, and the 
Economic Agency. 
The High Committee for National Planning was established by Presidential 
Decree. The Economic Agency, which was established as Law 20/1957, was 
"supposed to combine under a single head all the functions assumed by various 
ministries and departments in the companies of mixed type that existed on January 
13,1957" (Abdel-Malik: 111). In effect, it was like a central holding company. 
The Economic Agency also played a role in the execution of the Plan, not only by 
managing the enterprises it held, but also by creating new enterprises, in 
accordance with the Plan. As such, the Economic Agency "emerged clearly as the 
representative of state capitalism in the period under study: instead of the former 
owners and managers, the agency managed companies, and it created new ones 
that it held in full ownership" (Abdel-Malik: 111). As the state's role in the 
economy increased, so did the importance of the Economic Agency. 
An important issue that must be emphasised is that though, from an economic 
perspective, the Egyptianization laws were a turning point in the direction of the 
government towards economic centralisation or a command economy achieved 
through the "glorious July laws" of 1961-64, political centralisation was already 
under way before the Egyptianization laws. Since Nasser came to power in 1954, 
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there had been a crack-down, sometimes violent, against 'opposition', particularly 
the Left and the Muslim Brotherhood. This was a trend toward the hegemony of 
the state over the various fields of political, social, and economic life. It was then 
the turn of workers to come in line. 
Thus, a five-year plan was initiated in 1958, but after some initial difficulties, it 
was transferred to a three-year plan. The three year plan provided the 
industrialisation process with a strong push, albeit resulting in an unbalanced 
budget (Abdel-Malik: 131). But, the five-year plan for 1960-65, often referred to 
as the first five-year plan, was very important as it paved the way for the extensive 
nationalisation of 1961-64. Already in 1959, there were clear indications of the 
direction the government was to take with the 1961 `Socialist Laws'. In a speech 
by Nasser in 1959 he stated that: 
There is all that justifies the ownership of industry by the state, 
because it [State] represents the people, and because it creates a 
balance to private ownership, and provides security from the 
control of private capital over industry. 
(Kasem: 324) 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) 
In 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council approved the establishment of a 
central labour organisation, as a confederation. Thus the Permanent Congress of 
Egyptian Trade Unions was initiated and it operated until 1957, but it had not 
submitted any documents for its establishment. At the same time another 
organisation, the Congress of Trade Unions of the Republic was formed. Thus, in 
fact two confederations were in existence. The Permanent Congress was quite 
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active, it established the Pan-Arab trade union federation in 1956. In January 1957 
the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was declared, after the Permanent 
Congress pressured the preparatory committee to make a constitution for the 
ETUF. 
The objectives of the ETUF were clarified in its program. It aimed to protect 
workers from "exploitation", thus for example it banned (sub)contracting of 
workers. The objectives include the limitation of working hours to 48 hours per 
week. Other objectives of the ETUF were ensuring adequacy of wages, and 
insurance against work related injuries and illness (Adly, 1993: 160-1). 
Organisationally, the ETUF is the peak of a pyramid forming the trade union 
structure. At the base of the pyramid are enterprise-based union committee, 
between the ETUF and the latter is the general or industry union. It is possible to 
form a union committee at the enterprise level if a minimum of 50 workers join 
the union committee23. With the introduction of law 62/1964, union committees 
came to acquire complete legal status, and thus these committees could be 
dissolved without affecting the remainder of the union structure. 
The ETUF is the organisation responsible for the direction of the Egyptian trade 
union movement, since the ETUF plans the policies, and puts in place all the 
programs necessary for attaining its objectives. Among the more specific 
objectives of the ETUF are the responsibility to defend the rights of Egyptian 
workers, participate in discussions on economic and social development for Egypt, 
give a consultative view on any laws relating to work and labour, co-ordinate with 
I 
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general unions and assist them in attaining their objectives, and form a model 
system that general unions, and committees would adhere to. Such a system would 
cover the administrative and financial by-laws of the organisation (Adly, 
1993: 170-1). 
The general union is, as has been mentioned earlier, the intermediary level in the 
overall structure of the union structure. It is not possible for members of a single 
trade to be organised in more than one general union. As for the responsibilities of 
the general union these are: the protection of workers' rights, improvement of 
working conditions, upgrading social status of workers, participation in planning 
and implementation of vocational training for workers, supervision, following up 
and monitoring activities of union committees. 
Union committees have a number of responsibilities basically related to the 
workplace, such as dispute settlement. Yet, it cannot have collective agreements 
without the approval of the "general" or industry union. Union committees 
participate with the general union in the preparation of collective/joint contracts. 
They also participate in the discussions of the production plans of the enterprise 
and implement such plans. Also, union committees provide a consultative view on 
breeches of bylaws by employees. Before it implements any service, the trade 
union committee has to review them with the general committee. Thus trade union 
committees (enterprise level) basically play a consultative role, and fall under 
much supervision from the general union. 
23For agricultural co-operatives the minimum number of workers is 30. 
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It emerges that the structure of trade unions in Egypt is hierarchical with strict 
delegation of authority and regulated responsibilities. It is organised with a clear 
flow of command from the top to the base. The level that is most in contact with 
workers, namely the union committees, are the weakest and are subject to extensive 
supervision by the general union. Subsequent labour laws have not altered this 
situation, rather they have consolidated power and control at the top of the 
hierarchy. Yet, as a policy or decision-making organisation, the ETUF does not 
have significant power, and it represents the corporatisation of the trade unions by the 
state. 
The Nasser Regime, with its populist ideology, had a profound impact on the trade 
union movement in Egypt. Nasser had certainly issued a number of protective laws 
for workers, but in doing so he intentionally neutralised the trade union movement 
in Egypt. Nasser curtailed the role of trade unions to economic concerns. To be 
specific, the role of unions became more as mediators since the legislation provided 
workers with what had been long-standing union/workers' demands. Also, as a 
result of the highly centralised, hierarchical, and diversified organisation of the trade 
union, they became to a large extent isolated from the rank and file. Thus, with 
Nasser, the trade union movement was weakened. 
Although the formation of a federation had been a long-standing demand of the 
labour movement, the formation of the ETUF was met by severe criticism by some 
unionists. It was argued that the unitary organisation was undemocratic and 
compromised the independence of the labour movement (Serafy, 1983: 18). This 
was especially the case by making membership in the ASU mandatory for trade 
unionists. In addition, the bureaucratisation of the structure led to the emergence 
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of bureaucratic unionists, who dealt with unionism as basically an administrative 
charge (Serafy, 1983: 25). Further measures were adopted in subsequent years that 
further corporatised the labour movement. 
Unified Labour Law 
On April 5,1959 the unified labour law (Law 91/1959) was issued with the aim of 
unifying the trade union movement and to unify the different labour laws, some of 
which dated back to 1933. The law was considered one of the most significant labour 
laws issued after Nasser came to power (Ezz El Din, 1987: 902). It had consequences 
that were very far reaching for the trade union movement in Egypt. Among the 
provisions of the law was the adoption of industry based unions, rather than the 
enterprise based unions. A general union combined all workers in one industry or 
group of industries that were interrelated by the production of one product. As a result, 
almost overnight, the number of unions decreased from 1400 enterprise based unions 
to 65 industry based unions, with only 59 of the latter established (Adly, 1993: 145). 
The general union was represented in governorates through local branches of the 
union. This is evidence of the further consolidation of the power and authority of the 
state over the trade unions and the labour movement. The unified labour law was 
defined as "a landmark piece of corporatist legislation" (Bianchi, 1989: 78). The 
rationale behind the reorganisation of unions was largely for security reasons. The 
Nasser government was informed by the Syrians, which Egypt united with in 1958, 
that "by consolidating union activity in a handful of big federations", the Syrians 
explained, "the new labour law had eliminated many of the local nesting areas that 
served as the traditional refuges of Ba'thist and communist troublemakers" (Bianchi, 
1989: 78-9). 
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In addition the unified labour law limited the action of the trade unions by 
regulating the expenditure of unions and authorised areas of expenditure. The law 
regulated some aspects of the budget of the union, specifically it indicated that 
administrative expenses were not to exceed 20% of the annual revenue, and a 
minimum of one third to be used as expenditure for workers, such as health. Most 
significant the law indicated that the Minister of Social Affairs had the power to 
request from a primary court to dismiss a union if it was found to have instigated 
change in the political system, or lobbied against any sector in society, and leaving 
or avoiding work intentionally, thereby severely limiting the independence of 
unions. Indeed, these provisions limit any attempt at action. 
It was the massive nationalisation which started in 1962 that was of particular 
significance during the Nasser era. A substantial public sector emerged accounting 
for approximately 40% of GDP. The (public sector) enterprise became the central 
unit of the system. In 1961 a law initiating workers participation in management 
was issued. The 1961 Laws included measures that regulated profit distribution in 
joint companies, setting a minimum wage, and regulation of working hours. Law 
114/1961 allowed for the participation of workers and employees in the 
management of enterprises through the board of directors via two elected 
representatives. The law was modified in 1963 to double the number of elected 
workers' representatives to four. In 1966 a law was issued which decreed that 
employees "controlled public and state money which they were to utilise for 
production according to a national plan" (Bayat, 1993: 67). These 'gains' for the 
workforce however, came at a price. There were some guidelines that had to be 
adhered to. All strikes were banned. It was illegal to "[incite] class antagonism, 
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taking industrial action, or trying to overthrow the political system" (Bayat, 1993: 
68). 
The over-arching objective of the first five-year plan in 1960 was the doubling of 
the national income in ten (10) years. Indeed the growth rate projected for the 
industrial sector (including electricity and construction) was 81.8% for the period 
of the plan. Evidently this required an increase in the workforce; 17% for 
unskilled labour, 25.4% in industry, electricity, and construction. Wages would 
increase by 34%. In return labour output would increase by 21.8% on average 
(Abdel-Malik: 132). Given such an ambitious plan, there was a need to attract 
workers to the industrial sector from the then-predominant agricultural sector. 
By 1961, after nine years of various approaches aimed at enhancing 
industrialisation, the initial goal of the revolutionary government, of social and 
economic development, remained to a large extent unfulfilled. Local and foreign 
capital did not invest sufficiently in industry. It seemed to be that what 
Egyptianization did attain was bureaucratisation of economic management. 
Rather, economic problems were increasing, while the "country's wealth was still 
being employed only in part, while its capital was getting very little use, and that 
in a rather incoherent fashion" (Abdel-Malik: 150). 
The July 1961 socialist laws resulted in the nationalisation of the bulk of 
commercial and productive enterprises in Egypt. With Law 117/1961 came the 
nationalisation of the banks, insurance companies, and enterprises in the heavy- 
industry sector, and other agencies. Law 118/1961 allowed for at least 50% of the 
capital of 83 enterprises to be held by a public corporation, and finally Law 
119/1961 which "affected 147 medium industrial companies ... belonging to 
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groups or families, established state participation through state ownership of all 
shares held by each stockholder in excess of LE 10,000" (Abdel-Malik: 153). The 
justification used at the time for the nationalisation was, according to Ali Sabry, 
the then Minister for the Presidency of the Republic: 
It was necessary... to mobilize the nation's savings in a deliberate 
fashion in order to accomplish the national objective: 
development. Similarly, this economic mobilization must be 
carried out in conformance with our basic principles: it must 
respect the individual's right to existence, his right to creation 
and growth, and his right to property within the framework of the 
law... lt was on the foundation of these positions that the word 
nationalisation' was coined; nationalisation is ownership by the 
nation in the true literal sense of the word.. . For us the public 
sector is not a method chosen for the liquidation of property but 
rather one that should lead to the broadening of its base". 
(Abdel-Malik: 154) 
All nationalised enterprises, totalling 367, were to be allocated to 38 public 
corporations, which came to replace the Economic Agency. The High Council for 
Public Corporations presided over the different public agencies. In line with this 
development, law 62/1964 was issued, which further concentrates the number of 
24 
It is interesting to note that the same terminology is used for privatisation in the 
present, which is officially referred to as the broadening of the base of ownership. 
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general unions, from 59 to 27. Similar industries were organised into a general 
union. 
Law 62/1964, concentration of power 
Subsequent to the Unified Labour Law 91/1959, law 62/1964 was issued, partly as a 
response to the nationalisation's of 1961 - 1964. Most importantly, law 62/1964 re- 
categorised unions so that any industry or group of industries that are similar or 
related or produce a common product were to be organised into a general union. 
Thus, a further condensation occurred, whereby the number of general unions 
decreased from 59 to 27. The law made clear that it was not possible to have more 
than one union per industry or per enterprise. By virtue of this law, unions became 
legal entities entitled to settle disputes. 
Among the other provisions of the law is the expansion in unionisation, the law 
allowed state employees to form unions, and agricultural workers could form 
unions in villages. Although the law dismantled branch unions in governorates, it 
established regional unions at the level of the governorates to co-ordinate among 
unions. Financially, the law increased the administrative budget of unions from 
20% to 30%, as well as other financial considerations (Adly, 1993: 150). 
The major thrust of the law was that it further condensed the number of general 
unions, which leads to more control. The effect of these combined laws on the trade 
union federation is that it has rendered unions centralised structures. Among other 
corporatist measures adopted by Nasser, was that in order to be eligible to become 
a union official, it was necessary to be a member of the `Arab Socialist Union'. 
These measures, understandably limited the effectiveness of trade unions to carry 
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out or encourage class-based action of the working class, because basically the 
working class became a part of the state. 
One of the often referred to features of the state under Nasser was its labour laws. 
The laws were protective of workers, and addressed/legislated most of the demands 
workers had made over several years during the 1930s and 1940s. An examination 
of the labour laws shows that the process of legal change under the Free Officers 
was a gradual and incremental process. It is, however, possible to argue that the 
labour laws corresponded to the different stages the government went through in 
pursuit of execution of its overall social and economic policies, and specifically 
industrial development. Previous to 1961/2 labour legislation centred on the 
conditions of work, but under the 1961/2 laws workers were 'appropriated' by 
enterprises. 
Concerning the governments' policies, the period previous to the 1960s was 
concerned with the "wo/manning" or staffing of the industrial sector, thus with 
improvements in the conditions of work. After the nationalisation of 1961, 
industrial development grew at a very high rate. In fact, it is estimated that the rate 
of growth, levels of investments, and levels of productivity achieved during the 
period of nationalisation and to some extent that of Egyptianization, were 
unprecedented, and have not been attained since then. Henceforth, the labour laws 
of the 60s that provided for security of employment, participation in management 
and decision-making, and sharing in profits of the enterprises. With an objective of 
doubling the national income, and a growth rate of 81.8% as per the five year plan, 
such laws were used for the stability of the workforce. On the other side of the 
equation, the trade union movement was effectively rendered powerless. At the 
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organisational level, the trade union movement was very centralised, and rigid. 
The unions at the level of the enterprises, a potential source of labour activity, 
were made vulnerable by giving them a legal persona, thus they could be 
dismantled in a court without effecting the rest of the trade union hierarchy. 
Corporatisation of the labour movement and labour unrest 
While it has been shown that for the most part the labour movement in Egypt was 
contained, there was evidence nonetheless of labour unrest. While one of the first 
provisions of the regime was banning strikes, workers registered their conflicts 
with employers via Conciliation and Arbitration committees or in labour tribunals. 
A cursory glance at the number of registered disputes between workers and 
employers since 1952, reveals that there was a sharp increase when compared to 
the pre-revolutionary era. The average number of labour disputes for the period 
1945-1951 was 15,221 while for 1952-58 it was 45,635 (Beinin, 1989: 77; El- 
Gebeilly, 1991: 317). Partly, the increase was because of the ban on strikes, but it 
points to the situation that despite legalisation of workers' rights, the laws were 
not always enforced. 
It important to put this increase in labour disputes in the context of the size of the 
industrial workforce for the period under examination. The size of the total labour 
force in 1952 was 6.48 million, while in 1958 it was 6.79 million (El-Gebeilly, 
1991: 308). While in the industrial enterprises employing 10 or more workers it 
was (in thousands) 264.9 in 1952, and 268.2 in 1957 (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 313). 
Thus the increase in the size of the workforce for the period under examination, 
from the mid 1940s to the end of 1950s, was not major. The sharp increase in 
labour disputes thus could not be due to an increase in the labour force. 
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Many employers were able to get around some of the restrictions imposed on them 
by the laws. For example, employers could dismiss workers or not pay the 
minimum wage by hiring workers for the probationary period, in some cases 
workers were fired and then re-hired immediately by the same employer for an 
additional probationary period (Beinin, 1989: 80). Another area of infringements 
was the hiring of workers through contractors. This was a prevalent practice in 
some industries, namely "in agriculture, construction, and longshore work" 
(Beinin, 1989: 80). Although many workers registered their complaints as 
disputes, the number of cases which the workers won was not substantial. Thus for 
cases presented before labour tribunals in 1954, out of a total of 14,640 cases 
workers won 29.8% of the cases, and for 1955 workers won 38% of cases (Beinin, 
1989: 78; El-Gebeilly, 1991: 318). The absence of trade unions in settling disputes 
was glaring, and when there was trade union activity, it was not difficult to 
dismiss the `troublesome' trade unionists/workers. In fact, it is reported that 
sometimes trade unionists themselves "sometimes colluded with employers to 
have militant workers dismissed" (Beinin, 1989: 81). 
End of Nasserism: A new beginning for labour 
By the mid-1960s Egypt had serious economic crisis partly instigated by the 
decrease in the profitability of the public sector. Underlying the populism adopted 
by Nasser were some structural problems that eventually led to the collapse of 
Nasserism. Populism "faced a conflict between the political/social basis of the 
state, and its economic rationale. This is to mean that conflict emerged by trying to 
satisfy conflicting classes, workers, and the bureaucratic/ technocratic state" (El- 
Shafei, 1993: 10). Whereas individual enterprises were pursuing efficiency and 
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profit maximisation, the state adhered to pursuing social objectives that included 
job security, and selling goods at low fixed prices. 
The crisis was a crisis of capitalism. It was on the one hand a crisis of capital 
accumulation, or rather non-accumulation, and a crisis of profitability (Bradley: 
80). By the mid 1960s investments in industry had plateaued. At the same time, 
industrialisation and investments in industry were not met by increased labour 
productivity, basically because the of the state's populist policies regarding 
employment of workers (obligatory recruitment and secure employment), and 
fixed wages (since 1961, minimum wage was enforced). As a result the value- 
added declined. A fall in profitability occurred, followed by "stagnation in the 
accumulation of capital" (Bradley: 82). The way out for the economy was 
liberalisation and encouraging private investments, a process which began to take 
place by the late 1960s. Liberalisation became not a policy option, rather it became 
inevitable. 
The high expectations of people which the Nasserist rhetoric fed, were confronted 
by limited economic and political resources. Politically, the death blow to 
Nasserism came in June 1967, with the defeat in the 1967 war, whereupon the 
focus on development ceased and instead the government directed all its resources 
towards reconstruction due to the extensive damages caused by the 1967 war. The 
end of Nasserism seemed to have been marked by a wave of strikes that started in 
1968. For example, in February 1968 a strike erupted in Helwan, a major 
industrial area south of Cairo. The strike took the form of demonstrations carried 
out by workers and students. The strikes continued into the 1970s after Sadat had 
seized power. For example, in August 1971 about 10,000 workers in the Iron and 
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Steel industry went on strike against deteriorating conditions. This wave of strikes 
continued well into 1972. An adequate explanation is that these strikes were 
primarily instigated by declining economic conditions. The end of Nasserism thus 
had both an economic dimension and a political one. 
Conclusion 
The corporatisation of the labour movement provided workers with a social 
contract based on the legalisation of workers' rights and demands, ranging from 
wage increases to participation in the management of enterprises. In return, 
workers were expected to abide by the formal channels provided by the state 
structure for the negotiation of conditions of work, and the settlement of disputes. 
Most important, workers were expected to carry out their part of the bargain and 
become `productive'. This became more pronounced since 1961-2 and the 
enactment of the Socialist Charter. In that scheme, trade unions were no longer 
seen as proponents of workers' economic rights (Posusney, 1991: 80). Rather, 
after "The Great Transformation" as the `socialist' period was sometimes referred 
to, the role of unions changed. The following quotation which appeared in an 
economic periodical on 12/1/61, describes the new role of unions: 
unions are no longer charitable societies, helping the 
distressed and treating the sick - they must become centers of 
revolutionary radiation and instruments for pushing forward the 
wheels of production. 
(in Posusney, 1991: 80) 
114 
Nevertheless, corporatisation of the labour movement, and legalisation of workers' 
demands did not satisfy the requirements of some unionists, even those who `co- 
operated' with the regime. Thus, while the working class made further gains under 
the `socialist' reforms of 1961-2 through provisions for 50% representation of 
workers and peasants in all local and national councils, including the House of 
representatives, some unionists felt that the regime did not go far enough. Thus, 
for example in 1962 in a meeting with Nasser, some unionists insisted that they 
wanted the right to carry out collective bargaining with respect to wages and 
conditions of work, as well as the right to make collective agreements with 
management (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 942). They were totally refused their request and 
informed by Nasser that the gains of the working class under the `Revolution' far 
exceeded what workers demanded. Indeed, Nasser said that "they [workers] made 
agreements and bargained for hundreds of years, for decades and still, the 
minimum wage law was passed without being asked for" (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 943). 
It is also, important to note here the fact that while the ETUF was by law required 
to be represented in the committees for formulating labour laws, their opinions 
were only consultative. 
The benefits of Nasserism to workers were not felt by all workers. Some gained 
more than others. Overall, only a proportion of the labour force was unionised. 
Thus for example while the labour force in the early 1960s was between 6 and 7 
million, in 1964 unionised workers were approximately 1.1 million, and for 1965 
it was approximately 1.3 million (El-Gebeilly, 1991: 314). Thus the benefits of 
corporatisation of the labour movement went to a proportion of the labour force. 
One possible winner was women workers. 
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The Nasser era was reputed as advancing the situation of the working woman. 
During the first few months after the establishment of the ETUF in 1957, a branch 
(shu'ba) for working women was founded comprised of a number of women. On 
21 October 1957, ' the shu'ba proposed some amendments to laws issued in 1933 
concerning annual leave, maternity leave, work related injuries, and wages of 
working women. In January 1958 some amendments were made limiting working 
hours for women, and setting a maximum for the number of overtime hours per 
day (ETUF, 1992: 456). The Nasser era had equated working men and women in 
wages, and work entitlements. However, the role played by unions in the 
promotion of women's rights was not significant. The shuba of the ETUF was a 
sectional consideration of women. More middle class women benefited from 
Nasserism than did working class women. The primary reason was education. Free 
education at all levels including universities, combined with the government's 
policy of guaranteed employment for university graduates. Thus women graduates 
found employment in the administrative apparatus of state. The issue of the 
employment of women is discussed in more detail in a following chapter. 
Thus, by the mid 1960s corporatism developed many cracks, economic, social, 
and political. Economically it became unsustainable, and it raised the dissent of 
both workers and some trade union leaders. However, despite these critical 
problems in corporatism, the defeat in the 1967 War was the deathblow to the 
system. Nasserism completely lost any credibility that remained. With the end of 
Nasserism and the beginning of liberalism, especially after open door policy, 
capitalist social relations became more pronounced. The state became more 
pronounced as a capitalist state. The state became an instrument of capitalism via 
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legislation, and by subsidising the bourgeoisie. The position of the state became 
paradoxical, on the one hand a capitalist state, and on the other hand still trying to 
maintain the facade of a workers' state. The cracks in the system deepened. With 
structural adjustment, the state could no longer play both roles. The following 
chapter discusses the fourth phase in the development of the labour movement in 
Egypt. It discusses the era of liberation and globalisation, and their implication 
both for workers and trade unions. The basic challenge the state faces under 
liberation is that the `social contract' with the `popular forces' breaks down. By 
decreasing the role of state in the economy, it is inevitable that the state has to 
decrease its political grip on civil society. Thus, corporatism should, in theory, 
give way to pluralism. 
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Chapter Three: Liberalisation And Globalisation: 
Trade Unions At A Cross Road 
A new stage in the development of the labour movement started in the late-1960s, 
with the end of Nasserism, and continues to the present. The major trends acting 
on the labour movement at this phase, the fourth in the development of the labour 
movement, are economic liberalisation and Globalisation. In many ways these 
two processes have a similar impact on workers. They divide rather than unite the 
working class. While the two processes have provided some of the conditions for 
the strengthening of the labour movement, nevertheless, they also weaken it. The 
overlap in the two processes of liberalisation and globalisation has had a negative 
impact on the labour movement. The restructuring of the world economy, the 
globalisation of capital, and emergence of the neo-liberal ideology with structural 
adjustment as one of its key components, are founded on the primacy of the 
economic factor in development. 
Furthermore, I argue that in the current phase, the trade union organisation is in 
fact one of the causes of the weakening of the labour movement. Increasingly 
trade unions are being challenged from the workers themselves. The end of 
Nasserism has meant a gradual move away from state-led development based on 
both economic efficiency and social welfare, to growth-oriented policies based on 
economic performance. The position of trade unions vis-a-vis these changes 
became untenable. 
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The changes brought about by liberalisation policies adopted in Egypt and 
globalisation are discussed in detail below, with an analysis of the implications of 
these changes for the labour movement. 
Part l: The Era of Liberalization 
The beginnings of economic liberalisation: 
Economic liberalisation started out in Egypt as an attempt at redressing the 
failures of Nasserism. After the defeat in the June 1967 War there came to the 
fore calls for a reassessment of the "Revolution", and ridding it of `corrupt 
elements', in particular the much vilified "power centres" (marakez al-quwa). As 
already mentioned in the previous chapter, the defeat in the 1967. war sealed the 
fate of Nasserism. The weaknesses of the regime were fully exposed. In the 
aftermath of the defeat there was a number of protests. The military establishment 
came under much attack as inefficient and corrupt. Nasser, however, managed to 
weather the storm. Indeed, on June 9,1967 a few days after the War, Nasser 
made a public speech in which he claimed responsibility for the defeat and 
announced his resignation from all public offices he held. The reaction was 
immediate, on the following day the ETUF announced a general strike in almost 
all governorates in Egypt, and declared that it would not come to an end until 
Nasser withdrew his resignation. Nasser managed to utilise this `popular' support 
to introduce reforms, both political and economic. 
Liberalisation of the economy increasingly became viewed by the government as 
inevitable. However, liberalization policies also inevitably meant diminishing 
the benefits that workers received. As the June 10 strike demonstrated, workers 
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were an important power base for the regime to fall onto in times of crisis, thus 
introducing the kind of reform that was needed would lose the regime an 
important power base. The way the Nasser regime could proceed with the 
reforms toward liberalisation was by `recreating' the Revolution, and the re- 
making of a nationalist plan that would make some of the liberalisation measures 
acceptable, as sacrifices for the good of the country. This is made clear in the 
March 30 Program. 
March 30 Program 
The declared aim of the March 30 (1968) Program was purging the revolution of 
corrupt elements and included attempts at democratisation. ' It received the 
overwhelming support of voters on May 2,1968. The March 30 Program was 
basically the `manifesto' of the new stage of re-directing or correcting the path of 
the `revolution' (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 1002). The March 30 Program provided 
guidelines for the modernisation of Egypt after the defeat in the 1967 war, aiming 
to produce political and economic reform. More specifically, the program 
introduced some civil liberties measures by repealing some repressive laws or 
reforming them. These were law 119/1964 concerning state security, law 25/1966 
on martial law, law 84/1953 on judicial powers of the military officers (repealed), 
law 162/1958 relating to the emergency state, prison law 396/1956, and military 
decree 14/1956 on detention centres (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 993-7). 
1 
Indeed, the March 30 Program itself was issued in a `democratic' way, by a 
referendum. 
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The Program also included measures for elections to be held for "local and 
regional bodies along with the central organism, the Arab Socialist Union" 
(Hussein: 299). There was an attempt at making the ASU more democratic 
through elections 'rather than the system of appointments that was in operation. It 
is argued that Nasser wanted to break the power of the ASU and its power centres 
by making the ASU more of a bottom-top organisation (Waterbury, 1983: 329). 
The system of elections was to be applied to all ASU committees, at the local 
levels as well at the central one. It must be noted, however, that these 
`democratisation' measures were not very significant. The March 30 Program 
was: 
... a yes or no vote on a series of "democratic" promises without real 
content, followed by the election of bodies devoid of any real power, 
whose role was to avail themselves of the "popular will" in order to 
lead everyone back to his factory, field, or school, thus leaving 
politics to the politicians. 
(Hussein: 300). 
Among the major objectives outlined in the March 30 Program was the need to 
`repair' the economy. Although no specific policies in that regard were stated, 
there was a focus on `efficiency', and on "`placing the right man in the right 
position"' (Cooper: 484). The program did not make statements that pointed to a 
change in the direction of economic policy, but, as the subsequent months 
proved, the translation of the guidelines signalled a gradual move toward 
liberalisation. It is believed that the March 30 Program "initiates what might be 
conceived of as a reorientation of the regime and a narrowing of its 
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constituency... [by] shedding constituencies on the left and gaining them on the 
right" (Cooper: 486). Thus in June 1968, a decree was issued regarding foreign 
exchange, which allowed some groups to open accounts in Egyptian banks in 
foreign currencies. These covered foreigners living in Egypt, Egyptians who had 
immigrated, and Egyptians who lived outside Egypt for a period exceeding five 
years. No restrictions were imposed on such accounts (Cooper: 486). Imported 
luxury items were allowed into the country 2 and purchase was possible in 
convertible currency. Importation policies were revised so that importation for 
`personal consumption' was allowed. In addition, exportation by individuals was 
allowed (Mabro: 131). In part, this was an attempt on the part of the government 
to redress the trade imbalance with the then Soviet bloc. 
Scientific management and the public sector 
In keeping with the spirit of the March 30 Program and the call for 
modernisation, the regime placed much emphasis on "modern" and "scientific" 
methods for attaining (socio)economic development. The task of reconstruction 
of the country's facilities and economy after the destruction of the June 1967 war' 
was tackled on technical grounds. In fact, the focus on technical and scientific 
2 
Initially it was allowed in special shops, not widely available, since importation 
of goods was confined to `personal use'. 
3 
The governorates bordering the Suez Canal in particular came under heavy attack 
during the war, and were heavily destroyed. 
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administration, necessarily "efficient" administration, served to de-politicise the 
changes heralded by the March 30 Program (Cooper: 485). 
Attempts at addressing the problems of the public sector were made at this stage 
as a campaign for increasing production and efficiency. There was a call for 
purging the public sector of corrupt management, mainly those who belonged to 
the category of "political" military individuals who had connections with the 
centres of power, though some civilian managers were implicated with corruption 
as well. In May 1968, a significant change in public sector mangers was enacted. 
Public sector management was divided into three groups: a group that was loyal 
to the objectives of the revolution as well as `efficient and flexible'; a group that 
was not corrupt but which was nonetheless inefficient, and needed to be replaced 
with others possessing greater capabilities; and finally, a group that was both 
corrupt and not loyal to the objectives of the revolution "either intentionally or 
through ignorance" (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 1001). Only those in the first group were 
allowed to continue, the others were removed. 
The argument that was used to justify this action was that such a step was 
intended to purge the `socialist revolution' of the elements that led to the defeat 
of the 1967 war (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 1001). Although such a `witch hunt' may 
have been partly engaged in to dissipate some of the anger directed at the military 
after the defeat in the war, in fact, it was otherwise. One may argue that at this 
stage there was a separation between management of public sector enterprises, 
and ownership of these enterprises. The separation between the two allowed for 
carrying out reforms in the public sector without appearing to infringe on the 
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`public' nature of it, nor to appear to be retracting from the principles of the 
`socialist revolution'. ' 
Among the "scientific" methods used was the establishment of the technical, 
`Production Committees' in all public sector enterprises. There was a proposal by 
trade unions to establish `production congresses' in 1965, but no measures were 
taken in that regard until the formation of the `production committees' by Decree 
270 in 1969 (Posusney, 1991: 90). These committees addressed the call for 
increase in productivity. Production committees comprised of sixteen members, 
of which three were from the trade union committee at the enterprise. It is 
important to note, however, that the views of the trade union members of the 
production committees were only consultative (Ezz EI-Din, 1987: 1011). 
It is very important to note at this stage that there had been earlier attempts at 
addressing the problems of the public sector. A committee was formed in late 
1966 called the Supreme Control Committee, the objective of which was the 
"surveillance of the public sector and detection of opportunists and deviationists" 
(Waterbury, 1983: 98). The committee carried out changes in senior management 
positions, by removing some and appointing others. The reforms that were 
carried out after the March 30 Program was outlined in the pre-1967 war period. 
In March 1967, Nasser highlighted the following areas for reform: 
4 
It is interesting to note here that the issue of separation of management and 
ownership resurfaces in the 1990s, with the debate on the privatisation of public 
sector enterprises. 
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])Management is a science and its. rules do not change under 
socialism or capitalism. The only difference between the two 
systems stems from the ownership of the means of production and 
the control of profits. 
2)Wages must be linked with productivity. Socialism does not mean 
equal wages but equal opportunities to work. 
3)The Arab Socialist Union is to involve itself in public sector 
operations only to the extent that it can contribute to 
implementation of plans and smooth relations between workers and 
management. In no way is the ASU to interfere in the production 
process itself. (Waterbury, 1983: 99) 
Thus, however significant the March 30 Program was', the redirection of the 
economy it proposed was already underway in the period before the 1967 war. 
The reform measures adopted in line with the Program addressed some of the 
problems already in existence before the war, such as the foreign exchange 
imbalance (Waterbury, 1983: 168). The losses incurred in the war of 1967 and 
the rebuilding of the army, coupled with a call for the need to make sacrifices for 
the battle, were utilised to initiate policies that would have otherwise been 
difficult to justify earlier. The changes introduced by the March 30 Program 
therefore had the impact on workers of maintaining the facade of the social 
5 
It was considered among the `basic documents' of the regime of the Free 
Officers. 
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contract the government had made by security of employment and other 
protective legislation, but at the same time the costs of maintaining the contract 
were being gradually shifted from the government to the workers. This is 
highlighted by examining how workers were impacted by the move to 
liberalisation. 
Workers and the beginning of liberalisation 
Workers were directly impacted by the gradual shift toward liberalisation in a 
number of ways. Public sector enterprises were, as aptly phrased by Cooper, `the 
heart of reformism'. Since the public sector enterprise was both a social and 
economic unit, it produced subsidised goods, often at a loss, and provided 
lifetime employment to workers assigned to it. Labour productivity was a major 
concern because unemployment was avoided by "creating a large mass of 
underemployed and necessarily frustrated and inefficient public employees and 
officials" (Mabro: 210). This combination of policies resulted in a serious 
productivity crisis in the public sector. Coupled with the cost of reconstruction of 
the army after the war, there was a call for increased productivity, at no increased 
cost. The rallying call was sacrificing for the sake of the "struggle", al-maaraka. 
The impact on workers was twofold. Price increases led to a drop in the standard 
of living of workers and of most state employees. Simultaneously, there were tax 
increases and in 1968 a policy of wage reductions was implemented. In an effort 
to boost productivity, there was an increase in working hours, from 42 hours per 
week to 48 hours/week without compensation. In addition, forced savings were 
increased from 1/2 to 3/4 of a day's pay per month (Posusney in Lockman, 1994: 
218-9). Moreover, the March 30 Program initialled a "change in the distribution 
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of resources - either between the public and private sectors, or among units 
within the public sector" (Cooper: 488). In line with the regime's reforms of 
imposing economic criteria on the public sector, some limited "denationalisation" 
took place in 1968. 
The consequences of the above changes was no surprise. A number of factors 
congregated, leading to outbursts of strikes by workers, often not in isolation 
from other groups in society, notably student activists. These factors were, on the 
one hand a deterioration in the standard of living, on the other outrage at political 
corruption, and third opposition to what was considered by many to be going 
back on the `socialist gains' of the revolution. A number of strikes broke out in 
1968. For example, in February workers in Helwan went on strike in protest at 
the lenient sentences given to the army officers in the wake of the 1967 war. 
Also, in 1968 strikes took place as a reaction to the denationalisation plans 
announced, and the reductions in wages. A reallocation of resources at the wider 
societal level took place, so that at the same time that there were cuts and 
reductions in wages of workers, some concessions were made to the bourgeoisie, 
particularly the agrarian bourgeoisie'. 
The strikes by workers received neither much support nor much condemnation 
from the trade unions. Unions were engaged in their own `struggle'. Primarily it 
was a power struggle between the ETUF, presided by Ahmed Fahim, and the 
Labour Secretariat at the ASU, headed by Ali Sabry. In essence it was a struggle 
6 
For example, the desequestration of some land, and the `liberalisation' of prices 
of some agricultural products, such as vegetables and fruit. 
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for the independence of the ETUF from the ASU. Although it is argued by some 
researchers that it was a struggle for the independence of the labour movement 
from government control (e. g. Posusney and Ezz El-Din), I believe it is not 
exactly the case. Without a doubt, the ASU was a very powerful organisation and 
had political power over the trade unions simply because of the condition that 
trade unionists had to be members of the ASU. There is evidence that the ASU 
used this power in its favour, by blocking the ASU membership of `undesirable' 
candidates. The conflict intensified starting 1967, although it had begun by 1966, 
basically as a result of "the events of 1967 and early 1968" (Posusney, 1991: 85). 
This `struggle' can be highlighted by examining the conflict over the trade union 
elections of 1967. Trade union elections were scheduled for 1967, and in fact 
they had begun at the local level, but the onset of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
put an end to the elections. After the war, the ETUF campaigned to restart the 
elections, but the labour secretariat at the ASU managed to prevent the 
resumption of the trade union elections (Posusney, 1991: 92). The reasons for the 
postponement of the elections was the `public good', although there were 
elections for the ASU locals, and for the professional syndicates (El-Gebeilly, 
1991: 278). After the March 30 Program, the rationale for the delay was the 
drafting of a new labour law that would introduce changes to trade union 
elections (Posusney, 1991: 93). In fact, it was only in 1971, under Sadat, that the 
trade union elections were held. 
Also, there was a conflict between unionists at the different levels of the trade 
union hierarchy. In particular trade unionists at the enterprise/local level were 
very critical of the trade union structure. By the end of the 1960s, local unionists 
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"were in agreement that the trade union movement had stagnated and that the 
contact between its different levels had been lost" (Posusney, 1991: 99). The 
issue that came under most criticism was the system of indirect elections, 
whereby membership to the middle and top levels of the trade union organisation 
was not elected directly by workers, but were selected from among candidates 
appointed by the local boards. This system allowed `unpopular' candidates to be 
elected at the middle and top levels of the trade union organisation, though they 
may have failed to get elected to the local level (Posusney, 1991: 97). 
A point that needs to be emphasised is the growing distance between trade unions 
and workers whom they represent with the shift to liberalisation. As explained in 
the previous chapter, the measures to corporatise trade unions in the early and 
mid sixties were justified on the basis that the state legislated conditions of 
employment ranging from wages to ensuring security of employment. The shift to 
liberalisation led to a review of the state commitment to labour, while this move 
was not met by an equal `liberalisation' or democratisation of the trade union 
organisation7. In addition, the trade union organisation became more interested in 
the entity itself than the workers it represents. Since the late 1960s, the trade 
union organisation, particularly the top levels of the organisation have come 
under criticism by some unionists and leftists. The criticism pointed to the narrow 
concerns of the ETUF,, and highlighted issues that should have been taken with 
7 
In fact, there was a further of condensation of the number of general unions in 
1967, so that they were decreased from 27 to 21. 
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more concern by the organisation, such as. union democracy, and the relation 
between trade union action and political action (Ezz El-Din, 1987: 1005). 
The trade union members elected in 1964 have come under much criticism as 
having `betrayed' the true principles of the trade union movement. Specifically, 
the administrative apparatus of the movement increased its domination over the 
labour movement (El-Banna, 1994: 413). Indeed, "trade union leaders became 
isolated in their offices, managing the trade union movement, not leading it" (El- 
Gebeilly, 1988: 16). Charges were made against the movement ranging from 
corruption to lavish expenditure on the facilities of the trade unions, such as 
office equipment, and furniture, and mostly being undemocratic". There was a 
neglect of workers' concerns, and little effort to improve the increasingly 
deteriorating situation of workers (El-Gebeilly, 1988: 16-7). 
Thus, as Egypt moved toward liberalisation, the euphoria of Egypt's `socialist 
experiment' gave way to an increasingly bewildered and discontented working 
class, and a corporatised but divided trade union movement. Under Sadat, and 
particularly after the initiation of the Open-Door policy, these trends were 
exacerbated. In July 1971, a few months after Sadat was elected, the National 
Action Program was issued. It was a set of principles aiming at the 
`democratisation' of Egyptian society. The National Action Program defined 
trade union action not as confronting the owners of capital, but rather as the 
`preservation of workers' gains', and increasing their productivity. This was to be 
8 
From 1964 to 1971, the general assembly of the ETUF did not meet a single time 
(El-Gebeilly, 1988: 17). 
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done in collaboration with the ASU. By so-defining the role of trade unionism, 
Sadat undermined the aspect of class struggle in trade unions. Indeed, by 
emphasising that trade unions should collaborate with the ASU, the implications 
were compromising the independence of the trade union organisation (El- 
Gebeilly, 1991: 281). 
By thus separating the economic from the social and political it became easier to 
impose the liberalisation policies the regime wanted to introduce. Trade unions, 
because they were corporatised, also adopted the logic used by the government. 
As long as the government did not withdraw "workers' gains" trade unions were 
not willing to protest against the government. Instead, their struggles concerned 
their organisation not their constituents. This resulted in a growing gap between 
workers' interests and trade union willingness to pursue them. These measures 
were further deepened when Sadat came to power and extended liberalisation 
policies. What emerges with the Open-Door policy is that by allowing 
unregulated gains and consumption to the bourgeoisie in the name of encouraging 
investments, social inequality increased and became more visible. The sacrifices 
workers were asked to continue with and the economic hardship they endured 
became difficult to accept in a system where there was visible and provocative 
display of wealth. 
Sadat and the open-door policy 
When Sadat came to power after the death of Nasser in September 1970, he 
continued the reform toward liberalisation. The changes toward further 
liberalisation, which were initiated after the October 1973 War, were in response 
to the following problems. First, there was an increased need to import 
131 
food/nutrition products, particularly wheat. A need to replenish raw 
materials/strategic goods, and intermediary goods for production. This was 
mainly due to depletion of some of the existing resources due to the war effort. 
Third, there was a need to upgrade the existing infrastructure/public utilities 
which had deteriorated significantly because of lack of maintenance and 
destruction during the War. In order to address these problems, there was a need 
for extensive resources, both local and foreign. 
Over the few years following the War, the government witnessed a financial 
crisis. Savings fell, export levels remained basically unchanged and the deficit in 
the balance of payments increased, from LE 98 million in 1973 to LE 530 million 
in 1974 (Awadalla: 323). In order to finance its reform program, the government, 
then headed by Sadat, resorted to short-term loans, and the adoption of the so- 
called "open door policy". The intention of the open door policy was to attract 
foreign capital to Egypt, and to provide incentives for local capital. Towards that 
end, a number of measures were adopted by the government. 
It was in 1974, with the October Working Paper that economic liberalisation, or 
Infitah, became official government policy. The October Paper was a turning 
point from Nasserist ideology9. Although the October Paper was cautious about 
continuity with the `achievements' of Nasserism, it emphasised the need to 
"[rectify] the `deviations' of the sixties" (Hinnebusch: 112). 
9 
One may argue that the outcome of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War may have 
given Sadat enough confidence to carry out such a liberalisation plan. 
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The Open Door Policy, Infitah, encouraged capital investments in the country, 
both foreign and local. It was argued that Egypt's economic problems, further 
burdened by the cost of yet another war, could only develop by access to capital 
and technology. The `socialist' former Soviet Union was no longer deemed to be 
the source of such capital and technology, but rather, the `capitalist' West, in 
addition to funds from the Arab countries. A number of incentives were 
promoted, such as lenient taxation schemes, "free transfer of capital and 
remittances,... favourable labour legislation, [and] administrative assistance" 
(Bayat, 1993: 76). The policy also granted freedom for the press, and the 
initiation of a multi-party system. Both operated within limits set by the state. 
In 1974 law 43/1974 (investment law) was enacted. One of the major items in the 
law is that it places basically no limitations on the scope of investment activities. 
The law also guaranteed that any projects/investments will not be nationalised. 
Besides this guarantee, the law stated that all such investments will remain 
exempt from taxation for a period of five years. Finally, the law stated that if 
private capital was invested in public enterprises, then regardless of the legal 
nature of national capital, these enterprises are considered by this law private 
enterprises even if the public sector is the major contributor in them (Awadalla: 
325). This raises a very important issue, which is the blurring of the distinction 
between national and private capital in such 'public' enterprises. Law 43/1974 
was later replaced by law 32/1977 which stated that the private 
investments/private sector can operate in any field. 
Quite unlike the Nasser era, during the Sadat era importation of goods was 
legalised, and exportation expanded. Law 118/1975 removed many of the 
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restrictions on importation and exportation activities. It particularly encouraged 
the importation of raw materials, and intermediary goods needed for encouraging 
investments. There were restrictions on a number of goods that are defined as 
strategic goods, which only government could export. Among the strategic goods 
(18 items) were essential food products such as flour, and sugar, as well as items 
used for military production. The law applied to both the private and the public 
sectors. As a consequence of Law 118/1975, the private sector invested and 
exported consumer goods, as consumer goods "are easier to deal with than 
intermediate goods" (Awadalla: 328). The result was negative for the economy as 
a whole leading to increased consumption without an equal increase in 
productivity. This, points Awadalla, has led to the increased vulnerability and 
dependency of the Egyptian economy on the external markets. 
The foreign currency law, 97/1976, removed restrictions on dealing with foreign 
currency. These restrictions had been in effect since 1947. By virtue of the Law 
individuals and legal entities (excluding government and public sector 
enterprises) could possess foreign currency from any source (excluding tourism 
and some exports). One of the consequences of this law is that it encouraged 
commercial banks to compete with public-sector banks. Other laws were passed 
which "liberalised" the foreign exchange market. 
The ideology adopted by Sadat was unmistakably a move in the direction of a 
market economy. The role of the state in the economy, however, was not 
weakened. It was no longer that of `provider', but rather became that of 
`regulator'. This pertained not only to the economy but also to the distribution of 
resources in society. Thus instead of the direct measures such as nationalisation, 
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resources would be redistributed in society. using methods such as progressive 
taxation (Hinnebusch: 115). 
The open-door policy and the public sector 
State policy regarding the public sector was dealt with in the October Paper. It 
explicitly focused on the significance of the private sector. It was nevertheless 
recognised that the public sector still had an important role to play. In specific, 
the public sector would continue in the areas that the private sector could not 
operate, such as the large infrastructure projects. In addition, some `core' 
industries, such as "the major corporations in banking, finance, international 
trade, transportation, and manufacturing-would not be returned to the private 
sector. " (Baker: 193). Thus while the March 30 Program strove to `rationalise' 
the public sector, the October Paper moved it from being the pivot of economic 
development to a more narrow role as a partner, indeed, as Baker notes, "a means 
of support" with the private sector in the development of the economy. 
Among the significant laws influencing public sector enterprises is Law 111/1975 
for the reorganisation of the public sector. The General Institution (Al-mua'sasa 
al-ama), which acted as a holding company, was cancelled. This institution was 
responsible for planning and co-ordination of the activities of the affiliated 
enterprises. According to Law 111/1975, individual public sector and private 
sector enterprises could carry out trade locally and externally. This, it is argued, 
made the economy further vulnerable to the changes in the international 
economy. 
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Sadat and trade unions 
The Open Door policy had a different impact on various sectors in society. 
Continuing economic problems led to increased class conflict. The open door 
policy also had a differential impact within the same strata. Such is the case with 
trade unions, and with the working class. When Sadat came to power he helped 
settle some of the conflict that had been raging within the trade union 
organisation, by neutralising the ASU group and reinstating some of the old 
leftist unionists. This, however, did not prevent the re-emergence of conflict 
within the trade union movement. Trade unions, particularly those at the topmost 
and middle levels, benefited. To a great extent this was because of the increase in 
overt worker protests. The state "tried to control and absorb the demands of 
labour through the established corporatist-syndicalist structure" (Hinnebusch: 
245). This was carried out by increasing the corporatisation of the trade union 
movement. 
Trade Union Laws of 1976 and 1981 
The implications for the trade union movement of Sadat's open door or 
liberalisation policy was its further corporatisation. Trade union Law 35/1976 
provides the details of trade union organisations. It applied to workers in the 
public sector, public authorities, private sector, co-operative sector, and 
agriculture. The law was in essence and in many details the same as previous 
trade union laws. According to the law the objectives of the union was the 
protection of the workers' legal rights, the improvement of work conditions, and 
increase professional efficiency. The structure of the union organisation remained 
pyramidal, with ETUF at the peak, the general union in the centre, and the 
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enterprise union committee at the base. The duration of a union cycle was 
increased to three years instead of two. All trade unions were to abide by the 
system of by-laws/statutes of the ETUF. 
The new law imposed greater control on unions. Indeed, if a union committee 
was found in breech of any article of the law, it could be dismantled if after 
fifteen days of notification no remedial action was taken to address the problem. 
A court was no longer necessary. Also, the Central Agency for Accounting, the 
Ministry of Labour/Manpower and the ETUF, by virtue of the new law, had the 
right to audit unions. Unions had to submit accounts, budgets, and other 
documents to these organisations (Adly, 1993: 152-4). 
The freedom of unions was further limited by law 1/1981, which made some 
amendments to law 35/1976. The ETUF gained more authority, as most 
responsibilities and authorities became centred with the ETUF. All this came at 
the expense of the union committees (enterprise level). The law forbade any 
union committee meeting without the prior notification and approval of the 
general union. Also, the duration of the union cycle was further increased to four 
years instead of three. In a study by Bianchi on Corporatisation in Egypt, he point 
out that the Sadat regime: 
enacted several reforms designed to strengthen the union 
confederation, to alienate its leaders from the rank and file and to 
coopt them more effectively as junior members of the authoritarian 
elite and privileged partners in the new capitalist economic order. 
(Bianchi, 1989: 428). 
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The further corporatisation of the trade union movement enabled the government 
to exert more influence on the trade union membership, particularly those at the 
top level of the hierarchy, to ensure pro-government candidates. Furthermore, this 
group of `official' unionists were offered positions in the ruling party, and it 
became an established tradition that the Minister of Labour be appointed from 
among the senior ETUF personnel, in specific the ETUF president. 
From the outset, Sadat's regime alienated itself from the working class, preferring 
instead the business community10. However, Sadat courted the labour leadership, 
primarily to counter balance his lack of popular support. Thus, Sadat attempted to 
co-opt the labour leadership. Thus, the government "tried to transform the top of 
the union hierarchy into a self recruiting elite with broad power of consultation in 
economic policy making" (Bianchi, 1989: 129). The manifestations of these 
policies on the labour leadership scene were evident in a significant decline in 
turnover of union leadership in their positions, and the fact that increasingly 
union leadership at the national level became members or involved in the ruling 
party, the National Democratic Party (Bayat, 1993: 77). 
Some have expressed wonder at the fact that problems did not occur, for 
example, that membership in unions continued to grow (Bayat, 1993: 77). 
10 It is important to point here to the `method' Sadat used to neutralise his 
opponents regarding the open-door policy, mainly by appointing Marxists in 
positions of power. This was the case with Ismail Sabry Abdalla, whom Sadat 
appointed as Minister of Planning, and Ahmed Rifae El-Sayed as deputy to the 
president of the ETUF from 1971 to 1973. 
138 
However, one may argue that one does not negate the other. Membership in the 
unions remained largely an automatic procedure. In addition, there was a 
separation between workers and trade union leaders. In 1987, the number of 
unions in the ETUF was 23, with a total membership exceeding three million. In 
1964 the proportion of union membership as a percentage of the economically 
active population was 8.8%, in 1976 it was 20.1%, and in 1982 it was 23.2% 
(Bianchi, 1989: 133). The increase between 1964 and 1976 was basically a 
consequence of the extensive nationalisations that took place during the 1960s. 
Despite the corporatisation of the topmost levels of the ETUF hierarchy, and 
often because of it, there was discontent within the trade union movement. The 
change in the government policy toward the public sector particularly alarmed 
many unionists. Among the measures proposed for the `new partnership' between 
the public sector and private sector, was the selling of a part of some public 
enterprises to the private sector to form joint venture companies. Many unionists 
objected to the "removal of parts of the public sector from the provisions of the 
labour law through establishment of joint ventures.... they opposed,... the hiving 
off of the best parts of public firms in foreign joint ventures" (Hinnebusch: 245). 
Ultimately, despite trade union objections, the joint ventures were established. 
The same situation applied to trade union opposition to the direction of the 
economy and the consequences for workers, namely, the increase in cost of living 
with no adequate wage rises, and the proposed subsidy removals. Again, the 
regime implemented its proposed plans, but in the case of removal of subsidies, it 
turned out to be an explosive situation as the `food riots' of January 1977 
demonstrated. 
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It became increasingly difficult for dissenting unionists to rise in the ranks of the 
trade union organisation. But, dissident unionists found a platform for voicing 
their discontent via alternative channels, in particular opposition parties. Among 
the latter the Tagämuu party attracted a considerable number of unionists. The 
party had a leftist ideology and its social base was "concentrated among the ranks 
of industrial workers, intellectuals and small government employees" 
(Hinnebusch: 197). Sometimes the significance of the Left for the labour 
movement is overestimated. One of the most frequent criticisms made by activist 
workers is that the leftist parties are dominated by the intellectuals, often 
bourgeois intellectuals. Workers, though they may constitute a considerable 
proportion of the membership of such organisations, often find themselves 
marginalised or patronised by the intellectuals (Serafy, 1992: 204). As a result, 
dissenting unionists find themselves marginalised at both the formal trade union 
organisation and in the other alternative channels. 
The alternative channels through which dissenting unionists operate provide 
opportunities to voice discontent, are not channels for collective agreements. 
Channels for collective agreements are corporatised into the state bureaucracy. 
Trade unions have limited access to this channel, basically through the ETUF. 
The centralised collective agreement system, as undemocratic and authoritarian 
as it is, made trade unions the only formal channels through which workers can 
make their industrial relations demands. For this reason, it was possible to 
`contain' the labour movement, despite frequent protests by workers. 
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Workers and liberalisation 
The combined costs of war and the restructuring of the economy in the seventies 
resulted in a deterioration in the standard of living of workers. Prices soared, and 
inflation increased, particularly after the 1973 war. In addition, immediately after 
the war forced savings were increased to a full day's wage per month instead of 
3/4 of a day's wage (Posusney, 1991: 221). As the standard of living deteriorated, 
some minimal changes were made. For example, in 1974 public sector workers 
had their minimum wage raised from LE 9/month to LE 12/month. In addition, a 
similar raise was enacted for private sector workers, via law 64/1974. This 
highlights two issues. First, although there had been some trade union attempts to 
raise the issue of wages in the People's Assembly a few months earlier, their 
efforts at parliament did not meet with much success. The change in minimum 
wages came about as a direct intervention from the President, Sadat. It implies 
that collective agreements are very limited. Second, the fact that a law was issued 
on minimum wages for the private sector workers was an indication of the rising 
significance of that sector with liberalisation. 
The measures taken were not sufficient to cope with the problems of the 
deteriorating standard of living. Thus in September 1974 a strike wave started, 
revolving around economic demands for workers". This wave of strikes 
continued until 1977, which coincided with the continually deteriorating 
11 
It is important to mention again that strikes were, and remain illegal in Egypt. A 
new proposed labour law is now in the final stages of approval which legalises 
strikes, but under restrictive conditions. 
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economic situation. Though primarily of an economic nature, worker's strikes 
also had a political dimension. At one level it became difficult for workers to 
accept `making sacrifices for the battle' at a time when there was a discussion 
about diplomatic channels to resolve the problems with Israel. It has also been 
suggested that the criticisms of Nasser during Sadat's rule may have helped spark 
some of the labour strikes (Posusney, 1991: 222). 1 believe that the political 
dimension of the workers' struggle had an important economic underpinning. The 
negative portrayal of Nasser and his achievements, including the public sector, 
was an indirect attack on workers' `gains' under Nasser. This view is supported 
by the attitude of government officials toward workers in the era of liberalisation. 
For example, in parliament, before minimum wage increases in 1974, demands 
for improved wages were regarded by government officials as unjustified, as 
when the deputy Prime Minister Abd el Aziz Hegazi objected to wage increases 
because "a wide range of services and subsidies provided by the government, 
whose cost was also increasing, should be considered as part of workers' 
salaries" (Posusney, 1991: 221). When the economic situation improved, from 
1977 to 1984, there were no recorded cases of strikes for that period. These were 
years of the oil boom. So, with the decline in the oil boom, the cost of living 
increased, with a fall in real wages, prompting another wave of strikes (Shafei, 
1993: 35). 
The strikes of the mid-seventies and marches to parliament were directed against 
liberalisation of the economy. Specifically, the strikes revolved around wage- 
related matters (Hinnebusch: 245). Other issues, such as increasing workers' 
contribution to pension funds, and equitable treatment of public sector employees 
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with other state employees, were also made. The strikes emanated from 
individual enterprises, with the important exception of the January 1,1975 strike. 
The January 1975 strike was carried out by workers in a number of enterprises 
located in Helwan, at the behest of a `local official' who personally contacted 
others in other enterprises in Helwan. The striking workers were joined by 
railway workers. The strikers objected to the regime's anti-labour policies 
(Posusney, 1991: 224). 
The most significant of the 1970s strikes was the January 197.7 riots. Based on 
agreement with the IMF in 1976, the government removed subsidies on a number 
of food items in January 1977, notably bread. The backlash was immediate. On 
January 18 and 19,1977 rioting broke out in the streets of Cairo and other 
governorates on a level that was unprecedented since the revolution of 1952. The 
riots resulted in 79 deaths and 1200 arrests by the government. Workers and other 
groups in society rioted. Trade union leaders, particularly in the face of the 
January 1977 strike, were compelled to support the workers "under heavy 
pressure from below" (Bayat, 1993: 78). 
The role trade unions played in the strikes was not significant. Union 
involvement came after the strikes took place, if at all, and even then it was 
basically the enterprise based unions. One area where there was a considerable 
involvement of trade unions in voicing workers' demands was in the People's 
Assembly. The largely leftist union members of parliament were elected from 
workers' districts. The general unions and the ETUF were not involved in the 
workers' protests, and it was at these two levels that the government sought to 
negotiate workers' rights (Posusney, 1991: 227-8). Within the ranks of the trade 
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union organisation, a leftist group of unionists tried to push for an independent 
workers' representation, and changes favourable to workers. This group had limited 
successes. 
The strike wave stärting 1974 and extending to 1977 resulted in some concessions 
to workers. The government issued wage adjustments and cost of living increases 
to both public and private sector workers (Posusney, 1991: 229). But, at around the 
same period, starting 1976, there were government moves to further corporatise the 
trade union movement. On the one hand, the power of the leftists was curbed. On 
the other hand, trade union legislation (Law 35/1976) was issued which made the 
organisation more centralised and authoritarian, as discussed in a previous 
section. 
The open door policy was not a negative experience for all workers. The impact 
of liberalisation was both the free movement of capital and of people. Prior to 
1971 migration of Egyptian was a difficult process. On the one hand, issuing 
passports and obtaining permits to travel abroad was a very complicated process. 
On the other hand, regulations relating to job placement and obligatory civic 
service after graduation from university or technical schools basically made 
migration untenable. The constitution of 1971 allowed "the right of every 
citizen to migrate, regardless of whether the migration is permanent or temporary 
for work" (ETUF, 1992: 197). The dual impact of the liberalisation of the 
economy and the sharp increase in the price of oil in the aftermath of the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli war, opened up two labour markets: the oil-rich Arab states, 
and the private sector in Egypt. One group that particularly benefited from 
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liberalisation was skilled labour'2. The liberalisation policies adopted by Sadat led 
to "the greater facility with which skilled manpower on all levels has left Egypt to 
participate in the boom economies of the oil-rich Arab states" (Baker: 194). The 
higher wages available in the oil-rich countries led to a very considerable 
migration of skilled workers, estimated in some studies at 450 thousand (Baker: 
148). Besides the skilled labour, a large number of unskilled and semiskilled 
workers who used to work in agriculture also migrated to the oil-rich states in 
search of high wages (LaTowsky: 12). 
The boom in oil prices led to the adoption in the oil rich states of huge 
infrastructure development projects, financed mainly from the oil revenues. 
These countries had a serious shortage of labour at all levels. Egypt, on the other 
hand, had a problem of surplus labour and the oil rich states was an opportunity 
both to relieve the labour problem, and to utilise the remittances sent by migrant 
labour. Among the countries other than the Gulf states that attracted large 
numbers of Egyptians were Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and Libya. 
By the mid 1970s, the ETUF began to discuss the `problem' of migrant labour. In 
a general assembly meeting held in February 1977, the ETUF pointed out that 
there is a need to regulate the migration of labour. In 1978 a committee was 
formed at the Ministry of Labour with members from the ETUF to discuss the 
migration of Egyptian labour. Based on the recommendations of the committee, it 
was agreed that the Ministry of Labour would help those registered with 
12 
In 1969, a union of skilled workers was established (nigabat al-mihan al- 
tatbikeya). 
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obtaining licences to work abroad, and. that trade unions could set up 
`employment offices' the aim of which was to help workers find work abroad 
(ETUF, 1992: 198). In effect this meant that trade unions were operating as 
labour sub-contractors. 
YEAR Number of Migrants 
1974 500,000 
1976 600,000 
1980 875,000 
1985 1,924,000 
1986 3,000,000 
Compiled from: (ETUF, 1992: 199-200) 
The bulk of the migrants were in the oil-rich Arab countries. For example, of the 
three million in 1986, about 2.5 million were in Arab countries (ETUF, 1992: 
200). 
In examining the implication of extensive migration for the trade union 
movement, one finds that it was a blessing in disguise for the trade unions. 
Migrant workers had to register as union members in order to obtain a licence to 
travel, which increased the membership of the trade union organisation, even 
though many workers did not even know they were registered as trade union 
members'3. Also, the ETUF considers among the benefits of labour migration that 
13 
This information was given to me by unionists at Tagamuu. 
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it relieves the problem of un-and under-employment in Egypt, leading to 
increased labour productivity (ETUF, 1992: 204-5). 
While the migrant labour market absorbed workers of varying skill levels, the 
private sector in Egypt attracted to it skilled labour from the public sector at all 
levels, from management to blue-collar workers (Baker: 194-5). Often workers 
thus employed would take long-term leave of absence from their public sector 
work, attracted to the higher wages of the private sector, but reluctant to give up 
the benefits of the public sector, such as the pension scheme, insurance, and 
health care. Needless to say, the private sector employed a considerable number 
of workers who were solely private sector workers. Unionisation of workers in 
the private sector enterprises is not consistent. Some enterprises do not allow 
their workers to unionise, though they have the required number of workers. 
Workers in such enterprises report breaches of wages', and working conditions. 
Despite reported complaints to the ETUF against this situation, no redressive 
action was taken by the ETUF. 
The situation of working women did not improve during liberalisation. Women 
workers were concentrated in some industries. Often women workers' wages 
were calculated on a daily, not a monthly rate. The ETUF arranged the first 
congress on working women in 1975, organised by the ETUF Secretariat for 
Eradication of Illiteracy, Family Planning, and Working Women's Affairs, which 
was founded in 1973. The Secretariat aimed at providing training programs for 
14 
For example, wages are calculated on a daily rate rather than on a monthly rate, 
which means a cut in wages of about 30%. 
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working women to teach them sewing and knitting and to organise sessions on 
family planning and first aid, as well as provide illiteracy classes. The Secretariat 
encouraged the establishment of subsidised food stores in the place of work, and 
child nurseries for children of working mothers. The First Congress made a 
number of recommendations relating to social security, and the necessity of 
dealing with the problems of working women (ETUF, 1992: 458). Nevertheless, 
the recommendations of the ETUF were not enforced. 
In assessing the impact of liberalisation on workers, it is possible to say that it 
had a differential impact on the working class. Public sector workers were 
negatively impacted by the adjustment of the economy, and increasingly they 
voiced their discontent over the increase in the cost of living. Some groups of 
workers, namely the skilled labour and migrant labour at various skill levels 
benefited from liberalisation policies. Unionised workers, of whom a large 
majority was public sector workers, did not receive much support from the 
unions, and ultimately the government conceded to some of their demands. Yet, 
"public sector workers knew that their wages were several times those of private 
sector workers and that a huge reserve army of unemployed coveted their jobs" 
(Hinnebusch: 245). In trying to understand the reason behind the move of public 
sector workers to the private sector despite the higher average wages of the 
former, one may argue that skilled labour is highly rewarded financially in the 
private sector. Skilled labour is relatively scarce, and many public sector 
workers, through their experience, acquire skills rewarded by the market. 
Nonetheless, trade union organisations came under criticism from the workers. 
This became particularly clear in the January 1977 riots. 
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In the next part of this chapter, the discussion of structural adjustment will 
examine the extent to which SAP was imposed by the International Financial 
Institutions and the extent to which it was a choice by the government. 
Globalisation entailed international trade, export-led growth, and the opening of 
markets for imported goods. Reforming the economy to reflect these 
requirements was not a matter of choice, it was not possible to engage in the 
global market without carrying out these reforms. The implication for workers 
was that public sector enterprises became one of the core elements of reform. 
Part ll: The Era of Globalisation and Structural Adjustment 
The buzz-word in development circles during the 1980s and well into the 1990s 
was "structural adjustment". The adjustment programmes sponsored by the World 
Bank and IMF have been implemented or are in the process of being 
implemented in numerous developing countries and in Eastern European and CIS 
countries. The interesting aspects about "structural adjustment" are its almost 
universal application, and more interesting its presentation as THE viable 
solution for sustainable economic development. The absence of working 
alternatives is remarkable. Ghana tried to resist the implementation of the World 
Bank/IMF programme for ten years, but in the end had to succumb to the 
programme at the brink of collapse. 
The '80s decade was one of decline in much of the third world. After years of 
'development' Third World countries managed to improve many of their 
'development indicators' such as decreased levels of infant mortality, and 
increases in literacy rates. The '80s decade witnessed a setback. Development 
policies adopted failed to achieve the desired goals. Indeed, "instead of a self- 
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sustained growth ..., many developing countries are up to their ears 
in debt" 
(Schuurman: 9). Quite to the contrary, some of the measures of structural 
adjustment such as user charges for health services are feared to contribute to an 
eradication of some of the gains of the past. 
The rise of neo-liberal theories of development 
The impasse in development theory that occurred in the 1980s was mainly in the 
Marxist and neo-Marxist development theories. Neo-liberal theories, proponents 
of the open market, gained from the crisis. Indeed, "what started in the 1970s as a 
neo-monetarist vision on the problem of hyperinflation in many third world 
countries, grew into a new development ideology" (Schuurman: 11). With the 
decline of the Keynesian model, a change in the role of the state was envisaged. 
Accordingly, state intervention in the market mechanism was considered 
ineffective and counterproductive. As a development ideology, neo-liberalism 
most resembles the well known modernisation paradigm, but in fact it has less to 
offer because the role of the state has been minimised. ... the neo-liberal 
trajectory denies the third world states the policy tools to intercede actively in 
favour of those without jobs, houses, health care, schooling and food. 
(Schuurman: 12). It is possible to observe how structural adjustment policies 
resonate this philosophy. By minimising the role of the state, and support for 
international market liberalisation, neo-liberal theories in effect promoted the 
rationale of adjustment policies of the World Bank/IMF. 
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The international crisis of the '70s and '80s 
The 1970s and 1980s were decades of decline in growth at the international level. 
In both industrialised and developing countries the trend of growth of the 
preceding period was reversed. Two major developments have contributed to the 
decline, the move away from Keynesian economics, and the internationalisation 
of the world economy. Of particular relevance to the developing countries was 
the latter phenomenon. The impact of the two developments have been 
particularly strong on employment. 
Keynesian `demand-management policies' were utilised from the post-war period 
in the formulation of economic policies. By virtue of that system, governments 
- could attain growth and, most important, full employment. An examination of the 
growth rates of most industrialised countries as well as third world countries 
attests to the success of that claim. For many years annual growth rates of 5% or 
more were achieved (Pursey: 230). This was an era of achievements for trade 
unions as well. Due to the healthy growth in the economy, wages and conditions 
of work improved. In general, "full employment was widely accepted as a 
fundamental goal of economic policy" (Pursey: 230). This situation, however, 
was altered. 
The reasons for the reversal of the growth that occurred in the post-war period"' 
remain disputed. There is an indication that the "ending of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates based on a dollar standard in 1971 and the shift to 
15 
After independence for developing countries. 
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floating exchange rates contributed to increased instability and a slowdown in 
investment" (Pursey: 230). The public sector, which had been an engine of 
growth in many economies, and which absorbed labour was cut back. In the 
attempt to curb ihflation particularly in response to the sharp increases in oil 
prices in 1973/4 and 1979/80 industrialised countries adopted deflationary 
measures, so that eventually the concern for controlling inflation began to 
outweigh concerns for controlling increases in unemployment. Thus, the concern 
over inflation has led many governments to maintain that any economy must have 
a `natural' rate of unemployment so inflation would not increase. This `new' 
philosophy seemed to ignore the fact that in an earlier period, the post-war 
period, unemployment rates were lower and yet the economies attained growth. 
Thus in theory, by cutting inflation, growth would be stimulated and 
consequently unemployment would fall. In fact, however, "while profits have in 
many cases increased and inflation fears receded, growth remains low and the 
level of unemployment high" (Pursey: 231). 
Since the post-war period the economies of the world have been interlinked 
closely, it has become 'internationalised', so that the status of 'international 
economic relations' has a direct bearing on the social and economic conditions in 
the different countries, particularly employment. Trade unions increasingly find 
themselves in a position of having to accept what is feasible. What is feasible is 
increasingly defined at international levels and thus beyond the sphere of 
influence of individual countries. The impact of internationalisation has been, 
however, more severely felt in the developing countries. 
152 
The decline in growth in the industrialised countries has had a negative impact on 
developing countries. The demand for the exports of the latter, primarily raw 
materials has fallen. The economies of the developing countries have been further 
burdened by the increase in interest rates, making their debts unserviceable. As a 
result developing countries have witnessed "falling wages, devaluation, 
underemployment and an expansion of the informal sector, as well as budgetary 
austerity resulting in public sector retrenchment and cuts in social services" 
(Purley: 235). This begins to point to a possibility that internationalisation or 
globalisation of the world economy has left little room for governments to 
formulate alternative strategies, that in fact countries are in a relatively no-choice 
situation, with only alternatives being how best to counteract the negative impact 
or the social costs on the most vulnerable sectors in the population. Development 
strategy is increasingly leaning towards semi-alternatives. 
Countries adjust either to avoid a crisis or after the occurrence of a crisis. The 
crisis is defined as "budget deficits and current account deficits" (Bourguignon: 
18). This condition was widespread in the beginning of the 1980s. Many 
developing countries during the 1970s postponed the payment of interests on 
foreign debt, resulting in the accumulation of interest which eventually became 
unmanageable. Foreign loans were used to finance public investments, "which 
sometimes proved not very productive" (Bourguignon: 11). In order for the 
indebted countries to have access to additional loans, they were required to adjust 
their economies. In addition to the internal factors, two international 
developments contributed to the crisis of many countries during the 1980s, a rise 
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in interest rates/scarcity of international credit, and a deterioration of the terms of 
trade (Bourguignon: 19). 
The World Bank/IMF are often associated with adjustment policies, but some 
countries carry out, their own adjustment programs independent of the World 
Bank/IMF after a crisis. Structural adjustment aims at restructuring the economy so 
it can become more efficient, and "structurally" less prone to crisis. Structural 
adjustment consists of two types of measures, stabilisation, and adjustment 
measures. Following is a review of each. 
Stabilisation and adjustment measures 
The process of structural adjustment is often a lengthy one. Some measures are 
deemed to be more urgent than others. Henceforth, structural adjustment 
programmes include short-term stabilisation measures, and longer term adjustment 
measures. Stabilisation measures are the domain of the IMF, whereas the World 
Bank is responsible for the longer term adjustment measures. The distinction 
between the short-term stabilisation policies and the longer term adjustment 
policies should, however, be minimised, since the two are practically conducted 
concurrently. 
Stabilisation measures address the demand side of the economy, while adjustment 
measures are related to the supply side. The WB/IMF structural adjustment 
program is introduced in countries with serious financial imbalance. Specifically 
these problems include, "large balance of payments and fiscal deficits 
accompanied often by high inflation" (Weissman: 1622). The external deficit is 
the consequence of the cycle of loans and repayments on interest rates on debts 
incurred. Internally, the financial deficit is the result of policies of investments, 
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STABILISATION 
*Measures that directly address 
financial crisis (reduce demand to 
decrease exterior deficit) 
*Reduction in public investments 
*Cuts in current expenditures 
(includes wages) 
*Decelerate growth of money supply 
*Devalue local currency 
ADJUSTMENT 
*Liberalisation of both foreign and 
domestic trade to increase efficiency 
of economy 
*Rationalisation of state enterprise 
either by privatisation or by 
management reform so that 
subjected to market forces. 
Privatisation not an end in itself 
*Promote domestic liberalisation, so 
that agricultural prices would 
increase and terminate agriculture 
monopolies 
*Reduce customs tariffs as it results 
in the restructuring of entire 
economy, especially industry. 
Considered most important of 
adjustment measures. 
Material compiled from Bourguignon. 
often heavily subsidised, in non-productive sectors. To redress such 'short-comings', 
and to instigate growth, a number of measures are to be undertaken under the 
structural adjustment program. The above table summarises the different 
stabilisation and adjustment measures. 
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Stabilisation measures are applied almost " as a prescription for the different 
countries. The 'standard program' to establish macro-economic balance ignores 
the specificity of each country's problems. Often associated with the 
implementation öf stabilisation is the cut back on some public investments, 
which comes at social cost. Governments should opt for least social cost, but 
because of budgetary constraints "these countries are not able to finance 
compensatory transfers" (Bourguignon: 9). 
The long-term adjustment measures require major changes in the "pre-existing 
patterns of resource allocation" (Roe: 3). The policies adopted in many 
developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in patterns of resource 
allocation that were often unsustainable because they were largely based on 
subsidies, directly or indirectly. The situation further deteriorated during the 
1970s and early 1980s because of "violent shifts in international circumstances 
which had confounded the price and/or demand assumptions upon which major 
public and private sector investment decisions had been based" (Roe: 4). 
It is generally recognised that structural adjustment programs have adverse effects 
on "employment, wages and government spending for education and health" 
(Bourguignon: 9). In most of the countries where structural adjustment has been 
implemented the per capita expenditure on education and health declined. The 
toll of adjustment falls most heavily on the poor, particularly the urban poor. The 
social cost involved in one of the adjustment measures is particularly high, 
namely the "rationalisation" of public sector enterprises. The measure involves 
retrenchment of employees, and "when implemented during a stabilisation 
programme, it could create explosive conditions in the cities. Compensation 
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programmes to aid the unemployed... are therefore indispensable" (Bourguignon: 
15). 
There is some indication that rural or agricultural areas stand to gain from 
adjustment measures. The liberalisation policies, particularly customs tariffs, 
have a negative impact on the "owners of overprotected and inefficient 
businesses, as well as their workers who have middle and high incomes" 
(Bourguignon: 14). The result is that "this policy lowers prices of manufactured 
goods relative to prices of agricultural products, which benefits peasants and 
decreases poverty when this predominates in rural areas" (Bourguignon: 14). 
Nonetheless, some measures such as the removal of subsidies on fertilisers or 
diesel fuel may lead to sharp increases in production costs to be borne by 
cultivators or consumers. 
In response to the claims that the structural adjustment program proposed by the 
World Bank comes at great social cost, the Bank has increasingly taken this point 
into consideration by adopting a gradualist approach in implementing its projects, 
and the introduction of funding to support the most vulnerable groups during 
adjustment, for example funds for education, and employment creation. 
Socio-political impact of structural adjustment 
As has been previously indicated, structural adjustment does not fall evenly on all 
groups. The bias of structural adjustment is pro-rural, pro-private sector, and 
encourages stronger ties with international trade. This disrupts the hegemony that 
has predominated in most developing countries, consisting primarily of "a 
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'populist' dominant coalition based on the military 16, the public sector, and urban, 
white collar interests" (Waterbury in Roe: 56). This coalition has encouraged 
import substitution industry, and has contributed to the siphoning off of 'wealth' 
from rural to urban centres. 
Political instability is a potential hazard during periods of adjustment, particularly 
from the 'dispossessed' groups. An example of the threats a changing tide of 
fortune may bring about is that the aggrieved white collar unions and professional 
associations in Sudan brought down the regime of Gaafar Nimeiri in March 1985. 
Another potential source of unrest is organised labour, particularly in a public 
sector dominated economy. Labour action may 'paralyse' sectors of the economy. . 
Indeed, "failing to anticipate the grievances of a specific union may sometimes 
exact a high political price" (Waterbury in Roe: 57). The situation is further 
complicated in countries where unions are corporatised to the state, whereupon 
workers' action may take place independent of the unions, and hence less 
controllable by the unions. This represents the case of Egypt. 
In populist regimes the consequences of adjustment are more severe than in other 
cases for organised labour. When 'rights' are withdrawn, this triggers violence 
that has as its goal to restore the withdrawn rights. Thus, "protests under a moral 
economy aim at resurrecting the status quo ante" (Posusney, 1993: 85). In a 
patron-client relationship, as that between workers and the state in Egypt, 
16 
It is to be noted that in most cases, the military would retain its dominant 
position after adjustment. 
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workers' protest is directed against the state (Posusney, 1993: 89). This has 
disruptive and destabilising implications. 
Following is a summary table demonstrating the potential threats by different 
sectors. 
SECTOR ACTION 
Organised labour Strikes 
Urban low-income/unorganised Riots 
Private-sector, importers Capital flight 
Migrant and skilled labour Capital flight 
Public sector enterprises Hoarding and unsecured 
borrowing 
Compiled from Waterbury in Roe, p59. 
It has been noted that stabilisation and adjustment programs do not per se cause 
violence, "they may ignite an already explosive situation" (Waterbury in Roe: 
58). This may be the case as the causes of violence may be rooted in an unjust 
distribution of resources and wealth in a society. Nevertheless, whether cause or 
catalyst for the outbreak of violence, the implementation of structural adjustment 
measures carries a destabilising effect for the economy. There is a concern that 
the short-term political effects of structural adjustment have been exaggerated. 
The 'political sustainability' of structural adjustment "can no longer be confined 
to the immediate reaction of particular groups to ill-tasting medicine; rather it 
becomes the willingness of the body politic to accept a lengthy course of 
treatment" (Weissman: 1623). 
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Impact of structural adjustment on employment 
The impact of structural adjustment policies on employment is evident in two 
areas, the increase in the informal sector, and the pro-rural/agriculture trend. 
Adjustment results in a "disequilibrium between labour supply and labour needs 
of the formal sector" (Bourguignon: 32). Labour that exceeds the need is 
absorbed in the informal sector activities. Due to increases in unemployment, 
which seems to be structural unemployment on a world scale, the informal sector 
is swelling in developing countries. 
Informal sector workers are more vulnerable than workers in the 'formal' sector. It 
serves as a refuge for the unemployed where there are no unemployment benefits 
(Bourguignon: 12). This is a significant issue because a point of difference 
between a discussion of unemployment in developing countries and in the 
developed world is that in the latter, unemployment "is linked in part to a system 
of unemployment benefits" (Bourguignon: 31). In the context of a developing 
country, where such benefits, more often than not, do not apply, the unemployed 
are left basically to cater for themselves. 
Employment in rural areas is not drastically influenced by structural adjustment. 
Instead, there are indicators that there is a revival of rural employment during 
adjustment periods, largely because of the favourable impact of liberalisation in 
agriculture. It is important to note, however, that there may have already existed 
some factors in rural areas that do not allow for the 'take off supposedly resulting 
from adjustment policies. 
Structural adjustment seems to have an opposite impact on the wages in the 
public and the private sectors of the economy. Due to cut backs in public 
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expenditures, one of the measures of stabilisation, wages in government/public 
sector are reduced (Bourguignon: 35). In cases of adjustment during a crisis, real 
wages decline in the public and private sectors. If adjustment occurs before a crisis, 
however, a decline did not occur because only moderate budget cuts were made 
(Bourguignon: 12). 
Given the almost inevitability of increases in unemployment and in poverty, it has 
been suggested that among the measures governments in developing countries take 
is the implementation of programs of worker training/retraining, and identification 
of areas where jobs may be created, as in the agricultural sector. One of the areas 
identified as one of high potential for employment generation is that of small-scale 
enterprises, particularly for the vulnerable groups (e. g.. women). While it is desired 
that "workers' rights are safeguarded and adequate standards of social protection are 
provided for workers engaged in such enterprises" (Pursey: 239), from an 
organisational perspective, such workers may remain un-unionised and therefore 
vulnerable. 
Adjustment should, in theory, encourage the participation of workers in decision- 
making, "but co-operation with employers and governments must be based on the 
confidence that change will result in improved conditions of work and life. The 
experience of the 1980s has not created such confidence" (Pursey: 243). The 
scenario does not seem to be particularly a positive one, after all about 40% of 
international trade is carried out by transnational corporations, which are a few in 
number. Governments and trade unions in developing countries have little control 
over the profits, marketing, or decision-making within such corporations (Pursey: 
243). 
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In concluding the part on structural adjustment, some remarks are due. Based on 
some experiences of structural adjustment, the overall the programme has helped 
create an "improved framework for economic growth" (Weissman: 1632). Economic 
indicators did pick up, "but this is a fragile trend, one that could be disrupted by bad 
weather, adverse terms of trade, and the vagaries of international assistance" 
(Weissman: 1632). Economic growth, however, is not sufficient, because often SAP 
comes at great social cost, despite various poverty alleviation measures. An equally 
serious concern is that structural adjustment liberalisation policies "seemed to 
founder on a failure to address the very institutional weaknesses in the private 
sector that helped produce the need for adjustment" (Weissman: 1632). Thus it is 
not possible to rely on economic indicators to assess the success of adjustment 
measures. 
Having thus examined the background to adjustment measures, following is a 
discussion of structural adjustment in the case of Egypt. 
The IMF and World Bank in Egypt 
In order to finance the development plans of the government, Egypt obtained 
during the period from 1973-1977 medium- and long-term loans from Arab 
countries/Arab funds. However, in order to meet the demands of the extensive 
importation policy, the government resorted to short-term loans. But, the period 
1973-1977 indicated that despite the government's policies to encourage foreign 
capital investments, only a small amount of foreign capital was invested in Egypt 
during that period. Thus, in order to address the problem of cash solvency, Egypt 
started negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. This is the background 
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against which structural adjustment is to be understood. Egypt does not represent 
a unique case. Many developing countries share similar experiences. 
When negotiations began in March/April 1976 with the IMF/World Bank, these 
agencies saw that Egypt needed a structural reform program, adjustments . in 
economic and fiscal/monetary policies. The basic features of the reform program 
were stated as follows. The establishment of a foreign exchange market, with a 
flexible exchange rate mechanism. This was to be carried out jointly by the 
Central Bank, commercial banks, and the Ministry of Economy. Second, the 
central bank can intervene in cases of sudden or unexpected changes in the 
market by selling or buying currency. Third, it was recommended that there be a 
gradual transformation of exports of public sector enterprises to the commercial 
market, and that a commercial exchange rate be applied to capital transfers. The 
exports of private sector enterprises are not to be restricted. Finally, the exchange 
rates of the different currencies were to be fixed against the US dollar (Awadalla: 
337). 
The Egyptian government was reluctant to adopt these policies because there was 
a risk of exacerbating inflation, and affecting subsidies. Thus, the Egyptian 
government turned to Arab countries for loans. The so-called "Gulf Fund for the 
development of Egypt" was founded, but it agreed to provide Egypt with the 
loans only if the Egyptian government signed the agreement with the IMF. The 
government of Egypt was forced in 1977, to comply with IMF terms and 
conditions and started the implementation of IMF recommendations by reducing 
subsidies on some basic commodities. The consequence came in the form of the 
food riots of January 18 - 19,1977, whereupon the government backed out of 
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implementation. During that brief period the "Gulf Fund" was used for the 
repayment of short-term debts, however, this source of funds was terminated with 
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977. In March 1977 Egypt signed the Letter of 
Intentions with the IMF. 
Role of the IMF 
The IMF sets the terms and conditions to address economic imbalances in 
developing countries burdened with debts. The government of Egypt signed several 
Letters of Intention with the IMF. As mentioned above, Egypt signed a Letter of 
Intentions in 1977, and once again in 1978 whereupon Egypt received a three year 
loan of US$ 720 million. The loan was to be used for the balance of payments 
deficit, and some reform in the fiscal/monetary policies. In May 1987, Egypt signed 
a new letter of Intention with the IMF, by virtue of which Egypt received a loan of 
US$ 327 million over 18 months for the reforms. in the fiscal and economic 
policies. 
The IMF views that the basic problem in the Egyptian economy is the imbalance 
between supply and demand, which results in balance of payments deficit, a 
deficit in the budget of the government in order to address this problem. The IMF 
recommends that the interest rates for loans be increased, as well as placing credit 
ceilings to the government and the public sector. Another measure encouraged by 
the IMF is the reduction of the external value of the Egyptian Pound, and fixing 
its pricing, which would reduce the price of exports and hence increase 
demands for their exportation. On the other hand, reducing the value of the 
Egyptian Pound would increase the price of non-essential consumer goods, 
thereby reducing the demand for them. Finally, the reduction of the deficit in the 
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balance of payments by increasing revenues, through increasing prices of goods of 
the government/public sector, a gradual erosion of subsidies, and adjustment of the 
taxation system. 
The World Bank 
Since the beginning of the 1980s the World Bank initiated loans for structural 
adjustment, loans usually given to countries after the signature of the Letter of 
Intentions with the IMF. Based on the World Bank report on the Egyptian economy 
(1985), it is pointed out that the Egyptian economy went through problems during 
1981/1982 due to the fall in prices of oil world wide, and a decrease in the 
remittances of Egyptian workers abroad (mainly in the Gulf). The periods of 
1983/84 and 1984/85 were of crisis. Foreign currency was largely unavailable, both 
in the Central Bank and in commercial banks. In response to this shortage, in 
January 1985, the government of Egypt banned importation without exchange of 
currency, and imposed limitations on imports, two measures the World Bank 
strongly criticised. 
As for the "prognosis" of the World Bank for the Egyptian economy, it was tackled 
on a sector-by-sector basis. The World Bank report identified that there are some 
problems/obstacles in agriculture. The most significant of these are, the scarcity of 
agricultural land, poor irrigation systems, and poor pricing policies for agricultural 
products. The report also pointed out that a considerable amount of resources is 
directed to land reclamation, albeit with dissatisfactory results. In the industrial 
sector, the value-added ratio decreased significantly in the early 1980s, as a 
consequence of poor maintenance due to lack of funds, raw materials, and others. 
Also, the increase in loans has strongly impacted the private sector. The existing 
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policies encouraged certain types of industry (high expenditure industries) at the 
expense of other more competitive industries (Awadalla: 412). The energy sector 
also posed problems because demand for it was very high due to the relatively 
low prices for its products. Thus, according to the World Bank report, there was a 
need to increase prices to reduce demand. 
The World Bank report pointed out that the major sources of economic growth 
during the seventies, namely, oil, workers' remittances, Suez Canal revenues, and 
tourism will decline, and accordingly, a structural adjustment program should 
generate new/additional resources, and decrease deficit in the budget, by 
decreasing the demand for imported goods. One of the major concerns of the 
World Bank is the necessity of increasing prices to reflect adequate levels in all 
sectors of the economy. 
Thus, the major recommendations of the world bank with regard to a program of 
structural adjustment are the following: the removal of price regulations 
including subsidies, reforming the relationship between public and private sectors 
so as to encourage the latter, deregulation of exports and imports, and finally 
reform of taxation system to encourage foreign and local capital investment. 
The bulk of the proposed reforms affected workers more than any other sector in 
society. Workers in the public sector are particularly affected by the reforms. 
With structural adjustment, the liberalisation policies adopted by the earlier 
regimes were being taken to the limit. The benefits of the program were 
nationalised, but the down-side of SAP for workers was argued to be beyond the 
control of the government. Furthermore, the government argued (as did the trade 
unions) that the best deal possible was obtained. The working class as a political 
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power base decreased in significance to. the regime, but the trade union 
movement was further coopted to control labour. 
The Mubarak Years 
The bulk of the Mubarak years was similar to the 1970s. The government further 
integrated the ETUF in the system, and the ETUF also provided the government 
with support. In 1985 the Workers' University was established. The University is 
controlled by the ETUF. The University "is a non-degree institution which 
provides training and education to the trade unionists" (Bayat, 1993: 77). The 
Workers' University, or as it had been referred to earlier the Workers' 
Educational Institute, had been a long-standing demand of the ETUF. In 1983 the 
Workers' Bank was established. The ETUF and other union organisations 
provided 50% of the capital of the bank (El-Banna, 1995: 533). The bank was 
also financed by pension and social insurance funds. Thus the ETUF "has been 
allowed to join in the widening movement of syndical capitalism by using 
pension funds and state subsidies to establish its own economic enterprises" 
(Bianchi, 1989: 130). Also, during the Mubarak era, the ETUF increased its 
involvement at the international level by participation in several organisations, 
such as the ALO (Arab Labour Organisation), OATUU, and ICATU. 
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Workers, trade unions, and globalisation. 
The boom of the late seventies 17 started to slow down by the early 1980s. Starting 
1982/83 there began a decline in oil prices, resulting in a slowdown in the 
undertaking of some major projects and the cutting back in number of foreign 
workers in the oil-rich countries. There were consequences for the Egyptian 
economy, which was beginning to go through a crisis. The Egyptian economy 
was to a large degree a rentier economy. State revenues were derived primarily 
from the Suez Canal, tourism, the sale of oil, and worker remittances. Thus the 
decline in oil prices hit the Egyptian economy at two levels: the revenues from 
the sale of oil, and the reduction in the remittances of Egyptian workers in the oil- 
rich countries. 
Increasingly, the government came under pressure from the international financial 
institutions to take steps to redress the imbalances in the economy. The decline in 
the growth of the economy resulted in inflation/price increases. The Mubarak 
government adopted a gradualistic approach to reform, to avoid the mistake of 
January 1977. Workers were impacted in a number of ways. Mubarak noted in 
1983 that there was no more wage raises. Some subsidies were removed, and in 
September 1984 a law was issued, backed by the ETUF, doubling the 
contribution of workers toward health and pension insurance (Bayat, 1993: 78). 
17 
Waterbury has aptly described this period as "seven 'lean' years of low growth 
and little investment, 1967-74, ... followed by seven `fat' years, 1974-81" (Owen, 
1983: 12). 
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A new wave of strikes and worker protest started in 1983, stronger than the 
previous wave of 1974-7. The strikes occurred in all the major industrial centres 
in Egypt: in Heiwan, Shubra Al-Kheima, Mehalla Al-Kubra, and Kafr al-Dawar. 
The new wave of strikes revolved around issues that were not new demands, 
rather, for the most part the protests were over "accumulated and recognised 
rights" (Ezz El-Din, 1987a: 141). The workers' demands in this wave of strikes 
as well was focused around wages, incentive pay, and insurance, primarily 
economic issues. For example, in February 1983 the workers at the Nasr 
Company for Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals demanded increased incentive pay 
and other compensations. Another example is the case of the worker protests held 
in August 1983 at the #36 factory in Helwan, wherein workers demanded cost of 
living increases, and the payment of incentives which had been held (Posusney, 
1991: 240). 
As indicated, many of the strikes of the mid-1980s started because a legal right of 
workers had been denied or withheld. An example is the case of ESCO which is a 
spinning and weaving company in Shubra E1-Kheima, where workers went on 
strike in 1986 to demand they be paid seven days rather than for six days per 
week18. Whereas workers had won the case in court, yet, management did not 
comply with the ruling (Shafei, 1993: 48). Workers received no support from 
their trade union committee prior to the strike. It was only after the workers went 
on strike that the trade union committee supported workers. After the strike, 
which was quelled by the police, the management of the company conceded to 
18 
This case was not unique to ESCO. 
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the seven day per week pay, albeit on a piece-meal basis (Shafei, 1993: 50-1). It 
was by strike action that workers obtained their demands. 
One of the features of the strikes and worker protests was that they were carried 
out outside, and often against, the trade union organisation. The trade unions did 
not address the workers' demands, and sometimes when a protest took place, they 
became involved at a late stage. The worker protests were basically spontaneous, 
carried out in many cases by informal leadership (Ezz El-Din, 1987a: 143). A 
case in point is the Railway Drivers League, which is a charitable association, not 
a union (Ezz El-Din, 1987a: 143). Indeed, the Railway Drivers League played an 
important role in the train drivers strike in 1986 (Posusney, 1991: 154). Besides 
the worker leagues, other `alternative' groups are the leftists19 who have played an 
important role in some major strikes (Serafy, 1992: 204). 
The support the workers received from the informal groups contrasts sharply with 
the reaction of their trade unions. At best, workers received lukewarm support 
from the trade unionists, and at times, the workers were criticised by the trade 
unions and called `trouble makers' (Badawi in Abbas: 57). In a study of worker 
protests from 1988 to 1991, out of a total of 242 protests 156 were carried out 
outside the trade union committee, 11 against the trade unions, and 38 were 
carried in enterprises without unions (Badawi in Abbas: 62). The worker protests 
during 1988 to 1991 were, as earlier, primarily for economic concerns. 
19 
Among the most distinguished of the leftist groups is the Sawt Al-Amel group, as 
portrayed in the study by Posusney. 
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Though most of the worker protests were among public sector workers, since the 
mid-1980s there was an increase in private sector protests, due to the expansion 
of the latter during Infitah (Posusney, 1991: 243). Nevertheless, private sector 
protest was not a big proportion. For example, from the period 1988 to 1991, out 
of a total of 242 protests, 23 labour protests were in private enterprises, and 40 
were in the `investment' sector (Badawi in Abbas: 72). Economic demands were 
prominent among the private/investment sector protests, as in the case of the 
public sector. 
However, one of the issues that must be highlighted is the fact that some of the 
protests in the private sector took place without a union committee. The 
unionisation of the private sector in industry is problematic. On the one hand, it 
requires that the number of employees in an enterprise be 50 at least to allow the 
formation of a trade union committee. On other hand, "in smaller plants, workers 
desiring to unionise must find other small plants performing similar work, and 
then band together in a regionally-based local" (Posusney, 1991: 156). Partly as a 
reflection of the increasing significance of the private sector from a political 
perspective as well as an economic one, minimum wage legislation similar to that 
of the public sector was introduced. But, wage increases lagged behind those of 
the public sector. In 1980, the ETUF negotiated an agreement with both the 
Federation Of Chambers Of Commerce and the Federation Of Chambers Of 
Industry to increase wages for private sector workers. Also, Law 137/1981 was 
passed which, among its provisions, required annual raises in the wages of 
private sector workers (Posusney, 1991: 238). 
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A final observation about the outcome of worker protests that took place in the 
1980s is in order. The worker protests have been defined in numerous studies as 
directed against the state. That characterisation is correct in the sense of state as 
employer. The response of the regime was a combination of partial concession to 
workers' demands, together with an intolerance of the methods used by workers. 
Worker protests were addressed and resolved `from above', not through 
negotiations between workers, their representatives, and management. This was 
institutionalised in the industrial relations system in Egypt, as evidenced by the 
statutes and laws that regulate wages and conditions of work (Ezz El-Din, 1987a: 
143). The settlement of industrial disputes through courts was further advanced in 
the aftermath of the riots of January 1977. Abdel Latif Bulteya, the president of 
the ETUF and simultaneously the Minister of Labour "issued a number of 
directives aimed at speeding the settlement of individual and collective workers' 
complaints, and generally improving industrial relations" (Posusney, 1991: 236). 
Thus, this system makes collective bargaining meaningless, and instead focuses 
on the role of trade unions as mediators between workers and management. 
Conclusion 
Economic liberalisation and globalisation are challenging the trade union 
movement in Egypt. In one direction there are pressures for state-dependent, 
corporatised trade unions, and there are equally strong forces pushing in the other 
direction for an independent pluralist trade union movement. As discussed in this 
chapter, the impact of the implementation of economic reforms on workers has 
proven to be potentially politically destabilising. The regime has responded by 
further increasing the corporatisation of trade unions, particularly at the ETUF 
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level. One finds that in trade union elections, some trade union committees at the 
enterprise level, and some trade union boards at the general union level win by 
default, without going through the process of elections, as documented for the 
elections of 1979,1983,1987, and 1991. Turnover in the committees and boards 
at senior level was low, and rarely as a-response to pressures from below. Indeed, 
this situation came under much criticism from trade unionists themselves, who 
argued that the presidency of the ETUF "had become indistinguishable from the 
state bureaucracy" (Bianchi, 1989: 141). 
Increasingly, trade unions became more concerned with their survival as 
organisations rather than as representatives of the workers. A blatant example 
involves the talks between Sadat and the ETUF on January 21,1977. The 
meeting was held to discuss the riots of a few days earlier and the price hikes that 
the ETUF objected to. In the meeting with Sadat, the ETUF used the fact that the 
regime was on the defensive to try to promote the organisational interests of trade 
unions rather than the interests of workers. Thus, in the meeting the ETUF made 
a compromise by agreeing to drop pursuing the formation of a workers' party in 
return for "the demand for regular and structured channels of communication 
between the ETUF and the government, and for implementation of the provisions 
of the 1976 labour law which gave the confederation consultative rights on all 
draft legislation affecting workers" (Posusney, 1991: 134). The ETUF also 
requested that the general unions be granted the same rights as the ETUF. 
Ultimately, two factors reinforce the corporatist tendency in the trade union 
movement. First, so long as the trade union organisation was a hierarchical 
structure, with power residing at the top level, it remained under the control of 
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the ETUF. By co-opting the unionists at the ETUF level, particularly the senior 
level which became a `self-perpetuating elite', the government ensured a `tame' 
trade union organisation. Second, regardless of the problems of trade unions as 
representatives of workers, trade unions remain, nonetheless the only formal 
channel through which workers could make their demand. Although there were 
numerous strikes, sit-ins, and other forms of worker protests, these remain illegal. 
Thus, the government was able to control the workers, and "as long as workers 
made their demands through the controlled unions, they were diverted from overt 
anti-system activity" (Hinnebusch: 245). 
The corporatist tendency within the trade union movement, however, was 
challenged. First, among the rank and file unions began to lose their credibility. 
Unionised workers sought alternatives to the trade unionists, due to the failure of 
the latter to adequately address their demands. The alternatives, such as the 
informal worker leagues, however, have limitations because they are `informal' 
and uninstitutionalised. The pressures also came from within the trade union 
organisation itself, from among unionists. On the one hand, there are those 
opposed ideologically to the direction of the trade union organisation, most 
prominent of whom are the leftists. The locus of their dispute is the issue of the 
fate of the public sector under liberalisation. The leftist unionists are distraught 
by the adoption and support given by the ETUF to pro-market, pro-business 
polices (Bianchi, 1989: 143-4). The `leftist' group is becoming increasingly vocal 
in its criticism of the `official' trade unions, particularly the ETUF, as 
privatisation plans proceed as will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Another factor that works against the unitary, corporatist tendency in the trade 
union organisation is that divisions within the working class could no longer be 
addressed through one hierarchical organisation. There are differences among the 
various industries "in size and heterogeneity; in industrial, white-collar, or 
agricultural membership; and in public, private, or foreign employers" (Bianchi, 
1989: 142). The classification and re-classification of industries into general 
unions/federations rarely reflects such differences. Although ETUF officials 
argue that "a single peak association ended the historical fragmentation of the 
labour movement, there are growing doubts within many affiliates that the 
interests of all workers can be served any longer by one association" (Bianchi, 
1989: 142). 
The end of the era of import-substituting-industrialisation as the motor of 
(industrial) development, combined with economic liberalisation, and 
globalisation, resulted in some sectoral changes within industry. Some industries 
benefited more from liberalisation than others, for example textiles, and furniture. 
Simply stated, some industries are more competitive than others, and some 
workers are more skilled than others. In the relatively `open' labour market, skill 
differentials are rewarded in the form of increased wages, and competitive 
industries could demand better wages and working conditions. The trade union 
organisation, as it exists, however, does not operate along this line. It rewards 
years of experience or seniority rather than skillp (Goldberg, 1992: 158-9). Many 
workers in Egypt seek additional employment in the private sector. This is 
20 
However, in some cases skill is acquired with years on the job. 
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basically because the wages received from their (public sector) job are not 
adequate to meet the cost of living. This system works particularly well for 
skilled workers. Their skills are rewarded but without resorting to the trade union 
organisation. The trade union thus is irrelevant to them. 
In the final analysis, the resolution of the dilemma trade unions are in will depend 
on a number of factors. However, perhaps the most detrimental factor in 
understanding the future course of events is the overlap in time between the 
liberalisation of the Egyptian economy and the globalisation of the world 
economy. Phrased rather crudely, liberalisation came to Egypt rather late. Had 
liberalisation taken place earlier, the conditions for the development of an 
independent trade union movement may have taken root. The experience of 
privatisation is further challenging trade unions, and as is discussed in the 
following chapters, it is reinforcing the corporatist tendencies. 
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Chapter Four: Public Enterprise Reform Between 
the World Bank and the Egyptian Government 
In response to the re-emergence of the crisis in the Egyptian economy by the mid- 
1980s, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the IMF, 
proposed a number of stabilisation and adjustment measures deemed necessary to 
address the crisis. The government of Egypt adhered to the reform measures. The 
GOE, however, had some manoeuvrability in the implementation of the reforms, 
dictated to some degree by concerns for internal stability. The reform measures 
proposed by the World Bank and those adopted by the GOE clearly point to the 
primacy of economic considerations, often at the expense of `social' ones. The 
reforms of public sector enterprises are a case in point. 
The following discussion examines the implementation of SAP measures by the 
GOE, with a focus on measures to privatise public sector enterprises. The previous 
chapter discussed the basic features of the reform program recommended by the 
World Bank and IMF in addressing the problems confronted by the Egyptian 
government. However, in order to examine the response of the Egyptian 
Government to proposed reforms, it is first important to shed light on the precise 
reform measures suggested by the IFIs. 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) 
Policies proposed by the IFIs for Egypt are divided into growth-oriented 
adjustment measures and stabilisation measures. While the reforms recommended 
are deemed to be necessary for the attainment of equilibrium and sustainable 
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growth, the World Bank recognises that some segments of the population will be 
negatively effected by the reform measures in the short-run (World Bank, 1990: 
24). Without reforms, the World Bank argues, the social costs "would be even 
higher" (World Bank, 1990: 24). As stated in the World Bank report, the reform 
measures do not constitute "a major departure from the reform policies already 
pursued by the Government but rather foresee their broadening, strengthening and 
speeding up" (World Bank, 1990: 52). 
The scope of the reform program is comprehensive. It is divided into four major 
policy areas. First, a number of growth-oriented adjustment policies were outlined 
by the World Bank that aim to `rationalise' and prioritise public expenditures, as 
well as encourage private sector involvement'. The key to adjustments proposed 
was increased efficiency in the utilisation of resources. The shift signalled a focus 
on quality rather than quantity, so that "the kind of growth that Egypt can expect 
to achieve will not be, as in the past, based on increases in resources" (World 
Bank, 1990: 25). Adjustment measures were proposed for the agricultural, 
industrial, and services sectors. 
Other areas of adjustment were also deemed important to promote growth, such as 
exchange rate liberalisation, changes in tariff laws, reforms in pricing policies, and 
public enterprise reforms. The World Bank recommended that further steps should 
be taken toward adjusting the Egyptian currency in relation to foreign currencies in 
a manner that would reflect a truly competitive rate. A competitive exchange rate 
I 
Indeed, the encouragement of the private sector is considerably emphasised in the 
World Bank report. 
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would "[stimulate] exports and is vital to both growth and stabilisation" (World 
Bank, 1990: 31). As in the case of exchange rate liberalisation, the Egyptian 
government had already adopted some measures to liberalise external trade. 
However, more steps were needed to liberalise foreign trade, such as the removal 
of protective tariffs. From the perspective of production, measures to reform 
pricing policies were deemed essential to enhance growth (World Bank, 1990: 32). 
According to the World Bank, the impact of `price distortions' are greater for 
industry than for agriculture, as the latter has fewer `distortions' than the former. 
The World Bank promoted reforms to energy prices, and the (gradual) removal of 
subsidies on raw materials and intermediate products, which are considerably 
subsidised (World Bank, 1990: 32-4). 
Public enterprise reforms are of particular importance for the current research. By 
taking into consideration the size of public enterprises (PEs), in terms of 
employment and output, it becomes understandable why it came under particular 
focus by the World Bank. There are in Egypt 370 public sector enterprises 
distributed over 18 Ministries. The PEs constitute the bulk of the industrial sector, 
where the PEs "represent 60 percent of the sector's value-added, 82 percent of the 
capital stock, [and] 54 percent of employment" (World Bank, 1990: 34). 
According to the World Bank report, the PEs have been performing inefficiently 
due to a number of reasons. The report highlights that these enterprises aimed to 
"efficiently produce goods or services plus serve various social objectives (e. g., 
provide subsidised staples to consumers and increase employment)" (World Bank, 
1990: 34). Added to this are other reasons that hamper growth already discussed 
earlier, such as low energy prices and subsidised raw materials. 
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In order to redress the problem of PEs, the World Bank recommended a number of 
areas of reform to meet the objectives of increasing the efficiency and finances of 
PEs. Institutional reforms were recommended by virtue of which the autonomy of 
management would be increased. Thus, by making management more autonomous 
and accountable, it was hoped would lead to more efficient performance by 
making PEs more competitive and less bureaucratic (World Bank, 1990: 34-5). 
The report also advises that public investments be more selective, and it gives a 
bigger role to Public Sector Corporations in project review and selection. Another 
area of reform in PEs is that of employment. PEs are deemed to suffer from 
"overstaffing, an inadequate skills mix, and rigid labour laws concerning hiring 
and dismissals" (World Bank, 1990: 35). In this system, level of education and 
seniority determine wages and promotions. This results in a situation where there 
is a lack of motivation on the part of workers, and a lack of skills that may 
improve performance (World Bank, 1990: 35). Financial reforms were also 
proposed for PEs. Management in enterprises would play a role in determining the 
allocation of surplus, and in making PEs abide by the `laws of the market' (World 
Bank, 1990: 36). Perhaps it is important to highlight that the World Bank report 
does not specify that PEs must be privatised, rather it envisages that reform might 
improve their competitiveness with the private sector (World Bank, 1990: 34). 
Indeed, the World Bank report states that ownership is not as important as 
efficient management, and that public ownership and efficient management are not 
mutually exclusive (World Bank, 1990: 36). 
The second area of reforms under ERSAP is stabilisation measures. Stabilisation 
measures address macro-economic problems, and are necessary for the success of 
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the growth-oriented adjustment measures outlined above. Reforms in fiscal and 
monetary policies, as well as wages and the exchange rate were proposed. The 
budget deficit was one of the focal points of reform. In order to reduce inflation 
the government had to reduce both external and internal borrowing. The latter had 
a particularly negative impact on private sector development. Also, the report 
recommended the government that it reduce issuing money, in order to curb 
inflation (World Bank, 1990: 38-9). Among the most important monetary reforms 
were the increase of interest rates, and limiting credit ceilings. The report also 
points out that there is a need to reform the wage policies, and that such a change 
would result in the short term in wage reductions. The report, however, indicates 
that the longer-term gains of such reform would be positive, such as stimulation of 
job creation (World Bank, 1990: 45). 
Third, the ERSAP measures to reform the performance of the Egyptian economy 
emphasises the necessity of resource mobilisation. Revenue generating measures 
are as important as expenditure reducing ones. The World Bank thus states that 
measures such as increasing energy and electricity prices, reducing the subsidies 
on raw material and intermediate products, as well as non essential food are 
necessary. In addition, the report points out that the taxation laws in Egypt need to 
be revised, in such a manner that would collect revenue and be progressive (World 
Bank, 1990: 41-2). Other measures include the introduction of user charges for 
education and health services. Resource mobilisation measures are perceived as 
indispensable to the growth-oriented and stabilisation reforms. 
Finally, the report of the World Bank acknowledges that reforms will come at 
some social cost. In this regard, the World Bank proposes that there is a need to 
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develop tools to better target the sectors in society that are negatively impacted by 
the reforms. Such measures include selective provision of subsidies so that it 
reaches the most needy, and equally important to refine the methods and criteria 
for identifying the poor (World Bank, 1990: 47-8). In order to address this 
concern, as well as to `contain' the `new' development of Egyptian returnee 
workers from Iraq after the Gulf Ware, a Social Fund For Development was 
established (World Bank, 1991: 11). The Social Fund was partly financed by the 
IDA, and aimed to provide "a short-term safety net to vulnerable groups" (World 
Bank, 1991: 32). 
The Social Fund for Development (SFD), launched in 1991, was officially created 
to cushion the economic impact of structural adjustment on those 'most adversely 
affected' by ERSAP. The SFD mission statement is to provide a "comprehensive 
package" of assistance to the aforementioned target group. It includes community 
development, public works, enterprise development, and labour mobility 
programs. The bulk of the funding for the SFD is from the World Bank and a 
number of international and bi-lateral donors, but the government of Egypt is also 
involved. In fact, there is a strong case to argue that the SFD was created to 
cushion the political impact of adjustment as much as, if not more than, the 
economic impact. The SFD has received much propaganda as a 'government' 
project in national newspapers, and more recently a weekly program on television 
where the small enterprises established through the SFD, complete with interviews 
z 
It is important to note that the participation of Egypt in the Gulf War paid off, in 
the form of some debt relief approved by the Paris Club. 
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with the beneficiaries' (mainly unemployed youth), is aired on one of the national 
channels. Thus, what the government takes with hand, it gives back to "the 
people" with the other hand. 
The reform and adjustment measures proposed by the IFIs address what are 
beyond a doubt serious problems facing the Egyptian economy. The reforms, 
however, apply a primarily economic standard, sidelining social considerations 
from development strategy. By so doing, the inequalities in society increase. The 
selective social targeting proposed by the World Bank may provide some 
assistance in the period of transition to some people, but it is not sufficient. While 
the selective targeting is geared at the poorest of the poor, many who are not 
among the poorest do suffer from a considerable decline in their standard of 
living. Among the groups who are negatively impacted by structural adjustment 
measures are workers. Following, in the current chapter and after, there is a focus 
on how public enterprise reforms are implemented in Egypt, their implications for 
workers, and how trade unions respond to the situation. 
The Thousand Days Program 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the GOE started the implementation of some 
measures to reform the economy in the 1970s, in particular stabilisation measures. 
However, it was not until the 1990s that the government took major steps to 
implement the structural reform program. Previous negotiations with the IMF had 
floundered in 1987, but they resumed in 1991 (Wahba: 58). According to the IFIs, 
Egypt was not carrying out the reforms quickly enough. At the same time, the 
Egyptian government insisted on gradual reforms, in great measure in fear of a 
repeat of the January 1977 riots. 
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What may be considered the `manifesto' of the government concerning structural 
adjustment was the Thousand Days Program. The thousand days program does 
not have the same significance as the March 30 Program or the October Working 
Paper, but it nönetheless does provide an orientation of the government 
concerning reform of the economy. It does not signal the initiation of structural 
reforms, rather, the Thousand Days Program was a `justification' to carry out the 
reforms. At the behest of Mubarak, The People's Assembly was requested to 
prepare the program to finalise the liberalisation of the Egyptian economy in one 
thousand days. Various committees at the People's Assembly discussed the 
program in 1991, after which the Thousand Days Program was voted and received 
the unanimous approval of the People's Assembly (ARE, 1991: 2). The structural 
adjustment program was thus `nationalised'. 
In outlining the objectives of reform, the Program states that liberalisation of the 
economy is not an end in itself, rather, it is "a means to achieve the real aims of 
[the) program" (ARE, 1991: 3). The objectives of the program are five: the 
attainment of growth in order that the economy may 'take-off; the abolition of 
unemployment on a gradual basis by creating about half a million jobs annually; 
balancing savings and investments on the one hand, and consumption and 
production on the other; cutting back on government expenditure; and limiting 
foreign indebtedness by mobilising Egyptian resources (ARE, 1991: 4). The 
Program gives an important role to the `business' or private sector in achieving the 
objectives of reform. It is defined as the "drive and incentive to economic revival 
and to achieve economic and social development in Egypt" (ARE, 1991: 5). 
Toward that end, the Program recommends that institutional and legislative 
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obstacles to the promotion of the business sector be reviewed. One thus finds that 
the stated objectives of the Thousand Days Program reiterate the recommendations 
of the IFIs for Egypt. 
The Program is comprehensive, addressing reform at the political, economic, 
legislative, and institutional levels. Since the Thousand Days Program is in the 
first instance a public relations measure, it is not necessary to provide the details 
of the various elements of the program. The general orientation of the Program is 
toward redefining the role of the state under liberalisation. The role of government 
would increasingly be a supervisory and consultative role. The Program states 
clearly that the role of the government would remain a very important one (ARE, 
1991: 10). The state would have an increasingly regulatory role, by the "provision 
of legislation, management and legal frameworks that permit the undertaking of 
economic activity in a way that guarantees sound competition, continuity and 
efficiency" (ARE, 1991: 10). The state would also intervene to correct the 
`failures' of the market, such as "limiting monopoly and manipulation of prices" 
(ARE, 1991: 11). In addition, the state would provide basic social services such as 
education and technical training to promote increased productivity. Another issue 
dealt with in the Program is adoption and encouragement of policies that would 
enhance competitiveness in the market, decentralisation of decision-making, and 
increasing accountability, legally and administratively. 
Concerning public sector reforms, the Program indicates that liberalisation does 
not imply the dissolution of all public sector enterprises. Rather, liberalisation 
implies reducing bureaucratic constraints, and entails the application of sound 
economic criteria on the performance of enterprises, thereby separating 
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management from ownership (ARE, 1991: 17-8). In the discussion of privatisation 
it is pointed out that transferring enterprises to the private sector has rendered 
them more `efficient'. The Program proposed the possibility of privatisation for 
enterprises that "do not produce nor sell strategic goods" (ARE, 1991: 19). It is to 
be noted, however, that there is no mention of what constitutes a `strategic' good. 
Following is an examination of the process of implementation of structural 
adjustment to public sector enterprises in Egypt. The study is based on interviews 
in two public sector enterprises, a tobacco company and a glass manufacturing 
plant. Interviews were carried out primarily with management personnel and 
workers' representatives in the trade union committees. In addition, some 
interviews were carried out with trade unionists who are politically active in 
opposition parties. 
State and Management of Public Enterprises 
In the case of Egypt, the creation of public sector enterprises has played an 
important economic role in the government's attempts to promote a social and 
economic development program. The "route" to fulfilling that development 
program emerged over time, partly as a response to the failure of earlier attempts 
of the government to involve the private sector in the government's 
industrialisation plan. However, despite the extensive nationalisations particularly 
of 1961-63, the government did not have absolute hegemony over the economy. A 
private sector persisted in both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, albeit a 
small one. The government enforced its ownership and control over the productive 
sectors through a web of administrative/legal regulations. This took the form of 
setting production targets, price controls, and perhaps more significantly the 
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distribution of goods. It is indicated that the distributive role of the public sector 
exceeded in significance its productive role (Waterbury, 1993: 2). 
It became increasingly apparent that the public sector would not be able to attain 
the development objectives set out by the government. The public sector, 
particularly manufacturing was increasingly burdened with debts. It was against 
this background that in 1974 Sadat introduced the Infitah or Open Door policies. 
This Infitah stage of economic liberalisation tried to encourage investments from 
local and foreign capital. Incentives to invest in the economy took the form of 
exemptions from taxes, relaxing the rules on sources of income, and the 
introduction of laws that, in theory, gave more autonomy to management in public 
enterprises. The ultimate result of Infitah was, however, to inject life to the private 
sector, with minimal changes to the structure and function of public enterprises. 
As Henley and Ereisha point out, the result of Infitah was "the restoration of 
dynamism to an already existing parallel private economy rather than reform the 
public sector" (Henley and Ereisha, 1989: 70). In retrospect the Infitah policies of 
economic liberalisation did not strengthen the productive private sector, rather it 
resulted in a mushrooming of import and export businesses, with the emphasis on 
the former. Thus, the market became flooded with imported goods that competed 
with the goods produced by the public sector enterprises. 
The disillusionment with the private sector as it developed since the Infitah period 
is reflected by a former Chairman of the Board of Directors of a public sector 
company, he said: 
Management in the private sector does not exist, and where it does exist it 
is taken from the public sector. There is no economic vision, no planning 
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for production. There is only speedy production. <AZEI-Din, 
RACITA, 17/8/1994> 
The extent of regulations that exist, even with regard to the private sector led 
many to doubt whether it is possible to refer to the existence of a private sector in 
the true sense of the word <OAbu-Ismail, Maragel, 20/8/1994>. 
The open door policies did not alter the condition of public sector enterprises 
significantly. They remained institutions under the management and regulation of 
the state. For example a labour law was issued (Law 48/1978) entitled Public 
Sector Employees Law. The law covers various aspects of employment, such as 
wages, incentives, promotions, performance evaluation, social security, among 
others. The law replaced previous legislation concerned with public sector 
employees. Though the law did not alter previous laws significantly, it nonetheless 
gave management in public sector enterprises a degree of flexibility (Waterbury, 
1993: 241). The public sector, however, remained a financial burden. Politically, 
public sector enterprises were not allowed to go into bankruptcy, despite the 
serious financial problems confronted by them, mainly a result of the combination 
of subsidised prices of goods, and decreasing productivity. Public sector 
enterprises were allowed to borrow from state banks in order not to go into total 
bankruptcy. In an interview with a previous Chairman of a Pubic sector company 
he said that, "Credit for the public sector is unlimited, it is open. The size of the 
debts of the public sector to banks is written off, " <AZEI-Din, RACITA, 
17/8/1994>. 
With structural adjustment the government is promoting policies towards a market 
economy. Economic liberalisation as per the World Bank formula has meant that 
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public sector enterprises would have to function as viable economic units. The 
government opted for privatisation as the inevitable solution. Yet an examination 
of the role government is playing in managing the transition of public sector 
enterprises to the private sector highlights the political significance of the public 
sector. The process contains many contradictions. 
It is important to note that prior to SAP, there have been attempts on the part of 
the GOE to reform public sector enterprises. For example, in 1982 the National 
Specialised Council proposed that PEs be granted rights similar to those of the 
joint venture enterprises, and that managers may have more autonomy (Waterbury, 
1993: 141). 
Since Sadat the government has introduced legislation that benefited the business 
community. However, the legacy of the Nasser regime with regard to the working 
class remained. The same trend continued with Mubarak, where the government 
has been actively supporting the private business community, while at the same 
time maintaining the more obvious vestiges of Nasser's socialist system. With 
structural adjustment many of the artificial props carried out by the government 
are being eroded, in the name of "economic liberalisation", and the consequent 
rationalisation and efficiency of enterprises. 
Process of Transition to Privatisation 
Problem of the public sector 
For a considerable time in Egypt it has not been possible to discuss public sector 
enterprises without talking about the problems of these organisations. As already 
mentioned, state-owned enterprises have not been economically efficient, and 
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numerous mechanisms have been adopted to prevent their collapse. The nature of 
the problem has been defined by many of the interviewees as one of too much 
legal and administrative interference in the management of the enterprises. During 
the Nasser era production subscribed to a national development plan, thereby 
quantity was controlled, and more significantly prices were set by the Ministry of 
Industry. The situation did not improve under Sadat. Management in public sector 
enterprises had limited powers in determining the amount of production, and 
almost no power in pricing. The Chairman of the tobacco company said, 
"Economics and politics, the two are inseparable. Our mistake is that we separated 
politics and economics and gave priority to politics, " <MSadek, Giza, 23/8/1994>. 
In defining the problem of public sector enterprises, one of the debates is whether 
it is a management or an ownership problem. This view is voiced by a previous 
chairman of a public sector company: 
The problem of the public sector is not an ownership problem, it is a 
management problem. It is a political problem, and a problem of political 
and managerial interference. <AZEI-Din, RACITA, 17/8/1994> 
One may argue that such a debate is adopted as a compromise, it does not 
condemn the government as owner, but rather allows for government ownership, 
provided it loosens the ties that bind public enterprises administratively to it. This 
attitude is adopted as a means to maintain 'workers' gains'. It is the failure of 
management, be it via corruption, or adhering to some uneconomic policies that is 
the problem with the public sector. In an interview with the head of the labour 
secretariat in the leftist Tagamuu party he said: 
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The public sector has not failed, the accusations of its failure are unjust. It 
made losses, although in some companies it was successful, because it was 
subjected to government policies resulting in redundancy among workers, 
corruption was ignored, and fixed prices. ... The public sector is 
independent of ideologies, for example, it is found in big capitalist 
countries like Italy. It is a mechanism for society to develop... . 
It provides 
safety in times of crisis.... Management in the public sector is inefficient 
and corrupt. Workers' representatives in the BODs and in the unions 
report about 90% of the corruption. Ownership has nothing to do with 
failure or success of enterprises. Now is the age of big companies that are 
run by professional managers. The decline in productivity and the quality 
of the products is partly the responsibility of the government. 
<AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
Perhaps one may argue that in such cases 'ownership' is used in the sense of 
ownership by the people, and divesting public sector enterprises is interpreted as 
taking ownership away from 'the people' and putting it in the hands of self-serving, 
profit-seeking 'individuals'. This debate separates the political role of the 
government/state from its role in the economy. 
In practice, however, the brunt of government control or regulation does not apply 
equally to all public sector companies. Enterprises that are making profit can 
ignore the directions of the relevant authority. In an interview with a previous 
chairman of a public sector company, he informed me that when he was chairman, 
the enterprise set its own production goals and achieved them. Since the enterprise 
was productive, it continued to set its own goals. He told me that "So long as a 
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company is successful, no one interferes in its management, " <AZE1- 
Din, RACITA, 17/8/1994>. However, industries that are defined as 'strategic' 
industries, including monopoly industries, are strongly regulated, even when they 
are profitable. In an interview with the Chairman of the tobacco company' he told 
me: 
... the company cannot price cigarettes because it is a monopoly industry 
and only the government has the right to price it. As for water pipe 
tobacco (me'assel), we can price it because it is a competitive commodity, 
the private sector produces it. The reason why the price of cigarettes is set 
by the government is that cigarettes are not a flexible commodity, and a 
monopoly producer may increase the price, but that will not have an 
impact on demand for cigarettes, thus the producer may abuse this 
situation. <MSadek Giza, 231811994>. 
Even if an enterprise is making losses, there are loopholes that are used to sell 
products at market prices. For example, it is not uncommon for management in 
such enterprises to define perfectly manufactured goods as sub-standard or faulty 
and thereby sell it to middle-persons for whatever price such commodities would 
get in the market. The reason for this is that it is the prerogative of management to 
3 
The tobacco company is considered a strategic industry because it is a monopoly. 
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"dispose" of faulty goods or outdated equipment. Sometimes, however, such 
profits are not fed back into the enterprise'. 
Views on structural adjustment 
Structural adjustment is an issue of heated debate in Egypt. With respect to the 
implementation of the program on public sector enterprises opinions range from 
SAP being the remedy for the ailing enterprises, to those who believe it entails the 
destruction of Egypt's economic wealth, with few opinions in between. Economic 
liberalisation per se is not new to Egypt, as the previous discussion of Sadat's 
Infitah policy pointed out, thus it is not this aspect of structural adjustment that has 
come under fire. The concerns raised about SAP with regard to the public sector 
are with the consequences of the tariff policies and privatisation. During a visit to 
the glass manufacturing plant I met the head of the projects department in the 
Shubra E1-Kheima factories who voiced his misgivings about structural 
adjustment: 
There are two factors to consider, quality and price, we cannot compete 
with both. External technology saves on cost, for me labour costs a lot as it 
is not only wages, it includes meals, medicine, etc... The international 
system has changed, there is no longer Russia which we used to hide 
behind. GATT policies, removing restrictions on the importation of goods 
and the reduction in tariffs have a negative impact on us. Now there are 
4 
Information based on earlier research I carried out in 1989 at a textile factory in 
Shubra E1-Kheima. 
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cheap imports of good quality. The -situation before this in the company 
was that clients lined up for our products despite the poor quality of the 
glass sheets, and the drinking glasses were green and we used to wrap 
them in newspaper. <unions, shubra kheima, 26/9/94> 
Problematic it may be, but, there is little doubt about the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies. The position of the government is that SAP is 
beyond the control of the government, a series of policies dictated, with little 
flexibility, by the World Bank and IMF. Since 1990, the government has carried 
out negotiations with the World Bank and IMF, and has partially succeeded in the 
postponement of the implementation schedule so it may be more adequate for the 
situation in Egypt. There is a noticeable lack of alternative proposals by the 
government to the measures of the World Bank. It is also observable that the exact 
terms of the negotiations between the government and WB/IMF are restricted. 
This has attracted much criticism. One of the interviewees said: 
The People's Assembly does not know the exact terms of the agreement 
between the World Bank and the Government.... What will happen if we do 
not implement the reform conditions? Nothing, as in the case of Brazil, but 
this is government corruption. <AZEI-Din, RACITA, 17/8/1994> 
There has also been criticism that the government is utilising the negotiations as a 
ploy to enhance its image. The director of a research centre in Egypt observed that 
"Structural adjustment is government propaganda so that it would give the 
impression that there is reform, reform is a value judgement, " <ISAbdalla, Third 
World Forum, 28/9/1994>. There are strong indications that the implementation of 
structural adjustment in Egypt is a choice by the government. As in the case of the 
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earlier Infitah policy, it promotes liberalisation of the economy, providing support 
to the private sector, and encouraging investments in the economy. Unlike earlier 
economic liberalisation programs, the current government aims at transforming 
Egypt to a private' sector led economy, and thus the remains of Nasser's socialist 
policies and institutions are deemed to be obstacles to such a development goal, to 
be terminated not tolerated. In an interview with the head of the labour secretariat 
at Tagamuu, he stated such a concern: 
The beginning was 1974, they wanted to reach this situation in about five 
years, but it was delayed, it was the objective from 1974. During this 
period there were some steps that were taken, for example the policy of 
participation of private capital in the public sector. Sadat wanted to make 
in Egypt an economic miracle, but the project was aborted. Sadat used to 
support this policy,... The death of Sadat and the change in authority has 
slowed down the process. Law 43 [investments] has conditions that do not 
exist elsewhere in the world, among which are exemptions from taxes for 
10 years, and legalising the transfer of money outside the country. The 
seed of structural adjustment had started. <AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
Few can deny that public sector enterprises need reform. Production is carried out 
in many enterprises with machinery that was installed in the 1940s, or in better 
situations since the 1960s. The impact on productivity and the quality of goods 
produced is inevitably affected. Many enterprises have deteriorated considerably, 
due to negligence and lack of new investments. There is a recognition that public 
sector enterprises will collapse without further investments. There have been 
various attempts at `privatisation' of PEs. At one level, there was a legal channel, 
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thus by virtue of law 43/1974 any project that obtained private investments 
became a joint venture company. In this manner, a number of PEs became 
`privatised' (Dessouki in Handoussa &Potter: 262). Complete sell-offs of PEs were 
discussed in the 1980s but not undertaken. However, a `compromise' was made in 
1990, when it became possible to sell public sector shares in joint venture 
companies to the private sector (Dessouki in Handoussa &Potter: 267). A 
"backdoor" to privatisation was used particularly in the tourism sector, namely by 
leasing the PEs to the private sector, but without changing the legal status of the 
enterprises as `public sector (Dessouki in Handoussa &Potter: 267). The three 
measures outlined are still used. 
The financial status of the enterprises, in addition to lack of big investments in 
Egypt due to political instability has made the search for investments in enterprises 
an unappealing prospect. Measures have been adopted that have led many to claim 
that these enterprises are being wasted. The following remark is representative of 
that point of view: 
In most companies, it is necessary to reform the financial structure in them 
so that the company may be sold, and this is squandering of Egypt's 
resources. There are investment since the time of Ismail Sidqi (before 
Abdel-Nasser). Since nationalisation, there have been increases in 
machinery and expansions in most companies worth billions. There are 
assets accumulating before nationalisation and after 
nationalisations. <AZEI-Din, RACITA, 17/8/1994> 
Besides the financial and political considerations, there still remains the problem 
of legislation. In an interview with the chairman of a public enterprise, he said: 
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Concerning the companies that have been sold [Coca-Cola], the buyer 
made a condition that the money he paid to purchase the enterprise be kept 
in a deposit in his name for five years until liberalisation becomes 
institutionalised. The problem is that laws say one thing but there is no 
institutional support for it, in fact, laws may say one thing but practice 
may bring about exactly the opposite. <OAbu-Ismail, Maragel, 
20/8/1994>. 
Among the issues that have also raised concern is that some of the public 
enterprises are increasingly being perceived as profitable as real estate. Thus for 
example, warehouses or other buildings belonging to public enterprises in cities 
are considered for renting, in one case as a shopping mall. Although many 
enterprises were originally outside city boundaries, rapid urbanisation of the past 
decades has stretched the city limits. 
Actual Measures of Privatisation 
Privatisation of public sector enterprises in Egypt has been primarily justified due 
to the economic inefficiencies of the enterprises partly as a consequence to the 
government's recruitment policies, and for increased competitiveness of 
enterprises locally and internationally. The debate was how best to privatise and 
manage the process of privatisation, not on options whether or not to privatise. 
The current 'transitional' phase of privatisation reveals much caution on the part of 
the government in implementation of the plan. As it was originally drawn out by 
the Public Enterprise Office (PEO), the schedule of implementation was spread 
out into three tranches, from 1991 to 1994, with a total of 85 enterprises (PEO: 59- 
64). However, the process of privatisation was expected to continue until 1997 
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(PEO: 10). It is to be observed that in the USAID privatisation project document, it 
is stated that, "seventeen Holding Companies (HCs) are charged with managing 
and selling their properties over the next five to ten years" (USAID, 1993: iii). In 
addition, the USAID proposed that about 73 privatisations would take place. Until 
the end of 1994, only two enterprises had been privatised, the Pepsi-Cola and the 
Coca-Cola companies. This has been partly as a result of lack of buyers, and partly 
for political reasons. 
In the following section, the discussion will centre on two main aspects of the 
transition to privatisation of the public sector: the institutional set-up for 
privatisation, and the process of evaluation of the public sector enterprises. 
Throughout the discussion, there will be an attempt to high-light how workers in 
such enterprises are impacted by such changes. 
Institutional set-up for privatisation 
A number of significant steps were taken to "prepare" public sector enterprises for 
privatisation. The ground work for privatisation started by the early 1990s, 
organisationally and legally. The Minister of Public Enterprise, and the technical 
office, PEO, are charged with co-ordinating the process of reforming and 
privatisation of PEs. The PEO was established in November 1991. Laws were 
passed that had a direct role in the process of privatisation, namely laws 203/1991 
and 95/1992. Whereas law 203/1991, Public Enterprise Law, dealt primarily with 
the restructuring of PEs including the formation of holding companies, law 
95/1992 known as the Capital Markets Law, dealt with the reformation of the 
Stock Exchange and the Capital Market Authority. Furthermore, in January 1996 a 
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Ministerial Committee For Privatisation was formed'. For the purposes of this 
research, the focus will be on the PEO and Law 203. 
Public Enterprise Office (PEO) 
Before proceeding, it is interesting just to observe the names or nomenclature that 
surround the privatisation of public enterprises in Egypt. The organisation whose 
function it is to manage the process of transition to the private sector is named the 
"public business sector office" [maktab kita'a al-amal al-am]. Second, 
'privatisation' of public enterprises is referred to by the PEO and often the official 
publications as 'expansion of the ownership base of the'private sector'. At the level 
of language, there is a reluctance to do away with the term 'public', and thus it is 
integrated into the new lingo. 
The PEO is a technical office the functions of which are to provide assistance in 
the process of privatisation, and to provide co-ordination. The PEO operates as a 
technical secretariat to the Minister of Public Enterprise to implement Law 203 
(PEO: 15). The objectives undertaken by the PEO are: increasing the utilisation of 
resources in PEs, limiting the drainage of financial resources of PEs, attracting 
investments and new technologies, increasing the share of the private sector, 
increasing job opportunities, restructuring PEs and paying off debts to banks as 
well as using the surplus to increase the revenue of the state budget, and finally to 
stimulate the capital market (PEO: 6). The PEO issued guidelines covering 
5 
The process of privatisation received a boost since January 1996 with the coming 
to power of Kamal E1-Ganzouri as Prime Minister in a cabinet re-shuffle. 
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procedures of restructuring for enterprises, as well as some measures to enhance 
performance of the companies. Enterprises to which the privatisation program 
applies are public sector enterprises organised by law 203/1991, and enterprises 
that have a public sector share such as Law 159/1981 enterprises6, and Law 
230/1989 enterprises? (PEO: 12-13). 
Holding companies 
Holding companies were introduced in 1991 through Law 203/1991, basically as 
an attempt to adjust the financial status of public enterprises. It was one of the first 
steps towards privatisation. Previously, enterprises were affiliated to General 
Organisations (hai'a a'ma). Enterprises from the same industry were grouped 
together, under the general organisation for that industry. Holding companies 
replaced general organisations'. Though holding companies also represent 
industries, not all the enterprises affiliated to a holding company belong to the 
same industry. Financial considerations are paramount in holding companies. The 
basic aim of holding companies is the restructuring of the financial status of 
enterprises, in preparation for the sale of the shares. Thus, at present in Egypt 
enterprises pertaining to the same industry can be dispersed over several holding 
companies representing differing industries. The rationale for such a regrouping of 
industries is provided by the president of the holding company for thermic and 
6 Corporate Company Law. 
7 
Companies operating under Investment Law. 
8 
There are seventeen holding companies, to which are affiliated 314 enterprises. 
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metallurgic industries, to which are affiliated the two companies in which I 
conducted my fieldwork, the glass manufacturing, and tobacco enterprises: 
The main reason is that holding companies operate as investment trusts 
(mahafez maleyya), it is a balance between companies that are successful 
and those that are losing. <MAAbdel-Kerim, HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
The classification of enterprises in the holding companies by type of industry 
sometimes conflicts with the general union affiliation of the enterprise. This gives 
weight to the argument that the holding company is primarily of financial 
considerations. Such an observation was made during a visit to the tobacco 
company in a meeting with members of the union committee: 
Some of the classifications have changed. We used to be affiliated to the 
general organisation of Food Industries, but now to Metallurgy. Union- 
wise we are affiliated to the General union for Food Industries, there is a 
General union for Mining, Quarrying, and Metallurgy, but we are not 
affiliated to it. The classifications were made on an economic basis only, 
for example, the beer company is affiliated to the holding company for 
cinema and theatres, for the reason that it supports the holding company. 
The goal was to make the weight of the holding companies equal. There 
are some enterprises that have a stable and strong position, they always 
make profit, the holding company says that the enterprise [i. e. El-Sharkia] 
is the hen that lays the gold egg. <GRShaf: k, Giza, 1811011994> 
In the case of the tobacco company, there is in fact a sense of pride that the 
company is profitable, so much so that one of the interviewees told me, "the 
company [El-Sharkia] provides the government with a revenue of LE 2 billion per 
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year, it comes after Suez canal, " <FAlbrahim, Giza, 15/10/1994>. Here one of the 
recurrent themes of the privatisation debate in Egypt emerges, the distinction 
between profitable or successful enterprises, and the loosing ones. As will emerge 
in different sectidns, this distinction is used to subside fears among employees 
about sale of enterprises and redundancy of the workforce. 
Legislation 
Three sets of legislation are related to the privatisation of enterprises in Egypt: 
Law 203, the new labour law, and the new trade union law. The last of these laws 
will be dealt with in the chapter on trade unions and reform. The new labour law 
and law 203 are complementary in a way, as the former is concerned with labour 
relations and conditions of work at the macro level, while the latter refers to the 
individual 'public sector' enterprises. Also, while law 203 is intended as temporary 
or transitional, the new labour law is not. 
Law 203 
The core of the transitional phase is Law 203. The law replaces the earlier law 
97/1983. By virtue of the law holding companies are established with the aim of 
financial restructuring of companies. The law provides the basic outlines of the 
areas in which the enterprises can formulate its individual by-laws. However, it is 
better to discuss the various features of the law separately. 
The law defines the framework for the establishment of holding companies, their 
functions, the composition of their BODs and General Assemblies, as well as the 
financial and accounting systems of both. The law specifies in article 16 that Law 
203 applies to any company that has at least 51 % of its capital owned by a holding 
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company. Among the most significant aspect of Law 203 is the changes it initiated 
to the management of public sector enterprises. These include changes in the 
board of directors, and the general assembly, particularly the functions of these 
bodies. For example, the law gives the enterprise the right to price its goods, an 
important move away from the central price setting of the past. Law 203 allows 
PEs to set their own administrative and financial by-laws. This is to be done in 
conjunction with the general union to which an enterprise is affiliated, as per 
article 42. Needless to say, this undermines the enterprise-based trade union 
committee. 
Though law 203 introduces some significant changes, some of the union members 
I interviewed dismiss it as basically a reformulation of a previous law, namely law 
48. The following comment was made by unionists at the tobacco company: 
It is a reformulation of law 48, but keeping into consideration what is 
suitable for the financial structure of the company. <FAlbrahim, Giza, 
15/10/1994> 
This comment seems an understatement, given that the law makes changes. Such a 
situation does have an explanation. First, although Law 203 was issued in 1991, 
many of the provisions of the law, particularly administrative and financial by- 
laws, remain ineffective until they are approved by the PEO. Until the by-laws are 
approved, law 48/1978 pertaining to public sector employees applies. Second, 
some articles in Law 203 refer to Law 48 for their application (article 44). The 
reason is that laws 203/1991 and 48/1978 are in some respects complimentary. 
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Perceptions of law 203 are varied. By some it is deemed to mark the transition to 
privatisation. It paves the way for the development of an entrepreneurial culture. 
This is reflected in the comment of the chairman of the tobacco company: 
By virtue of Law 203, change is beginning. There is a disparity in 
understanding the philosophy of the 'business sector : The ministry of 
finance by constantly increasing the sales tax, is overvaluing prices. 
<MSadek, Giza, 23/8/1994> 
A different point of view is voiced by the trade unionists I met. To them, law 203 
represents the undoing of the public sector, and the benefits of workers9. 
Law 203 ties public sector companies to attaining economic success, 
which is at the expense of workers and some of the recreational programs, 
such as clubs and summer resorts. ... Saving on production costs will 
create a big problem, which is excess labour, but in fact, there is no excess 
labour. In the private sector there is no security for workers. All workers' 
gains are in the public sector, everyone knows their rights and their 
responsibilities. Due to Law 203, it will be possible to get rid of workers 
easily. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
It is interesting to note that while the interviewees recognise that the public sector 
is making losses, they seem to believe it is acceptable, because of the benefits 
9 
This point of view is found in the leftist opposition press. For example, see Al- 
Ahali dated 9 November 1994, an article entitled "Workers' Rights Are Lost By 
Law". 
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workers derive from it. The enterprise becomes a service entity rather than a 
productive, economic one. 
Law 203 is a disaster for the situation in Egypt, because the public sector 
is a support/subsidy (da'am) to the country. Most public sector enterprises 
make losses for the sake of the people. Public sector enterprises play a 
very important social role. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
Another unionist gave a similar response. His response concerns the timing of 
reforms. He said: 
Law 203 came at a bad timing. The public sector has become indebted to 
the government due to government lending policies. The public sector has 
been losing since a long time. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
The law has in general received negative responses. These have been basically in 
the areas of distribution of profit and the board of directors. Due to the financial 
arrangements made by the law with regard to the distribution of profit of 
individual enterprises, it has been often criticised as a law benefiting unprofitable 
companies, while harming successful ones, via allocations and mostly due to the 
formation of holding companies. This is clearly stated in the following comment: 
Law 203 limited the percentage of profit. The total that may be distributed 
is calculated after the allocations, and putting aside a credit reserve for 
the company. Included in allocations are a strong financial situation for 
the company, and services. Then after this, 10% of the remaining profit, 
with a maximum limit of 12 months salary, goes to workers. In the 
beginning [i. e. old system] all the profit went to the Ministry of Industry, 
and the Ministry would distribute it to all the companies, so the share of 
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the individual was about LE 100 in all cases, in companies that are 
successful and companies that are unsuccessful. The present system, 203, 
stated that it is the right of the successful companies to take 10% of the 
total that remains/surplus for distribution. About LE 90 million go to the 
holding company, the mother company, the investment trust. This is the 
disadvantage of this system, instead of the Ministry now there is the 
Holding company. <GRShafik, Giza, 18/10/1994> 
This is the case in the Law. Article 33 in Law 203 does set a minimum limit of 
10% of profit for employees, provided it does not exceed the annual basic salary 
of employees. Excess profit that exceed this limit is channelled back into 
enterprises to services that would benefit workers. Furthermore, article 34 of the 
law allocated a maximum of 5% of the profits to the BOD. 
The provisions of the BOD of enterprises under law 203 came under criticism. 
From the administrative point of view, the law allows the chairman of the 
company to act as a designated member as well (article 22). The latter position is 
supposed to be independent in order to "audit" the company. In an interview with a 
previous chairman of a public sector company, he said: 
The proper management system is that no one should supervise/audit 
themselves. In fact, this is not the case. In almost all companies, the 
President of the Board of Directors is the designated (muntadab) member 
to the BOD [holds two positions in the same BOD]. In most cases 
financial supervision/auditing is internal. <AZEl-Din, RACITA, 
17/8/1994> 
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Another cause of resentment produced by the law is that it is financially very 
generous to the members of the BOD. By examining the remarks, one feels that it 
is resentment brought about by a sense of injustice. 
... by virtue of the law there is a bonus of LE 500 for (a'baa' murureia) [for 
attending a BOD meeting], even if this 'murur' means going from one 
office to the next. Also, the salary of the BOD member increased from LE 
300 to LE 1200. The new management is the same persons. It is like a 
game of chess, move them from here to there, there are no new ideas. 
There is one member of the BOD in our company who occupies 7 positions 
in one time, he cannot work well in all of them, but he earns from all 
seven. Members in management from one company are transferred to 
another. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
One may argue that this indicates that the senior management of public sector 
enterprises are doing well with adjustment, it is the middle management that is 
negatively affected. The following remark high-lights this point. The head of 
projects in the glass manufacturing company told me: 
There are problems with 203, the BOD system is not good. Five percent 
(5%) of the annual profit of the company is distributed among 9 people 
[members of the BOD], while 10% is distributed to the workers in the 
company. Also, the salary of the members of the BOD has increased. In the 
BOD, they have removed technicians and in their place came so called 
experts who say theoretical things but do not have practical knowledge of 
the problems of the company. It is people who are involved in the day-to- 
day work operations who know what the work is all about and what are 
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the needs and the problems, but they get experts for compliments, for 
example, in the company the expert is from beer company. We know the 
theoretical work too but we also know the practical. The head of the 
automated factory was a member of the BOD previously but he was 
removed and the one from the beer company came in his place, how does 
he feel after having given so much to company and an outsider comes and 
takes his place and at such a salary? How can he be satisfied at work 
now? Since the new BOD was formed we have not seen them and we do 
not even know what they discuss. We should know as managers of the 
company, but the opinion of technical experts in the company is not taken. 
Salaries of new staff increased, even workers' representatives now take 
about LE 200 per month for BOD meetings and before it was LE 
25. <unions, shubra kheima, 2619/94> 
A similar view is given by trade unionists in the same company: 
It is a reformulation of previous laws, Law 48, which applies to holding 
companies, and law 137 which applies to affiliated companies. The law 
has financial burdens, 5% of profit to the board of directors, which 
consists of 9 members, and 10% of profit to be distributed to workers. 
Workers' gains will be affected. Article 25 of law 203 states there should 
be 2 workers' representatives, instead of 4. It reduces the role of workers' 
representatives. The law gives a lot of power to the BOD, and increases 
expenditures. <unions, shubra kheima, 2619/94> 
Despite the furious debate about the benefits and harms of Law 203, much of the 
provisions of the law are neutralised. Without the approval of the by-laws by the 
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PEO, the law can only be partly applied. In an interview with the Director General 
of Organisation and Administration at E1-Nasr Glass, he informed me that: 
The basics have not been implemented, the structures, the financial and 
administrative bylaws. It has not been implemented to date. Until there is 
implementation, the company will follow law 48. <Mahmoud Abu 
Bakr, 28/8/94> 
Thus, it is perceived that "there isnt yet complete implementation because it is tied 
to the passing/issuing of the bylaws, and they have not been passed yet, " 
<RHIbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994>. In the meantime, it seems that management in 
enterprises has accommodated itself to operating on the basis of two laws, 203 and 
48, wherever each is applicable. 
Beyond the imperfection of the implementation of Law 203, from the perspective 
of senior management, Law 203 is a step forward for enterprises. The head of the 
legal affairs department at the tobacco believes that the law has advantages: 
It is a transformation economically, which is in accordance with the 
nature of human communities, as much as you produce you benefit. 
<RHIbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994> 
By virtue of the law each company is responsible for designing the internal by- 
laws of the enterprise: 
... The advantages of Law 48 will be transferred to the new law, but also it 
may be that there will be new benefits. Each company will implement its 
bylaws so they would be suitable to the nature of its work and 
circumstances. There will be liberalisation in production, there will not be 
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inspection agencies, but there is the Central Agency for Accounting. The 
inspection agencies place limitations, a lot of questions asked. The 
intention is always to be beneficial, but sometimes other than that 
happens. Inspection produces fear. <Mahmoud Abu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
Within an enterprise it is the board of directors that has the responsibility for 
formulation of the by-laws. Indeed, the law gave much power to the BOD of 
enterprises. Yet, there are some problems. When asked about Law 203, the head of 
the legal affairs department said: 
It is a legislative attempt after socialism, the bylaws have not been passed 
yet. There are several obstacles that began to emerge. The objective of the 
law is complete freedom for the enterprises to manage their affairs, but in 
the law there is what contradicts this.... The partial implementation of 203 
has proved there are obstacles, the finite that governs the infinite. It is a 
difficult equation, complete freedom, losing companies will not reach the 
existing ceilings (rawabit). External agencies will interfere in direct or 
indirect ways, all this is according to 203. <RHlbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994> 
The law has its critics in senior management. In an interview with the deputy 
manager of Operations sector at the tobacco company, he said: 
Law 203 has no noticeable advantages, it did not differ too much from 48, 
and it has not been implemented yet. <AHMahmoud, Giza, 2719/1994> 
Yet, despite these considerations, law 203 remains basically an ineffective law, 
because the changes proposed by it, the company by-laws, have not been put into 
motion because the relevant authority has not yet approved them. 
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Problems with the law would seem to indicate that the government has taken the 
measures necessary for reform - as per the World Bank and the government 
position - but that implementation is gradual, perhaps to soften its impact 
politically. 
Labour Law 
The new labour law, officially called the Unified Labour Law' replaces law 
137/1981. The 'unified' in the new law refers to the scope covered by the 
legislation, pertaining to both the public and private sectors. It will combine all 
labour legislation. The law governs the relations and terms of employment 
between employees and their employers in enterprises. There is an assumption that 
such relations operate in a system of free movement of workers and capital. The 
law is controversial, and has been treated with utmost "discretion", so that it was 
by accident that a draft of the new law was leaked to members of opposition 
parties. There are numerous articles in opposition papers and leftist magazines that 
indicate that the drafting of the new law was carried out in secrecy (Badawi, 
1/94: 24). This accusation was denied by government officials (A1-Wafd, 
September 4,1994). 
The drafting and revision committee was established in October 1991. It included 
lawyers, members from the Ministry of Labour, the ETUF, and businessmen's 
associations (Posusney, 1995: 9). Based on interviews, the draft of the law was not 
made accessible, until members form the Tagamuu party managed to get a copy 
through informal means, though the ETUF was involved in the drafting of the law. 
The Tagamuu party mobilised a campaign against the law. Strong objections were 
made to some of the articles in the law on the grounds that they are not compatible 
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with ILO conventions. A copy of the law was sent to the ILO headquarters for 
revision and the ILO upheld the objections made by Tagamuu. This version of 
events is very significant, however, elsewhere it is pointed out that the President of 
the ETUF, Ahmed A1-Amawy'° , who was a member of the drafting committee, 
insisted on involving the ILO in the drafting of the new law "to ensure that the 
new law did not contradict Egypt's participation in international agreements" 
(Posusney, 1995: 10). It was the case that access to the drafts of the new law were 
restricted and that even within the trade union organisation the general unions and 
enterprise-based union committees did not have access to make their opinions 
about the law known (A1-Shaab, 8 January, 1994). 
The new draft law represents a significant departure from the earlier labour law, 
137/1981, as the new one puts to an end the security of tenure of employees. 
Previous laws, such as law 48/1978 did provide some flexibility to management to 
hire workers, but the new law gives management the right to fire workers as well, 
as in articles 105-132 in the draft law. The new law allows for collective 
bargaining. The areas for collective bargaining as stated in article 149 are : 
improvement of conditions of work and employment, dispute settlement between 
workers and employers, and co-operation between labour and employers to 
achieve the economic and social goals of the enterprise. Collective bargaining can 
take place at the level of the enterprise", industry, regionally, and nationally 
10 
He is currently the Minister of Labour. 
11 
Those employing 50 or more workers. 
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(article 150). The law makes it difficult for either party in `negotiations' to exert 
`pressure' on the other while negotiations are on-going. 
The issue that raised the greatest problems was that of the right to strike. In 
interviews I carried out it was pointed out that in the original formulation of the 
law, there were no provisions for strikes. Tagamuu objected on the grounds that in 
return for the right of employers to fire employees, the latter through their 
representatives must have the right to strike. The new law does allow for strikes, 
which are recognised in article 196 as a legitimate right of workers, to defend their 
occupational, economic and social interests. However, the conditions for a "legal" 
strike are restrictive, and undermine the enterprise-based union committee. Thus, 
the enterprise-based union committee can strike only after the approval of the 
general union by a majority of two-thirds of its members (article 197). 
Furthermore, the employers must be notified beforehand in written form at least 
15 days before the intended strike. This point is clearly accentuated in the 
following remark by a unionist at the Nasserite Party, where he said: 
The new law reduced workers' rights to vacations, and the right to strike, 
which was given under conditions that make it impossible to happen. All 
the world gives the right to strike in return for the right of closure for the 
employer For example, the general union has to approve the strike, this is 
nonsense. In the past 20 years there was a big number of strikes in the 
presence of a law that incriminates strikes, the strike of 1986 was a 
turning point. The union movement, all its leaders belong to the 
government. A strike needs funding and there is no strike fund, and in the 
new law in case of a strike the wages of workers are stopped. The social 
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insurance fund, the right to invest it and placing a percentage of it in a 
strike insurance fund <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
A similar remark was made by another unionist, from Tagamuu: 
The system is incomplete liberalisation, only the economic side, without 
political liberty. Unions do not have the right to strike, they do not have 
weapons. On the other side, Government makes its men infiltrate the union 
movement, and thus the government is surprised by the spontaneous 
uprisings. <Sayed Rady, 25/10/94> 
There were other points of dispute concerning the labour law. In general the law 
was perceived by many, particularly of the unionists, to renege on workers' rights 
(Al-Ahrar, 18 September, 1994; Al-Ahali, 9 February, 1994). In an interview with 
a unionist at Tagamuu, he said: 
It is a blunt aggression against workers' rights, for example arbitrary 
dismissals are allowed. There were committees formed in all the worker 
districts in Egypt, but the modified law is being done in utter secrecy. It is 
not in the interest of anybody to prepare a law that is a social law with 
economic and social effects on more than 10 million workers in a secret 
manner. In order for it to be legitimate it has to be discussed at the widest 
level. For this law to be done in a short time will have very dangerous 
consequences. Following this there is also the trade union law, which is 
also being prepared in secrecy, even behind the backs of trade union 
committees that are part of the structure of the trade union movement. This 
goes against reason, it has to be discussed in public, and presented to the 
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union committees to take their opinion about it before it is discussed in the 
People's Assembly. <AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
Perhaps it is interesting to observe that Al-Shaab paper, which is Islamic, declared 
the new labour law as contrary to Islamic Shari'a as it is "unjust, and creates a 
state of insecurity and instability psychologically, and socially to the workers, and 
their families" (A1-Shaab, 30 August, 1994). 
While on the one hand the politically active unionists played a significant role in 
the drafting of the law, it came as a surprise to me that some of the branch-level 
unionists I met did not know much about the law, and only talked about it in 
general terms, though this is a confirmation of the views expressed by the 
Tagamuu member quoted above. In a meeting with a group of unionists at the 
glass manufacturing enterprise, I asked about the new labour law: 
It is a draft, and has not been passed yet. It has some points against 
workers, for example, firing without compensation. Capital is the 
domineering force. The new law wants to tie wages not only with 
production, but also with distribution. Thus, a working paper from the 
general unions and the federation was done. <unions, shubra kheima, 
26/9i94> 
Indeed in one interview at the tobacco company, both unionists I was interviewing 
knew nothing about the new labour law, "it was not discussed in the trade union 
committee, maybe it was discussed in the general union or in the federation, " 
<FAlbrahim, Giza, 1 5/10/1994>. One of the interviews said that he only knew that 
the new law will be discussed in the people's assembly <FAIbrahim, 
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Giza, 15/10/1994>. Again, such an opinion -confirms the rift between enterprise 
unions on the one hand, and the general unions and the ETUF on the other. 
The law has also been perceived as an excuse to justify labour redundancy. A 
unionist at the Nasserite party said: 
The law gives the right to closure and reducing workers, it dropped all the 
conditions that exist in the present law, so that workers may be reduced for 
economic reasons that the employer sees are needed. The 
employer/employer only has to inform them.... The new law has set the 
minimum wage to LE 75. It leaves wages to collective negotiations, and 
allows joint worker contracts as in Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. The 
union organisation is lacking in experience and the ministry of labour has 
lost its experience since a long time. These are the mechanisms of the 
government for dealing with the situation. It gave the right to the employer 
to reduce labour. <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
From the point of view of management the new labour law has benefits. In a 
meeting with the deputy manager of the Operations sector at the tobacco company, 
he told me that the new labour law gives freedom to the enterprise <AHMahmoud, 
Giza, 27/9/1994>. While it was recognised that the law may result in labour 
redundancy, it was justified on the grounds of the interest of the company. The 
head of the legal affairs department in the tobacco company makes the following 
comment: 
As for dismissal, there are specified cases in the labour law, and they are 
sufficient for the needs of the enterprise in managing its affairs. 
<RHIbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994> 
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One lone voice among the managerial staff interviewed noted that the pace of 
implementation of the labour law is problematic. In a meeting with the manager 
of Industrial Relations at the glass manufacturing company he recognised that: 
Transition needs temporary laws to deal with the negative impacts. This 
should be over a period of 10 years, then make a permanent law. There 
are constraints on workers, I cannot stand by the gate and tell workers 
who can come in and who cannot in one day, it needs a transitional labour 
law. <Fawzi Nawar, 29/8/94> 
The above comment again highlights that there is a general attitude among 
management staff and policy makers that a change in the laws/structure will bring 
about with it a new "entrepreneurial culture". 
There seem to be some major problems with the new labour law. Recognising that 
the labour law is intended as a permanent law, and that law 203 is meant as a 
transitional law, the simultaneous application of the two laws is incongruous. The 
following comment by the head of the legal affairs department at the tobacco 
enterprise sheds light on the problem: 
Collective dismissals, this is the phenomenon that will appear in 
implementation of new labour law, though it is illegal since law 203 stated 
that workers' rights should not be tampered with, but practical 
implementation will force it upon us. We saw it implemented in enterprises 
that were completely privatised, like Coca-Cola and Pepsi. A new 
organisational structure was made and workers either accepted the new 
position or gave up work in return for the wage. <RHlbrahim, 
Giza, 2419/1994> 
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To conclude this section on the institutional. measures of PE reform, it is evident 
that it is geared at reforming the financial status of enterprises. It also highlights 
that reform does not have the same impact on all public sector enterprises. For 
example, companies that are successful or profitable are forced to give up a larger 
share of their profits to the holding company. Also, within enterprises, some 
groups benefit more than others from reform. Probably the biggest beneficiaries 
are senior management who gain greater autonomy and benefit financially. The 
section on evaluation of PEs points to some of the `losers'. 
Evaluation process 
The evaluation or valuation of enterprises is carried out by Becktel, Coopers and 
Lybrand, and Arthur Andersen, in conjunction with USAID12. The evaluation of 
enterprises is carried out through consultancy to the PEO, principally through the 
USAID-funded `Partnership In Development Project' (USAID: 3). It is interesting 
to note that government agencies play a secondary role in the process of 
evaluation. The holding company to which an enterprise is affiliated gives 
feedback on the valuation submitted by Becktel. The process involved is concisely 
outlined by the chairman of the glass manufacturing company: 
There are several stages to privatisation. The first stage is evaluation of 
the enterprise which is carried out by Becktel, then the evaluation is 
presented to the Holding company so it may give its feedback in the 
evaluation of the assets of the affiliated company. Once the holding 
12 
USAID is providing technical assistance to the PEO for privatisation. 
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company approves the evaluation, the General Assembly for the company 
meets to decide on sales procedures. <Adel Kamel, 2418194> 
Concerning the criteria used for valuation of enterprises, the interviewee 
continued: 
There are four basis for evaluation of enterprises: the book value of the 
assets; the adjusted book value or exchange value of the assets; cash flow; 
and profitability. Each approach has its advantages and benefits. The 
evaluation report lists the different approaches, and these are examined 
and one is chosen. <Adel Kamel, 24/8/94> 
The valuation of the enterprises has attracted criticism, but none in the course of 
the fieldwork related to government involvement. 
Two special issues must be highlighted with regard to the evaluation of 
enterprises, the financial restructuring of enterprises, and the use of labour as a 
cost of production. In order to improve the financial situation of enterprises, 
management has resorted to a variety of measures that would allow the enterprise 
to engage in profitable activity. It is to be noted that since Law 203 has been 
issued, it gave the BOD of enterprises the authority to carry out such activities. As 
the overwhelming concern is with improvement of the financial status of 
enterprises, management has in many instances expanded the activity of the 
enterprises into non-production/manufacturing areas. An example of this is given 
by the Chairman of the tobacco company: 
Utilisation of the land economically, for example the company has 
storage facilities in Giza which can be used as a shopping mall, and the 
returns from such a project can be utilised to finance the new operation in 
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6 October. It is also possible to rent offices and to use the transport 
facilities. As an example, there are trucks that carry goods from the 
factories here for distribution in Aswan [in Upper Egypt]. After the goods 
have been delivered the truck comes back to Cairo empty. The President of 
the sugar company in Aswan suggested to me, that he could use my 
vehicles to load sugar to Cairo for a fee, and I think it is a very good idea. 
Transportation is expensive. <MSadek, Giza, 23/8/1994> 
The sale or lease of real-estate owned by the enterprise is one of the methods 
resorted to in the attempt to adjust the financial status of enterprises (Butter, 
9/1995: 3). Indeed, advertisements are placed in daily newspapers for the sale of 
land owned by PEs, such as the one by ESCO company that announced the "sale 
of land and property owned by the company no longer required and readily 
available" (Al-Ahram, 26 August, 1994: 6). 
In the specific case of the tobacco company, since it is a monopoly industry, the 
company cannot set the price of the goods. The prices of cigarettes are set by the 
government. The issue is clarified by the following comment of one of the trade 
unionists in the company: 
We have a problem of disguised losses because of the subsidy of the 
government. In the past the name of the company was El-Sharkia for 
Tobacco and Cigarettes, now only El-Sharkia so that it would give the 
company the ability to enter in other areas/fields like commerce and 
agriculture. <GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994> 
With due consideration to the case of monopoly industries, the expansion of 
economic activity of enterprises is happening at a time when due to Law 203, 
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management in enterprises can price its own-products. It is plausible to argue that 
the government has withdrawn the mechanisms for supporting public sector 
enterprises, be they subsidies or banking facilities, and as a result the boards of 
directors of enterprises have taken over the role of making the enterprises viable 
economically, and sustainable. The expansion into profitable activities that are far 
from the main productive activities of enterprises is a recognition by the BODs of 
such enterprises of the desperate situation the companies are in. 
A rather extreme example of this I have encountered at work in Egypt. It relates to 
a phosphate mining/extraction company located at the Red Sea. The Chairman of 
the company pointed out that it is no longer possible to carry out phosphate 
extraction as there had not been any phosphate to extract for some time. He was 
seeking funding to help the company expand into new activities. Among his 
proposals were fishing boats so that the company can make use of its location by 
the Red sea to fish and distribute fish to the near-by governorates. The second 
proposal was to grow mushrooms in the mines and sell the mushrooms to 
hotels/restaurants and other similar places. Desperate measures as these are taken 
to try to avoid total bankruptcy, and consequently liquidation of the enterprises, 
because even if the company were to be liquidated, there is an obligation to pay 
compensation to the employees. Such is the state of some enterprises that they 
cannot pay this, and the responsibility is taken over by the holding company the 
enterprise is affiliated to. During the interview with the chairman of the holding 
company for Thermic Industries and Metallurgy he told me about one of the 
enterprises that was affiliated to the holding company: 
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Faraskour company was liquidated, and workers received a compensation 
of 72 months on total salary (basic salary and incentives or 140 months on 
basic salary). The company was making losses of about LE 6 million per 
year, so I paid LE 5.5 million in compensations just in one time, this has 
saved much money. <MAAbdel-Kerim, HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
There is little doubt in the minds of those who are involved in the day-to-day 
affairs of public enterprises that they face serious financial problems, but the 
involvement of the holding company is deemed by some, particularly the unionists 
to be problematic. These issues are high-lighted by the following remark by a 
unionist I met at Tagamuu: 
Who would think of buying a losing company, in our company they are 
selling the equipment to pay the salaries, but, we are opposed to selling 
the company. The new law [2031 placed all the companies in one basket. 
This is a part of the losses. The holding companies are helpless in the 
face of the problems that are confronting the affiliated companies, and 
have not contributed to solving these problems. For example, the 
procedures for the sale of obsolete equipment requires committees. But for 
the sale of land is done as a compliment. <Abdel Menem El- 
Gamal, 5/10/94> 
There is little doubt that many public sector enterprises are uncompetitive in a 
market economy. The primary concern of the BOD, however, is that by boosting 
the financial status of the enterprises the value of the company shares would 
increase in the stock market. The aim of improvement of the share value is, 
apparently, its sale. The chairman of the Glass manufacturing company told me: 
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One of the points to consider... is that-the investor is only interested in how 
much a share costs and how much it will yield, this is the critical factor for 
an investor. It is important not to exaggerate in the evaluation (not to 
over-evaluate) or there will not be investors. From here, it is important to 
ask for whom are we selling. If I aim at selling to Egyptians then it is one 
thing, and selling to foreigners is another. It is a very complicated 
operation and thus it is critical to be transparent. <Adel Kamel, 24/8/94> 
In addition to expansion of activities, enterprises have adopted other measures 
such as contracting out some of the secondary operations. This however, depends 
on the industry. When I met the chairman of the holding company for thermic 
industry and metallurgy I asked him about the feasibility of selling off parts of the 
operations and he said: 
It is possible in some cases, for example packaging. But in the 
metallurgical industry it is otherwise difficult. <MAAbdel- 
Ke rim, Ho 1ding Co, 2 2/8/1994 > 
The second issue of concern with regard to evaluation of enterprises is labour as a 
cost of production. Before dealing with the issue of labour, however, it is 
important to mention that enterprises are resorting to a number of areas where 
costs can be cut, for example energy 3. This move to increased 'efficiency' is if 
anything an unpleasant verdict on the previous state of affairs of the public 
enterprises, where there was much waste. 
13 
An example of this is cited in Al-Wafd, 30 August, 1994: 4. 
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We have started to cut down on costs, by reducing residuals or waste. We 
have adopted a rationalisation policy and reducing costs. For example, by 
controlling energy. Through automation, fuel is saved, for example by 
filling the furnaces so they operate at full capacity [i. e. not half full 
furnaces], and by making sure that the material adheres accurately to 
specifications. <MAAbdel-Kerim, HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
Labour redundancy 
Among the factors of production evaluated by Becktel in its assessment of 
enterprises is the size of the labour force. Not surprisingly, it was reported that 
there is redundant labour. The issue of redundancy is a sensitive one, and through 
the years enterprises have developed strategies to try to deal with it. Enterprises 
were obliged to employ every year an allocated amount of employees, with 
different qualifications, as a result of the guaranteed employment scheme adopted 
by the government. Serious problems began to develop by the late 1970s and 
graduates of universities, secondary schools, and technical schooling had to wait 
for their 'guaranteed' jobs for a very long period. Often a 'government job' 
appointment was offered several years after graduation. The director general of the 
organisation and administration at El-Nasr Glass told me: 
In all companies, there was recruitment for political reasons. <Mahmoud 
Abu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
For many years public sector enterprises were no longer obliged to accept 
employment appointments. As pointed out earlier, enterprises adopted measures to 
cope with redundancy. Among these was the so-called "natural attrition", which 
refers to a policy of not substituting for workers who retire, and if their job needs 
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to be filled, recruitment was carried out internally, but no new employees were 
recruited. In a meeting with the head of the administration division at the tobacco 
company I asked about the extent to which reform policies could result in 
redundancies among labour: 
Redundant labour is c-e to replacement of the old machinery with new 
ones. There is training and vocational training.... The average of ages is 
old, the number of people who leave the company because they have 
reached retirement age is high.... We are still continuing with the 
recruitment policy, but it is limited, only in cases where there are no 
transfers from inside the company. <MMahmoud, Giza, 20/9/1994> 
In an interview with the chairman of the glass manufacturing company I asked him 
if the size of the labour force in the enterprise was evaluated in the report by 
Becktel, to which he replied in the affirmative. He said: 
About one-third of the labour force is excessive or redundant. It is found in 
all sectors, in the administrative as well as the productive sectors. If I were 
to take into consideration only economic factors, I would fire one-third of 
the workforce, but there are political and social considerations that would 
not allow me to do so. <Adel Kamel, 24/8194> 
The problem of redundancy is basically universal among public sector enterprises. 
In the tobacco company, the elected workers' representative at the BOD repeated 
this view: 
... The recruitment of labour constitutes a burden on the company. The 
company has stopped recruitment since 1990, and this has helped the 
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company stand on its feet. About 150 retired and they saved the company 
half a million pounds. <unions, shubra kheima, 26/9/94> 
Such a comment from a workers' representative in the BOD clearly indicates that 
he is primarily interested with financial considerations. Contrary to this remark, 
one of the unionists I met at Tagamuu told me: 
They blame the public sector that it absorbs excess labour, in reality it was 
labour qualified to be transferred to other factories. The public sector is a 
school that the private sector and Arab countries depend on. Absorbing 
excess labour is a needed social objective. Companies that are called 
losing are in fact made to lose, for example due to franchising 
(tawkilat). <Sayed Rady, 25/10/94> 
While redundancy exists in both the administrative and production sectors, often it 
is dealt with as a problem among the latter. Although it is not possible for 
enterprises to dismiss labour, there are indications that it does happen. For 
example, indirect methods are used to force workers to resign or be dismissed for 
failure to carry out their responsibilities, such as the case of `Groppi', a public 
sector pastry shop which transferred 30 employees to the Red Sea (Al-Ahali, 8 
December, 1993). Cases of worker dismissals are reported mainly in the 
opposition press. 
Nonetheless, as a result of the evaluation carried out on enterprises and the 
identification of redundancy, it has been stated that no new buyers would want to 
inherit the labour redundancy problem. Some measures were devised to deal with 
this situation, including early retirement schemes, and availing grants to 
employees, mainly referring to the blue-collar workers, to start small enterprises. 
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These measures, it is always assured, are entirely voluntary. Accounts of the case 
of Coca-Cola indicate that this is not entirely the case. In order to diffuse some of 
the anger over declarations that a 'solution' must be found to labour redundancy, 
another provision was made. It is explained below, in the words of the chairman of 
the glass manufacturing enterprise: 
One of the measures that are being adopted as a compromise to the 
problem of redundancy is that whoever buys the enterprise keeps the 
workforce as it is for three years, after which time, the new owners/share- 
holders can do what they want with the workers. This, he said, is not a 
solution to the problem, it is postponing the problem for three years. 
Instead, why not encourage early retirement so that workers would get a 
recompensation and leave. <Adel Kamel, 24/8194> 
The redundant workforce has thus been largely made a problem of the employer. 
According to the chairman of the glass company this should not be the case, the 
'responsibility' for redundant labour should be borne by several agencies. When I 
asked what are the plans for the redundant work force, he replied by saying: 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Securities has to play its role and carry 
out its responsibilities. The Ministry is probably the richest ministry in 
Egypt because it takes money from people but does not give securities, 
notably unemployment security. Also, the Ministry of Health and medical 
insurance has to play its role by providing health care for those who need 
it. All government agencies have to play their role because redundant 
workers are not the problem of the enterprises only. Redundancy is not due 
to the policies of the enterprises, rather it is due to government policies, 
227 
thus the different agencies of the government must bear in the 
responsibility. This is management of change, it has to start in the 
government. I have a worker in this enterprise who has kidney failure, 
such a worker does not work, if 1 fire hint he will surely die because the 
enterprise pays for his treatment, he cannot afford it. So, I pay about LE 
20,000 a year for the kidney machine. I should not be paying this, the 
Ministry of Health and Medical Insurance should pay it. <Adel 
Kamel, 24/8194> 
One of the features of the debate on redundancy is that it invariably refers to 
'excess workers' and the problem of redundancy without clearly distinguishing 
where the problem is concentrated. In fact, the bulk of the problem lies in 
administrative staff, rather than among blue-collar workers. This is succinctly 
stated by the chairman of the tobacco company: 
The problem of redundancy is mainly in the administration. As for 
production workers, there is a very high turnover, it is also easier to re- 
absorb redundant production workers. But redundancy among production 
workers is harmful, as it leads to problems. Redundant workers have time 
to spare, which they spend chatting. <MSadek, Giza, 23/8/1994> 
Though there is a recognition of where the bulk of redundancy lies, production 
workers bear the brunt of the blame for it. It is at this point that one should 
mention that in engaging about debates of redundancy and threat of redundancy, 
there is talk of 'good' workers who should be kept at the enterprises, and bad' or 
'troublesome' workers whose services are to be terminated. 
228 
There must be a plan for keeping good workers. There used to be an 
apprenticeship scheme in the company, and it is these workers that the 
company is working with. Here this is a casting industry, it needs extensive 
experience, it is a school. There used to be a training centre, affiliated to a 
production efficiency institute. The skilled workforce is taken by the 
private sector because it will not spend any money on training. The wage 
per day here is about LE 5 or 6, in the private sector it is about LE 20. 
Workers do not leave the company before they reach retirement, it is a 
matter of increasing income. They work in the private sector but they do 
not resign from the company. Most of the workers who benefit from this 
are the young workers. <unions, shubra kheima, 26/9/94> 
In the above quotation by the elected workers' representative at the BOD, there 
emerges the theme of the private sector. It seems to fit into the overall context of 
workers in the public sector. Often workers, because their wage is poor, resort to 
employment in the private sector either as a second job or take long leaves from 
their work in the public sector. The public sector job is, however, maintained 
because of the 'security' it provides, particularly in terms of pension schemes. For 
workers, the private sector pays off in financial terms. The following observation 
reflects a similar view: 
It is a good law [law 203] for the man who is working and who is not 
bad [meaning not troublesome]. There are some people whom the public 
sector has treated unjustly because there was lack of discipline (tassaiub). 
It is not possible to apply the law at once, it is imperative to educate 
workers. ... There are educational courses in the workers' institute in 
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Sheriffein street. If people knew the. law and its advantages there would 
have been accomplishments in a sick and old factory. There is competition 
with the monster of the private sector and importation. <unions, shubra 
kheima, 26/9/94> 
Beyond redundancy, one issue that does not emerge much is that not infrequently, 
public enterprises recruit workers, production workers in particular, on a 
contractual basis. This allows the enterprise to benefit from their labour, while at 
the same time the enterprise is not bound legislatively to provide employment 
benefits. As a result many of these 'temporary' workers fill gaps in production 
while at the same time they are 'insecure' and underpaid. Under-age individuals are 
thus recruited, and in the past once they reached the legal working age, they 
became recruited as regular enterprise employees. This method is mostly used in 
industries that are labour intensive, such as the food processing industry, and 
where there is high labour turnover. It is important to note also that a considerable 
number of young women are thus recruited. 
Employee Shareholders' Associations (ESAs) 
After valuation, shares of the enterprise are sold in the stock market. However, not 
all the shares of the enterprise are sold this way. By law, in public enterprises 39% 
of company shares are thus sold, while 51% remains with the Holding company, 
and 10% to employees. In all enterprises 10% of the shares of the enterprise are 
sold to employees of the enterprise at the nominal value of the share, as an 
employee shareholders' association. This division raises several important 
questions about the status of public sector enterprises. Among these is what role 
will the holding company continue to play in these enterprises in the future, and 
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the extent to which laws like 203, which. are "transitional", will cease to be 
implemented, and finally how different will the new companies be from law 159 
companies. 
During the interviews such issues were not raised concerning enterprise shares. 
For example in meetings with unionists I was constantly told about the 10% share 
for employees. It is presented as a benefit to employees, as becomes apparent from 
the comments of the chairman of the holding company: 
There is a nominal value for the share, and this is what workers take, after 
that the remaining shares are placed in the stock market. This means that 
the share-owners federation in the enterprise is given an advantage. 
<MAAbdel -Kerim, HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
Participation in the scheme is voluntary, where employees can purchase shares 
after these have been valuated. The benefits of the ESA are that shares are 
subsidised. The issue however, seems to be surrounded by confusion. In one of the 
interviews with trade unionists at the glass manufacturing company the following 
conversation took place in which one of the unionists and the elected workers' 
representative at the BOD were involved. The elected BOD member said: 
The federation has a board of directors composed of unions, elected 
members, and managers. Subscription is voluntary, payment is over three 
years, with a 20% subsidy. No shares are owned before payment is 
completed. A unionist said: No, first the company is evaluated, then 10% 
of the shares are set aside for the employees to be paid over a period of 10 
years. <unions, shubra kheima, 26/'9/94> 
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There is also confusion about the appropriation of shares by employees. During a 
meeting with a union member at the glass company I asked what happens if for 
any reason the worker is no longer engaged in the company, such as if a worker 
has gone on pension, or if a worker no longer wants to pay for the shares: 
In the case of pension, workers continue to pay, and if the worker wants to 
discontinue, he can sell his share to someone else.... There are about 35 
managers in the share holding scheme. <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94> 
It is to be noted that when asked this question, the chairman of the holding 
company gave the following response: 
The project is still new and some problems may emerge, but only with 
practice will solutions to the problems be possible. <MAAbdel-Kerim, 
HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
The issue of the fellowship fund seems to be an idea promoted to absorb the 
anxiety over privatisation of public sector enterprises. On the one hand, it is open 
to all employees at the enterprise thus it is less likely that the bulk of the shares 
will be purchased by the production workers as they have limited budgets. Second, 
membership is pending on full payment for the shares to be paid over a period of 
three years, which again gives the impression of working against workers. 
Politically, it may be perceived as a tool of appeasement because it gives the 
impression that share-holders are owners and also that owners cannot be 
dismissed. It is a vague symbol of 'security'. In reality, the three year payment 
period cannot be regarded as coincidence with the three year period during which 
the new owners of enterprises are required to keep the workers. Even if disaster 
strikes after the three year period, problems are no longer to be defined as 
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government problems, the problem will be. with the then owners. The same is 
happening in the cases of Coca-Cola and Pepsi, where all the blame is laid at the 
feet of the new owners, and occasionally used as a testimony against immature' or 
'greedy' Egyptian 'capitalism. 
However, as the process of privatization increased in pace in 1996, many of the 
issues that were surrounded by confusion in 1994 began to become clear. The 
10% share allocated to the ESA is in fact a way of going around the issue of the 
share allocated to employees as a share of the profits of the enterprises. Thus, 
according to the new capital markets law, an ESA is formed in enterprises with a 
maximum ceiling of 10% of shares of the company. The distribution of the annual 
profits of the enterprises is from their 10% ESA (Khattab: 18). Furthermore, there 
are criteria for the establishment of ESAs, including that the enterprise should 
have at least 50 employees and that the capital of the enterprise should not be less 
than LE 1 million (Khattab: 18). This in fact is a method of `rationalising' the 
benefits workers obtain in an enterprise. One may argue that ESAs are designed 
in a way where there are no handouts: what workers get, they must buy first, 
although at a nominal price. 
The views of the trade union members on the share-holders federation is 
interesting. In an interview with union members at the tobacco company, a 
unionist from another company who was visiting said: 
Now it is public ownership through the stock exchange, they will not 
repeat the situation of selling to the private sector because the experience 
of Coca-Cola and Pepsi was bad. In Pepsi they tied production and 
salaries with distribution. In the case of Coca-Cola, the entire company 
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was sold for LE 250 million. There are 14 factories in Coca-Cola, anyone 
will know that the value of the land alone is much more than that amount. 
<GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994> 
The above view is not shared by the chairman of the glass company: 
Already the decision has been taken to form a share-holders' federation for 
10% of the shares. This measure is not one of the true objectives of 
privatisation. The objective of privatisation is the transfer of ownership to 
the private sector, and to reduce bureaucratic measures. Privatisation 
means liberalisation of management in its decisions, so that the 
performance of management may improve. Instead of borrowing from 
banks and paying interest on loans, enterprises should encourage 
investment. It is thus very important at this stage to make people 
understand the concepts involved. It is important to make people 
understand what a 'share' means, and how investing in a share differs 
from depositing money in a bank. It is also important to make people 
understand what are the relevant indicators in the budget of an 
enterprise. <Adel Kamel, 24/8/94> 
To conclude this section, the process of evaluation of enterprises has not 
proceeded smoothly. Problems interlock, on the one hand the position of the 
government of taking one step forward and then stopping, arising from political 
considerations, and on the other hand the conflicts between different institutions 
and problems of an over bureaucratised system emerge. While Law 203 in theory 
enables the general assembly of enterprises to proceed with decision-making, 
conflicts with institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, which are as 
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authoritative as they are bureaucratic, limit the autonomy of the enterprise 
decision-making bodies. Thus, what emerges is that there is a political will on the 
part of the state to change and to deregulate, but an inability to implement rapidly. 
Underlying the sitbation, one may argue, is a conflict within the various agencies 
of state. Deregulation of the economy entails the reduction of power of several 
organisations that are considerably powerful. Indeed, the government by not 
pursuing radical changes "tried to build public consensus for reform" 
(Hinnebusch, 1993: 168). 
From the passing of law 203 to January 1996, only a few enterprises were 
privatised. Since that date, however, the pace of reform changed dramatically, 
after a Cabinet reshuffle and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Kamal EI- 
Ganzouri, known as a technocrat". Thus a Ministerial Committee for Privatisation 
was formed in January 1996. In May 1996 three Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
took place, of which two enterprises sold majority shares in the stock market 
(ARE, 1996: 73). By the end of July 1996, "28 companies have been majority 
privatised (including 10 companies under liquidation), ... [and] another 17 
companies have been minority privatised" (ARE, 1996: 73). The sale of the 
enterprises included both law 203 and law 159 companies. In addition to the stock 
floatations and private sales, a number of enterprises sold a majority of shares 
(95% of shares) to Employees Stockholders Associations (ESAs). All ESAs are 
only in the agriculture and construction sectors (ARE, 1996: 74). The number of 
14 
Ironically, he was also known for his conservative views on privatisation when 
he was Minister of Planning. 
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enterprises sold to ESAs are ten. There are criteria for the sale of 100% or 95% of 
shares to ESAs. The most important of these is that the enterprise being thus sold 
should be in an activity that relies almost completely on labour as a factor of 
production (Khattab: 18). The enterprises thus privatised must also be small 
companies. One may argue that the significance of this step is in fact political, so 
that it would appear that there are different options for labour, including 
ownership. However, these "advantages" for labour, as they are referred to, are 
primarily for political appeasement. 
Conclusion 
The reform of PEs has been deemed one of the most important features of 
ERSAP, as envisioned both by the IFIs and the GOE. While it was recognised that 
reforms would come at a social cost in the short term, the failure to do so was 
perceived to be more harmful in the long run as "the stagnant public sector can no 
longer absorb job seekers and unemployment is climbing" (Hinnebusch, 1993: 
164). Reform has negative consequences for workers, and the measures developed 
to placate the emerging dissatisfaction and fears among workers have not been 
satisfactory. As the crux of reform of PEs has been financial restructuring, the 
`social' role of enterprises was not taken into account. Labour was assessed 
primarily as a `cost of production'. In great measure this policy was adopted in 
order to attract private sector investments. Indeed, this is reflected in a number of 
measures the government has taken. For example, one of the measures to promote 
an adequate `investment climate' was "the mere 2% capital gains tax the 
government is proposing in the new draft tax law" (Hinnebusch, 1993: 165). Thus, 
the burdens of PE reform fall on workers. 
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The process of reforming public sector enterprises provides a good indication of 
the political choices made by the government in the course of economic 
development. The price of reform is being paid by workers. The discourse the 
government has used in calling for public sector reform has allocated the blame 
for the problems of that sector in large measure to the workers. Workers bore a 
large responsibility for the failure of enterprises because of their numbers. One of 
the keys to solving the problems of the enterprises became reducing excess 
workers. Although the government did share a part of the responsibility by 
recognising that it was government policies that led to the development of the 
situation, there are no workable measures that address the problems created by the 
laying off of workers. Some measures were developed which would have just 
postponed the problem. Increasingly the governmet is moving toward a system of 
financial settlement such as early retirement schemes. 
By examining the proposals developed to try to deal with the problem of the 
public sector, one finds that they are not very encouraging. For example, it 
became clear from the interviews that the new management teams that were to 
take the public sector through the transition period are the old managers but 
reshuffled among the enterprises. Thus the argument the government used to 
separate management and ownership is not workable. The role of the new 
management teams seems to be basically to try to stop the collapse of the 
enterprises, until they are privatised. The clearest indication of this is that the 
holding companies are often referred to as investment trusts, combining industries 
that bear little relation to each other. The goal is financial gain, not restructuring. 
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The process of reform highlighted problems with the trade union organisations in 
their relations with workers. On the one hand, there was concurrence at the 
topmost levels of the organisation, ETUF and the general unions, with the 
government in the formulation of the policies to restructure enterprises and in the 
design of the labour law that is meant to be investor-friendly, and which does not 
reciprocate with equal rights for workers. On the other hand, the trade union 
organisations at the enterprise level were not involved in policy formulation. 
Indeed, some instances revealed an almost complete lack of communication 
between the different levels of the organisation. At that level of the organisation, 
unions did not seem to be able to help workers, at best. The one group of 
unionists who seemed to try to represent workers and their concerns, the unionists 
in political parties, were defending the public sector. But in their defence, they are 
not presenting viable alternatives. This leaves workers, particularly public sector 
workers, in a situation where their rights are withdrawn but they cannot defend 
themselves through the existing formal channels. This issue is examined in 
greater detail in the next chapter on the impact of restructuring on workers. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of Restructuring on 
Workers 
In Egypt, as elsewhere, structural adjustment comes with unavoidable social costs. 
These costs "are both concentrated and dispersed" (Waterbury, 1993: 203). Some 
measures of the restructuring program negatively impact the bulk of the 
population, while other measures have a more specific or located impact. Workers, 
particularly public sector workers, are among the groups most adversely affected 
by reforms, both through the reform measures within PEs, and the more 
extensive/comprehensive measures of SAP, such as the removal of subsidies and 
trade liberalisation. The workers thus impacted constitute a large segment of the 
unionised workforce'. Nevertheless, trade unions have not been able to reduce the 
costs borne by workers. In part, this asserts the powerlessness of trade unions 
because of their corporatisation. While there is some resistance to the reforms, 
trade unions are not able to initiate substantial changes. Indeed, unions often have 
to justify to workers the reforms and subdue workers' misgivings. 
Following is an examination of the impact of restructuring on workers. 
I About 75% of the 3.3 million unionised work force is public/governmental sector 
(ETUF, 1992: 113). However, the number includes a considerable proportion of 
white-collar workers, in central and local government, as well as in the public 
sector authorities. 
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Reform Measures within Enterprises 
Most of the reforms in the public sector have their foundation in Law 203. Along 
with the establishment of holding companies, and the reform in the role and 
composition of the boards of directors of enterprises, law 203 allows individual 
enterprises to formulate their by-laws. Allowing for small differences in the by- 
laws of enterprises, the reforms have concentrated on the area of personnel 
management, and regulation of wages and incentives. The rationale for the reforms 
has been primarily to pave the way for the privatisation of enterprises, and making 
them more attractive for investors by promoting the productive efficiency of the 
enterprises, by addressing the failures of enterprises to attain efficiency due to past 
policies. The enterprise is redefined as a profit-making institution (PEO, 1993: 51). 
Thus, the new by-laws directly or indirectly feed into the goal of profitability of the 
enterprise. 
The by-laws of enterprises are drawn from Law 203/1991, Law 48/1978, and the 
proposed Unified Labour Law2. Article 42 of Law 203 states that the enterprise and 
the general union draft the by-laws of the enterprise regulating the personnel 
system (nizam al `ameleen). These cover wages and incentives, and holidays 
(article 42, law 203/1991). The by-laws in many instances are based on the terms 
stated in Law 48/1978, the Public Sector Employees Law, such as dismissal of 
employees, and annual leave/holidays. Each of these are dealt with separately. 
2 
Article 5 of Law 203 states that once the by-laws have been ratified and thus 
implemented, it is no longer possible to operate by law 48. 
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The formulation of the by-laws is basically carried out by the board of management 
(BOM) of the enterprise with inputs from the relevant departments, based on 
'model' by-laws provided to enterprises by the PEO, as is clearly stated by the head 
of the legal affairs department at the tobacco company: "There are model by-laws, 
which are in fact just an outline" <RHIbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994>. According to the 
law, as mentioned above, the general union is supposed to be involved in the 
drafting of the by-laws. Based on the research conducted, the situation is somewhat 
different. After the by-laws have been drafted at the enterprise, they are given to 
the general union for review and approval. 
It is important to emphasise that it is the general union, and not the branch-level 
union committee that is involved in the drafting and approval of the by-laws, 
although the union committee may be involved by presence of some of its 
members in the BOM, as indicated by one of the unionists at the tobacco company: 
It was in the BOM, it was formulated with us, 15 members from the union 
committee, and three from management. I do not say 4 from management 
because one of them is Ashour, we say he has two souls as he is considered 
both management [BOMJ and union'. <GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994> 
Once drafted, the by-laws are sent for ratification by the Minister concerned 
(article 42, Law 203/1991). At the time the research was conducted, in 1994, 
although it was several months since the by-laws had been drafted in both the glass 
3 
It is not an unfamiliar practice for unionists to combine more than one position in 
an enterprise. 
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manufacturing and tobacco companies, they. had not been ratified. The situation 
thus was that the enterprises were Law 203 enterprises, but the stipulations of the 
Law could not be fully implemented until the by-laws were ratified. 
Following is a description of the reforms formulated by the new by-laws in the two 
enterprises in which fieldwork was conducted. 
a. Performance evaluation, and incentives 
Performance evaluation is carried out on an annual basis in most enterprises. In 
both enterprises where research was carried out the same changes were initiated, as 
they were based on the model by-laws. The change introduced is expanding the 
scale by one level and setting percentages for each scale, as outlined below by the 
head of administration at the tobacco company: 
For each group of positions there is a model for performance evaluation. 
Under the old system there were four scales : weak, average, good, and 
excellent. In the new system, as suggested in the by-laws, the scale is: weal 
average, good, very good, and excellent. The percentage of excellent [per 
department] should not exceed 15% of the employees in the department, 
while the very good should not exceed 25%. ... In order to achieve 
objectivity, there are three supervisory levels that carry out the evaluation: 
It is worth noting that according to article 24 of Law 48/1978 there are three 
levels: excellent, average (efficient), and weak. This system of evaluation is not 
applicable to senior management. 
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the director of the department, the director general, and the head of the 
sector. <MMahmoud, Giza, 20i9/1994> 
The significance of performance evaluation is that it is directly linked to a financial 
incentive". A bonus is provided depending on performance. The placing of ceilings 
for levels of performance is an attempt at enhancing competitiveness, but it is also 
a method of placing ceilings on bonus payments. This issue seems to be 
disregarded by the union committee members interviewed. In an interview with a 
unionist at the tobacco company he detailed the scales for performance evaluation 
and the corresponding bonuses: 
In the new bylaws there is a performance efficiency bonus. The annual 
reports, were -excellent, good, average, weak- in the new system it is - 
excellent, very good, good, average, and weak. In the old system only 10% 
of employees could get excellent, in the new system, 15% excellent, and 
25% very good. In addition to the periodic allowances, the 'excellent' is 
given 100% of the performance efficiency bonus, while the 'very good' gets 
80% of it, in addition to the periodic allowances. <FAlbrahim, Giza, 
15/10/1994> 
Unlike the previous system, under the new by-laws only two categories receive 
the performance efficiency bonus, those graded 'excellent' and 'very good'. 
5 
Other financial incentives include the transformation bonus, which is given once 
for transferring the company from Public to Business sector law. In addition, a 
periodic incentive, which is 40% of the salary, is given once a year. 
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Regardless of the merits of the new system. or lack of, it is obvious that the new 
by-laws place a ceiling on this type of bonus. This is in line with Law 203, which 
states that incentives and bonuses must be linked to achievement or performance, 
either in the form of increased output/productivity, or as profit (article 43, Law 
203/1991). Thus, a person rated `weak' does not receive a performance bonus, 
nor the periodic incentive <GRShafik, Giza, 18/10/1994>. 
The implications for workers are clear. While it is difficult to justify the 
distribution of non-existing profit to employees, as was the case in some public 
sector enterprises until recently, it is possible to understand how workers can be 
financially vulnerable under the new rating. This is particularly the case in the 
absence of the tripartite committees comprised of representatives from workers, 
the union committee, and the Ministry of Labour. Indeed, as will be highlighted 
in the section on `dismissals', performance evaluation can be used to dismiss 
labour. The new system links productivity, labour, and profit. 
b. Dismissal: 
Another measure of reform concerns the dismissal procedures of employees. As a 
result of the new by-laws, procedures for dismissal of employees have become 
easier than in the previous system. These by-laws are based on the provisions of 
Law 48/1978. Article 31 of law 48 states that if an employee is rated `weak' in 
performance evaluation twice consecutively, s/he should be transferred to another 
position more suited to her/his abilities. Only in the case where a worker is 
practically unable to carry out any work is s/he to be dismissed. In case of 
dismissal, the worker is entitled to pension payment or compensation (article 31, 
law 48/1978). In practice, however, the situation is somewhat different. There is an 
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indication that the method of rating employees `weak' is used to dismiss unneeded 
labour. An example is cited in Al-Ahali newspaper, the case of a worker who has 
always `excellent' rating was given two consecutive `weak' evaluations "in 
preparation for firing him" (Al-Ahali, 20/10/93). 
Article 100 of law 48 states that a worker is considered to have resigned if the 
worker is absent without leave/permission for 15 consecutive days/year or 30 non- 
consecutive days/year. The new by-laws alter this: 
In law 48 dismissal happens after 30 interrupted days of absence, or 15 
continuous days of absence. After 15 days of interrupted absence, there is a 
deduction of up to three days' pay. No more than 5 days' fine per month is 
given, and if there is more, then it is transferred to the following month. 
The new system recommends 20 interrupted days of absence, or 10 
continuous days. <FAlbrahim, Giza, 1511011994> 
Under the provisions of the Unified Labour law, the employer, if necessary can 
transfer employees from one position to another to suit the `nature of work' (article 
123, Unified labour law). Should the employee refuse, then he/she can terminate 
the contract. During the research, this point was mentioned on many occasions, 
particularly in reference to the Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola companies, where the 
new owners used this method to both push wages down, or simply to get rid of 
redundant labour, with minimum obligations. In an interview with a unionist at the 
Tagamuu party he said: 
The direct consequences are that psychologically, workers' feeling of 
stability and the feeling of security started to end. From the practical 
perspective, only Pepsi-Cola changed, the other companies did not change. 
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One of the goals of the policy is the reduction of workers, recruitment 
stopped since 1985. <Sayed Rady, 25/10/94> 
No feature of employment in public sector enterprises was valued by workers more 
than the security of employment. Dismissing workers was a very difficult and 
lengthy process. It is for this reason that this feature of reform is dreaded. 
Nevertheless, though there may be opposition to the measure, it was approved by 
the general union and by the branch union committee members in the BOM. 
c. Job qualification: 
One of the most significant reforms introduced by the by-laws is that on job 
qualifications. According to the existing system, under law 48, job positions are 
tied to educational qualifications. Job descriptions state the required educational 
qualification for the position. The system rewards educational attainment rather 
than work experience. This policy is referred to as `pricing of certificates'. As a 
recruitment policy, it cannot be separated from the policy of universal and free 
education from the primary level to university. It is also inseparable from the 
guaranteed employment scheme promoted by the government. Figuratively, it is 
almost a caste system, with positions particularly in administration, barred from 
any individual without a university degree. Benefits are tied to seniority, rather 
than performance. From the organisational perspective, it is a supply-sided system. 
The new by-laws aim to introduce a demand-oriented system. The interview with 
the director general of organisation at El-Nasr glass company reveals this: 
There will be an organisational structure for positions. The organisational 
structure is being designed from the top to the bottom, and it is essential to 
have information about the base. There is a description for everyjob, a job 
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description card that includes conditions and goals/objectives of the 
position. There are some basic or essential positions in the structure. It is a 
process of linking the needs and the jobs, this is the organisational 
structure. It is possible to compress positions in order to decrease 
them. <Mahmoud Abu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
The interests of the productivity of the enterprise and its profitability become 
paramount under the new by-laws. The elimination of redundancy, to enhance 
productivity, is one of the goals in the proposed by-laws. In an interview with the 
director of industrial relations at the glass manufacturing company, he said in 
regards to the `pricing of qualifications': 
I link the position with production, and take account of experience. The 
new system will eliminate the worst workers, whoever works their income 
will increase. The ill and troublesome workers will be gone/finished. Of 
2400 workers in the factory 200 (8%) have chronic illness and constantly 
take sick leave. There will not be wasted time, companies will only support 
skilled workers, thus it will increase production, and consequently 
prosperity, Mubarak has grown tired of saying increase productivity. 
<Fawzi Nawar, 29/8/94> 
The by-laws relating to job qualification as well as the changes introduced 
regarding the employment and dismissal of workers, have far-reaching 
consequences for the organisation of work. The discussion of basic positions and 
non-basic ones, signals the introduction of flexibility in the workplace, together 
with provisions allowing employers to assign and re-assign workers to any 
positions needed for the `nature of work', is in reality a discussion of 
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organisational flexibility in the workplace. The essence of the change can be 
summarised as follows: what is good for the enterprise, is good for workers. Indeed, in 
the guidelines for Law 203 companies, the PEO states that independence of 
(enterprises) "aims at achieving the general interest, that is the interest of the owner of 
capital" (PEO, 1993: 51). Henceforth, the `good' worker is the one who is co- 
operative, and productive. 
d. Wages 
The consequence of the policy of `pricing of certificates' is that every level of 
educational attainment is priced. Such a price is the basic salary of the employee. The 
wage system is, however, scaled to account for some experience. Thus within each 
educational `band' there is a scale of number of years of experience, and accordingly, 
the basic salary increases by number of years. The basic salary system is universally 
applied in all public sector employment, including the civil service. By virtue of Law 
203, enterprises can design their wage scale, through the enterprise by-laws (article 
42, law 203/1991). In an interview with the head of the administration division at the 
tobacco company he explained how the enterprises proceeded with formulating the 
by-laws for wages: 
There were suggestions from the company. We adopted the principle of pricing the 
position, rather than pricing of certificates. In the public sector system, every 
certificate has an employment level, for example, a welder with industrial secondary 
certificate is fourth level. It is also possible by seniority to move through the levels. 
All this, however, applies to the basic salary only. As for the additional salary, 
which is the incentive, it differs, because it is in return for work performed, and 
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generally, productive work has more incentive than clerical or 
administrative work. <MMahmoud, Giza, 20/9/1994> 
A crucial point to mention here is the significance of the piece rate for production 
workers. It exceeds the basic salary, particularly if one adds the overtime wage, 
and is thus very significant for production workers. Indeed, the piece rate is used 
"to supplement employee income rather than as a reward for increased and 
improved performance" (Henley and Ereisha, 1989: 71). Yet, the by-laws for the 
piece rate had not yet been approved by the enterprises 
<MMahmoud, Giza, 20/9/ 1994>. 
e. Holidays and annual leave: 
Last, and least of the reforms is that regulating the numbers of days of annual leave 
for employees. According to the Unified Labour law, a worker is entitled to two- 
weeks annual leave, of which at least six days must be uninterrupted (article 48, 
Unified Labour law). In addition, the worker is entitled to six days of casual leave. 
This is a reduction from law 48, which states in article 65 that a worker is entitled 
to seven days casual leave per year and a 15 working day annual leave for the fast 
year of employment, 21 for those who worked for up to ten years in the enterprise, 
30 days for ten years or more, and 45 days for those aged 50 years or older. 
The discussion of the reforms within enterprises indicates that the new by-laws per 
se do not differ extensively from the old ones. However, by combining the by-laws 
with the increased autonomy of management in decision-making introduced by 
Law 203, significant changes will occur in enterprises. The utmost concern of 
reforms has been how to make enterprises more efficient. This is inevitably related 
to the issue of worker productivity. The shift from a public sector, state controlled 
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apparatus to a market-responsive system is a shift from a system that rewarded 
seniority to one that rewards productivity and output. The rather well-known `they 
pretend to pay us, we pretend to work' was the principle in operation in public 
sector enterprises; according to which workers put in minimum labour, and 
management provided minimum wage (Waterbury, 1993: 126). The fact that 
management in PEs could not easily dismiss workers allowed the system to 
continue'. The relaxation of the rules on dismissal of workers will change that 
situation to benefit management. Thus, workers are confronting more insecurity 
and instability in employment, with little or no backing from trade unions. 
An examination of the reaction of unions to the reforms within enterprises 
indicates that trade unions participated in their formulation and, from some of the 
remarks made by unionists about the adoption of the by-laws, it seems that branch 
level unions approve of the reforms. The following remark from a unionist at the 
tobacco company depicts this: 
... The bylaws were formulated and we hope they are implemented. 
<GRShafik, Giza, 18/10/1994> 
This is recognised by management as well. The 'co-operation' of the unions is 
reflected in a remark by the head of administration at the same enterprise. I asked 
him what was the reaction of the BOM committee to the new by-laws, and if there 
were any objections from the union committee to the by-laws: 
6 
The crisis of productivity is multi-faceted, and it has been discussed in an earlier 
chapter. The issue of labour-management trade-off is an important aspect of it. 
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There were no major objections from the union committee, in fact the 
general union commended the by-laws. ... The president of the union 
committee cares about the well-being of the workers, and the role of 
management is to balance between the well-being of workers and work 
<MMahmoud, Giza, 20/9/1994> 
One area of concern among unionists, however, was how the unified by-laws 
would impact the different companies, those that are profitable, and those that are 
not. Some unionists interviewed were concerned because companies that are losing 
and those that are making profit are equated <FAlbrahim, Giza, 15/10/1994>. This 
attitude reflects a wider debate of how the profitable and the losing companies fare 
under reform. There are those who argue that the bringing together of losing and 
profitable companies under single holding companies is necessary. This view is 
partly based on the notion that the losses of some PEs was a factor of corruption at 
the top7, and that the change in the top leadership in losing enterprises leads to 
recovery of losses (Al-Ahram, 1/10/94). In an interview with the president of the 
General Union for Engineering Industries, who is also a member of the BOM of 
7 
In 1996 a previous chairman of the BOM of an electrical engineering public 
sector company came under fire for charges of embezzlement from the company. 
He was tried and recently found guilty of the charges, and found to have 
transferred large sums to Swiss bank accounts. The case fuelled the debate of the 
corruption of some public sector managers, and their role in the failure of public 
enterprises. 
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the holding company of the Engineering industries, he pointed out to the financial 
benefits of combining losing and profitable enterprises in holding companies: 
There are 17 engineering companies in the holding company for 
engineering industries. In 1991 there were 4 profitable companies 
and 13 losing. In 1995/6 there are 13 companies that are profitable. 
This was done by paying off some of the debts of the losing 
companies from the profitable ones. Also, we negotiate with the 
banks <Niazi Abdel Aziz, ETUF, 25/2/97>. 
The concern of unionists was how it would impact "their company" in broad terms. 
Particularly in the branch unions, this indicates that trade unions are too localised 
in their concerns. The consequences of this is that it limits their action. 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that the concern is primarily on the enterprise, and not 
on the impact of reform on workers. In fact, trade union support was sought and 
attained for the reforms. As pointed out earlier, it reflects an attitude that the 
interests of work and the workers coincide. By combining both the interests of 
work and workers, trade unions ensure their continuity in enterprises. Trade unions 
thus `legitimise' their continued presence. This issue comes under greater analysis 
on the chapter on trade unions and SAP. 
In the following section is an examination of the wider impact of structural 
adjustment policies on labour. 
Labour and Structural Adjustment 
The previous sections focused on the changes affecting public sector enterprises 
within the context of structural adjustment and reform. The impact of the changes 
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in public sector enterprises on workers was . dealt with as well. 
It is important to 
consider the broader issues of structural adjustment and their consequences for 
workers. The following section examines the impact of trade liberalisation on 
public sector workers, the impact of the removal or decrease of subsidies and 
insurance, and finally the impact of reforms on women workers. After examining 
these three issues, trade union reactions to them are discussed. 
Liberalisation, enterprises and the workers 
The liberalisation of the economy is translated as the removal of barriers to the free 
movement of goods in the markets, and thus competitiveness among industries. It 
is argued that once some `impediments' to the development of industry, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, are removed, Egyptian industry would be 
able to fulfil its competitive advantage (Handoussa in Handoussa and Potter: 95). 
The perceived strategy is that of promoting export-led industrialisation. At the 
same time, the relaxation of constraints on the importation of goods allows the 
entry of 'foreign' goods in local markets which then compete with local goods. 
Unfortunately as with all 'struggles', survival is for the fittest, in this case not 
Egyptian industry. 
The problems of Egyptian industrial enterprises, specifically the public sector, 
extend beyond financial and administrative mismanagement, and too much state 
intervention. A very important consideration is a dilapidated, or at best humble, 
industrial base. In many enterprises the machinery is outmoded. As a consequence 
the goods produced are of an inferior quality in comparison with imported goods, 
and due to the frequent break downs of such old machinery, more expensive in 
relative terms. This issue is a concern among mangers in public sector enterprises. 
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In an interview with the operations manager-at the Musturud branch of the glass 
manufacturing company, he said: 
The goods imported into Egypt are cheaper than the equivalent 
Egyptian goods. This is unfair competition because Egyptian 
industry is not as sophisticated as foreign industry. As a result the 
demand for Egyptian goods dropped and this led to piling up of 
products in warehouses in the enterprises. This leads to reducing 
production <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94>. 
There is a recognition, however, that in an effort to increase productivity, 
enterprises - particularly in the private sector - utilised sophisticated and labour 
intensive machinery (Handoussa in Handoussa and Potter: 101-2). In fact, two 
opposing considerations are at play: enhancing productivity means reduction of 
employment levels in PEs, and at the same time the decline in labour absorption 
in the economy and consequently unemployment is a major concern. The labour 
absorption capacity of both public8 and the private sector enterprises remains low, 
but it is to be noted that private sector labour absorption increased slightly in the 
early seventies, at the beginning of Infitah. That slight change, however, did not 
alter the absorption pattern of employment in manufacturing across the different 
sectors in the Egyptian economy since the mid-1970s, which is approximately 
46% in the public sector, 9% in the private sector, and 45% in the small 
enterprises sector (Hussein in Abbas: 31). 
8 
It is to be noted that the bulk of PEs is in the manufacturing sector. 
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The problem in public sector enterprises is -further complicated by the refusal to 
provide required spare parts. The result is lack of productivity. In an interview with 
a tram driver he explained the situation found in the company where he works: 
The situation is getting worse, since importation from outside has stopped. 
Spare parts for the cars [train units] are not available. Local production 
does not last more than 7 days, while from Japan it lasts a year or two. 
There is a big number of workers without work for example, 15 drivers 
and 30 ticket collectors in every shift are without work There is no 
importation of spare parts from the outside, while about LE 362 million 
was spent to buy 400 motors for the Heliopolis company, but in our 
company there are 65 tram units in need of motors. The difference is that 
the Heliopolis company was merged to the General Transportation Agency. 
<Kamal Ismail, 25/10/1994> 
The halt or decline in productivity in PEs slashes the wages of workers because the 
piece rate, which constitutes a considerable part of the wages is directly linked to 
productivity. The relationship between economic performance and workers' pay is 
depicted in the following remark: 
Economic depression has an impact on workers, because it impacts 
production and services and this directly affects incentives which have 
come to represent the major part of the workers' pay. For a long time the 
government has been trying to remedy the problem of wages through 
incentives, but it is influenced a lot by conditions of the market and the 
economic situation, income decreases and prices increase. <Fathy 
Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
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These concerns reflect the end of an era when the public sector was perceived to be 
a place of security for workers. There is apprehension about the future 
<FAlbrahim, Giza, 15/10/1994>. Yet, some persist with the view that since their 
company is profitable, no changes will occur. In an interview with a worker at the 
tobacco company, I asked him about privatisation and its impact on workers, he 
said: 
As for the company, there are no problems, it will not impact us because 
the company is successful, they will not bring someone else to manage it. 
<MKGad, Giza, 1811011994> 
In the specific case of the tobacco company the impact of liberalisation perhaps is 
not as pronounced as it is for other enterprises. First, it is a monopoly industry and 
thus it may be the case that resources are available for upgrading the industry. In an 
interview with the same worker he told me that there are new machines in the 
company <MKGad, Giza, 18/10/1994>. Second, competition with imported 
cigarettes and other imported tobacco products may not be posing a serious threat 
because the company is producing some 'foreign' brands under a franchise license. 
This reflects the differences between and within industries in the post import 
substitution industrialisation period. Some industries are attaining moderate rates 
of return, while others are not. The former industries are primarily "activities in 
areas of comparative advantage" (Handoussa in Handoussa and Potter: 107). It has 
also been pointed out' that even within the same industry the gap between 
9 
The study by Handoussa focuses mainly on the manufacturing sector. 
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successful and average enterprises is large (Handoussa in Handoussa and Potter: 
108). 
While admitting for some differences among enterprises, the situation nevertheless 
remains negative for most public sector enterprises and the workers in them. The 
liberalisation of external trade, including lifting protective barriers against 
imported items does have a considerable impact on goods produced locally. The 
imported goods are of better quality than their local counterparts, and often 
cheaper. The consequences are negative for both the private and public sector 
industries, but the biggest burden is borne by the workers in the public sector 
(Hussein in Abbas: 27). The following remark by one of the unionists at the glass 
manufacturing company illustrates the point: 
The Graphite pens Company, due to importation, is facing serious 
problems, goods imported from China are cheaper than the Egyptian 
products, the Chinese pencils are sold at about 10 piasters, while the 
Egyptian costs about 11 piasters and is sold at 15. It is an economic game, 
a flooding operation to destroy industry here. It is a government policy, it 
should have placed limitations, the right to import should have been given 
only to public sector companies. <unions, shubra kheima, 26/9194> 
In another interview at the glass manufacturing company, the director of 
organisation and administration pointed out that liberalisation may be perceived as 
a stimulus to improve production. However, while he said that production 
improved, sales did not. By accumulation of goods, the result for workers is the 
same: 
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It is necessary to change, there is a development/boom. There are new 
products, new glasses, we have changed the packaging, new designs. The 
products had to change to keep up with the products of the investment 
sector, and imported goods, as much as possible we tried to renovate the 
equipment. Importation is a problem, the machinery we have is old, and the 
production of other countries is better, but it is also not that good. 
Importation has affected sales, not production. The company exports to 
Arab and African countries. At this stage the marketing operation is the 
most sensitive stage [in the production process] and this is the problem, it 
is a problem of marketing. <MahmoudAbu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
The proponents of trade liberalisation argue that an economy can flourish by 
focusing on developing industries where the country has comparative advantage. It 
is a recipe based on export-led industrial development. Yet, in practice, the 
evidence in Egypt suggests that many local industries, regardless of whether they 
are in the public or private sectors, end up the losers in this system. Workers in 
particular are among the groups most specifically impacted by trade liberalisation 
policies. A decline in wages associated with reduced productivity/distribution of 
goods, or a reduction in numbers of labour utilised are how trade liberalisation 
policies are affecting workers. Indeed, in the World Trade Organisation conference 
held in Singapore in 1996, one of the issues debated was the implementation of 
international standards. of labour in developing countries. The debate centred on 
the extent to which governments in developing countries have the right to deal 
with low-wage labour as a comparative advantage. In specific, international labour 
standards include the right of workers to organise in unions, but governments of 
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developing countries were reluctant because cheap labour was a comparative 
advantage. Thus `workers' are treated as `goods' of comparative advantage. 
In the following section another aspect of the impact of the implementation of SAP 
on public sector workers is examined. 
Impact of reforms on services to workers 
In addition to the reform measures that had a direct impact on workers specifically 
through the workplace, other reforms impact a wider strata in society. Workers, 
particularly public sector workers, are among the groups affected by such reforms. 
Perhaps equal to the security of employment, the attraction of PEs to workers was 
in the services or benefits it provided its employees. Such welfare measures have 
always been of greater significance to workers and other salaried employees than 
their meagre wages (Hank, 1992: 481). With the implementation of SAP, these 
benefits are under threat. 
One of the basic elements of SAP is the removal of subsidies, both on consumer 
items, and on production inputs'0. It is a policy measure that impacts workers as 
part of the underprivileged, not distinctly as a working class. The underprivileged 
is a fast expanding group in Egypt that includes the urban (and rural) poor. 
Government employees or those with a limited income are also adversely affected 
by the removal of subsidies. The extent to which subsidies are vital to many 
Egyptians was depicted by the January 1977 food riots, triggered by the removal of 
10 The impact of production input subsidy cuts was discussed in an earlier chapter. 
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subsidies on basic consumer items: bread, rice, and sugar. This is reflected in the 
comment of the head of the labour secretariat at the Nassente Party: 
The economic changes that are taking place and which workers bear the 
biggest burden of are, for example, the issue of abolishing subsidies and 
the increase in prices that is not compatible at any rate with the increase in 
income and wages. <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
Another incident that provoked rioting among workers over subsidy cuts was 
among the textile workers of Kafr El-Dawar in 1984. As in the case of January 
1977, the government went back on the cuts (Brumberg in Barkey: 90). However, 
by May 1990 the government had started implementation of subsidy cuts. In May 
1990 a cut of about 35% on rice, flour and pasta was implemented, in addition to 
subsidy cuts on electricity bills and gasoline (Niblock in Niblock and Murphy: 67). 
Yet, these cuts and subsequent ones did not go far enough as far as the IMF was 
concerned. One may argue that a subtle change in the discourse on subsidy cuts 
took place. Increasingly, it was dealt with as `an increase in prices of basic goods' 
rather than a `subsidy cut' (A1-Wafd, 5/12/94: 1). The latter implies a 'withdrawal' 
of a `right'. Other tactics used to get around the issue of subsidy cuts on consumer 
goods was reducing the amount of the goods and selling them at the same price, for 
example, bread became smaller. 
The debate about removal of subsidies is very sensitive in Egypt. Coupled with 
inflation, overall rates of poverty have increased. Cost of living studies and 
household surveys point out that the bulk of household expenditures (55%) goes 
into food, and thus an increase in the prices of food through subsidy cuts and 
inflation place a heavy burden on many households (Al-Ahali, 26/5/93). This is 
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particularly so for the urban population (Richards and Waterbury: 230). Indeed, in 
a recent study, it was pointed out that about 19 million Egyptians are living under 
the poverty line (Al-Ahali, 8/5/96: 3). Although ideally subsidies are intended as a 
form of redistribution of wealth in society, what has happened is that the rich have 
benefited more from subsidies than have the poor. The reason is the bulk of the 
subsidies in Egypt "goes to non-food items and is skewed in favour of middle- and 
high-income groups" (Hank, 1992: 482). As such, subsidies in Egypt though they 
are necessary for the lower-income strata, do not serve the function of the 
redistribution of wealth in society. Although there have been attempts to make the 
subsidy system more effective, the problem of maldistribution persists. 
It is recognised by the government that the implementation of the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) "implies that considerable 
hardship is now borne by the poor and ultra-poor as a result of the elimination of 
most subsidies" (Institute of National Planning: 33). The proposals are based on 
making the existing system more effective, basically by application of methods 
aimed at better targeting of the `genuinely' needy. A `social safety net' was 
proposed" that would "target beneficiaries via a screening process based on 
eligibility criteria, so as to restrict transfers to those groups who are unable to work 
or have no other source of income" (Institute of National Planning: 33). One point 
that needs to be highlighted, is that increasingly the government encouraged 
NGOs/PVOs to `share' in the responsibility in the provision and delivery of basic 
services and goods to the poor (Institute of National Planning: 31). In 1992, there 
11 This was originally recommended by the World Bank (World Bank, 1990: 47). 
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were 15,000 such organisations registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(Zaki: 56). Yet, the PVOs/NGOs are regulated by Law 32/1964, and the law is 
notorious for the amount of constraints it places on the NGOs". Thus these 
organisations have not been able to go much beyond being "mere agents for the 
delivery of services subsidised by the government and/or foreign donors" (Zaki: 
57). Yet, some charitable organisations are able to deliver much assistance, goods 
and services, to the poor. Many of these organisations are religious, both Christian 
and Muslim, as well as secular ones. Among these associations are Islamic 
charitable organisations. 
Islamic charitable organisations are one of the numerous aspects of the wider 
Islamic `revival' in Egypt 13, which range from the purely spiritual such as the Sufis, 
to the militant groups that want to overthrow the government to establish in its 
place an `Islamic' government. The charitable organisations are widely dispersed 
and evidence points that they have been able to address the failures of government, 
particularly toward the poor. There is also evidence that the activities of such 
organisations are not motivated by purely humanitarian concerns, though there may 
be an element of that: 
12 
It is estimated that about 50% of these organisations are completely ineffective 
(Zaki: 57). 
13 
It is to be noted that there is a reluctance by some to view the Islamic charitable 
organisations as an aspect of Islamic revival, since there is a long history in Egypt 
of the existence of such organisations (Sullivan, 1994: 58). 
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Food, fuel, clothing and electricity all used to be available for a 
small fraction of world prices in Egypt, but their prices have risen 
substantially in the last two years with the slashing of subsidies and 
lifting of controls. The poor, of course, suffer most from higher 
prices, and their neighbourhoods tend to receive low priority when 
it comes to establishing schools and health clinics. The Islamic 
activists have been able to ease some of the burden with health 
clinics, Koranic schools and even loans. 
(Reed: 99) 
Islamic charitable organisations pose a challenge to the government simply 
because they address "the problem of unmet social needs and/or the need for new 
services which the state could neither effectively provide nor afford to undertake" 
(Zaki: 57). The appeal of the Islamic organisations among the poor extends beyond 
the charitable organisations. It is pointed out that there is a following, particularly 
among unemployed young men, to the militant organisations, such as Al-Garnaa 
Al-Islameya (Reed: 99). One point is clear, there is a direct link between adherence 
or support to Islamic movements and poverty. Furthermore, the Islamic movement, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, has opted for trying to gain `control' by 
infiltration into various structures of civil society (Zaki: 119). This, as will be 
explained in greater detail in the following chapter, is one of the methods used by 
the Islamists in trying to `control' the labour movement. Thus the quest of the 
Islamists is social and inevitably political, largely brought about by the policies 
adopted by the government. Such policies force workers - as part of the 
underprivileged - to seek alternative channels to address their economic demands. 
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In addition to subsidies, other changes have a major influence on the working 
class, such as pension laws and medical insurance. Social insurance is regulated in 
Egypt by a number of laws, such as for Egyptians working abroad, or for the self- 
employed, and even temporary workers. For employees in the public, private, and 
governmental sectors Law 79/1975 applies. " Social insurance covers pensions, 
work-related injuries, and other services and benefits such as employee funds, 
illness insurance, life insurance, and unemployment insurance (Abdel-Rahman: 
10). Both the employees and the employer have to pay a share toward social 
insurance monthly, except in a few cases such as work injuries and unemployment 
insurance where only the employer pays. The share of the employer is, by law, 
larger than that of the employee. Among the criteria for eligibility for social 
insurance are a minimum age of 18, and a `regular' working relationship between 
employees and employer. By the latter is meant that the job of the employee has to 
be an activity in the employers' field of work, or that the employees have been 
working for at least six months, regardless of the nature of their work (Abdel- 
Rahman: 13). 
It is not possible to deny that services to workers in the public sector have been 
affected by economic reform policies. Public sector enterprises provide employees 
with a number of services including medical insurance, social insurance or' 
pensions, transportation to and from work, in some cases a food co-operative with 
subsidised products, and some `emergency relief services as department funds, 
and the fellowship fund which is managed by the trade union committee, and 
14 
It is interesting to note that Law 79/1975 has replaced 18 laws and decrees. 
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which provides compensations to employees on retirement. During an interview 
with one of the unionists at Tagamuu party I asked him about the services the 
company provides to workers, and he replied: 
Medical treatment of workers and employees which the company bears 
totally, [as well as] transportation, clubs, resorts, and housing.... There 
was much resistance from workers whenever possible [to reforms affecting 
the services], but gradually companies began to abandon that role. Society 
is threatened by spontaneous movements, it does not need much insight, but 
trying to blame or affiliate worker movements to political forces has 
become exposed. <Sayed Rady, 25110/94> 
While the law is clear that social insurance is obligatory, in practice many private 
sector enterprises manage to go around the law. Furthermore, with the 
implementation of the reform measures, and the issue of law 203/1991 the once 
secure position of public sector employees regarding social insurance was shaken. 
In a meeting with the head of the labour secretariat at the Nassente party, he 
expressed fears about the price workers would pay for reform: 
.. Changes in the law of workers' representatives in the BOM, a proposal to 
change social insurance, a proposal to change the union law. There are six 
laws that are will be modified in the coming period, they are linked to 
economic reform. This organises a new labour market that serves the 
mechanisms of the market and employers/employers. The issue of 
unemployment is the most dangerous because the supply is much larger 
than the demand. The volcano will erupt in Egypt from the labour 
cause. <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
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The concern expressed above is justified. There are modifications to social 
insurance (includes pensions), and medical insurance. The changes place a bigger 
burden on workers, although in an interview with the manager of legal affairs at 
the tobacco company he said "the umbrella of insurance will not be affected" 
<RHIbrahim, Giza, 24/9/1994>. While it is true that insurance will continue, 
employees will have to pay a bigger share of it. Besides the fact that workers have 
to pay a bigger share in insurance, and simultaneously employers pay a smaller 
share, there are numerous methods used by employers, particularly in the private 
sector to avoid insurance. The problem with private sector evasion of insurance has 
long been recognised. One of the loopholes in the social insurance law is used by 
the private sector to avoid payment of insurance to workers, namely that the job of 
the employee has to be an activity in the employers' field of work (ETUF, 1992: 
187). It is to be noted that although the ETUF knows of this situation, it was 
unable to implement a change in this practice of private sector employers. The 
situation in the private sector remains precarious, so that it is not uncommon for 
workers to be forced by employers not to participate in the social insurance scheme 
at all (Al-Ahali, 29/5/96: 7). In some cases, the employer makes the worker pay the 
bulk of the insurance money <Abdel Hamid El-Sheikh, Tagamuu, 5/3/97>. At the 
same time the ETUF continues to honour the tradition of 'rewarding' some 
unionists by providing an exceptional pension (law 80/1973 and a subsequent Prime 
Ministerial Decree in 1976 to make the pension transferable) to honour them "for 
carrying on their shoulders the struggle of the Egyptian labour movement" (ETUF, 
1992: 188). 
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The attitude of the ETUF is indicative that first, it perceives itself as an 
organisation for public sector workers, and second, it is more effective in pursuing 
its own institutional interests than those of workers. This point is further illustrated 
by the attitude of the ETUF toward a proposal in 1984 to double workers' 
contribution to social insurance. There was an uproar among many workers, and 
many strikes" took place when it became apparent that the new insurance law (law 
47/1984) would substantially increase workers' share in social insurance, and that 
furthermore the ETUF had endorsed the law (Posusney, 1991: 244). The extent of 
the protest of workers forced the modification of the law, and interestingly the 
ETUF went back on its original position of endorsing the law and demanded its 
modification (Posusney, 1991: 244; ETUF, 1992: 189). 
Medical insurance is of particular significance to workers in the public sector. It is 
believed that the medical service is the most valued service provided by the 
enterprise from workers' point of view. Many enterprises, particularly the big ones, 
have their own hospital (basically a big multiple clinic), and more frequently a 
clinic. For years, treatment in the enterprise clinics has been recognised as poor, 
notorious for giving patients a standard prescription, aspirin or its equivalent, for 
almost all ailments. The inefficiency of the service is illustrated by the following 
remark made by a tram driver at one of the transport agencies: 
15 
It is very important to emphasise that the strike waves starting 1984 were linked 
to a great extent to the deterioration of the economic situation in Egypt, and an 
increase in prices of some items. 
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We have a hospital at the General -Transportation Agency. The doctor 
writes the treatment, but he may give me half the treatment [medication] or 
may not. There are no hospital ambulances in the branch. <Kamal 
Ismail, 2511'011994> 
More often than not these clinics provide first aid services for injuries incurred at 
work. The benefit to employees, however, was that serious conditions, such as 
operations and prolonged illness, are covered by the insurance, usually at the 
general hospital in the area where the enterprise is located. Medical insurance 
covers employee and family. Despite its problems, medical insurance is important 
to workers. It should be added that medical insurance was and still remains a major 
item of expenses on company budget. The following remarks demonstrate these 
points. In an interview with the head of labour secretariat at the Nasserite party, he 
said: 
There is not only the labour law, but also modifications in medical 
insurance laws and treatment, and it includes dangerous articles. There is 
an article on increasing the workers' share and this is in contradiction with 
customs and logic. True, the cost of medical insurance has become very 
expensive but it is also true that any country has medical insurance.... The 
new law cancelled treatment outside the country, it gave to the prime 
minister the right to modify [the contributions of the employee and 
employer] without laws, so as to make the beneficiary bear a third of the 
price of medicine. In other countries there is medical insurance for 
foreigners, which is a progressive vision. <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
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The following remark indicates the same concern with the increases in the burden 
on the employees, and what is more points to a fear that such changes may just be 
the beginning of more drastic changes, which translate as a bigger burden on 
employees to bear' 
There is also a draft law on medical/health insurance that states that 
workers are to bear 30%, this is in the general framework of privatisation 
of everything even insurance. Only three years ago did the Health 
Insurance begin to have a financial crisis, make losses, among the reasons 
is the increase in the prices of medication. The budget was affected by the 
general [public or state] policies. Now there is a committee examining how 
it can be privatised. The biggest danger is that it may be the entry point to 
total privatisation. ... 
The government has placed the burden of structural 
adjustment and economic reform [on workers], the government has given 
up on its responsibilities and wage earners are bearing it. There were some 
demands to reduce the price of medication, and its exemption from taxes. 
<AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
In the draft of the unified labour law articles 220 and 223 discuss medical 
insurance. These `oblige' the company to carry out a preliminary medical check on 
workers/employees to ensure that they have the physical, mental, and 
psychological aptitude to carry out the work that is to be assigned to them. The 
adequate levels of `aptitude' are set by the Minister of Health (article 220). This is 
in fact a little-disguised measure that gives to the employer the right to not hire 
anyone who may have a health condition that would require financing by the 
company, regardless of whether such a condition is an `impediment' to work or 
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not'6. Furthermore, article 223 states that it is necessary to carry out a daily check 
of the place of work to ensure that no health hazards are in existence, and if a 
worker complains of any ailment, the doctor resident at the enterprise must check 
if it is work-related or not. A routine check up of all employees is to be conducted 
to detect any illnesses at the early stages. While it is to be recognised that workers 
would benefit by any measures to reduce their exposure to health hazards at work, 
one can also argue that it would be thus possible to get rid of workers who may 
prove to require medical expenses beyond what a company is willing to pay. Other 
aspects of medical insurance, such as the contribution of employers and 
employees, are covered by the insurance law. 
If one may speak of a `real politick' of trade unionism, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that trade unions are dealing with many of the changes that are coming 
about as a result of reforms in the economy as inevitable. Although Al-Ahali, the 
newspaper of the Tagamuu party in which many trade unionists and labour 
activists write, has carried out an attack on privatisation and continues to do so, 
one notices that concerning health insurance, as an example, it seems to argue for 
`better' conditions. Specifically, the paper proposes that in three cases, workers 
with chronic illness, hospitalisation, and workers who abide by the unified labour 
16 
During the Nasser era, legislation was introduced that obliged companies to take 
5% of their workforce as incapacitated health-wise. It was meant as an egalitarian 
measure. But, it became the case that the public sector, already burdened with 
many deficits, was paying much toward the treatment of a number of its 
employees. 
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law, all these three should not be made to pay an increased share towards their 
health insurance (Al-Ahali, 3/4/96). By calling for exemptions, it means Al-Ahali 
has accepted the rules. 
In this section, an attempt was made to illustrate that the services to state 
employees have been affected by the reform programs of the World Bank and IMF. 
The impact of the changes is felt by state employees in general, workers included. 
Such services are important for their beneficiaries, and consequently there has been 
resentment on their reform. In a manner, the reforms are perceived as a one-sided 
termination of the social contract on the part of the government. At the same time 
as workers and other state employees are expected to pay a substantial share for 
these services, the government has withdrawn its 'responsibility' due to financial 
difficulties, while not making attempts to address the other inadequacies of the 
services. On the other hand, there are numerous concessions made to the new 
'forces' of development, employers and business people, which measures are 
deemed to encourage investment, and hence new jobs. 
Economic liberalisation has resulted in the marginalisation of large sectors of 
society (Mostafa in Amin: 160). While people are marginalised economically and 
politically, they can express their frustration at their marginalisation by asserting 
their `cultural' identity. Thus, it is observed that the increase of economic and 
political marginalisation has been accompanied by a sharp rise in identity politics. 
In the case of Egypt, it is in the form of the Islamisation of society. It is the case 
that the re-emergence of Islamism occurred in the mid-1970s, after Infitah policies, 
which marginalised many. The process continues with the implementation of SAP, 
and indeed is exacerbated by it. Ironically, it is at this level, the cultural level, that 
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the state is willing to concede to pressures from below, albeit to the point where 
such pressures do not threaten the continuity of the government. In a sense, the 
cultural identity is perceived as the one element of `integration' of the 
marginalised. It is in this sense that the Islamists have managed to impose a 
stronghold on many professional syndicates (for example: lawyers, doctors, 
pharmacist), basically because these sectors benefited tremendously from the 
Nasser era, specifically through the educational policies. With liberalisation and 
globalisation, these groups have become increasingly marginalised, and 
Islamisized. For this reason, there have been attempts to Islamise the workers' 
movement, but it has not been as successful as the Islamization of professional 
unions/syndicates. This issue is dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter 
on trade unions and SAP. 
Impact of reform on women workers and employees 
Numerous researches have recognised that the burdens of reform and structural 
adjustment fall harder on women than on men. This is particularly the case for 
women workers. Some of the areas of concentration of women's employment are 
negatively impacted by reform. Beginning with the statistics, there are numerous 
problems with definition of women's work, and with measuring it. Numerically, 
women accounted for 11% of the labour force in 1993 in Egypt (World Bank, 
1995: 218). Even allowing for some different statistics that place the number closer 
to 14%, it remains a small rate of participation. This rate, however, does not give a 
correct view of women's work in Egypt. In a different survey, the Labour Force 
Survey, the economically active rate of women above 15 years of age at 1989 was 
estimated at 30% (ILO, 1993: 14). Although the years differ, the difference in the 
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two sets are not the result of a change in the employment of women, they are the 
result of different measurement methods. There is recognition that there is a 
problem in measuring women's employment in many third world countries, and in 
the case of research carried out on Egypt, it was pointed out that problems of 
method in data collection is the primary cause of the consistent underreporting of 
women's employment (Anker and Anker in Khoury and Moghadam: 148-9). 
Women's work is best understood by examining dichotomies; formal sector versus 
informal sector, public versus private, and rural versus urban. While it is not 
possible to give exact numbers for the employment of women in the informal 
sector, they are considerable. It is estimated that the informal sector accounts for 
about 11% of women's employment in the non-public sector (Soliman: 35). Yet, it 
is the case that activities in the informal sector are often underreported (Al-Qudsi, 
Assad, and Shaban: 5). This is because to a great extent the home is the base of 
operation. The home is used for producing and selling products, such as food or 
clothing, but these often pass off as household work. By examining the sectoral 
distribution of the rates of employment of women, it emerges that services and 
agriculture are the bulk employers of women", with industrial activity the lowest. 
Perhaps the following table is used as an example to highlight the problem in 
defining the employment of women. It refers to the urban/rural divide in the 
employment of women: 
17 
It must be pointed out that some data indicate services to be the largest absorber 
of women's employment , while others indicate it is agriculture. 
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Survey Census (1986) LFS (1988) 
Urban . 10.6% 
18.8% 
Rural 3.6% 32.5% 
Total 6.6% 26.6% 
Not only is there a major difference in overall estimation of participation rates, 
there is what is more serious, a contradiction between the two in regard to which 
sector absorbs more women. It is my opinion that the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
is more realistic. Again the core of the difference may lie in accounting for some of 
the activities of women in the informal sector in the LFS. 
The objective of the statistical presentation is to point out the extent to which the 
trade union organisation is NOT representative of women workers. While the trade 
union organisation represents only about a third of the labour force, this is even 
less in the case of women workers. The percentage of women employed in the 
government and public sectors (unionised) is approximately 40% of the total 
employment of women, in the formal sector one may add (Institute of National 
Planning: 112). Thus the amount of women workers who have benefited from the 
labour legislation are a limited percentage of working women in Egypt. 
Employment laws in Egypt provide women with benefits and are to a large extent 
egalitarian. These laws were the product of the Nasser regime. Among the benefits 
of women employees are generous maternity leaves (article 72, Law 48/1978), 
provision of child nurseries where more than fifty women are employed, and equal 
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pay as men for the same job'". It is believed that such provisions as well as equality 
between the sexes stated in the constitution were basically geared at the 
modernisation and nation-building efforts (Hammam: 50). 
The guaranteed employment scheme of university graduates opened up 
opportunities for the employment of women in relatively large numbers in the civil 
service, as per the provisions of law 14/1964. Recruitment for such positions has 
been largely gender neutral, and so have promotions within the governmental or 
civil services sector. Nevertheless, a gender division of labour, even within the 
theoretically gender neutral civil service, exists. To some extent this is the result of 
the concentration of women in some areas of study or vocation, and their relative 
scarcity in others. For example, the department of engineering is dominated by 
male students, while literature was predominantly a woman's field. Thus within 
the civil service women are primarily in the clerical and secretarial jobs. In 
industrial enterprises, there is a large concentration of women in the clerical 
positions. In addition, women production workers are concentrated in some 
industries, in particular textiles and food processing, which are considered `female' 
industries. The `ghettoisation' of women's work in specific areas is linked to lower 
skill levels, and consequently lower wage. Thus, the idea of equality of the sexes in 
employment is not the case in practice. 
Employment legislation for women emerged within the context of state feminism. 
However, the agenda of state feminism was not comprehensive. Reform was not 
18 
It refers to the basic salary. Thus, when piece rate is added the wages of men and 
women workers differ significantly. 
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undertaken in needed areas, in particular the. personal status laws (Hatem: 232-3). 
It was not a state feminist ideology because it did not challenge relations in the 
private sphere. Thus while women became [more] equal with men in the public 
sphere, the relations between men and women in the private, family sphere were 
not changed. 
The `progressive' employment legislation has benefited women in the civil service 
much more than women in the production sector. There are specific legal 
provisions made concerning the employment of women. For example, the 
employment of women in jobs defined as harmful to women, health-wise or 
morally, or in `hazardous' work such as mining and quarrying is banned. Also, the 
employment of women between 7 p. m. and 7 am is not permissible, except in some 
instances specified by the Minister of Labour. In fact, this basically rules out the 
evening shift in production. The result of this policy in the industrial sector is that 
though formally there is equal pay for equal work, the wages of women are on 
average less than those of men because the piece rate pay is less for women simply 
because they work less. 
A study carried out by UNICEF/Egypt indicated that women workers in industrial 
enterprises were not satisfied with their situation. Concerning the hours of work, 
although women did not work in the late night shift, in order to get to work at 7 in 
the morning most had to get up at around 4 in the morning, have a male relative 
accompany them and wait with them for the bus in order to avoid harassment. 
Many women bore that situation and the stress of trying to jostle their work and 
family responsibilities because their salary was indispensable to the family income 
(Hammam: 60-1). Another area of complaint among the women workers was the 
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nursery provided by the workplace. Many objected that it was either inconvenient, 
or simply they did not want to pay money for the nursery for a service that is poor 
if they could find an alternative, such as a relative, or neighbour (Hammam: 61-2). 
What is noticeable is that trade unions do not address these problems of women, 
and instead are quick to blame women workers for problems at work, and even 
problems of the public sector, as will be illustrated below. 
One of the consequences of the implementation of structural adjustment has been 
an erosion of some of the rights of women in employment. It is important to note, 
however, that even before SAP many of these rights were ignored or by-passed. In 
public sector enterprises, with the reforms, women workers are targeted as 
redundant labour. While this is not a formal policy, it is a recognised practice. 
Some argue it is a consequence of the benefits to women ensured by law. 
Following are some of the issues raised concerning the withdrawal of some of the 
employment benefits of women. In an interview with the head of the labour 
secretariat at the Tagarnuu party, I asked him to what extent there was a tendency 
to target women as redundant workers: 
Officially this does not exist, even in the administrative sector. Employers 
are not pleased with the privileges [of women workers], but in some cases 
they do not implement the rights like the nurseries. The discriminatory item 
that is felt is that in newspapers some advertisements [job ads] require 
"Males Only". This is in contradiction to the law. The private sector does 
not follow the law or adhere to it. Whoever employs does not adhere to the 
law, but most important is that women themselves are beginning to give 
secondary importance to work, and to the family the first attention. The 
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sixties and seventies used to be a very good period [for women]. But the 
present period is not good, and it is a product of the [political] 
environment. <AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
While women are blamed for not giving enough attention to work, there is no 
suggestion that they do carry a double burden, one at home and one at work. 
Furthermore, the performance of men, which is no different from that of women is 
not criticised, nor is the fact of male absenteeism" because they are moonlighting. 
The focus is on the `legal' breach, but no viable alternatives are presented. Another 
comment reinforces this view. In an interview with Ismail Sabry Abdalla, the 
director of a research organisation in Cairo, who was a minister of planning during 
the Sadat era: 
There is a trend against women's employment, [this trend] is illegal and 
goes against two articles in the constitution, article 40 on equality in 
general, and article 12 concerning providing facilities for women to 
manage between work and children. <ISAbdalla, Third World 
Forum, 28/9/1994> 
The proposed unified labour law, like the law it will replace, regulates the 
employment of women. The law reduces the benefits of women workers, so that 
the woman who gives birth to a child is entitled to maternity leave after spending a 
longer period of time at work than in the existing law -ten instead of six months- 
19 
This is especially the case in administrative work, where it is not uncommon for 
employees to sign their name and then `disappear'. 
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and that a woman is entitled to maternity benefits two times throughout her period 
of employment, instead of three. The problem is basically that the proposed law 
allows for dismissal of employees, and hence it makes employment unstable. It is 
reported that women workers try to hide their pregnancy as long as possible lest 
they be dismissed (El-Nakash: 55). Yet, some seem to focus on the legal aspects 
and overlook the actual practices, as indicated by the manger of the legal affairs 
department at the tobacco company: 
The advantages [rights] of women workers are included in the company 
by-laws, because the by-laws are the law of the relationship. <RHIbrahim, 
Giza, 24/9/1994> 
During the interviews, when the issue of redundancy among women workers was 
raised several reasons were given to justify this situation. One of the most 
prevalent excuses for redundancy in the two enterprises visited was 'nature of 
work'. In a meeting with the chairman of the holding company to which the two 
enterprises are affiliated, I asked about the employment of women, and the extent 
of redundancy among women. He said: 
In the metallurgical field the number of women employed is little. There are 
some women workers in the china company, but the majority of them are in 
the administrative/clerical jobs. In the glass industry they are concentrated 
in the engraving operation, design, and packaging. <MAAbdel-Kerim, 
HoldingCo, 22/8/1994> 
The `nature of work' argument reinforces the sexual division of labour. This is 
reflected not only among the management staff, but also among the unions. In an 
interview with unionists at the glass manufacturing company a similar point of 
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view was repeated, that there are not many women workers in the enterprise, and 
that those working in the enterprise are mostly in administrative positions. The 
unionists explained to me that this was the case because it was based on the labour 
law (conditions of employment of women in hazardous jobs) <unions, shubra 
kheima, 26/9/94>. It is relevant to note that the wages accorded to `workers in 
hazardous jobs' are better than the average of public sector workers because they 
have a generous `nature of work' compensation. 
Another issue that emerged during the research was that there exists an attitude 
that the work of women is dispensable. In an interview with the manager of the 
administration division at the tobacco company there was an attitude that women's 
presence in such jobs was unnecessary: 
Concerning women, in the productive and marketing operations, their 
percentage is very small. This is because of the nature of the work There 
was a proposal to let women work half the time in return for half the wage, 
but it did not succeed. Frequency of leaves has led some managers to avoid 
employing women.... <MMahmoud, Giza, 2019/1994> 
Various approaches to `encourage' women to leave work are adopted. For 
example, a proposal was made to let women receive half their salary, and all the 
benefits of pension and social security in return for leaving work. Such an 
arrangement would be legally made as a long-term vacation (Al-Ahali, 27/10/93). 
This proposal was made in A1-Ahleya company for metallurgical industries at the 
behest of the head of the trade union committee. The scheme, it is emphasised, is 
entirely voluntary. 
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In general, redundancy was perceived as a woman's problem. The fact that men sit 
in offices chatting or reading newspapers was not mentioned by the interviewees. 
Thus, in an interview with unionists at the glass manufacturing company I asked if 
women were targeted for redundancy: 
We did hear this, but the problem is not in the factories, the problem is in 
the government where there are offices where there are 5 people, but only 1 
is working, you find some people [women] doing their knitting, or you may 
even find seven people sitting at one desk. Salah Abu Ismail, a member in 
parliament during Sadat's time, made a proposal that women workers be 
given half their salary in return that the women leave work. But the 
proposal did not come up again. In fact, in some areas it is not possible to 
spare women, like teaching and medicine. 
<NasrUn i ons, Mustu rud, 25I9/94> 
Another proposal made regarding women employees was to reduce the retirement 
age for women from 60 to 55 years of age. From the interview with the manager of 
the administration division at the tobacco company it is interesting to observe that 
he almost implies that it is the duty of women to `sacrifice' and make room for 
others. He then goes on to imply, it really is not a `sacrifice', it is what the women 
want. The `sacrifice' argument, however, has a loophole. If the intention is 
encouraging redundant workers to leave, then no `new graduate' should be offered 
the woman's job: 
. There is also a proposal to make the retirement age for women 55, but 
keeping all her rights [social insurance]. In this way she would be giving 
an opportunity for the new graduates, they are after all our children and 
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her children too. By the way this is what women themselves say, and you 
will find this yourself when you meet some of them, but meet some of the 
older women, not the young ones. The young ones are still enthusiastic 
about world and have not yet had the responsibility of children.... As for the 
men, they too want early retirement, but according to the insurance law, 
their pension would be significantly reduced if they did, because it would 
deduce the pension for the piece rate, which is a big section of the wage. 
This leads to their continuation in work because of their financial needs. If 
the law is changed, this would be considered a solution to the 
unemployment problem. <MMahmoud, Giza, 20/9/1994> 
The argument above reinforces the images of men as breadwinners, and thus their 
income is indispensable, while women are nurturers. Thus the continued 
employment of men is required while that of women is not. Although it has been 
indicated in several researches that in fact many women workers would take the 
opportunity to leave work if they could find suitable compensation, they do not. 
Women continue to work, in difficult circumstances, because their wage - though 
little - is indispensable. In some cases, women leave work after they get married, 
but too often they go back to work because they must (Hammara: 63). 
In targeting women for redundancy not only was the 'nature of work' argument 
used, rather `nature of woman' was used. In what is an essentialist view, women 
are deemed as primarily responsible for their families, and that this `nature of 
women' conflicts with their employment situation. This argument was given as an 
excuse for the poor performance of women relative to their male counterparts. The 
manager of the legal affairs department at the tobacco company told me: 
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On the issue of reducing women workers, this is based on production 
measures/rates. This is an injustice to women because men are dedicated to 
their work, while women have the housework too. <RHlbrahim, 
Giza, 24/9/1994> 
Financial considerations were highlighted as reasons for reluctance to employ 
women in the first place, and now in targeting them for redundancy. It is argued 
that employment of women is expensive basically because of their legal rights. The 
director of organisation and administration at the glass manufacturing company, 
while negating that women were targeted as redundant workers said: 
The work/employment of women is a financial burden because she takes 
leaves, child care, she has responsibilities at home. The private sector has 
no mercy, it takes a person's meat and throws away the bones. It is better to 
take her wage and remain at home, raising children is important. 
<Mahmoud Abu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
At the same company the director of personnel in one of the branches told me: 
Women take many holidays/leaves especially after they get married, I 
cannot give a woman an assignment and then find her absent the next day, 
and I cannot do anything if she says her child is sick I cannot tell her to 
leave the child and come to work. I do not give work that needs follow-up 
to women. <Ali Damallawi, 30/8194> 
The same attitude about women is held by the unionists. Concerning the future of 
women and work and in particular the legal provisions for women workers, one of 
the unionists at the tobacco company told me: 
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These advantages began to diminish. The employer is only concerned with 
regularity at work. Women have conditions, and God has created them like 
that. <FAlbrahim, Giza, 15/10/1994> 
In concluding this section, one observes that the impact of SAP on women is dual, 
as increased economic hardship and poverty on the women who are part of the 
underprivileged strata in society20, and in specific toward women workers, leading 
to their increased marginalisation in the labour market. The combined effects of 
high and increasing unemployment, and employment legislation that is 
investment/management-friendly makes the marginalisation of women workers 
possible. In the case of women workers, it is inescapable to notice that women 
workers are a marginalised concern in the trade union organisation 21. Women 
workers who are unionised represent the relatively privileged women workers. The 
bulk of women in employment, which is in the informal sector and even in small 
enterprises that are not unionised, work under very poor and insecure conditions. 
Yet, this seems to be of no concern for the trade union organisation. Women's 
problems are treated as `specific' problems and marginalised at best, or simply 
ignored at worst. 
20 One of the groups of women who are particularly hard-hit by liberalisation and 
structural adjustment are the women-headed households (Handoussa, 1994: 1). 
21 
As an indication of this it is to be noted that in a 600+ page book by the ETUF 
that covers all aspects of the trade union organisation in Egypt, there are no 
statistics on the number of women workers who are union members. 
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Failure to address the problems of women and the imposition by the state of its 
own `gender agenda' that served the needs of the state rather than women, led to 
the development of solutions from below, among the most successful of which was 
the Islamists (Hatem: 240-1). Their success among college students was 
remarkable. For example, the Islamists provided women students with a segregated 
transportation system, which was demanded by the women students because of the 
harassment in public transportation. Soon the project became so successful that it 
became obligatory for students utilising the service to be veiled. Women's 
[Islamic] societies and associations were established that were either headed by 
men who claimed that they knew Islam better than women, or by women2 who 
were guided by a religious/traditional view that objected to a secular view of the 
role of women (Hatem: 246). More secular women's association exist, but for the 
most part they are middle to upper class women's associations (Hatem: 247). 
Although the secular associations have their successes, they do not have grass roots 
support, and many view their ideology as alien. The Islamic societies, on the other 
hand, have a wider base of support. The consequences for women, particularly 
women workers under such circumstances are not encouraging. It points to the 
marginalisation of women and their work, by emphasising the private and public 
spheres of women's social existence. 
The following section examines workers' reactions to the transition from public to 
`business' sector, and how trade unions are responding to workers' concerns. 
22 Zainab AI-Ghazali was very prominent in one such group. She was one of the 
first women trade unionists in the 1940s. She is an ardent Islamist. 
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Reactions to the Transition 
Two factors play an important role in understanding the reactions of workers to the 
transition of public sector enterprises to the `business' sector. Confusion and 
vagueness on the one hand, and the pace of implementation on the other. By 
examining the term used, `business' sector, it is vague and does not clearly indicate 
how much similar or different it is from `private' sector. Similarly, the term 
`privatisation' has been avoided by all except the critics of the process2. Thus 
many workers are not sure where they are going. An example to illustrate this point 
is that during one of my visits to the Musturud branch of the glass manufacturing 
company, after I finished the interviews of the day, I was offered a lift in one of the 
trucks that was going to deliver a load of medical ampoules to an area near 
Heliopolis, where I live. After a while and some chatting with the driver, he asked 
me what I was doing in the company, and I told him I was doing research. He told 
me he thought I was there for the sale of the company. He told me that the workers 
in the company do not know if the company is going to be sold or not and that they 
are worried. He told me that two years earlier (by my calculations around 1991) the 
license plates for all company vehicles were changed, from the blue public sector 
plates to private sector plates. When I told him that this was not enough to indicate 
that the company will be privatised, he told that all the public sector is being 
23 It is interesting to note that when the debate about privatisation started in the 
1980s, the term for privatisation in Arabic now in use, `khaskhasa', was dealt with 
as a linguistic innovation. Perhaps underlying that was an impression that like the 
term, the process was an innovation as well. 
286 
liquidated. As another indication he told me that he was once told to bring rice for 
the kitchen at the enterprise and he said that he and the person accompanying him 
went to several public sector co-operatives (game ya) to buy the rice but they found 
the shelves empty; and they were told by the staff there that the co-operative will 
not get new stocks since it will shut after they sell the goods they have. When I 
asked him what do the unionists tell them, he told me they tell them that the 
company will not be sold. 
The above situation reveals both the frustration and anxiety among employees of 
public sector enterprises due to lack of knowledge about their situation, and that 
they do not fully trust the unionists. The reason is because the latter are not telling 
the workers what is happening, in many cases because the unionists themselves do 
not know. In an interview with unionists at the glass manufacturing company, I 
asked what they as unionists tell workers if asked what will happen to the 
company, and how the workers will be affected: 
I do not tell them that the company will be sold. ... Because I am like them, 
whatever will happen to them will happen to me. How can I tell them, what 
can I do for them? It makes no difference to the worker whether it is public 
sector or private sector, all he wants is to 'eat bread' [to make a living]. 
There are people who go to work outside the company but they return to 
the company again. The private sector gives the worker, and takes from 
him. Eight hours of work means eight hours of work, no rest and no time to 
pray. <NasrUnions, Musturud, 2SI9194> 
Since that interview, although the glass manufacturing company was listed among 
the companies that would sell majority shares to the public, by examining the latest 
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update from the PEO, this had not yet taken place until beginning of March 1997 
(khattab: 9). 
The lack of knowledge of the unionists about how they will be impacted by 
privatisation makes them fall back on the argument about successful and losing 
companies. In both cases they argue that the company will not be sold. If the 
company is successful, there is no reason for the government to sell it, and if it is 
losing, no one will want to buy it. In an interview with a unionist from a 
construction company held at the Tagamuu party I asked how they as unionists 
respond to workers' questions on the sale of the company: 
In the beginning when [law] 203 was first passed [in 19911, questions 
concerning privatisation were many, but since about a year ago we no 
longer get these questions. We used to tell them that this [i. e. privatisation] 
is for the companies that are making profits, but we are a company that is 
making losses. Workers feel that we defend them, even if it is for LE 1 we 
defend them. On 5 April 1992, we had a sit-in in the company, we were 
demanding work because all the work had halted. State security (amn al- 
dawla) took us and there were some transfer orders issued, [i. e. transfer 
from one location to another]. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10194> 
The following remark reveals the opposite situation. The success/profitability of a 
company, or lack of it, is used equally to convince workers that the company will 
not be privatised because the situation does not apply to their company. This is an 
indication that enterprise-based unions do not have a clear view of what is 
happening from management, but that the unions are used as a go-between, 
between management and workers to calm the fears of the workers about 
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privatisation. I asked one of the workers at the tobacco company about 
privatisation, and its impact on workers. He replied: 
As for the company, there are no problems, it will not impact us because 
the company is successful, they will not bring someone else to manage 
it. <MKGad, Giza, 1811011994> 
Since that interview, shares of the tobacco company have been sold in the stock 
market with 5% of the shares sold to an Employee Share-owners Fund, valued at 
LE 47.5 million (khattab: 20). 
What emerges is that in the midst of confusion and lack of knowledge of what is 
happening, unions are taking the position that they know what is good for workers, 
either because the workers do not know or understand what is happening, or 
simply that they do not care what happens. An interview with one of the unionists 
at the tobacco company concerning workers' reactions to Law 203 reflected that 
communication channels between workers and unionists do not exist: 
Workers do not have an opinion, he only cares about his own good/benefit. 
He does not know the difference between [laws]48 and 203. <FAlbrahim, 
Giza, 15/10/1994> 
Some remarks by unionists indicate that they are more concerned with the survival 
of the public sector per se, rather than with the interests of workers. The 
continuation of the public sector one may add, ensures the continuation of the trade 
union organisation: 
Workers do not care whether it is public sector or private sector, but there 
is security in the public sector. The public sector has financed wars, and 
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now the nation [meaning the government] is dispensing with it. The 
socialist system is returning, the big nations protect their industry.... The 
worker is threatened with the sale of the public sector, for example, the 
three years' issue [in the conditions of the sale of public sector companies 
the new owner is obliged to keep the workers for three years, after which 
he/she is no longer required to keep the workers]. The new owners will not 
fire the workers, they will make them submit their resignation. For 
example, in Asfour factory [a private sector glass/crystal factory], there 
are LE 7 million in social insurance, in the form of nutrition, clothing, 
medical treatment, that workers will not take and transportation for those 
who live near has been discontinued. <unions, shubra kheima, 26i9/94> 
The attitude of some unionists that workers either do not understand or do not care 
is reflected by management as well. After I finished my interview with the director 
of personnel at the Yassin branch of the glass manufacturing company he came 
with me to show me the way out of the factory. On the way out I asked why 
security was making such a problem about my visit, if there had been a problem. 
He said there was no problem, but that I must have a permit. I asked him if workers 
in the company make protests and he said they do not. He said that so long as 
workers are hungry they do not make problems <Ali Damallawi, 30/8/94>. 
Yet, the attitude adopted by unionists only exacerbates the confusion among 
workers. Remarks made by some workers reveal such a concern. In an interview 
with a worker at the glass manufacturing company, I asked him about the issue of 
redundancy he said: 
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When they dismiss, they will dismiss anybody, people are afraid, even those 
that they will dispense with must have a chance/an alternative. They say the 
share of government will be 51% to preserve workers' rights. They 
[workers] must have a position so that they are not a burden on the 
company. He [the new employer] will save in everything, meals, 
transportation, and others, and at the same tine can take 
insurance. <HSAbdel-Meguid, Shubra El-Kheima, 19/10/1994> 
Unionists understand the fear of the workers because the private sector has a 
reputation of insecurity for workers. When I asked a unionist at the tobacco 
company what is the reaction of workers to the transition to the private sector, he 
told me: 
Workers were afraid of privatisation because the public sector has been 
here since 1961. They are afraid because most of them had lived through 
the private sector [before nationalisation]. <SAAshour, 
Talbia, 16/10/1994> 
It has been argued by some that the confusion surrounding the sale of enterprises 
and what will happen to the workers is close to being a psychological game. It has 
worn workers out, and since 1996 with the privatisations that took place, workers 
are now concerned with better conditions for leaving the public sector than to 
remain <Abdel-Hamid E1-Sheikh, Tagamuu, 5/3/97>. This has been the case for 
some time. Indeed, I was informed that in one case the head of the trade union 
committee in Damanhour for Carpets rejected a management offer to workers for a 
package of early retirement to workers, and the reaction of the workers was to 
withdraw confidence in this unionist <Abdel-Hamid EI-Sheikh, Tagamuu, 5/3/97>. 
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The issue to workers is no longer public sector versus private sector. In both cases 
workers are losing and thus they are opting for the better of two bad and uncertain 
situations. By accepting compensation to leave workers at least have gained 
something. 
Conclusion 
Structural Adjustment and economic reforms adopted by the government have 
negatively impacted workers, in a `dispersed' and `concentrated' way, to use the 
phrases in the introduction of the chapter. The price of reforms has been borne by 
workers as a part of the poor and underprivileged, and as production workers. At 
the workplace workers are facing more stringent disciplinary codes and a more 
`rationalised' incentive and bonus system, but they do not have the mechanisms to 
enforce that they are not mistreated. Unions at the enterprises had not initiated 
with management the development of adequate assurances that workers would not 
be rendered vulnerable with no line of defence. Instead the argument used was that 
the union should represent both work and workers. 
At the broader level, the liberalisation of trade has had a negative impact on public 
sector enterprises and this has translated for workers into lower wages. Other 
measures that are of great significance to workers are the removal of subsidies, 
health and social insurance as well as other benefits obtained from employment in 
the public sector. These benefits are in fact what compensates for the poor pay at 
public sector enterprises. Islamist groups have been able to fill in this void by the 
provision of services to the poor at modest prices. Trade unions, on the other 
hand, have not been able to challenge these changes, rather they often have to try to 
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down-play the fears of workers. Again, it is an indication that the trade union 
organisations are powerless to initiate changes for workers. 
The losses of the workers have been the gains of the `winners' in the adjustment 
process, the old and new bourgeoisie, local and international. Concessions have 
been made by the government to the bourgeoisie in the name of attracting 
investments and promoting growth. This it is argued by the government would in 
the longer term be of benefit to all, workers included. The government has 
buttressed itself by integrating the new elite and allowing it to `share' power in a 
limited sense. A manifestation of this was an international conference held in Cairo 
in November 1996, The Cairo Economic Conference, in which the business 
community and the government were partners in promoting Egypt as an `emerging 
market'. A President's Council was established some months earlier that included 
among its members some of the most prominent figures of the business 
community, in addition to Gamal Mubarak, one of the sons"` of the President. 
Yet, at the same time the government has broken its `social contract' with its 
power base among the workers, peasants, and state employees, with minimal 
obligations. This was carried out without expanding `popular participation' in 
government, beyond a few cosmetic measures. The frustrations created by both 
economic hardship and political stalemate has allowed Islamists to emerge as a 
grass-roots movement that has economic, political and cultural grievances against 
the regime. It has been able to gain in strength and has been able to mobilise 
24 
Both Gamal and `Alaa Mubarak figured very prominently in the Cairo Economic 
Conference, particularly Gamal. 
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support from a wide segment in society, including the workers. However, as will 
be discussed in the following chapter, the Islamist movement has serious 
limitations. 
The following chapter discusses how trade unions are reacting to the SAP, and the 
extent to which they are more concerned with their survival as organisations than 
with workers. The failures of trade unions, have allowed the Islamists to make 
some headway into the labour movement. 
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Chapter Six: Trade Unions and Structural 
Adjustment: Partners in Change? 
The trade union organisation in Egypt as it exists was a product of an economic and 
political system based on central decision-making. Trade unions are involved 
closely in the process of structural adjustment, both at the policy level, and in the 
implementation of reform. The ETUF is represented in all committees that 
formulate policies or legislation concerning labour. This has included the 
committees to draft the unified labour law, and the trade union law. Furthermore, 
the general union was involved in the implementation of reform, for example in the 
formulation of company by-laws. One also finds that trade union committees have 
been involved in the process, albeit in a limited fashion. The participation of the 
various levels of the trade union organisation in the process of reform and structural 
adjustment has been problematic. Trade unions have been acting more out of self- 
interest, than in the promotion of the interest of workers. Yet, by so doing the 
conflicts within the trade union organisation have intensified, so that just as there is 
a strong force within the trade union movement for the continued corporatisation of 
the movement, there are pressures for reform within the organisation. 
Following is a discussion of how the trade union organisation has reacted to reform 
and structural adjustment. 
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Reactions of the ETUF and General Unions to Reform and SAP 
The public sector constitutes the bulk of union membership, and henceforth the 
debates about public sector reform and privatisation are of critical significance to 
the trade union organisation. The issue of workers' rights was inevitably brought 
to the fore. The ETUF' tried to walk a tightrope, on the one hand calling for the 
necessity of reforms, and on the other hand stating that workers' rights would not 
be affected by reform. One observes that the position the upper trade union 
hierarchy adopted regarding structural adjustment and reform was that it was 
inevitable, but that the government had got the best terms possible. This is 
reflected in the interview with the President of the general union for engineering 
industries: 
Structural adjustment is in two phases. The first is financial, all 
the people bore its consequences, it included measures such 
as fixing the value of the pound against the dollar, and taxes. 
The impact of these reforms was hardest on the poor segment 
of society. Second, economic reform and adjustment: the World 
Bank made a deal with the government that 50% of the debts 
of Egypt would be written off if Egypt proceeded with the 
reforms, particularly privatisation. And let me say that despite 
all the language used, public sector reform means using 
market mechanisms. After the agreement with the World Bank, 
1 In this section I use ETUF to refer to both the ETUF apparatus as well as the general 
unions, the headquarters of which are in fact situated in the ETUF building. 
296 
World Bank, Law 203 was issued. After all, if I could get the debt 
reduction it is a benefit <Niazi Abdel Aziz, ETUF, 2512/97>. 
At about 1988 and 1989 as the debate intensified in Egypt about the World Bank, 
IMF, and privatisation, the ETUF put forward its vision of reform. In December 
1989 the ETUF, then headed by Ahmed Al-Amawy, issued a statement on "The 
vision of the workers of Egypt on reform, support and development of the public 
sector" (ETUF, 1992: 332). It was based on a study of the problems of the public 
sector and ways of improving its performance. At the outset the statement 
emphasised that constitutionally the government of Egypt is a `Socialist 
Democratic' system, where there is public ownership of the means of production, 
and that the public sector has a leading role in fulfilling the development plan 
(ETUF, 1992: 333). 
The statement made a number of recommendations on the pricing policies of the 
public sector, the utilisation of available resources, the financial structures of the 
public sector and the labour `problem'. The measures proposed revolved around 
making the existing system more efficient and discouraging wasteful practices. 
For example, it was proposed that products be priced at their economic price, not 
the subsidised one, to cut back on importation of semi-finished products, 
reallocation of resources between enterprises, rescheduling of debts of losing PEs, 
and carrying out accurate feasibility studies for new projects. One of the proposals 
made was to sell the shares of PEs in the Joint-investment companies and to use 
the proceeds of the sales in setting up a central fund for PEs to adjust their 
financial structures (ETUF, 1992: 335). The last measure depicts flexibility on the 
part of the trade union organisation in that it can propose two very different things. 
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The statement focuses on the significance of the public sector, but one of the 
recommendations is the sale of some shares of enterprises that are partially public 
sector owned. 
As for the proposals made regarding labour, they focused on efficiency and 
productivity. In the statement there was a separate discussion of management and 
of labour, but the recommendations were similar. The proposals were basically 
geared at making the system in public enterprises responsive to performance rather 
than seniority or automatic promotions. Emphasis was placed on the need for 
training to continually upgrade the skills of workers and employees. There was 
also a recommendation in the section of workers, but not in the section on 
management, to revise the wage schedule and to allow for by-laws for the different 
production sectors, to make wages compatible with the increase in prices (ETUF, 
1992: 338). Also, the participation of workers' representatives in the BOMs of 
enterprises was re-affirmed, but it was pointed out that the criteria for eligibility 
should be revised so as to ensure best performance (ETUF, 1992: 337). The 
statement did not indicate what the criteria sought were. 
The recommendations made by the December 1989 statement described above 
seem to confirm the line that the ETUF had taken earlier with the signing of a joint 
statement with the EBA (Egyptian Businessmen's Association) in May 1989. 
However, after the outrage that occurred when the joint ETUF-EBA statement 
became known, the December statement went along the `need to reform' line but 
in a watered down approach. The ETUF-EBA joint statement: 
called for a number of reforms in the operation of the public 
sector, including freeing it from subordination to government 
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administration, separating its management from the state, 
enhancing its access to credit, lifting price controls on its products, 
allowing individual firms to adopt their own regulations, and 
linking wages and incentive pay to productivity. 
(Posusney, 1995: 15) 
The joint statement was opposed by unionists at various levels of the hierarchy. In 
defending the joint statement, Al-Amawy said that it was discussed at the ETUF 
and by the general unions and was approved unanimously', that the statement was 
in defence of an increase in productivity and did not come near worker' rights, and 
furthermore that it was in line with the workplan of the ETUF to develop the 
public sector. Indeed, Al-Amawy referred to it as "a light in the darkness" (Al- 
Ahali, 19/5/93). Despite some opposition from both unionists and workers, the 
policies of the ETUF proceeded in the direction of endorsement of the line of the 
government. This became increasingly apparent with regard to Law 203/1991. 
The ETUF made some objections to law 203, and there was opposition to the law 
at the different levels of the trade union organisation. The law gave management 
greater autonomy in the running of enterprises, and this seems to have been an 
issue of concern to some unionists. However, the greatest concerns was that the 
law in its draft form was vague on some of the rights of representation of labour in 
enterprises. The general union for engineering industries was according to its 
current President, the only general union to oppose the law, and insisted on some 
2 It has been mentioned elsewhere that some unionists were coerced to sign it 
(Posusney, 1995: 16). 
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modifications <Niazi Abdel Aziz, ETUF, 25/2/97>. In an interview with him, he 
said: 
We were the only General Union that objected to the draft of the 
law, and we were able to push for some changes. For example, we 
insisted that the trade union organisation and its responsibilities be 
indicated in the law. We also pushed for the inclusion of the 
President of the trade union committee as a member of the BOM 
<Niazi Abdel Aziz, ETUF, 25/2/97>. 
I told Mr. Niazi that the president of the trade union is not a voting member of the 
BOM, whereupon he said: 
We insisted that this be the case. ... You know that the system of 
voting of the BOM is by majority vote, thus there is an equal 
number of appointed and elected members, and the president of the 
BOM. What would be the situation if the president of the trade 
union committee was on the side in minority, it would be bad for his 
positionlprestige. Another reason is that he is the legitimate 
representative of all the employees in the company, how could he be 
in a position of responsibility if he takes sides? Also, it is within his 
power to raise a suit against the company. As for the General 
assembly, we insisted that it should include representatives from the 
trade union committee. As for article 42 of law 203 on by-laws, we 
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insisted that the trade union be involved, and we called for a 
periodic bonus equivalent to 5% of the basic salary <Niazi Abdel 
Aziz, ETUF, 2512/97>. 
The reason he gave is completely unconvincing, but it demonstrates that the role 
of the unionist is perceived as a personnel function, serving all employees. From 
the issues raised, it becomes clear that the upper levels of the trade union 
organisation did not question the essence of the law. By examining the minutes of 
the meeting held on 3/4/91 at the ETUF in which the BOM of the ETUF and the 
heads of the general unions met with the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Industry, 
Labour, and the President of the Central Agency for Organisation and 
Administration, it emerges that the ETUF and general unions had basically 
accepted the Law, but that they called for some changes related to worker rights in 
representation in the BOMs of the enterprises and in the preservation of the 10% 
profit to be distributed to workers (ETUF, 1992: 344). The trade union 
organisation had accepted the law as "representing a reality that must be dealt 
with" (ETUF, 1992: 359). This represented the tone that the ETUF would adopt 
henceforth, that basically the economic and political changes that were happening 
world-wide could not be stopped, and that trade unions had to evolve to deal with 
the changing world. 
The fact that such a high level, ministerial committee met with the ETUF and 
general union leaders signifies that the government was `courting' the trade union 
3 
On being asked why the general union and not the local union committee, he 
replied by saying that the general union is the basis of membership. 
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organisation. At a time when the changes toward a market economy (and 
privatisation) seemed inevitable, there was fear on the part of the government of 
how workers would react, thus trade unions were sought to control the workers. 
The modifications the trade unions made were included in the law. As for the 
trade union organisation, the organisation wanted to ensure for itself a continued 
role to play in the future. This became more clear over the issues of the unified 
labour law. 
The draft of the new labour law was a watershed in the relations between the 
ETUF and workers. For the first time since Nasser's era, the trade union 
organisation participated in the formulation of legislation that allowed workers to 
be fired by the employer. In addition, as it was originally formulated, the law did 
not allow strike action by workers. As discussed in an earlier chapter, it was 
pressure from within the trade union organisation and ILO intervention that led to 
the revision of the issue of the right to strike. The right to strike was conceded, but 
the conditions for it were very restrictive, including that the general union to 
which an enterprise is affiliated had to approve of the strike beforehand, and that 
strikes were not allowed in `vital' industries. The debate about the law is still on- 
going and it has not yet been issued as law, the draft has to be presented to the 
People's Assembly for discussion in order that it may be issued as a law. This 
reflects the extent to which the law is significant. 
In the face of the opposition to the law both from within the trade union 
organisation and from the workers, the ETUF has tried to downplay the problems 
posed by the law. The President of the ETUF, EI-Sayed Rashed, insisted that 
through collective bargaining provisions, the law puts workers' representatives on 
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an equal footing with the representatives of the owners of capital. In addition, he 
argued, the law deals with the rights of workers provided in law 137 as the 
absolute minimum (Al-Hayat, 9/2/96: 12). On the issue of firing of workers, 
Rashed stated that the law clearly explained on what conditions an employee may 
be fired, basically for gross negligence (Al-Hayat, 9/2/96: 12). According to the 
presidents of the general unions for Chemical Industries, and for Electrical 
Industries, the assurances of Rashed are not justified. The law, they point out, is 
not very clear and very flexible, so that it allows for arbitrary dismissal of 
employees, and that it restricts the right of workers to strike (Al-Hayat, 9/2/96: 
12). The law has been criticised as being unbalanced, promoting the interest of the 
employers at the expense of workers (Al Wafd, 22/2/96: 11). 
In the face of such intensive opposition, the ETUF made recourse to the argument 
that the rights of workers would not be affected by the new law (Posusney, 1995: 
33). Nevertheless, the proposal was not altered to respond to the demands for 
change. By so doing, the senior ETUF leadership managed to present itself as 
`responsible' to the government because it endorsed needed reform, and at the 
same time members insisted that the rights of workers would not be affected. It is 
noticeable that there is a lack of alternatives that would address some of the 
demands of workers. 
In addition to trying to ensure a place for itself by presenting itself as a partner to 
the government in reform, the upper levels of the organisation have sought ways to 
strengthen the institutional basis of the trade union structure. Stemming from a 
belief in the need to prepare unionists for the coming stage in trade union work, 
there is a concern by the trade union organisation with the adequate training of 
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unionists. In the following section is an examination of the AFL-CIO project with 
the ETUF, and the increasing role of the Workers' University. 
A `Program Of Assistance To The Egyptian Trade Union Federation' has been 
developed jointly by USAID and AFL-CIO. The program is being implemented in 
Egypt through the African-American Labor Center (AALC), which is the 
international institute of the AFL-CIO. The duration of the program is from 
September 1995 to September 2000, which was preceded by a two year 
`transitional' project, estimated at about US$ 12 million and LE 2 million. The 
goal of the program is: 
To develop within the Egyptian Trade Union Federation and some 
of its major affiliates a capacity to respond to the changing 
economic environment and to improve the labor movement's ability 
to represent the interests of the Egyptian workers through collective 
bargaining, dispute resolution and public policy advocacy 
(AALC/AFL-CIO: 9). 
The project aims to provide assistance to the ETUF and the general unions "in 
developing the capacity to build a more representative democratic labour 
movement capable of representing workers in a more decentralised private sector 
economy" (AALC/AFL-CIO: 6). The focus of the program is best described as 
training-of -trainers. The program trains selected unionists in the education of 
other unionists and the development of training curricula in the skills needed for 
performance of their role as unionists. The areas of training include "leadership 
training, building the local union, safety and health, dispute resolution, worker 
rights, privatisation, issues of working women, and the role of the union in a 
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changing economy" (AALC/AFL-CIO: 10).. The role of the Workers' University 
or as it is otherwise known the Workers' Education Association, figures very 
prominently in this respect. 
As per the project report, the activities of the program in Egypt can be divided into 
two main areas: internal trade union development, and the promotion of the role of 
unions in economic and social development. Under trade union development, the 
focus is on the development of the capacities of the Workers' University, and 
trade union professional staff development (AALC/AFL-CIO: 10). As for the 
second component, promotion of the role of unions in economic and social 
development, it comprises women's' programs, ESOP programs, labour and 
environment, as well as "the establishment of a Vocational Centre for the building 
and construction trades" (AALGAFL-CIO: 11). 
The project points out that the existing industrial relations system in Egypt is not 
suitable for the period of economic liberalisation because the trade union system is 
centralised, and undemocratic. Although the aim of the project is to enhance the 
capability of the trade union organisation to deal with a private sector-led 
economy, the training program is in fact utilising the very centralised and 
undemocratic structure it criticises. The focus of the training is on the institutional 
development of one of the agencies controlled by the ETUF, to develop the 
capabilities of the ETUF and the general unions, and furthermore the benefits of 
the program in the form of training of unionists is dispensed through the ETUF, 
through its agency the Workers' University. Also, by examining the areas of 
training, although they deal with significant issues, they nonetheless fall short of 
the concerns of the majority of the working class, most important among which 
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are unemployment and measures to deal with it, job creation, and extending union 
rights to non unionised workers. Thus, in a sense the project of the AALC has 
given the upper trade union hierarchy a new area of channelling its authority and 
control of the trade union organisation, particularly as training and retraining 
activities are becoming increasingly significant as job turnover rates increase. One 
may extend the argument further and say that trade unionism is being presented as 
a `science', and that only those who are equipped with the tools of the science are 
capable of dealing with it. Therefore, instead of promotion of a grass-roots 
approach, an exclusives, top-to-bottom approach is used. 
The experience of the senior levels of the trade union organisation, ETUF and the 
General Unions, in the process of structural adjustment has been to maintain a 
balance between workers and the government. In so keeping the balance, the trade 
union organisation is trying to design a new role for itself that would be of use to 
the two. Increasingly the trade union organisation is promoting for itself the role 
of peace-keeper. It works through consent not through conflict. However, it is the 
case that by keeping the balance between workers and state, the interests of the 
organisation are served best, since the organisation will continue to be relevant in 
particular to the government. Thus the institution is aiming at strengthening itself. 
An indication of this is the focus of the organisation on training activities, taking 
on the role of `producing' the `good' unionist. 
The following section examines trade unions at the base level of the trade union 
hierarchy, and their reactions to structural adjustment. However, prior to that 
discussion there is an examination of the role of the enterprise based unions. The 
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discussion helps one understand the reactions of enterprise-based unions to 
reform. 
Role of Enterprise-Based Unions 
The role of trade union committees in enterprises is limited. Due to the 
organisation of trade unions in Egypt, there is a grading of responsibilities for the 
different levels of the union hierarchy. Issues such as employment or wage 
policies and legislation, such as insurance or Medicare, are determined at the 
national level, at the ETUF. Industry related concerns are concluded at the level of 
the general union. The role of unionists at the enterprise level involves 
'representation' of workers in a number of sub-committees. The following section 
examines how management and unionists in the enterprise perceive their role. 
Management's perceptions of the role of the enterprise-based union: 
Management perceives the union committee as primarily a service aimed at 
worker welfare and representing the interest of work. This view is indicated by the 
head of the organisation and administration division at the glass manufacturing 
company. I asked him about workers' representatives in the union and in the BOM: 
The union is a social service for workers, it is service oriented, the 
members of the BOM work to improve the company, and planning it for 
the benefit of workers and work. He said that there are also production 
committees in everyfactory and a main/central committee, they discuss the 
mechanisms of production, it provides information annually on equipment, 
production, sales, what are the obstacles to production. They examine all 
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conditions of production. The president of the BOM is the president of the 
central production committee. <Mahmoud Abu Bakr, 28/8/94> 
In a meeting with the deputy director of the operations sector in the tobacco 
company, he said the following remark about unions: 
Unions are concerned with material and non-material benefits to 
workers. <AHMahmoud, Giza, 27/9/1994> 
The comments of managers and also those of unionists about the role of the trade 
union committee is dominated by vagueness. The role of unionists in enterprises is 
largely defined in terms of being 'a service to workers', or 'service-oriented'. It can 
be argued that this vagueness is real. The activities of unionists at the enterprise 
level are secondary, ironically just as the word 'service' is in the context of a 
'production' activity. The following remark by the director of the manual 
production factory at the Shubra El-Kheima branch of the glass manufacturing 
company reflects the situation: 
In the past there was a worker-based union organisation, it used to be the 
interest of the worker, and obstacles to production, the improvement and 
development of workers' rights. Now there is none of that, only summer 
resorts/beaches and services to workers. <MAShafei, Shubra E1-Kheima, 
19/10/1994> 
Unionists on their role in enterprises: 
Most unionists do not have a very different view of their role from that described 
by management. 
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Unionists first of all describe their role as representatives of workers. In an 
interview with a unionist at the tobacco company he listed the various committees 
in which the union committee members participate: 
The role of the union is worker representation. I represent workers in the 
personnel affairs committee dealing with promotions, and secondment; the 
committee for petitions/appeals concerning fines or sanctions in which we 
examine the workers appeals. There are two members from the union 
committee represented in this committee; Social support (takaful) 
committee, which investigates the condition of workers when they need 
financial support, for example, for an operation; Production committee 
which investigates all the company's production problems; Industrial 
security committee; Tripartite committee, in the labour office; Medical 
committee (khumasseya) which determines whether a worker's disability is 
partial or total, and thus provides the worker with the appropriate 
compensation <FAlbrahim, Giza, 1511011994> 
However, the participation of unionists in several committees does not necessarily 
indicate effective involvement. Some of the sub-committees mentioned are held 
rarely, such as the tripartite committee, the purpose of which is investigation of 
major infractions as in union elections. Concerning the production committee, it is 
of a predominantly technical nature and thus is dominated by the technicians or 
engineers, and in some enterprises, particularly those that are confronting major 
financial problems or bankruptcy, it is a defunct sub-committee. 
The most visible role of union committees is the resolution of problems that 
confront workers at work. It is, furthermore, the function which unionists most 
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associate themselves with. In a meeting with a unionist at the glass manufacturing 
company I asked him what the responsibilities of the unionist are and he said: 
As for the unionist he considers/examines workers' demands, such as, 
penalties, clothes, and medical treatment. Concerning medical treatment, 
there are contracts with specialists [meaning not general practitioners], 
the company spent about LE 2 million on medical treatment this year. The 
unionist also looks into promotions, in fact our company is the only 
company that has promotions. <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/'94> 
A similar remark was made by the president of the trade union committee in the 
same factory when I asked him what his responsibilities were as a trade unionist: 
To avoid problems from occurring, and dealing with problems before they 
become bigger/increase. Among these problems are: petitions, health 
treatment, improving the incentive. <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94> 
From the interviews with the unionists some of them indicated that part of their 
responsibility was balancing between workers' demands on the one hand, and the 
demands of work on the other. In a meeting with a unionist at the Talbia factory of 
the tobacco company in discussing his responsibilities as a unionist, he said: 
The legitimate defence of workers, which is the main role of unions, and 
also to uphold/support the company. If an injustice has been placed on a 
worker, then we defend him. We investigate the injustice first, and if the 
worker is at fault, we rectify/correct him. As for the company, we protect 
the company and work. There is a production committee, and a civil 
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defence committee. We also participate in decision-making". <SAAshour, 
Talbia, 16/10/1994> 
Occasionally the balancing' between workers and work is taken to an extreme, as 
becomes apparent from the comment of the following unionist: 
The union committee participates with management in making all 
decisions concerning workers (promotions, etc. ), as a partner to 
management. <FAlbrahim, Giza, 1511011994> 
The functions of the union committee at the branch level, besides the 
representation of workers in several sub-committees, are the administration of 
relief funds given to a worker or his/her family in emergencies such as covering 
funeral or hospital expenses, the management of company transportation for 
workers, regulation of company clubs and summer resorts for workers, and 
educational and cultural activities, which includes illiteracy eradication classes. In 
addition, unionists address the concerns or problems of individual workers. This 
was pointed out in an interview with a unionist from a construction company I met 
at the Tagamuu party headquarters: 
As for us, we got close to the workers, we knew workers' demands when a 
particular complaint or demand was repeated by the workers. After 
examining the complaint or demand we hold a [trade union committee] 
meeting and try to 'pass' our opinion. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
SA is both a unionist and an elected workers' representative at the BOM. 
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The above remark implies that personal contact with the 'aggrieved' is the channel 
for knowing workers' problems. This 'function' of trade unionists is somewhat 
difficult because of two important factors. First, few branch-level unionists are 
full-timers, meaning that the unionists themselves have a position within the 
enterprise, and hence there is a time constraint on performing this activity. Second, 
the ratio of unionists to workers is one (1) unionist per one-thousand (1000) 
workers, thereby making access to unionists difficult. Another issue that must be 
high-lighted is that trade union committees are factory-based. Thus if an enterprise 
has several factories in several governorates, each factory has its own trade union 
committee. The result is the fragmentation of union committees at the enterprise 
level thereby contributing to the marginalisation of union committees. Workers' 
grievances remain at the factory level, and are addressed at that level. 
Yet, it is arguable that the most important role of branch-level unionists is 
following up complaints and problems of workers, though the unionists can do so 
by interceding. It is not a decision-making authority. An example of the 
marginality of the role of the branch-level trade unions occurred during my 
interviews at the Musturud branch of the glass manufacturing company, which 
employs the largest number of women workers in the enterprise, mainly in 
ampoule production. During the interview with unionists and a BOM elected 
member, the president of the Musturud branch union committee, Mohamed Sayed 
Abbas, had to leave for very important business, selection of the material for the 
uniforms of the women workers. During the interview someone came to see him, 
after which he told me he had to leave. He said he had to take the samples of the 
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material to the women workers so they would choose it in order that they would 
not complain later <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94>. 
Unionists recognise that the performance or carrying out of their role is 
problematic, in part because of the nature of the problems the workers bring to the 
unionists. The following comment by a unionist at the tobacco company reveals 
the limitations of the unionists: 
Most of the requests that workers make are regarding annual promotions. 
There are also the daily problems, problems of work and problems 
between colleagues because of work. There are also some violations of the 
work orders, but it is a secondary problem. There are disagreements at 
work with the supervisors/mangers, between the supervisor/mangers and 
the staff. There are problems about the annual reports, and problems with 
the doctors. There are differences of point of view between the union 
demands and the point of view of management sometimes. Some 
departments do not know exactly what the law says and the unionist must 
handle these things with prudence. <SAAshour, Talbia, 16/10/1994> 
Another unionist indicates a similar point of view. In the following remark there is 
an indication again of the difficulties in dealing with management in enterprises. 
The interviewee is a unionist who is a member of the Tagamuu party, working in a 
construction company. 
We [union committee] take workers' incentives by force of arm [i. e. we 
have to struggle for it]. The union committee reports deviations/errors 
(enherafat) 
.... Management in our company is narrow-minded, there are no 
attempts to solve problems. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
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However, such direct criticisms of management are rarely heard from enterprise 
level unionists. 
The Relationship Between Unions and Workers 
A number of constraints exist that render branch-level unions inadequate as 
workers' representatives. First, the role of branch-level unions as set out by law is 
limited. Branch-level unions are factory based rather than enterprise based, thereby 
practically excluding the branch-level unions from dealing with issues beyond the 
workplace. In the course of the fieldwork I have found this to be the case. In each 
of the two enterprises I visited, I went to two factories/branches in each, and in 
each there was a union committee whose members were responsible for the 
individual branch. 
The key element in the relationship between workers and unionists seems to be 
accessibility of the latter. Workers direct their problems or complaints either to 
their direct supervisors or to unionists. If a problem involves production often 
workers go to the supervisor. In cases of payslip problems, often involving fines or 
less incentives than expected, then workers seek unionists to solve the problem. 
Problems with services such as medical care, and problems with promotions are 
also usually directed to unionists in the first instance. Combined, the above 
mentioned two factors lead to the unavailability of unionists to most workers. It 
also may contribute to the perceived inefficiency of unionists by workers. Seldom 
though are the inadequacies attributed to the limitations imposed on branch-level 
unions. The following section examines the relationship between unionists and 
workers as observed during the fieldwork in the two enterprises. 
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`Not available' 
One of the most frequent remarks of workers concerning unionists is that they 
never come to the enterprise. During my interviews in the two enterprises I 
observed that when I had a meeting with unionists a group of 
-workers 
would 
gather wanting to see the unionist concerning a problem. During the meeting with 
Saleh Ashour in the Talbia branch of the tobacco company I noted the following: 
After Ashour came we went to a small room at the end of the corridor. There were 
a few workers waiting for him in the corridor asking him to finish some business. 
One group of workers was accompanying a man who seemed ill, they wanted 
Saleh Ashour to find a solution to his problem, since he could face dismissal 
because he has schizophrenia. There were others who were there to meet him with 
their problems, and one of them told me, "sorry it is not everyday that we see 
him, " <SAAshour, Talbia, 16/10/1994>. Even when we finally went to the room, 
later joined by Hafez M. Hafez, another unionist, there would sometimes be 
interruptions from workers who came to see Ashour with their problems. 
Obviously he does not come to the factory frequently <SAAshour, 
Talbia, 1 6/10/1994>. 
Saleh Ashour is a full-time unionist, and vice president of the union committee. 
He informed me that his job is a wage specialist. Despite being a full-time unionist 
he apparently did not meet the workers regularly. It was also noticeable during the 
interview that the workers came to see Ashour and not Hafez. Perhaps that was 
because Ashour is also an elected BOM member. 
In another case, during an interview with a worker in the Giza branch of the 
tobacco company, I asked him when he met the unionists: 
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At any time, they usually go around in the company, they are full time, and 
come in the mornings. <MKGad, Giza, 18/10/1994> 
During the same interview I asked the worker about the accessibility of the 
unionists. I asked if the union has an office where workers can meet the unionists. 
He said: 
The trade union have an office outside the factory, we go there if the union 
gives/has an invitation, for example, if there problems or new 
developments.... I then asked: When was the last time you went there? He 
said. I do not. remember, they select some elements (a'naser) from every 
section. <MKGad, Giza, 18/10/1994>. 
During an interview with a worker in the glass manufacturing company, at the 
Yassin branch, he had a totally different experience from the previous one. I 
asked the worker when he saw union members, 
We do not see them after elections, ". I then asked: And if you have a 
problem to whom do you go to solve it? "If I have a problem I solve it with 
the factory, with management. In the past there used to be support [from 
unions], they took stands, today the laws changed. They work [in unions] 
to get promotions, " <HSAbdel-Meguid, Shubra EI-Kheima, 19/10/1994>. 
From the above remark it emerges that there is a perception that unionists are 
motivated by self interest. 
Poor treatment 
Just as the above remark by the worker reflects a negative view of workers 
towards unionists, the following incident reflects the attitudes of unionist toward 
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workers. During a visit to the Yassin branch-of the glass manufacturing company I 
was accompanied by unionists to different workshops in the factory. When we left 
the semi-automated workshop, almost as soon as we got out of the workshop a 
worker came to one of the unionists, Helmi, a doctor, with a complaint about the 
medical service. The worker said that after he had paid for some medical treatment 
the company does not want to refund the money he paid. The worker was very 
agitated and he wanted the doctor to deal with that problem. The doctor told him 
that he would deal with this problem after he finished with me. The worker asked 
me if he can delay me for a while, and I agreed. I moved to another part of the 
yard, near the administration building. From where I was I could hear that Adel 
Helmi and the worker were arguing and basically yelling at each other. When 
Helmi returned he said "they are tired' people" [i. e. unsatisfactory] <unions, 
shubra kheima, 26/9/94>. 
Inefficiency of unions 
One of the complaints made by workers about unionists is that the unions are 
inefficient. In an interview with a worker at the Giza branch of the tobacco 
company I asked him: How effective are the unionists? 
There are some things he cannot do, he does not have the authority to 
compel. For example, if I have a problem with the head of the 
section/department, the unionist may be able to solve it once, twice not, in 
general about 80% of the time he is not able to do anything...! then asked, 
What are the obstacles to unionists performing their functions? He said., 
There are rules/laws that govern/control, he cannot change anything in it 
and he knows that. He is just an image [i. e. useless]... They [unionists] are 
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interested/concerned with materiallfinancial matters, money for the 
workers, that is all in general. <MKGad, Giza, 18/10/1994> 
The above remark indicates that there is a recognition of the limitations of the role 
of the branch unionists as set by law. However, it is to be noted that such an 
awareness of the legal limitations may not be the perception of most workers. 
Indeed, as the following remark indicates some workers perceive that the 
inefficiency of the unionists is the problem of individual unionists. 
Corruption of unionists 
The distinction between the inefficiency of unionists and their corruption is often 
vague. The common result, however, is that workers distrust unionists. In some 
situations it is a case of limited authority, but in others as the following case 
illustrates it is corruption. During an interview with branch unionists at a 
contracting company whom I met at Tagamuu I brought up this issue with them. 
One of the unionists, Abdel Menem, said: 
Sometimes the workers do not trust committee members because of the 
actions of committee members. For example, concerning the durable 
goods issue some union committee members take a commission. [In most 
public sector enterprises the workers through the union committees have 
an arrangement to buy from the public sector distribution centres e. g. 
Sednaui or Omar Effendy, some durable goods such as refrigerators, 
ovens, etc.. ]. This is because the unionist is concerned with looking for 
money. Of course some unions do this operation in a good way, and they 
place all profits in the fund. <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
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Another form of corruption is described by a tram driver who resents clique 
formation among the unionists in the company in which he works: 
I took five days' penalty because I was meeting with workers. I am reserve 
for the trade union committee, but I have not entered it because they are 
comrades/come from the same towns. One of the committee retired and I 
am the one following in votes. Article 28 of law 35, states that when there 
is a vacancy in the committee, there should be a general assembly meeting 
to nominate/select those following them in votes. Nothing happens because 
one year remains for the union [before the next union elections]. <Kamal 
Ismail, 25/10/1994> 
A similar comment was made by unionists at a contracting company, however 
referring to the general union rather than the branch-level: 
In the general assembly of the general union one member died and another 
retired but they have not been replaced/substituted because the union is a 
closed group. <AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
The views of workers on unionists indicates that the unionists are perceived as a 
group concerned with their self interest. In great part this is because of the 
inefficiency of unions in meeting the demands of workers. The following sections 
examines the extent to which trade unions at the enterprise level have dealt with 
structural adjustment, and the extent to which they have represented workers' 
interests in the process. 
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Reactions of the Enterprise-Based Unions to Reform and SAP 
An examination of unionists' reactions to structural adjustment and to Law 203 
accentuates some of the divisions that exist between unionists. At that level of the 
trade union organisation, it emerges that there is a high degree of `co-operation' 
with management. To a great measure this is the result of interference by the 
higher levels of the trade union organisation. To illustrate this point, the cases of 
trade union elections and the conditions in the trade union law are examined. 
Before the discussion of the reactions and perceptions of unionists regarding 
structural adjustment, the reaction of management to unionists' understanding of 
the issues of structural adjustment will be highlighted. 
Management perceptions 
It is not incorrect to say that management feels unions are incompetent. Although 
management may utilise unions to pacify workers, management nonetheless views 
the unionists as being as "ignorant" as the workers. The following remark made by 
the Chairperson of the BOM of the glass manufacturing company indicates that 
management dismisses the concern of unionists as due to ignorance or 
misunderstanding. I asked him how unions are responding to the changes resulting 
from SAP: 
The unionists do not understand what is happening, but they also are not 
qualified educationally. They do not understand their role, basically 
because privatisation is an economic issue and they understand nothing. 
Also, the general unions do not play their role in making people 
understand. It is essential for the general unions to have 
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educationalawareness courses. The -problem emerges when people either 
do not understand, or if they believe that they will be harmed. These two 
things are what make people object to an issue. Unfortunately, these two 
things exist at present. This is partly because of misunderstanding of 
information or being misinformed. A worker does not care who owns an 
enterprise, all a worker is concerned with is to keep his job. The major 
problem, that partly leads to fear and to objections to what is happening is 
that there is no trustlconfidence in the government. That is the major 
problem and which leads one to ask how can the government become 
credible to the people <Adel Kamel, 24/8/94> 
The attitude reflected in the above quotation is that unions, at the different levels, 
are wrongly apprehensive about the situation. The focus on the need to `educate' 
unionists is, as indicated earlier, what the trade union organisation is promoting at 
the moment. In both these cases, meaning management's perception of unionists, 
and in the case of the higher levels of the union organisation, the training or 
education of unionists is perceived to be a `need' to prepare unionists to carry out 
their role and responsibilities in the new era. The underlying expectation is that 
unions should be more `supportive'. In this respect, unions are perceived as 
intermediaries between management and workers. 
The following remark further illustrates the attitude of management to unionists' 
reactions to structural adjustment. During a meeting with the director of legal 
affairs at the tobacco company, I asked him how the union at the enterprise reacted 
to the changes resulting from SAP: 
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Trade unions had the same reaction as workers. There was fear from 203, 
but due to the complete slowing down of implementation these feelings 
ended, it represented the transitional period <RHlbrahim, Giza, 
24/9/1994> 
Since then, the pace of reform and privatisation changed, especially after January 
1996. Nevertheless, the above comment indicates that there has been concern 
among unionists about the implementation of SAP. Partly, this has been the result 
of the limited involvement of enterprise-based unions in the process of reform. At 
another level, unionists have not been kept in touch with the developments either 
by the general unions or by management. An example of this situation is that the 
General Assembly of the ETUF has occasionally not held its annual meeting, even 
though it is illegal (Al-Wafd, 12/12/94: 1). The ETUF president came under much 
attack for this, but it indicates that it is possible to cut off channels of 
communication and information from unionists. Management in enterprises 
involves unionists when there is a need to do so, basically to allow unions to carry 
out their functions. However, as will be further illustrated, among the enterprise 
based unionists there are some who are more involved in the process of change 
than others. 
The following section examines how unionists themselves view the changes 
connected with structural adjustment, and the extent to which the view of 
management corresponds to the situation of the unionists. 
Unionists' perceptions: business unionism 
The study of the involvement of enterprise-level unionists in the process of reform 
exposes some discrepancies among unionists. The reforms in the direction of 
322 
privatisation have not left only the workers feeling insecure, it has affected 
unionists in a similar fashion. In the public sector, unionists had a recognised 
position, regardless of the problems. At present, unionists feel under threat of 
being marginalised. The threat is the same to all unionists, but reactions to it are 
different, which may explain the friction among unionists. The feeling of 
insecurity among unionists is illustrated by the following remark by a unionist at 
the tobacco company. He has been a unionist in the company since 1975, and was 
the vice president of the trade union committees in the 1991-1996 round. During a 
meeting with him, I asked what are the major problems facing unionists: 
As a daily role, in trying to carry out its responsibility it is the 
disconnection between the committee, the general union, and the 
federation. The unionist does not feel safe/secure. In Pepsi the president of 
the company has fined a trade unionist. According to law only the minister 
concerned [Minister of Labour] has the authority to fine a unionist. There 
is total disconnection. The organisation is bad. The pyramidal 
organisation form does not have communication. It is only with personal 
effort that things can get done, you will not find anyone to help. What we 
hope for is fast communication, and meetings even if monthly.... The laws 
are not implemented.... There is no trust and no protection, only our votes. 
It is a poor chain <SAAshour, Talbia, 16/10/1994> 
One of the trends that emerged, particularly after the trade union elections of 1991 
which have produced unionists focused on privatisation, is that of trade unionists 
5 
He was also an elected workers' representative at the BOM of the enterprise. 
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trying to accommodate the changes and reforms introduced as a result of structural 
adjustment. The underlying concern of many enterprise-based unionists is that 
they are trying to establish trade unions as partners with management. The 
following remark by a unionist at the tobacco company who was first elected as a 
unionist in the 1991 elections, reveals that unionists are trying to pass the reforms 
initiated by management while at the same time appeasing workers. The unionist 
was commenting on how they dealt with some of the reform measures undertaken 
in the company: 
We have not cancelled all advances, the school advance has remained. We 
have allocated/cut off a portion of profit [for it]. The idea was successful 
and it worked. The Egyptian does not like to save, it is better to make it a 
grant.... Leadership [unions] has to have a degree of awareness. Under the 
present economic circumstances a crisis would have happened. Another 
case, there was a decree from the General Agency for Governmental 
Services, that stipulated that the minimum [employees should pay] for 
transportation is LE 3. In the company it was about LE 1.5, and had it not 
been for an enlightened union leadership there would have been a crisis. 
The institutional bylaws of the company state that the company is in a 
central area so there is transportation available. The union graded the 
charge/fare, so that the maximum is LE 7 to places like El-Ayat. I check to 
see how much it costs by government transport, how much does a route 
cost, so that the company bears 50% of the cost and the worker bears 
50%. From here, people began to accept the idea, in return we requested 
from the company that they provide a comfortable method of 
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transportation for everybody in return for the increase. Now it is a 
debating or argumentation operationlprocess <GRShafik, 
Giza, 1811011994> 
Thus, unionists perceive that they must `evolve' to meet the new challenges. The 
unionist quoted above introduced himself as an engineer in the Chemistry 
laboratory, where he is the head of research in the cleaning substances unit. There 
is an increase in the number of "white-collar" unionists. To some extent, their 
attitudes to the relationship between management and unions, that of 
accommodating change, is similar to the stand of the old, "professional" unionists. 
During an interview at the tobacco company with a unionist who had been at the 
time of the interview in the committee for the past seven years, I asked him what 
role did the unionist play in the process of transition: 
The trade union committee met with the management of the company in 
order to do the company bylaws for the administrative and financial 
organisation, as per law 203, like promotions, annual reports, bylaws for 
fines, and personnel affairs. It is the method of operation after 203 
between workers and management <FAlbrahim, Giza, 15/10/1994> 
One of the concerns of unionists is with the economic performance of enterprises. 
Improved economic efficiency is regarded as important, and it would also benefit 
the workforce: 
We make profit to the maximum, we have made profit of 102%, more than 
the rate designated to us <GRShafilc, Giza, 1811011994> 
The argument that the interests of work and workers coincide, and that the 
productivity of the enterprise is of direct benefit to workers is not new in Egyptian 
325 
enterprises, as has been indicated in an earlier chapter. The welfare of the workers 
is defined in economistic terms, which is the essence of business unionism. It is 
the type of unionism that is developing clearly in Egypt. For the trade union 
establishment business unionism ensures unions a continued role in enterprises, 
since it promotes the interests of work which makes unions useful for 
management. 
Oppositional unionism? 
Another group of unionists who have voiced their viewpoints on privatisation 
clearly is that group which is totally opposed to reform and has adopted an 
aggressive stance toward management and the government. The Islamists fall into 
this group, but the group is not exclusively comprised of Islamists. Some of the 
unionists who are involved in opposition parties are also opposed to reform, as is 
exemplified by the following remark of a unionist at a contracting company who is 
a member of the Tagamuu leftist party: 
We refuse the sale of the company, because it means increasing the value 
of another enterprise in the holding company at the expense of my 
company.... We refused that any worker in the company be dismissed, even 
temporary workers <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94> 
The greatest concern of this group is that the government by its policies is 
marginalising workers. In a seminar held at the Tagamuu party, a Labour party 
unionist expressed this view. 
The coming phase represents the exit from paradise. When people 
understand what is happening they have a different position. It is 
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necessary to warn workers from the coming flood <Tagamu 
seminar, 1019194> 
Attempts were made to try to present a united front of unionists and workers 
opposed to privatisation6. Unionists in opposition parties were very active in the 
formation of some of these committees. Among the committees formed were the 
`Committee For Defence Of The Public Sector And National Industries' in 
Helwan in 1989, the Alexandria-based `Popular Committee For Combating The 
Sale Of The Public Sector' in 1991, two similar committees in Helwan and 
Mahalla Al-Kubra in 1993, and the `National Committee To Combat 
Privatisation' in 1993. The membership of these committees was largely drawn 
from among unionists. The committees tried to mobilise support to stop the sale of 
public sector enterprises, and to warn of the dangers of privatisation (Posusney, 
1995: 23-6). The `Trade Union Front for the Defence of the Public Sector' insisted 
that privatisation threatens security and stability (Al-Ahali, 10/4/96: 7). These 
committees have not been able to exert much pressure for changing the terms of 
reform. In part, it is because the numbers of unionists involved was modest. In one 
case it was 80 (Committee For Defence Of The Public Sector And National 
Industries in Helwan) and in another it was 50+ (National Committee To Combat 
6 
The opposition press such as Al-Ahali, A1-'Arabi, A1-Shaab, and to some extent 
Al-Wafd, have carried out a sustained criticism of the privatisation and sale of 
public sector enterprises. The SAP policies and the role and intentions of the 
World Bank and IMF have also come under attack. 
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Privatisation). These were among the bigger ones. Perhaps more important, the 
presence of workers in these committees was not significant (Posusney, 1995: 25). 
In trying to make an assessment of these committees, and their limitations, one 
cannot ignore the fact that the object of the defence was the public sector, and the 
defence of workers' rights in the public sector. While it is not possible to deny that 
a concern for the rights of workers was advocated, it is also possible to surmise 
that these committees of basically unionists were very much concerned about the 
future of trade unions as organisations. Furthermore, the absence of workers in 
these committees raises many questions about the performance of the unionists 
vis-a-vis the rank-and-file. Some have argued that the reasons lie within workers 
themselves since "workers have traditionally been moved to protest in Egypt only 
after some negative change to their accustomed standard of living and working 
conditions" (Posusney, 1995: 25). This view is only partly correct. 
In great part, the reason also lies in trade unions and their relationship with 
workers. Since the corporatisation of trade unions and regulation of many aspects 
of the conditions of work and pay by legislation, trade unions at the enterprise 
level, the level where there is direct interaction between workers and unions, have 
come to acquire a `personnel' function where they basically deal with individual 
demands of workers, and not collective demands. Trade unionists developed a 
vested interest in the continuation of the trade union organisation, because it 
provided them with benefits. This is demonstrated by the low turnover rates in 
trade union positions in enterprises. With the changes resulting from structural 
adjustment, the situation of unions and their role is changing. The following 
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remark by the head of the labour secretariat at the Tagamuu party illustrates the 
point: 
After the 1957 organisation, there began to enter the movement tame 
people, and unionists became employees. The July Decrees removed their 
responsibilities from unions, and they became ineffective. After Sadat, 
after 1974, there was economic transformation, but they [unions] 
remained government people even after the government became biased 
against workers. In 1990/1991 they have justified the private sector and 
the passing of government policies, look what the federation is doing. They 
only want their own interest. El-Sayed Rashed [President of the ETUFJ is 
a deputy in the People's Assembly. There are legal constraints and 
financial constraints, their budgets are limited. Thus it is necessary to 
reform unions <AHSheikh, 1719/94> 
Among unionists who do not oppose privatisation and public sector reform, and 
those who do, one finds that in both groups there is an attempt on the part of 
unions to find a role to play with the transition. Unionists are trying to assert their 
presence, but in different ways. In some cases unionists are acting as 
representatives of workers, and equally there is a concern with unions as 
organisations, as may be observed from the following comment by a unionist at 
the tobacco company. In addressing the issue of the role of unionists in the future, 
he said: 
It will be very important, this is a transition phase. In the private sector, 
they [i. e. workers] will only be represented by the unions, they will not be 
in the BOM. The only legitimate representation is the union. The owner of 
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capital need someone to debate/argue with, therefore there is a need for 
people with a degree of education. The negotiator, the main goal is the 
interest of the company, if the company is loosing/unsuccessful, I will not 
give people their rights. Its [i. e. union's] role will be very important 
<GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994> 
The differences among unionists are not only brought about by their positions on 
the issue of reform, the differences are also a result of the position of unionists 
inside the enterprises. The discrepancy among unionists is clearest in the case of 
the conflicts between white-collar unionists and the unionists who are manual 
workers. The following exchange took place between two unionists in the tobacco 
company. Magdy Mansour is a manual worker, while Gamal Shafik is an engineer 
in the chemistry laboratory in the company. The unionists were discussing the 
transformation to privatisation and its impact on workers: 
Magdy Mansour: 
Because of the transformation from public sector to business 
sector, it has disappointed/frustrated many young people. Upper 
and middle management, if I find my supervisor/director is less [in 
qualifications] than me, this affects me in my incentives. If there is 
good material I will work ... If the law is implemented I will have a 
problem, unemployment. Then if the GATT is implemented this will 
close the Egyptian factories.... Middle management is the cause of 
the problem because it abuses the workers, if I am funny and with 
a sense of humour I take LE 300, if not, I take LE 150. The 
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manager can dismiss me arbitrarily. The GATT law is not a service 
to the people. 
Gamal Shafik: 
It can make me evolve, and make you apply the ISO system. I have 
to avoid the product I cannot compete in. 
Magdy Mansour: 
First you have to provide me with good material. 
Gamal Shaftk:. 
It must have its advantages and disadvantages. <GRShafil, 
Giza, 1811011994> 
The unionist who is a manual worker is more concerned with the consequences on 
employees, while the white-collar unionist is more in tune to what is best for the 
company. The involvement of white-collar employees in unions is one of the 
trends on the increase. It is justified on the grounds that there is a need for 
"educated" people who can deal with management, and have competence to deal 
with complex issues. This move is not welcomed by some unionists. 
Unions and privatisation 
As in the case of the debate defining the role of the union in the transitional phase, 
the discussion of the public/private sector divide is equally divisive. 
Inconsistencies can be found in the discussion. Although unionists deal with the 
expansion of the private sector as inevitable, they are ambivalent about it. On the 
one hand, there is a fear that the private sector, or business sector as it is often 
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referred to, can potentially harm workers, while at the same time the unions are 
trying to co-exist with the situation. 
The `professional' unionists, the ones who have been members of trade union 
committees for many years, are most resistant to the transition from a public to a 
private sector economy. During a meeting with Saleh Ashour, a unionist since 
1975,1 asked him in what way role of the unionist in the private sector differs 
from that in the public sector. 
The role of the unionist in the public sector differs from the private sector, 
the public sector is based on economic and social laws, the private sector 
is only interested in profit. It is a major difference.... The public sector is 
the foundation of the country. The selection of the public leadership, [and 
for] the federation is a matter for the national security and intelligence 
services. They select the people that betray workers, to the extent that they 
consider the spy a nationalist <SAAshour, Talbia, 16/10/1994> 
Perhaps in order to redress some of the fears of unionists with `business sector 
management', meetings and seminars have been held between unionists and 
management as a show of good intentions. One such meeting was held between 
the president of the BOM and editor in chief of Rose Al-Yusuf weekly magazine 
with unionists from the General Union of Journalism and Press, as well as the 
members of the enterprise union committee. The seminar focused on the role of 
trade unions in the `business sector'. The title of the article about the seminar 
reflects the tone of the meeting: "A strong trade union is a safety valve in any 
enterprise: Co-operation is the most important factor of success, and interference 
is the basis of disruption" (Al-Hewar, 19/10/94: 3). In the course of the meeting, 
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the President of the BOM, emphasised the need for management in enterprises to 
recognise the role and importance of the trade union, and at the same time pointed 
to the need for unions to understand their true role: 
... 
I consider trade union management is part of general 
management, and the duty carried out by the union is the work of 
three complete departments, which are: personnel management, 
legal affairs, and public relations (Al-Hewar, 19/10/94: 3). 
According to the President of the BOM, the relations between management and 
unions should be based on co-operation, and management can benefit much from 
unions "because it [unions] contributes to the flow of correct information" (Al- 
Hewar, 19/10/94: 3). An issue emphasised by both the President of the BOM of 
Rose Al-Yusuf, and a member of the General Union was that the age of the 
`political unions' which was a product of the 1960s was over, instead the move is 
toward unions that can be objective in their demands. The article emphasised the 
need for the training and education of unionists so they may develop a true 
understanding of reform and structural adjustment. One of the concerns pointed 
out by the unionists attending the meeting was that "the trade union organisation is 
facing a ferocious campaign and that some businessmen are waging a war against 
having any trade union organisation inside their work [enterprise]" (Al-Hewar, 
19/10/94: 3). 
Many of the issues raised in the meeting/seminar have been raised by management 
and unionists interviewed in both the tobacco and glass manufacturing companies. 
Based on the information, it emerges that the focus of unionists is on the union 
organisation per se, not as a representative of workers. For this reason, even 
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unionists who are opposed to the reform of PEs and privatisation are trying to find 
a method of surviving and being relevant, as is further illustrated by the following 
remark by the head of the labour secretariat of the Tagamuu party: 
There is no union that rejects the idea of privatisation, without exception. 
They are participating in the promotion of the privatisation program. The 
role of the public sector here is pivotal for development and national 
security. About the private sector, we have economic liberalisation and 
union dictatorship. I cannot answer this now. It is supposed that the 
private sector will produce strong unions, but this requires time. But it is 
necessary to have legal modifications/reforms. Now the role of the unions 
is to provide social services to workers, and at most raise issues 
<AHSheikh, 1/10/94> 
There is a recognition of the inevitability of privatisation, and some unionists feel 
that they need to prepare themselves for the change. In a discussion with a unionist 
at the tobacco company on what unionists perceived to be the action needed on 
their part to prepare for the transition to the private sector, he said: 
Prepare myself for the ability to negotiate/bargain. Unemployment 
support, there is none here. It is important in privatisation. The right to 
strike, the strike as a weapon, to use to put pressure on the employer. I do 
not strike now because the law gives us rights <FAlbrahim, Giza, 
15/10/1994> 
During an interview with the head of labour secretariat at the Nasserite party, his 
remarks on the private sector can be explained as trying to accommodate to an 
inevitable situation. He said: 
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Just so that we do not appear to be against the private sector, we call for 
the protection of the private sector and a call for developing the private 
sector to the same extent as that with which we defend against the sale of 
the public sector <Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94> 
The debate around the public sector versus the private sector is not a debate about 
ownership, but rather it is a debate of the rights and the security of the workforce 
and unions. For unions it represents a major change in their constituency which 
had been largely public sector employees. Perhaps more important for unions is 
that in the private sector in practice unions do not enjoy the same privileges as 
they do in the public sector. Henceforth, the significance of the trade union law. 
Trade Union Law 
Perhaps no other subject impacts trade unionists at the enterprise level more than 
the proposed new trade union law. The trade union law regulates all operations of 
trade unions. It covers the organisation of trade unions, the relations between the 
different levels, and responsibilities of each level in the trade union organisation. 
The law also lays out the membership and functions of the `formations' within 
each level, such as the BOMs and General Assemblies, and eligibility criteria for 
nominees. Other aspects such as financial regulations, allocation of membership 
fees, and administrative reviews are also covered. The new law (Law 12/1995) 
does not completely replace the previous law, 35/1976, but rather it modifies some 
articles of it7. The changes introduced, however, have further centralised the trade 
Law 35/1976 was similarly modified in 1981 by virtue of Law 1/1981. 
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union organisation. The general unions and "ETUF retained much power, and the 
enterprise-based unions did not acquire greater autonomy than in the previous law. 
The new law has been described as an undemocratic law. In one instance it was 
described as putting the enterprise-based unions into straight jackets (Al-Wafd, 
5/12/94). Twenty six articles of law 35/1976 have been modified or partly 
modified, two articles in Law 35 were annulled, and one article added. The most 
important changes in Law 12/1995 were lengthening the duration of the union 
BOM cycle from four years to five in all levels of the trade union organisation 
(article 41, law 12/1995). Another important change was that the law recognised 
the right to form a `strike fund'. However, the management of the fund is given to 
the general union (article 14), which also has among its responsibilities the 
approval of strikes as per the terms and conditions set out in the proposed unified 
labour law. 
Although the law gave the trade union enterprise-based committee a legal persona 
in article 4, that did not increase its autonomy. An enterprise-based union acquires 
a legal persona after it submits its registration papers at the Ministry of Labour and 
the General Union to which it is affiliated, and the ETUF (article 4), however, 
other articles allow the BOM of the General Union by a two-thirds majority vote 
to dismiss unionists who "break the rules of this law or the financial bylaws, basic 
system, or Code of Ethics" (article 26). Although the enterprise-based unions have 
a legal persona, it is possible for the General Union to withdraw it and hence 
cancel/annul the committee. In fact, if half the BOM members of the enterprise 
committee are no longer members the committee is automatically annulled (article 
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43). It must also be stated that all money. and property of an annulled union 
organisation, automatically is transferred to the higher level(article 71). 
Financially the General Union and the ETUF have control of the committee. First, 
as in the previous law, the new legislation describes the allocation of the financial 
resources of trade unions, of which 10% go to the ETUF, 25% to the General 
Union, 5% as a legal reserve, and 60% to the union committee. The allocation of 
the 60% to the committee is, however, further restricted so that for example, a 
maximum of 20% of it goes to administrative expenditures (article 62). 
Furthermore, the general union and the ETUF have a role in the financial 
supervision of enterprises. The upper trade union levels have come under criticism 
from many unionists in that they misuse the money, which is used for such 
purposes as travel abroad (Al-Wafd, 12/12/94: 9). 
Among the most controversial elements in the new law is that article 36 allows a 
unionist who serves for one year in the BOM of a union organisation to move to 
the BOM of the higher level without having to nominate him/herself for the 
position in elections. This condition came under much criticism in the opposition 
press. This measure has been described as undemocratic and that it would 
perpetuate a select group of unionists in their positions, thereby controlling the 
trade unions and not allowing for innovation and new members (Al-Shaab, 
6/12/94). The National Committee to Combat Privatisation had issued a very 
critical statement that it rejects all the changes introduced by the draft law 
basically because it was undemocratic and allowed the senior trade union 
leadership to impose its control over the trade unions (A1-'Arabi, 7/11/94: 6). 
Indeed, it has been mentioned in several articles that the passing of the trade union 
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law was done as a deal between the ETUF and the government. In return for 
perpetuating the authority of the ETUF in the trade union law, the ETUF would 
endorse the proposed unified labour law (Al-Wafd, 2/1/95). Regardless of whether 
this is the truth or not, it reflects the deep mistrust of many unionists and labour 
activists with the ETUF. 
Many unionists had more than the content of the new trade union law to criticise. 
The draft of the law was passed by the ETUF to parliament without being 
presented to enterprise unions or workers for comment. They were totally ignored 
by the ETUF (Al-Wafd, 1/12/94). An attempt was made to present an alternative 
proposal of the trade union law to parliament, notably the proposal by Ahmad 
Taha, but it was turned down by the parliamentary committee for 
manpower/labour force. The reason given by the parliamentary committee was the 
it would `fragment' trade union work (Al-Wafd, 12/12/94: 8). The Ahmad Taha 
proposal called for a pluralist trade union system where membership was 
voluntary, not obligatory. In defence of his proposal Taha said that the new 
economic changes require a review of the existing trade union 
structure/organisation, so it may develop and evolve. In parliament his proposal 
was described as taking the trade union movement "a step backward" (Al-Wafd, 
12/12/94: 8). Needless to say, among the critics of the Taha proposal were ETUF 
members who are members of the ruling party, for example Aisha Abdel-Hady. 
At the time of the interviews in the tobacco and glass manufacturing enterprises 
the debate about the trade union law was underway, yet, important as it was, some 
unionists did not know that there was a proposal to change the trade union law. In 
an interview with a unionist at the Musturud branch of the glass manufacturing 
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company, I asked about the new trade union. law, and he replied by saying: "In the 
new labour law there are things about the unions" <NasrUnions, Musturud, 
25/9/94>. I then told him that a new law will replace Law 35, and he replied that 
he had not heard -anything about it <NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94>. However, 
there was a difference between committees, since some committees knew about 
the law, and others did not. In the other branch of the glass manufacturing 
company, I asked about the new trade union law, and the unionists knew about it: 
We requested 5 years instead of 4 because this gives greater experience to 
the unionist. The law also gives the right to strike, and provisions for 
support for the strike. Legal strike action does not disrupt/effect 
production. The role of the trade union committee is consultative, now it is 
not binding. It all depends on the state/condition of the company, a weak 
committee [trade union committee] does not protect workers' rights 
<unions, shubra kheima, 26/9/94>. 
This situation again raises the issue that within the same company there is no 
union body that can co-ordinate or communicate with unionists in different 
branches. 
Among the unionists who were aware of the proposal to legislate a new trade 
union law, two issues received particular attention, the duration of the union 
committee, and the number of white-collar unionists. The following remarks by 
unionists show that these two issues were singled out. In an interview with a 
unionist at the tobacco company, I asked about the new trade union law: 
It was discussed in the federation. The duration will be extended to 5 
years, the representation of professionals (nzehaneyeen) will increase. At 
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present the representation of professionals in the committee is 20%. 
<FAIbrahim, Giza, 1511011994> 
In fact, the number of white-collar unionists did not increase, it remained 20% as 
per article 38 of law 35/1995. However, it must be noted that there were some 
statements issued primarily by opposition parties about the changes in the law. 
Based on material from Tagamuu, some of the items which had been announced 
did not take place. This could have been the result of some pressure exerted on the 
upper levels of the trade union establishment by unionists, after the proposed law 
became known, to alter or modify some of the proposals. Such action would have 
been very possible, as a concession of sorts from the ETUF. Nevertheless, some of 
the unionists interviewed did not object to the increase in the representation of 
white-collar unionists. On the contrary, it was seen as a positive change: 
I would like to increase the number of professionals because they are 
educated and enlightened. Under the old system, the role of the unionist 
was marginal because the old law gave workers their rights. But under 
privatisation, there will be bargaining/ negotiation and thus he [the 
unionist] must have a degree of education to know the laws. <FAlbrahim, 
Giza, 15/10/1994> 
The reactions of the unionists to the changes in the new trade union law show that 
there are differences in attitudes among unionists. Again the most prominent case 
is that of the reactions of the white-collar unionists and the unionists who are 
manual workers. The following argument between two unionists in the tobacco 
company, one a white-collar unionist (Gamal), and one a manual worker who 
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became a unionist (Magdy), highlights the differences in the viewpoints of the two 
concerning increasing the number of white-collar unionists: 
Gamal Shafik: 
It is a must to increase them. 
Magdy Mansour: 
As a worker, I find that it will decrease my share as a percentage 
of workers/labourers. 
Gamal Shafik: 
An intermediate qualification is considered feat. In the previous 
committee they did not even read, even the secretary general of the 
committee could not read nor write. 
Magdy Mansour: 
I took a course on collective bargaining, and we also studied the 
method of Nasser, a great method. We also studied what are 
demands, and rights. 
Gamal Shafik: 
We are all here representing the worker. If I want someone to 
bring me my rights, it must be someone who is able to 
debate/argue. 
Magdy Mansour: 
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I strongly object/oppose that a feat sit in his office/at his desk 
only. For example, one of the fe'at, Mahmoud, was a worker 
<GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994> 
From the presentation it is possible to say that there are more issues that divide 
unionists than there are that unite them. Unionists differ over the perception of 
reform, the need for it, and the course of action to take in the new setting. The 
differences between unionists at the different levels of the trade union organisation 
are particularly sharp. In spite of the differences, one element seems to unite the 
unionists, namely the need to continue being relevant organisations. Often, the 
workers whom the unionists represent take a second place in their priorities. 
Although a number of organisations emerged in defence of unionists and workers, 
few come close to the effort of Tagamuu. It is true that there are labour secretariats 
in political parties, such as the Nasserite Party, the (Socialist) Labour Party`, and it 
is also the case that there are organisations such as the trade union services centre, 
but Tagamuu takes a lead, perhaps followed by the Nasserite Party'. 
An example of the work of Tagamuu is that it called for a seminar on the proposed 
trade union law in September 1994. The seminar was held at the headquarters of 
the Tagamuu party. Although the seminar was much publicised in Al-Ahali, in all 
it was attended by 14 unionists and myself. Various issues related to the trade 
8 
Although the Party was socialist, now it has formed an alliance with the 
Islamists. 
9 
The Nasserite party, however, has recently been involved in internal problems. 
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union law were raised. A document was prepared outlining the areas of change in 
the new law, as well as an official statement from Tagamuu condemning the 
proposed law. Those attending disagreed with the new law, and objected to a 
number of points: Among the issues that came under focus was the status of the 
union committee, and the need to strengthen it. Several remarks were made about 
the need to give the union committee a legal persona: 
At present we are working through the organisational structure and we 
want to make changes in this light/within the existing structure, for 
example, the trade union committee should have a legal persona 
(shakhseyya eetibareyya), but should not be isolated from the general 
unions. <Tagamu seminar, 1019194> 
Yet, it was to be observed that although there was a concern about the 
undemocratic nature of the proposals, there was a push to reform by utilising the 
existing structure. Also, the federation of all industries was not to be affected, but 
reformed. An issue that was raised in the seminar was the need to consider sectoral 
strategies, instead of those strategies that covered all industries. One of the 
unionists attending suggested abolishing the present trade union law, but leaving 
general assemblies of unions to produce their own by-laws. He suggested: 
In this way each industry would be able to design specific 
rules/laws for the industry. The industry-level organisation would 
act as the general unions <Tagamu seminar, 10/9194>. 
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Unionists and Political Organisations 
Unionist representation in parties on the left is considerable. The labour 
secretariats of these parties are staffed by union members and workers. An 
undeniable part of the reason for-the appeal of the parties of the left is the legacy 
of Nasser. During interviews with workers and unionists at the Tagamuu party this 
situation emerged clearly, as in the case of Kamal Ismail, a tram driver. I asked 
him when he became a member of Tagamuu: 
I have been a member since 1976. [Why Tagamuu? ]... Because I like any 
party that talks about Abdel-Nasser. [Why did you not join the Nasserite 
Party? ] Because in the days of the parliament [actually said Al-barlaman, 
a term that is not used to refer to the present People's Assembly] there was 
a Tagamuu Party. What do I do when my daughter comes from school and 
asks who is Abdel-Nasser? He visited me when I was in hospital during the 
war of attrition. I was injured because an officer pressed the wrong button 
and real ammunition was fired When I was in hospital people asked me 
what I wanted and I told them I want to see Abdel-Nasser. Gamal Abdel- 
Nasser came to visit us in hospital. Until today there are pictures/posters 
of Abdel-Nasser in Helwan. Sadat cane and closed/shut Tagamuu. After 
he closed it, it continued secretly in houses and after it was re-opened the 
party spread from Aswan to Alexandria. [Why? ]... Because Khaled 
Mohieldein [head of Tagamuu party] was a struggle comrade of Abdel- 
Nasser <Kamal Ismail, 25/10/1994>. 
In a meeting with the head of the labour secretariat at Tagamuu, he explained to 
me the extent to which Tagamuu has a following among workers and unionists: 
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Among the ranks of workers and trade unionists, there are members from 
Tagamuu who succeeded in 120 companies and factories [in 1991 union 
elections], and they transmit awareness. It is by accumulation that our 
presence is felt, it is translated in the fonn of a movement at the level of the 
factory, and reactions to government action. It is not necessarily by 
immediate action. For example, Law 33, called the National Front, was 
issued in Sadat's time, it gave the right to the prosecutor general (Al- 
Muda'a Al-Eshterakey) to object to and dismiss union members who were 
elected. In the . 
1979 union elections they objected to 56 candidates, in 
1983 to 12 candidates, and in 1987 to 4 candidates. In the last elections 
none were objected to. These are causes that progressed through 
accumulated effort. In some cases the election programs were fulf lled. In 
1976 Tagamuu union leadership was about 20 members, presently about 
600. We are trying to force the government to reinstate union members 
who were dismissed <AHSheikh, 24/9/94>. 
The labour secretariat at Tagamuu is active in promoting trade union rights, such 
as helping establish a centre for union research and rights in July 1988, and in 
1991 the Arab Centre for trade union rights <AHSheikh, 24/9/94>. Several trade 
union rights centres were set up in a number of governorates as well. Tagamuu 
also acts as a centre for resolving legal problems for individual workers. In an 
interview with the head of the labour secretariat at Tagamuu, I asked him about 
the functions of the labour secretariat: 
Tagamuu is the major/primary defender of workers, it is the party of the 
base. The Labour secretariat is basically worker and trade union affairs. 
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We defend workers' rights by providing legal assistance. We have a 
specialised lawyer who is also a member of the Party, there are trade 
unionists and workers who have experience in union work and who can 
help if someone has a problem.... Raising the awareness of workers' rights, 
we issue papers and statements. There used to be a periodical `Awrak 
Umaleyya' [Worker Papers] that came out in Al-Ahaly, but it jailed due to 
financial reasons. We also raise many problems/concerns of workers in Al- 
Ahaly [weekly paper of the party]. There are seminars/lectures in the 
party .... We provide assistance in cases of 
detention, for example the riots 
of the railway workers in 1986, ESCO, and Iron and Steel. We give some 
assistance to the families of the detainees, and legal assistance to the 
detainees <AHSheikh, 24/9/94>. 
Tagamuu played an important role in having the draft of the unified labour law 
sent to the ILO to be reviewed. The ILO objected to some of the items in the law. 
It was also Tagamuu that organised a seminar to discuss the new trade union law. 
Yet, the seminar on the new trade union law was attended by a number of trade 
unionists, fourteen in all, and no other member from the Tagamuu executive 
committee was present. 
Unionists who are Tagamuu members work in their individual enterprises by 
trying to solve individual problems, by referring the concerned individuals to 
Tagamuu. This is no doubt a failure of the union committee at the enterprise level. 
A case to illustrate the point is that during a visit to Tagamuu, I met a worker who 
used to work in the aluminium plant in Nagaa Hamadi [South of Egypt], and who 
dismissed. The worker came to Tagamuu headquarters, based on what Tagamuu 
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members in the plant told him, so he may find a solution to the problem <Kamal 
Ismail, 25/ 10/ 1994>. 
One of the benefits of being a member of a political party, based on what unionists 
told me is that it provides them with information about what is happening, 
information that may otherwise not be available to them. An example of this is 
that some of the unionists interviewed in the two enterprises I visited did not know 
about the new trade union law. In a meeting with unionists from a contracting 
company, I asked in what way did being members of Tagamuu party impacted 
them: 
Tagamuu adds awareness to us. There are things that we have not come 
across before so we can know what to do because others at Tagamuu 
share their experiences with us. Also, if there is a new law I know about it 
from here because government newspapers say nothing <Abdel Menem El- 
Gamal, 5/10194>. 
Individual assistance for individual workers cannot form the basis of a collective 
action for workers. Other services and legal aid is a good rallying point for trade 
unions. However, as demonstrated by the number attending the seminar on the 
trade union law, the Labour secretariat at Tagamuu (and others) has not been able 
to mobilise enough support among unionists. Part of the problem is that in the 
political parties, labour is one constituency among several. In other words, the 
interests of workers do not constitute the core of the activities of the parties. 
Indeed, the experience of trade unions in Egypt indicates clearly that the unions do 
not address the concerns of the majority of the working class. While the clearest 
impact of economic reform and privatisation have been the problems of 
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unemployment and steadily declining standards of living, these have received 
minimum attention from unionists (Al-Ahali, 10/11/93). 
Trade Unions, Unemployment and Women Workers 
The government and the unions have been using the language of numbers to suit 
their purposes. Thus, estimates of the unemployment rate in Egypt range from 9% 
to 20% of the labour force, depending on who is talking and what the message is. 
One estimate of unemployment is 9% for 1995/6, according to the Ministry of 
Planning down from 10% in 1992/3. Another estimate is 17.5% in late 1992, 
according to the ILO-Fergany study (USAID, 10/95: 1). In a paper presented to the 
Ministry of Labour on the implications of GATT on the labour market in Egypt, a 
very technical presentation was made about the short, medium and long term 
effects of GATT on labour. It was assured that without reforms the situation 
would be worse (ETUF, 12/1995: 8). In the report, it was pointed out that one of 
the negative implications of GATT for Egypt was that in the short and medium 
terms the labour market would shrink, due to competition of local goods with 
imported ones to the advantage of the latter, adoption of capital intensive 
technologies, the slow rate of investments, and the policies of flooding the markets 
with imported items (ETUF, 12/1995: 6-7). It was also added that by the year 2005 
the numbers entering the labour market will increase more due to the population 
growth rates, that only came under control in the mid-1990s (ETUF, 12/1995: 9). 
The presentation in the ETUF paper adopts a stance that such a development, 
which it is reluctant to call by its name - unemployment, is due to `structural' 
reasons, and thus by implication solutions to it cannot be simple. Indeed, the 
coverage of unemployment in the ETUF publications is also not significant. As an 
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example, in the latest issue of Al-'Amal the focus was on the early retirement 
scheme and the proposed unified labour law (Al-'Amal, March 1997). 
Unemployment was dealt with as a news item in the section on the activities of the 
parliamentary committee on the Labour force. It pointed out that unemployment 
became increasingly apparent in the early-1980s due to the developments in the 
Gulf, economic depression in Egypt, and the increase in population, which 
combined led to a serious unemployment problem (Al-'Amal, March 1997: 44). 
The committee recommended the need to absorb excess labour via agricultural 
projects, and the use of labour intensive technologies. 
The strategy of the trade union organisation is "think positive". The ETUF is 
focusing on the number of jobs that will be created by SAP. The attitude of the 
government is the same, thus the Minister of Labour has stated that 3.5 million job 
opportunities are projected for the second stage of SAP (Al-Akhbar, 13/9/96). The 
Minister of the Business Sector announced that 150 thousand job opportunities for 
youth were made available as a result of management of enterprises as private 
sector businesses (Al-Ahram, 17/2/96). At the same it was stated in Al-Abram that 
unemployment benefits have been rejected as an option because they would have 
to be regulated by law so that they would not exceed six months (Al-Ahram, 
1/12/94). 
During the interviews some of the unionists affiliated to political parties raised the 
issue of unemployment. The problem was perceived to be largely a result of a 
number of factors, but that the problem was deteriorating. In particular, the private 
sector came under attack for exacerbating the problem: 
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In the Tenth of Ramadan [a relatively new industrial zone] the 
investments are estimated at LE 10 billion, and the total workforce 
there is 100,000. In Six October [another industrial area] there is 
the same situation. There is a structural disequilibrium, there has 
been no expansion in labour absorption. Even in the best of 
estimates half of them [unemployed] have been absorbed. There is 
about one million who have entered the workforce and left again. In 
the eighties the construction sector absorbed about 2 million, and 
half of them got out after the crisis [in construction]. The bet is that 
the new investments will not remedy unemployment. The 
government has started to adopt suggestions, and this is in the big 
development projects. After their education they [unemployed 
youth] stayed at home, after their families have sold all they possess 
to educate them. This is government corruption. The government 
gives a social insurance of 15%, but the increases in prices are 
30%. Unemployment has produced terrorism and other things 
<AHSheikh, 17,9,94>. 
In a meeting with the head of the labour secretariat at the Nassente party, he 
highlighted an aspect of the problem of unemployment that seems to be 
disregarded by the senior trade union levels: 
The sale of the public sector and the problem of unemployment that 
is expanding will bring into existence a labour market in which the 
employer/employer will control the conditions of work, and which 
reaches the extent of a preference to employ those who are not 
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affiliated to a union organisation. " This leads to increasing the 
extent of workers outside the scope of legal protection, where there 
is no government supervision nor union affiliation, and this is 
called the black market, and it is also outside the scope of insurance 
<Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10/94>. 
As indicated, these considerations are of a secondary significance to trade unions 
at the higher levels of the organisation. The focus of trade unions has been on 
public sector workers, and methods of dealing with the situation of public sector 
workers affected by reform and privatisation. The trade union organisation has 
been involved early in the process of development of 'alternatives' to workers 
identified as redundant in public sector enterprises, both at the policy level and in 
implementation. In the enterprises, labour adjustment committees were formed 
with representatives from management and the enterprise-based union committee 
to formulate options for redundant workers (Soliman, Al-Ahwany, & Soliman: 3). 
The options included early retirement, vocational training and retraining, small 
enterprise funds, or relocation and are partly funded by the Social Fund for 
Development (SFD: 9). 
Implementation of the various options proved to have problems, which prompted 
some to accuse the government (and the trade union leadership) of corruption. An 
early retirement scheme was designed and made available to workers on a 
voluntary basis, so it is always stated. In a recent interview at Tagamuu, I was 
informed that this was the case at present, unlike the situation a few years ago: 
There was a concern at the reaction of workers, but by '95 the 
government adopted the policy of the stick and the carrot. The 
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`stick' was in the form of pressures on workers and their 
representatives until they are tired, and the carrot is in the form of 
early retirement schemes'O, about LE 20,000. There is a sense of 
despair/nd hope of reforming enterprises - which leads to the 
liquidation of enterprises. The hopes for the continuation of the 
companies is minimal, thus workers want to benefit before it is too 
late. There is a disquiet among workers about their fate/future and 
what is coming. For example, Helwan company for weaving has not 
produced anything since `95, thus workers have no illusions that the 
situation of the company will improve. Thus the idea among 
workers has become to improve the conditions of their leaving, not 
refusing to leave <Abdel Hamid El-Sheikh, Tagarnuu, 5/3/97>. 
The fact remains, however, that the public sector employees are the concern of the 
trade union organisation. For 11 thousand public sector employees who went on 
early retirement, received compensation/severance pay, or retraining the cost was 
LE 200 million (Khattab: 16). On the other hand there are no unemployment 
benefits for an estimated 1.4 million unemployed. 
Another area where the trade union organisation has not been active is that of 
women workers. In 1991 the working women's secretariat was inactivated for 
three years but in April 1994 the President of the ETUF re-activated it (Al-'Amal, 
October 1996: 33). The focus of the secretariat has been in large measure 
10 The process has been very problematic and many workers went to court because 
they received much less than they expected (Al-Ahali, 12/2/97). 
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disconnected from the problems facing working women. The work of the 
secretariat has focused on a more visible representation of `working women' in 
conferences, in boards of associations (NGOs), and in seminars and workshops, 
with an emphasis' on child labour and working women's rights. Some training 
activities have been carried out as part of the AALC project, aimed at helping 
women set up small enterprises. These, however, are centred on what are 
perceived to be women's work" mainly crafts. In addition, some training has been 
directed to trade union rights and working women's rights (Al-'Amal, October 
1996: 33). These efforts are not addressed to the women workers who need the 
most assistance, mainly those in the unorganised sector, who face poor working 
conditions and are not given their rights, such as insurance. 
The trade union leadership has been concerned with a narrow focus. On the one 
hand, it has become a partner with the government in trying to control the workers, 
by softening the impact of reform and SAP on the public sector workers, who have 
some political weight, albeit a negative political weight. On the other hand, the 
unions have been more interested in the pursuit of strengthening their 
organisations. The concerns of the wide sector of the working class are not 
addressed, a working class that includes many who are unemployed, and many 
who are working in very poor conditions in the private sector. Failure of the trade 
union organisation to address the core concerns of the working class, have allowed 
11 
A distinction is often made in discussions of the work of women, so that while 
women's work is often referred to as `amal (work), it is also sometimes referred to 
as anshita (activities). 
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the Islamists to infiltrate the labour movement. This became apparent in the 1991 
trade union elections. 
Unions and the Islamists 
Islam as a political force has existed in modern Egypt since the late 1920s. The 
most successful of the Islamist groups, and the one that has survived over the 
decades is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hassan El-Banna. The 
rise of Islamic movements was prompted by disillusionment with the "obvious 
failure of the Egyptian forms of parliamentary liberalism to achieve full political 
independence or improve the standard of living of the people" (Beinin, 1987: 
363). Concerning the relationship of the Islamists with the working class, it started 
with the Brotherhood and was a gradual process of commitment. Initially, the 
movement supported workers by financial means, in the form of "financial aid for 
unemployed or disabled workers who joined the Society" (Beinin, 1987: 364-5). 
The Muslim Brotherhood managed to carry out its activities in alliance with other 
political forces, such as the communists. The arrest of Hassan El-Banna in 1943, 
however, had a significant impact on the movement. The Brotherhood became 
more assertive. 
The similarities between the rise of the Islamist movement and its approach and 
methods in the past and at present is surprising. At present, a declining standard of 
living, a wide gap between the haves and have-nots, and what is seen by many as 
an invasion of Western power and culture which compromises traditional, Islamic 
values, has been a major factor in the Islamic revival. One of the main Islamist 
figures is Gamal El-Banna, a younger brother of Hassan El-Banna, the founder of 
the Brotherhood. He is actively involved in the trade union movement, and is a 
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founding member of the International Islamic Confederation of Labour (IICL)". 
The involvement of the Islamists in the trade union movement is an inseparable 
aspect of the Islamicisation of society. Although the Brotherhood played an 
important role in working class politics in the past, their involvement at present is 
different. While in the past the Brotherhood was the dominant Islamist force, at 
present the Islamists are composed of a number of groups each competing for 
membership. 
There is little doubt about the attempts by the Islamists to infiltrate the labour 
movement. Research on the 1991 trade union elections states that, based on an 
examination of the results of the elections, Islamists managed to push through 
some of their candidates in the union elections (Shaaban in Abbas: 125). The 
influence of the Islamists on the trade union movement emerged in the 1987-1991 
cycle. It is believed that the reason for the success of the Islamists at the 1987 
elections was that trade union elections in 1987 came immediately after the 
parliament elections in 1987, where the Islamists carried out a very forceful 
campaign to win seats in parliament. The slogan "Islam is the solution" was 
adopted and won some support and candidates in both elections (Shaaban in 
Abbas: 124-5). Another factor that contributed to the success of the Islamist 
12 
The IICL was envisioned as an alternative to the WFTU and ICFTU. The IICL 
aims to bring together and defend all the Islamic labour force. It is based on the 
idea that other confederations of labour have become morally deficient because 
they are dominated by 'materialistic principles'. 
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candidates was the disillusionment of the workers with the existing trade union 
leadership. 
The Islamists attained some success in the 1991 elections but it was not entirely 
built on their `achievements' in the 1987-91 cycle. Quite on the contrary, it is 
argued that the Islamists had done better in the 1987 elections than they did in the 
1991 elections (Shafei in Abbas: 208). The activities of the Islamist unionists was 
basically propagating for Islamic values, but no concrete action was carried out to 
demonstrate how their `vision' would support workers' and their demands. It is 
perhaps for this reason that the unionists interviewed dismissed the impact of the 
Islamists, some even negating completely their influence. During an interview 
with unionists at the tobacco company, the issue of people who use Islam to attract 
workers to vote for them was raised, whereupon one of the unionists present said, 
"rhere is none of that here" <GRShafik, Giza, 18/10/1994>. Another unionist who 
was present said: 
The one who has a loud voice and proves himself in the factory, the 
workers find that he can bring them their rights, and nominate him. Mr. 
Gamal when he nominated himself he was the first one who started to talk 
about the Business sector law <GRShafik, Giza, 1811011994>. 
The same situation occurred in the glass manufacturing company with a group of 
unionists at the Shubra-El-Kheima branch. On being asked if there was support 
among workers for Islamic or other trends, they dismissed this possibility: 
The presence of the committee inside the factories does not make workers 
resort to any trend, all workers demands are fulfilled, thus there is no 
opportunityfor extremism. I then said that I am not referring to extremism, 
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but that I had been told in some companies workers support either Islamic 
or Leftist trends, whereupon one of the unionists said: The union 
represents workers' interest and the interest of work<un ions, shubra 
kheima, 26/9/94>. 
The unionists' dismissal of the impact of the Islamists overlooks one of the main 
reasons for the Islamists making some headway, namely that workers do not view 
trade unions as capable of attaining their demands. There is a recognition among 
some unionists, however, that poverty and economic hardship breed "terrorism". 
Even in cases where there is a recognition of the existence of Islamists, their 
influence is minimised: 
In the situation of transformation from one economic system to another 
there is a deficiency/incapacity of unions now and the inability to take 
initiative is pushing workers to the Islamic trend.... The Islamists have a 
strong presence in the Chemicals industry, but the general unions have 
dismissed/dismantled the committees. They do not have practical 
experience, nor how to deal with management. A big number of them won 
the elections, but they failed. The Islamists concentrated on the 1991 BOM 
elections but they did not succeed. Their influence in worker areas is 
through non-worker elements, like engineers in the BOM 
<AHSheikh, 1/10/94>. 
However, the significance of the Islamists should not be underestimated. 
According to the head of the labour secretariat at the Nassente party, the Islamists 
in the union and labour movements are a force to be reckoned with: 
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From what we heard, there is about LE 10 million to fund the infiltration 
of the union movement by Islamists. About 40 from the new Kafr El-Dawar 
incident were instigated by Islamic groups. There was a conference 
organised 'by the Muslim Brotherhood in the engineering union all the 
leaders want to allocate money to support Islamists <Fathy Mahmoud, 
22/10/94> 
While the information given by Fathy Mahmoud is unverified, his comments are 
credible perhaps not in terms of the accuracy of the information but in terms of the 
method of operation. The Islamic presence in labour is only one aspect of the 
infiltration of Islamists in other institutions. In addition, Islamic groups do receive 
funding for their activities. Islamists do have major weaknesses that prevent them 
from having a strong presence in the trade union organisation, such as resorting to 
populist language and not advocating an alternative, they only criticise. However, 
they are still important. An incident'3 that shows that Islamists have support among 
workers is that an industrial Adjustment Committee' was set up in Phillips 
company by the SFD, comprised of union members as well as management staff, 
in equal numbers, to draw up a plan of options to address redundancy. The Union 
members present in the IA committee, including the President of the union, 
insisted that a 'Sunni' member of the union be admitted to the IA committee, to 
make the program acceptable to the workers in the company. 
13 
This information was obtained from workers at the SFD. 
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Conclusion 
In confronting the challenges posed by structural adjustment, trade unions are 
trying to redefine their role. This is happening at the various levels of the 
organisation. In enterprises, trade unions emphasise that the interests of work and 
workers are inseparable. At the level of the ETUF and general unions, they 
present themselves as working to keep workers' rights, but also as partners with 
the government in its drive for growth. In both cases the unions are acting 
`responsibly'. Co-operation rather than conflict is the method of operation. By so 
doing trade unions are trying to de-politicise trade unionism, and instead focus on 
the economic gains. However, unions are trying to redefine their role away from 
workers. Trade unions at the various levels are not based on what the workers 
want or demand, it is based on what the trade unions want. It is based on the 
belief that the workers do not truly know their interests. The break between 
unionists and workers is demonstrated by the fact that workers' protest movements 
have often been against their trade unions. 
In contrast to the `official uniondom', there are unionists who are active in trying 
to promote workers' rights. This group of unionists is mainly from the political 
parties. Although they address many of the demands and grievance of workers, 
they are doing so from a political platform. While they are closer to the demands 
of workers, they stand divided among themselves and thus do not truly represent 
the interests of the working class. In these circumstances two courses of action are 
possible. Workers may produce their own representatives, but the institutionalised 
framework which the official trade union uses and the equally institutionalised 
setting of political parties from which opposition unionists operate are too strong 
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to overcome if the spontaneous movement is not unified. Second, the trade union 
movement may be used by Islamists to provide a popular base for their movement. 
By reducing the significance of the Islamists in the labour and union movements, 
while at the same time not addressing their own weaknesses asworkers' 
representatives, trade unions are ignoring a very strong force. Already there seem 
to be pockets of Islamist influence within the trade union movement, in the 
chemical and engineering industries. However, Islamists may have a strong 
presence among workers not as workers, but as part of the poor who are 
marginalised in society economically, politically, and culturally. The evidence in 
the previous chapter suggests that Islamic PVOs/NGOs are active at that level. 
Thus, to workers the `Islamists' are more relevant than the trade unions, and if one 
accepts that trade unionism is about `representation' of workers, then trade 
unionism in Egypt has failed in this respect. In the promotion of their interest as an 
organisation, trade unions are alienating themselves from the workers they are 
supposed to represent. By so doing, they are in fact self-defeating. Workers in 
large measure no longer perceive them as their legitimate representatives. Thus, 
workers are carrying out spontaneous action, and turning to other forces to address 
their demands, such as the Islamists. But, most of all, workers do get limited 
results to their grievances by their own spontaneous action, so in fact the trade 
union organisation is of secondary significance to them. While trade unions may 
benefit from this situation in the short and even medium term, it is difficult to 
imagine that in the longer term they can continue to be of `use' as an agent to 
control the workers. 
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Conclusion: Trade Unions, Workers, And Structural 
Adjustment 
An examination of the impact of structural adjustment on trade unions and 
workers reveals that economic changes that came about with SAP, and which 
challenged the ideological basis of the labour relations system in existence, have 
not led to its modification. The trade union movement is state-bureaucratised. At 
the same time there is a struggle within the trade union movement, but they are 
powerless to change. Also, they are too fragmented to challenge the 
institutionalised structure. The institutionalised sectors are capable of reproducing 
themselves and promoting their interests. 
The following discussion analyses the ways in which both trade unions and 
workers are contributing to the perpetuation of the existing labour relations 
system. 
Trade Unions: Resistance to Structural Change 
Trade unions are a self-perpetuating bureaucracy. The control of the trade union 
leaderships has been maintained by a combination of methods including the co- 
optation of `co-operative' unionists to the upper circles of the organisation, and 
most important by preserving the pyramidal, hierarchical structure of the trade 
union organisation. The trade union structure has allowed the top echelons of the 
organisation to control the organisation, through the limited authority of the 
enterprise-based committees and a system of indirect elections (Bianchi, 1989: 
129). An examination of the members of the BOM of the ETUF from 1976 to 
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1992 reveals that there is a very low turnover, particularly in the top-most 
positions of president and deputies. Most changes occur at the level of the heads 
of the various secretariats (ETUF, 1992: 63-86). 
The trade union organisation was regulated until recently by Law 35/1976, with 
some modifications introduced by Law 1/1981. In March 1995, Law 12/1995 was 
passed that is now the trade union law. Law 12, however, has not cancelled Law 
35, it modified some articles in Law 35. The bulk of law 35 remains intact, 
including the structure of the trade union organisation and the functions of each 
level of it. The union organisation is arranged in a pyramidal structure to ensure 
the unity of the organisation (article 7, law 35/1976). At the apex of the trade 
union organisation is a single federation, the ETUF. The central level of the 
organisation, the industry-based general unions, are 21 in number, each 
representing an industry or group of related industries. The base of the structure is 
comprised of the enterprise-level union committees or the occupational trade 
union committee. 
Membership in union committees is not exactly voluntary. If two-thirds of the 
employees of the enterprise join the union, the remainder are automatically made 
members. Some researchers argue that giving the union committee a legal persona 
allows the Minister of Labour to dismantle a union committee at a specific 
location/factory within an enterprise without affecting the remainder of the union 
committees in other branches of the enterprise (Adly: 162). Occupational 
committees can be formed in enterprises where the number of employees is less 
than the minimum required to form a union committee in an enterprise. The 
number was 50, but it was changed before the trade union elections of 1996 to 250 
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by decree from the president of the ETUF. Occupational committees are not 
enterprise-based, they exist at the level of the governorate. Their membership is 
comprised of employees from several enterprises. No more than one such 
committee may be formed in a city, per industry (El-Serafy, 1983: 18). Authority 
of the different levels of the structure flows from the top to the bottom of the 
structure, with most authority and power concentrated at the ETUF level, and the 
union committees at the enterprise level are reduced to the implementation of 
policies formulated at higher levels. 
The extent to which the ETUF controls the trade union structure is demonstrated 
by the fact that the ETUF has much discretionary power. An example of this is 
demonstrated by the issue of the ban on formation of more than one union 
committee per enterprise. According to Law 35/1976 it is not possible to form 
more than one union committee in any single "location", which is basically a 
factory. This, however, came under criticism from the ILO. A few years later Law 
1/1981 addressed this issue by defining it as an organisational issue to be dealt 
with by the ETUF. The guidelines for the ETUF were to maintain the pyramidal 
structure and the unitary nature of the union organisation. Thus, instead of stating 
the issue of a single union in law explicitly, it gave the ETUF the discretion but 
within specific guidelines. Another example of this is the recent ruling that the 
minimum number required to form a union was increased from 50 members to 
250. In a meeting with the President of the General Union for Engineering 
Industries, the issue was raised that this ruling does not reflect the reality of 
increasingly small industries: 
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The decree of the ETUF president is not the Koran, it can be changed. 
It is possible in exceptional cases [for ETUF to authorise] the 
formation of a committee with 50 members <Niazi Abdel Aziz, ETUF, 
25/2/97>. 
In addition to the vertical structure of the trade union organisation, the ETUF 
maintains control over the horizontal structure of the organisation as well. There are 
two horizontal trade union structures, the local federations and the branch general 
unions. They are representatives of the ETUF and the General Unions, respectively, in 
the different governorates. Their functions are purely administrative and they do not 
have legal persona. The local federation is defined as the local representative of the 
ETUF in every governorate, with the exception of Cairo since the ETUF is situated in 
Cairo. The local federation is not industry-based, rather it represents the various 
industries in a governorate. 
There are three criteria for establishing a local federation: number of workers in a 
given governorate, the geographical location of a governorate, and the availability of 
funds at the ETUF, since local federations receive their budget from the ETUF 
(ETUF, 1992: 116-7). At the end of 1991 there were seventeen local federations in 
Egypt. Excluding Cairo for the above-stated reasons, there remain nine governorates 
without a local federation, since there are twenty-seven governorates in Egypt. The 
functions of the local federations are, according to article 52 of law 35/1976, 
promoting the common interests of the union committees in the governorate, co- 
ordination of the social, cultural, health, and entertainment services for workers at the 
governorate, as well as designing their work plans, which are to be reviewed and 
approved by the ETUF. 
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The second horizontal body is the branch general union. It is possible to have 
several district branch unions per governorate, each representing a separate general 
union. The district branch union is not considered an integral part of the structure 
of the trade union organisation, because its presence is provisional, pending on 
ETUF regulations (article 41, law 35/1976). The primary function of the branch 
general union as per article 44 of law 35, is to act as a link in administrative, 
financial, and technical matters between the general union and the various 
enterprise committees affiliated to it in a governorate. 
Internal organisation of trade unions 
Each level of the trade union structure has an internal organisational hierarchy. 
The internal bodies are primarily the decision-making and executive organs of the 
union. At the base is the general assembly. It puts in place the basic plan of actions 
for the union, and "ratifies the basic system of by-laws, the financial system, the 
administrative by-laws, the budget, and the final statement/ account" (Adly: 173). 
The general assembly also has 'disciplinary' powers. It can dismiss a member of 
the union if found to have transgressed in some respect. Members of the general 
assembly are selected from the lower level of the union structure by the board of 
directors of that level. In the case of the enterprise-based union committees, as 
there is no lower body, the general assembly is composed of all the members of 
the union committee, provided they have fully paid membership dues, and have 
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been members of the committee for at least. six months'. The size of the general 
assembly for the general union and for the ETUF is not to exceed 35 members in 
both cases. 
The second internal body is the board of management. It is an executive body. It 
follows up and monitors the work of the general assembly. The members of the 
board of directors are elected from among the members of the general assembly. In 
the case of enterprise-based union conunittees the size of the board ranges 
between seven and twenty-one, while for the general union it is between eleven 
and twenty-one. The board of the ETUF is comprised of one member from every 
general union. 
The third and final internal organisation of unions is the office/bureau agency 
(hay'at al-maktab). It carries out the day-to-day activities of the union, and 
conducts the work of the board of directors of the union. Its members are elected 
from among the members of the board on its first meeting. It is composed of a 
president, a deputy or deputies to the president, a secretary general, an assistant 
secretary general, a treasurer, and an assistant treasurer. 
The description of the union organisation, the relationship between the different 
levels of the union hierarchy, and the internal structure of the unions elucidates 
that unions are highly centralised and bureaucratic organisations. The union 
committees at the base of the structure are powerless as power is concentrated at 
1 
Union committeess that are formed for the first time are exempt from the six 
months ruling. 
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the level of the ETUF. The mechanisms of internal selection within each level of 
the organisation reinforce the centralised nature of the system. This method 
actually renders workers' representatives at the top of the hierarchy, the ETUF, 
strangers to the workers. The horizontal organisations, by their direct affiliation to 
the upper levels of the structure, do not serve a function other than basically to 
`represent' the ETUF and general unions nation-wide. The membership of the 
horizontal bodies is not from the workers, but rather from union officials. 
The very structure of the unions is a manifestation of the weakness of collective 
representation of workers. At the enterprise level, there are separate union 
committees for every factory of the enterprise. There is no collective enterprise 
union. Indeed, union committees of an enterprise that has factories in different 
governorates are affiliated to different local federations and branch general unions. 
The central industry-based general union is the level at which all union 
conunittees of an enterprise are represented. However, this representation is at the 
basic level, because the decision-making bodies within the general union must 
ensure representation of the different enterprises within the general union. 
As has been depicted above, the trade union structure was formulated in detail by 
law. Almost every aspect of the operation and function of trade unions was 
regulated by law, be it size of the board, criteria of membership, functions, and 
power of the structure. The general union in particular has been the focus of much 
legal change. Two areas of reform are important: condensation of the number of 
general unions, and control over union committees. General unions as one of the 
levels in the union structure came to existence in 1959, constituting 59 general 
unions. Since that date there have been several changes in the number of general 
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unions. At present there are 21 general unions. General unions came to represent 
not a single industry, but rather a group of related industries. The latter issue raised 
the concern of some, on the basis that there is little common interest among 
enterprises in some general unions. El-Banna expressed his concern that some 
general unions comprised too many industries, he referred specifically to one 
which he described as: 
It was like a store for 1000 items, it included clerical lawyers, and 
employees of Ministry of Endowments/Religious Affairs, Social 
Affairs, Hotels and Tourism, night clubs, etc... so that we could find 
in it a cabaret dancer sitting next to a Religious Affairs sheikh (El- 
Banna, 1987: 94-95). 
General unions increased in significance as the process of nationalisation 
proceeded. Nationalisation of existing industries as well as investments in new 
industries, some of which were large-scale projects, resulted in the expansion of 
industrial enterprises. The effect of incorporating a larger number of enterprises in 
a fewer number of general unions was to weaken the level of the union 
committees in the trade union structure, particularly when one considers the 
representation of union committees in the decision-making bodies at the higher 
levels of the trade union hierarchy. The following section examines the issue of 
the relationship between the union committees and the general union in greater 
detail. 
One of the issues in the discussion of general unions is their control over 
enterprise-based union committees. Union committees have a legal persona, but 
there are limits to their autonomous action. For example, membership dues are 
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sent to the general union, which then redistributes the dues to the union 
committees. The allocation of the union committee's share of the dues to the 
various activities was delineated by law. Union committees, in addition, do not 
play a role in collection of the union membership dues. Membership dues are 
deducted automatically from workers' salaries. The ILO objected to the allocation 
of membership dues as it appeared in law 62/1964 on the grounds that it interferes 
with the freedom of trade unions, and consequently it was removed as an item in 
law 35/1976. The ETUF, however, included the allocation of membership dues in 
the model bylaws which all unions utilise (El-Banna, 1987: 102). Indeed this has 
come to be one of the features of trade union legislation in Egypt. If the ILO 
objects to any piece of legislation concerning trade unions, the law is revised, the 
article under objection removed, and instead it is incorporated as one of the 
guidelines or model bylaws of the ETUF or the general unions, which the union 
committees then have to implement. 
The restrictions on union committees, imposed by law or by the guidelines of the 
ETUF and general unions, limit the scope of decision-making of the former. Yet, 
within the limited room for manoeuvrability, decision-making in union 
committees is problematic. Decisions are made on a consensual basis. Based on 
interviews with some unionists, divisions in points of view among unionists are 
seen as an obstacle: 
As the number increases [in the committee] it becomes a problem, it 
becomes difficult to have consensus, and instead leads to branching 
or digression <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10194>. 
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The degree of the strength of the union committee, despite acts of assertiveness 
which sometimes occur, lies to a great extent with conditions external to the union 
committee itself, as the labour secretariat at Tagamuu explains: 
It is an equation. Weak management, poor economic situation, the 
union committee is strong. Strong management, good economic 
situation, the union committee is marginalised via benefits to 
workers <Abdel Menem El-Gamal, 5/10/94>. 
The discussion on the structure of trade unions shows that organisation is not 
ideology-neutral. The structure of trade unions serves the centralised autocratic 
tendencies within the movement which are concentrated at the top echelons of the 
hierarchy, corporatised by the state. The interests of the organisation have become 
of paramount importance. 
Trade Unions: Lack of Independence 
Until 1987 it was customary for the President of the ETUF to hold the post of the 
Minister of Labour simultaneously. Since 1987, the two posts have been held by 
separate individuals, but it has become the tradition that the Minister of Labour is 
selected from among the past presidents of the ETUF. As a consequence of this 
relationship, the work of the Ministry of Labour often feeds into the workings of 
the ETUF. The involvement of the Minister of Labour in the affairs of the 
Federation results from the involvement of the former in public sector enterprises. 
The Ministry is involved in a number of committees such as the tri-partite 
committee that looks into cases of worker complaints, and the medical committees 
that form to decide the right of workers for compensation for health treatment or 
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work-related injuries. The Ministry of Labour is also involved in the process of 
trade union elections. 
The shift away from a public sector led economy did not lead to less interference 
or involvement on the part of the Ministry of Labour. It is strongly involved 
through national/multi-Ministerial committees that deal with macro-economic 
issues, such as that which drafted the Unitary Labour Law. The relationship 
between the Ministry and the ETUF is, however, a very sensitive one. The 
experience of the previous Minister of Labour, Assem Abdel Haq, was 
problematic. He tried to interfere directly in the affairs of the ETUF by trying to 
support one candidate against another, Khairy versus Rashed, for the post of 
President of the ETUF. Rashed had already been elected as President when Al- 
Amawy left the ETUF presidency for a post in the Arab Labour Organisation, but 
the Minister of Labour tried to disqualify the candidacy of Rashed. So serious was 
the situation that the ETUF took the case to the Supreme Court in Egypt (Al- 
Ahali, 20/10/93). Eventually, Rashed maintained his position as ETUF president, 
and interestingly, the Minister was removed from power shortly after this incident. 
The new Minister, Al-Amawy, is very popular in the trade union organisation. 
The unrelenting involvement of the Ministry in ETUF affairs, in spite of 
privatisation, is exemplified by election procedures. The relationship with the 
Ministry of Labour has benefited the trade union leadership, especially the ETUF. 
It has allowed a `partnership' between the two to develop. 
Trade Unions: Refusal to Democratise 
The trade union elections of 1996 were evidence of the lack of will on the part of 
the trade union leadership to democratise the movement. The elections were for all 
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the levels of the trade union hierarchy as well as for the workers' representatives 
in the BOMs of enterprises. The elections were held in October/early November 
1996, and lasted twenty-one days. The involvement of the Ministry of Labour was 
evident in the processing of nomination forms, and ensuring that the procedures 
were correct. In the past, the Ministry had the authority to refuse the nomination of 
any candidate by the power of the Prosecutor General. The Minister of Labour 
announced prior to the elections that no candidates would be dealt with thus (Al- 
Ahram, 27/9/96). Although there is evidence that the utilisation of this method has 
declined, there are reports that the Ministry has refused the nominations of some 
candidates (Al-Wafd, 15/10/96). 
As for the ETUF, it has utilised methods that keep `dissenting' unionists from 
reaching power. The methods used are extremely undemocratic and serve the 
function of perpetuating the interests of the ETUF. For example, it is reported that 
a substantial percentage of trade union committees won by default (Al-Ahram, 
1/11/96). There was much criticism of the elections. The ETUF was accused of 
blocking candidates that do not speak the language of the ETUF. The result of the 
election has been the re-instatement of trade unions that are in large measure the 
"official" or pro-ETUF unionists. In a meeting with the head of the labour 
secretariat at Tagamuu, he said: 
The trade union committees are of different kinds. There are 700 
trade union committees for agricultural workers and these all ºtwon 
by default. In the services sector, there are many trade union 
committees, about 700, and competition was limited and thus most 
won by default. As for the industrial manufacturing sector, there 
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were 500 committees and competition in the elections was very 
strong, and thus the number that won by default was limited. There 
were people who were against privatisation who won, and there 
were others who were for privatisation who won. There is much 
confusion, unlike in 1991 when all who were against law 203 won. 
The last elections were an expression of a general discontent, a 
general objection <Abdel Hamid El-Sheikh, Tagamuu, 5/3/97>. 
The press, specifically the opposition, has reported extensively on the trade union 
elections. The reports testify that the election campaign were very vibrant, 
particularly in areas such as Helwan, which is an industrial district in Cairo (Al- 
Ahali, 30/10/96). The elections brought a heavy criticism of the trade union 
organisation. 
The frustrations over the elections were in the tail of earlier frustrations with the 
trade union leadership. As already noted, the trade union leadership succeeded in 
passing a trade union law that perpetuated the corporatist and hierarchical 
structure of trade unions. In addition, the ETUF president issued a decree that 
increased the number required to form a trade union committee from 50 to 250. 
When I asked the president of the general union for engineering industries for the 
rationale behind this decision he said: 
There are a number of reasons. First, it was a decree from the 
ETUF president, before the trade union elections took place, 
because there was a concern that some forces were trying to 
infiltrate the trade union movement through the small 
constituencies. [I asked him if he was talking about the Islamists] ... 
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I will tell you that it is the same force. that has been trying to control 
the professional syndicates, like the lawyers' syndicate [i. e. 
Islamists]. So if they push members through the small unions, they 
will have representatives at the higher levels. They do not have the 
interests of workers, they just want to serve their own interests. 
Second, a union of 50 members will have very few. funds, what can 
they do with the small membership fee? And for me, 1 have to pay 
for example the salary of striking workers. It is better financially to 
have a bigger number <Niazi Abdel Aziz. STUF, 25/2197>. 
One may say that the reasons given are not the whole picture. The ruling to 
increase membership is attempt to exert control over the trade union movement. 
The move is very controversial. The bulk of economic activity is in the small- 
scale enterprises, and the increase in membership limits the formation of 
enterprise-based unions in such firms. Although it is possible to form 
occupational union committees at the level of the governorate, there are many 
obstacles to achieving this. Most important, however, is that the enterprise-based 
union committees which are the most significant level for workers have been 
reduced significantly. Workers in occupational committees can only raise 
industry-based grievances. In this respect, the experience of the new industrial 
cities has been poor. Thus in the tenth of Ramadan city there are 700 factories, 
and only 70 trade union committees <Abdel Hamid El-Sheikh, Tagamuu, 5/3/97>. 
Representatives for the BOMs of enterprises under the Workers' Participation in 
Management (WPM) system were also elected during the same election period as 
the trade unions. The WPM system is regulated by Law 73/1973 and there are 
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provisions for it under article 21 of law 203/1991. The WPM is applicable to 
business sector enterprises (law 203) and joint stock companies (law 159). It is 
also possible to form it in private sector enterprises by decree from the Minister 
of Labour (article 1, law 73/1973). WPM is an alternative system of worker 
representation in enterprises. 
The presence of workers' representatives with decision-making powers in the 
BOM of enterprises had a negative impact on union committees within companies. 
With elected representatives in the BOM, unions have been de facto relegated to a 
subsidiary role. Basically, union committees became responsible for the 
improvement of the 'educational' and technical abilities of workers. 
There are indications that the decision-making authority of the elected members 
rendered them more powerful. In an interview at the glass manufacturing company 
with the unionists and the elected BOM members, I noticed that the unionists, 
among whom was the president of the union committee at the Musturud branch, 
kept referring to the elected BOM member as "El-Rayes", which is "boss", 
<NasrUnions, Musturud, 25/9/94>. 
On occasion the boundaries blur. It is possible for a unionist to hold the position 
of WPM as well, and in fact that was the case in the tobacco company. However, 
with the move to privatisation the scope and significance of WPM is being 
replaced in importance by the Employee Shareholders' Associations (ESA). But, 
whereas WPM was an involvement in decision-making of the enterprise since 
production was publicly owned, in the ESA the employees' involvement is limited 
to their ownership of shares of the enterprise. The ESAs are limited by the capital 
markets law to possess a maximum of 10% of shares, but there are cases where 
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ESAs control 40% and 95% of shares. A board of management for the ESA 
manages only employee shares in the enterprise. The evidence of privatisation in 
Egypt suggests that in the case of minority share-holders there is "little scope to 
make management changes" (Butter, 8 March 1996: 2). This is the case of the 
ESAs. 
As is the case of WPM, the ESAs marginalise workers. They are employee 
associations and include clerical and administrative staff as well as production 
workers. Since one of the requirements for nomination to the BOM of the ESA is 
ability to read and write, this cuts off a considerable proportion of workers. The 
same situation applies to the trade union organisation. There is a bias for 
administrative and clerical employees in the trade union organisation. It is a bias 
that leaves the' production workers with little actual representation in trade unions 
or other employee representative boards. While it is tempting to examine the 
extent to which the trade union membership reflects the distribution of the 
workforce in the economy by the different sectors, it would not be of much 
analytical value. The reason behind this is that it is not possible to have more than 
one union per enterprise, as a result union membership includes all employees - 
those in production work and those in clerical positions. 
The service sector has the largest membership in the trade union organisation. The 
place of the manufacturing industries in the organisation is an indication of the 
secondary position of industry in the economy as a whole. Most important, 
however, is that the predominance of the service sector membership and 
government employees serves to curtail the impact of the manufacturing workers 
on the trade union organisation (Bianchi, 1989: 132). The discussion on the trade 
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union elections of 1996 has pointed out that the election was most contested in the 
manufacturing industrial sector. 
Thus, the discussion above has shown that the trade union organisation shows no 
signs of responding to changes. While there is a move to smaller scale industry I. 
the ETUF increases by five-fold the minimum number required to form a union. 
Instead of democratising the movement, the elections show that in fact it is co- 
opting unionists and thus self-perpetuating. This leads one to question the extent 
to which reform of the trade union organisation can be pushed from the workcrs, 
thereby forcing trade unions to reform. The discussion on workers indicates that 
this is not the case. 
Workers 
Workers, as in the case of unions, do not present a homogenous group. There are 
differing interests as not all workers are impacted in the same way by structural 
adjustment. This issue, however, was dealt with in an earlier chapter. The focus in 
the following discussion is to examine the nature of worker protest, particularly 
that instigated by SAP measures. I propose that the nature of workers' struggle is 
one component of the existing system of labour relations system in Egypt that 
helps perpetuate it. The focus of labour activism is not over conditions of work, 
rather it is related to standards of living. In this respect workers are protesting as 
i The expansion in the small scale enterprise sector in Egypt may lead one to 
speculate that the cooperatives may increase in significance in the future. In fact, 
the president of the cooperatives federation is a deputy of the ETUF president. 
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`consumers' not as `producers'. This coincides, one may argue, with the fact that 
the distributive role of the public sector is more important than the productive role. 
It has been for this reason that workers in Egypt have protested as recipients of the 
benefits of the public sector, not as producers, meaning not against conditions of 
work 
There is evidence that leftist groups have tried and succeeded in organising workers 
in taking stands against privatisation. This was particularly evident after Law 203 
was issued. However, the participation of workers in these efforts was modest. The 
transition of most enterprises to the 'business sector' was accompanied by an 
increase in the spontaneous activity of workers directed in most cases against the 
new management team, or the new management practices of the 'old' team. Two 
measures are carried out by workers, sit-ins that do not disrupt production, and also 
increasingly the resort to courts to resolve grievances. Most worker protests, in both 
forms, are triggered by withdrawal or drastic reduction of 'rights' or benefits to 
workers resulting from the adoption of SAP. Workers protest as their standards of 
living decline further, and simultaneously at what is identified as an inequality in 
paying the price of reforms (Al-Ahali, 9/11/94). 
One can take the strike of the Helwan Iron and Steel workers as a beginning of 
reform- and SAP-related worker protests. The strike occurred in August 1989, at 
about the time that "Egypt was negotiating ... with the IMF for an agrccntcnt that 
was not finally reached until 1991" (Waterbury, 1993: 240). The action that led to 
the strike was brewing for some time. It involved the production incentive/bonus of 
workers. Workers' representatives in the BOM requested that the production 
incentive of workers be increased to 115% instead of 90% when the production of 
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the factory reaches 870 thousand tons (El-Banna, 1995: 587). After some 
negotiations between the elected workers' representatives at the BOM and the 
presidents of the BOM, it was agreed to increase the incentives. However, the 
president of the BOM sent a request to the Minister of Industry to ban two of the 
elected representatives from attending BOM meetings for six months. As a 
consequence of this action, workers sat-in in support of their dismissed 
representatives. Events escalated and state security interfered, resulting in the 
death of one worker. The workers requested that the president of the BOM and 
trade union committee be dismissed. 
The point of interest of this and subsequent strikes, was that elected 
representatives at the BOM played a bigger role than the unions in uncovering 
management corruption, or the reduction in workers' benefits. The case of the 
pharmaceutical company "CID" illustrates this, when in August 1994 the elected 
members of the BOM presented their resignations from the BOM over 
mismanagement of the company that led to losses (Al-Shaab, 16/8/94). A possible 
explanation of this situation is that the elected members to the BOM are in the 
course of their work exposed to the company plans. 
Economic reform and structural adjustment policies have resulted in inconmc- 
related protest among workers. On the one hand, management policies aiming at 
cutting costs have affected workers in their financial and non-financial benefits. 
For example, in the "CID" company letters were sent to workers who had 
contracted job-related illness and were receiving medical benefits to resume work 
immediately or face punitive action (A1-Shaab, 1/11/94). In April 1992 there was a 
sit-in at the General Battery company by workers over cuts in their incentives 
379 
(Badawi, November 1993: 30). The same -situation was repeated in numerous 
enterprises. The two Kafr Al-Dawar strikes in October 1994 received much media 
attention, in great measure because of how the government dealt with the strikes. 
The head of the labour secretariat at the Nassente party described the situation: 
In Kafr El-Dawar, those who are absent one day get a deduction of 
3 months' incentives. They [new laws] are flexible formulations 
that blur issues, not determine them unlike the rights and 
guarantees that the present laws and the constitution provide, as 
well as the international and Arab agreements... Since the president 
of the company was appointed there have been sharp 
disagreements among the members of the union committee. The 
pressure. of management, the absence of the role of the union 
committee and the general union for weaving workers and the 
ETUF combined. There was a sit-in, but production continued. 
Workers wanted the president of the BOM of the company to be 
removed. The police was called, they surrounded the factory and 
cut off electricity and water and declared that the siege ºvill 
continue until the workers die of hunger and thirst, and then 
announced an obligatory leave [dismissal] for all workers from I 
October, 1994. The people in town collected food and went to the 
factory gates to give to the workers inside, but the police prevented 
them, and started shooting. An armed vehicle, license number 7700 
police, fired on the housing, and some people (bringing food) diet! 
<Fathy Mahmoud, 22/10i94>. 
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The strikes at Kafr El-Dawar and other incidents proved that the implementation 
of SAP measures in enterprises was carried out in a way that made workers pay 
the price of reform. In Kafr El-Dawar the new president of the BOM 
.. worked to co-opt the trade union 
leadership, by transferring its 
members to administrative positions where they were r unoured to 
be receiving wages and bonuses almost six times as high as the 
average plant worker. He also appointed a board of 17 advisors, 
also earning exorbitant salaries, to help supervise his new policies 
(Posusney, 1995: 28). 
Workers in their protests have not been acting as producers, despite the poor 
conditions of work. One of the features of the protests in Egypt is that in the 
majority of them workers continued production. In fact, in many cases workers 
filed suits against the BOMs in enterprises for mismanagement. Mismanagement, 
workers argued, resulted in losses to the enterprises and work stoppages. In fact, in 
some cases workers demanded that the BOM be held accountable for the losses in 
enterprises (Al-Wafd, 28/8/96). The drive toward efficiency management has 
meant in practice that any losses in the enterprise is felt first by workers as 
reductions in services, and incentives. 
To conclude this section, in most cases where workers carry out protests their 
demands have been met, or at least partially met, although the regime often uses 
repressive methods to suppress uprisings. Workers have thus come to rely on their 
own efforts, rather than on trade unions. This will be the pattern in Egypt for the 
future. If a disruption occurs to workers' rights there will be a spontaneous protest 
by workers, whereby partial redress of the grievance by the government will take 
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place. This situation will continue so long as workers bear some political 
significance to the regime. At present workers are marginalised politically, but the 
government is aware of the consequences of breaking away completely from the 
`social contract' that was made during the Nasser years. Although the events of 
January 1977 are twenty years away, they are still fresh in the memory of the 
regime. However, as privatisation proceeds and the government's share of the 
Public-Business Sector decreases the political significance of workers will decline. 
At such a time trade unions will be indispensable for workers. 
Conclusion 
To go back to the beginning, will Egyptian workers prosper in an integrating 
world, as proposed by the World Bank Development Report of 1995? The answer 
is presented succinctly by Ethan Kapstein: 
The global economy is leaving millions of disaffected workers in its 
train. Inequality, unemployment, and endemic poverty have become 
its handmaidens.... Just when working people most need the nation- 
state as a buffer from the world economy, it is abandoning them 
(Kapstein: 16). 
Understanding the role of the state in the process of structural adjustment is 
important to understand the consequences or impact of reform on workers and 
their representatives, the trade unions. The process of implementation of economic 
reform and structural adjustment is both an economic and a political process. 
Public sector reform is seen as the core of the reform process, basically because "it 
is within that sector that entitlements and resources devised and allocated by state 
actors to favoured constituencies are concentrated" (Waterbury in Haggard and 
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Kaufman: 182). Attempts to reform the public sector in Egypt are not new, but 
until very recently they were not very successful. As the political significance of 
the working class decreased, it became possible to reform and now privatise public 
sector enterprises. ' In the public sector, the independence of the working class and 
trade unions was kept in check through a corporatised, state-dependent trade union 
organisation. The corporatisation of the trade union organisation, however, has 
state-bureaucratised it and separated it from the workers it represents. 
Egypt has, after much stalling, proceeded with economic liberalisation, including 
public enterprise reform and privatisation, but the government is still reluctant to 
`liberalise' the political sphere by democratisation. The government manages at 
present, as it has in the past, to trade off political liberalisation in return for a 
`social contract'. At present the regime has gradually shifted the social contract 
with the middle classes, the workers, and the peasants to a social contract with the 
bourgeoisie (Hansen: 117). While in the past the government had to pay for the 
contract of the `almost free loaf of bread', the government is not paying to 
maintain the new contract of la dolce vita' which the bourgeoisie enjoys in return 
for limited political participation, to use the expressions of Bent Hansen. 
However, the groups that are marginalised by SAP are being used by the Islamists 
as a base for an alternative reform program initiated from the grassroots. The 
Islamists pose a challenge to the regime not because they can overthrow the 
government, but because they cannot be ignored. The Islamists are too divided to 
pose a challenge of a regime-overthrowing type. Islamists have been trying to 
mobilise the labour movement and use it as a popular base to gain power. This has 
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been largely carried out by a marriage of convenience with the Socialist Labour 
Party, but they have not been very successful in that regard. 
Perhaps the key to trade union reform lies in the privatisation of public enterprises. 
Historically, the development of an independent trade union movement in Egypt 
occurred at a time where industry was dominated by foreign capital, or a 
Westernised bourgeoisie. Nationalism as an ideology spurted a strong trade union 
movement. Egypt seems to be heading that way again, but it is not certain that a 
trade union movement that utilises the language of nationalism or national 
industry in the age of globalisation would succeed. Already, there are strong 
pressures within the trade union movement for a more democratic and pluralist 
system, however, the corporatist majority has managed to perpetuate itself and 
marginalise the former. To a great extent this position has been maintained thus 
because the state is utilising trade unions to 'control' labour. However, there are 
weaknesses within the corporatist structure, the most important of which is that it 
represents only a sector of the working class, decreasing numerically and in 
political significance as privatisation proceeds. While there is no doubt that a 
corporatised trade union organisation will remain in Egypt for the foreseeable 
future, it will have to account for the varying tendencies within the trade union 
movement if is not to become totally irrelevant to workers. Two possible areas of 
reform are incorporating more workers, and increasing the number of general 
unions, the middle level of the organisation. The one area where there will not be 
reform in the near future is the unitary, pyramidal structure of the trade union 
organisation. 
384 
Bibliography 
A. R. E., People's Assembly. (1991). Report Of The General Committee On The 
General Principles Of The Program To Liberate The National Economy 
In One Thousand Days. (In English). Cairo. 
A. R. E., Ministry Of Economy And International Cooperation. (1996). Egypt 
Economic Profile. (In English). Cairo. 
AALC/AFL-CIO. (April 1995). Program Of Assistance To The Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation (ETUF): September 26,1995 - September 30,2000. 
Cairo: USAID. 
Abbas, Kamal et al (1994) Al-Haraka Al-'umaleya fl ma'rakat al-tahawul: 
derasatfil intikhabat al-nagabeya 1991. (The Workers' Movement in the 
Struggle for transformation: studies on the trade union elections 1991) 
Cairo: Markaz al-derasat al-arabeya. 
Abdalla, Ahmed. ed. (1994) Humum Misr wa azmat al-'ukul al-shaba (The 
Worries of Egypt and the crisis of young minds). Cairo: Markaz al-gil lil 
dirasat al-shababeya wal igtima'eya. 
Abdel-Malik, Anouar (1968) Egypt: Military Society. Translated by Charles Lam 
Markmann. New York: Random House. 
Abdel-Rahman, Brian. (July 1996). Al-Marge' Fi Sharh Ahkam Nuzum Al- 
Ta'meen Al-Igtimaee Fi Misr. (The Reference In Explaining The Applied 
Social Insurance System In Egypt). Part 1. Kitab A! -Amal. 
385 
Adly, Howaida (1993) Al-Omal Wal Seyasa: Al-Dor AI-Seyasi Li! Haraka A1. 
Omaleya Fi Misr Min 1952 ila 1981. (Workers and Politics: The 
Political Role of the Labour Movement in Egypt from 1952 to 1981). Al- 
Ahaly Bodk Series, No. 45. Cairo: Al-Amal Publishing and Printing. 
Ali, Mohamed M. (1984) Dalil Al-Tashkilat Al-Nakabeya Fi Misr: Dawrat 
1983-1987 Part 2 (Directory of Trade Union Formations in Egypt: 1983- 
1987 Cycle). Series: Kitab A1-'Aural. No. 241, March 1984. 
Al-Qudsi, Sulayman, Ragui Assad, Radwan Shaban (1993) Labor Markets In The 
Arab Countries: A Survey. Initiative to Encourage Economic Research in 
the Middle East and North Africa Conference, Cairo (June 4-6,1993). 
Amin, Samir (1978) The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles. 
London: Zed Press Ltd. 
Amin, Samir. (ed. ) (1996). Al-Mgtama' Wal Dawla Fi! Watan Al-Arabi Fi Titel 
Al-Seyasat Al-Ra'smaleya Al-Gadida: Misr (Society And State In The 
Arab World Under The New Capitalist Policies: Egypt). Cairo: Madbouli. 
Awadalla, Safwat Abdel-Salam. (1993) Al-Bank al-Dawly wa Mushkelat a! - 
tanmeya al-igtisadeya fi dual al-alam al-thaleth (The World Bank and 
Problems of Economic development in the Third World). Cairo: Dar Al- 
Nahda A1-Arabeya. 
Badawi, Hassan. (November 1993). "Million 'Amel Ya'taredun Tarik Ansar Al- 
Khaskhasa Heya Al-Hal" (A Million Workers Stand In The Way Of The 
Supporters Of Privatization Is The Solution). Al-Yassar. No. 45. 
386 
Badawi, Hassan. (January 1994). "Qanun " Al-Ama! Al-Muwahad Yushek Ala! 
Intiha' Fi GhaibatAl-Nagabat Wal Ra'i Al-Am" (The Unified Labour Laºv 
Is Almost Finished In The Absence Of Trade Unions And Public Opinion). 
Al-Yassar. 'No. 47, Pp. 24-5. 
Baker, Raymond William. (1978). Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser 
And Sadat. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Banna, Gamal El- (1987). Mashru' Li Islah Al-Haraka Al-Nakabeya Al- 
Misreya (A Proposal To Reform The Egyptian Trade Union Movement). 
Dar Al-Filer Al-Islamy. 
Banna, Gamal El-. (1995). AI-Haraka Al-Naqabeya Al-Misreya `Abr Meat . in: 
(The Egyptian Trade Union Movement Over One-Hundred Years). Cairo: 
Al-Itihas Al-Islamy Al-Dawly Lil Amal. 
Barkey, Henri J. (Ed) (1992). The Politics Of Economic Reform In The Middle 
East. NewYork: St. Martin's Press. 
Bayat, Assef. (1993) "Populism, Liberalisation and Popular Participation: 
Industrial Democracy in Egypt". Economic and Industrial Democracy. 
Vol. 14, pp. 65-87. 
Beinin, Joel and Zackary Lockman (1987) Workers On The Nile: Nationalism, 
Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Beinin, Joel. (1989) "Labour, Capital, And The State In Nasserist Egypt, 1952- 
1961 " International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 21, pp. 71-90. 
387 
Bianchi, Robert (1986) "The Corporatisation Of The Egyptian Labor Movement" 
The Middle East Journal. Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 429-444. 
Bianchi, Robert (1989). Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth 
Century Egypt. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bourguignon, Francois and Christian Morrisson. (1992). Adjustment and Equity 
in Developing Countries: A New Approach. Paris: OECD Publications. 
(series: Adjustment and Equity in Developing Countries. series editor 
Christian Morrisson) 
Bradley, Clive. (1983). "State Capitalism In Egypt: A Critique Of Patrick 
Clawson". Kyhamsin, 10, pp. 73-99. 
Butter, David. (1995). "Taking Stock Of Egypt's Assets". Middle East Economic 
Digest. 1 September 1995, Vol. 39, No. 35, Pp. 2-3. 
Cooper, Mark. (1979). "Egyptian State Capitalism In Crisis: Economic Policies 
And Political Interests 1967-1971. " International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 10, pp. 481-516. 
Deeb, Marius (1979) "Labour And Politics In Egypt, 1919-1939" International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 10, pp. 187-203. 
Dessouki, All E. Hillal. (1991). "The Public Sector In Egypt: Organisation. 
Evolution And Strategies Of Reform ". In Heba Handoussa & Gillian 
Potter. Employment And Structural Adjustment: Egypt In The 1990s. 
Cairo: American University In Cairo Press. 
Emam, Samia Said (1991). Man Yamluk Misr?! Derasa Tahlileya Lil Usul al. 
Igtimaeya Linukhbat al-Infilah al-Igtisady Fil Mogtansaa' al-hfisry 
388 
1974-1980 (Who Owns Egypt?! An Analytical Study of the Social Origins 
of the Open Door Elite in Egyptian Society 1974-1980). Nicosia: IBAL 
Publishing Institution LTD. 
ETUF. (1992) Al-Masira Al-Tarikheya Lil Itihad Al-Am Li Nakabal Omal Misr 
Fi 35 Aman: 1957 - 1992 (The Historic Path of the Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation in 35 Years: 1957 - 1992). Cairo: Workers' University 
Press. 
Ezz EI-Din, Amin. (1987). Tarikh Al-Tabaka Al-Amela AI-Misreya Rtunth 
Nushu'aha Hata Sanat 1970 (The History Of The Egyptian Working 
Class From Its Emergence Until 1970). Cairo: Dar Al-Ghad Al-Arabi. 
Ezz El-Din, Amin. (1987a). "Al-Idrabat Wa Ma'azaq al-Elaqat al-sinaeya flu 
qitaa' al-am" (Strikes and the predicament of industrial relations in the 
public sector). Qadaya Fikreya, May 1987, pp: 141-144. 
Gebeilly, Abdel-Moneim E1-Ghazaly El-. (1988). Muhadarat `An Al-Haraka Al- 
Naqabeya. (Lectures On the Trade Union Movement). Cairo: Dar Al- 
Hana Lil Tiba'a. 
Gebeilly, Abdel-Moneim El-Ghazaly El-. (1991). 75 `Arran Min Tarikh Al- 
Haraka Al-Nagabeya AI-Misreya (75 Years Of The History Of the 
Egyptian Trade Union Movement). Cairo: Al-Arabi for Publishing and 
Distribution. 
Goldberg, Ellis. (1986). Tinker, Tailor, Textile Worker: Class and Politics in 
Egypt, 1930-1952. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
389 
Goldberg, Ellis. (1992). "The Foundations of State-Labor Relations In 
Contemporary Egypt". Comparative Politics, No. 24, January 1992, pp: 
147-61. 
Haggard, Stephan and Robert K. Kaufman (1992). The Politics Of Economic 
Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributional Conflicts, And 
The State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hamed, Raouf Abbas. (1967). Al-Haraka AI-Omaleya Fi Misr, 1899-1952 (The 
Labour Movement In Egypt, 1899-1952). Cairo: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi LiI 
Tiba'a Wal Nashr. 
Hammam, Mona. (1980) "Women And Industrial Work In Egypt: The Chubra El- 
Kheima Case" Arab Studies Quarterly, 2, No. 1. Pp: 50-69. Winter. 
Handoussa, Heba And Potter, Gillian (1991). Employment And Structural 
Adjustment: Egypt In The 1990s. Cairo: American University Press. 
Handoussa, Heba. (1994) "Al-Itar Al-Iqtisadi Lilseyasay Al-Mu'athera Ala Al- 
Sayedat AI-Mu 'elat Fi Misr" (The Economic Framework Of The Policies 
Impacting Women Heading Households In Egypt). Paper Presented At The 
Conference On Women-Headed Households. Cairo: CAPMAS. 20 Much. 
1994. 
Hansen, Bent. (1991). The Political Economy Of Poverty, Equity, And Growls: 
Egypt And Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harik, Diya. (1992). "Subsidization Policies In Egypt: Neither Economic Growth 
Nor Distribution ". International Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies. 24. 
Pp: 481-99. 
390 
Hassan, Ahmed Atef. (1990), 2nd edition. Tarikh Al-Haraka Al-Naqabeyya Al- 
Mesreyya (The History of the Egytpian Trade Union Movement), Cairo: 
Workers University Press. 
Hatem, Mervat F. (1992). "Economic And Political Liberation In Egypt And The 
Demise Of State Femisism" International Journal Of Middle Eastern 
Studies. 24. Pp: 231-51. 
Henley, John S. and Ereisha, Mohamed M. . (1989). 
"State Ownership And The 
Problem Of The Work Incentive: An Egyptian Case Study. " Work, 
Employment & Society. March 1989. Vol. 3, No. 1, Pp. 65-87. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond A., Jr. (1985). Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post- 
Populist Development Of An Authoritarian-Modernizing State. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (1993). "The Politics Of Economic Reform In Egypt" 
Third World Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 1, Pp: 159-71. 
Hussein, Mahmoud. (1973). Class Conflict In Egypt: 1945-1970. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Hyman, Richard. (1971). Marxism And The Sociology Of Trade Unionism. 
London: Pluto Press Ltd. 
Institute Of National Planning (1995). Egypt Human Development Report 1995. 
Cairo. 
Kapstein, Ethan B. (May/June 1996). "Workers And The World Economy". 
Foreign Affairs. Volume 75, No. 3. pp. 16-37. 
391 
Kassem, Nawal (1987). Tataur al-sina'a al-Misreya Munth `ahd Mohammed Ali Hata 
`ahd Abdel Nasser. (The Development of Egyptian Industry from the Mohammed 
Ali era to the Nasser era). Cairo: Madbouli. 
Khattab, Mokhtar. (March 1997) "Al-Tagruba Al-Misreyya Fi Tahweel Sharekat Al- 
Qita'a Al-Am Ila Sharekat Khasa (Tagrubat Al-Khaskhasa)" (The Egyptian 
Experience In Transferring Public Sector Companies To The Private Sector (The 
Experience Of Privatisation)). Cairo: Public Enterprise Office. 
Khoury, Nabil And Moghadam, Valentine M. (Eds) (1995). Gender And Development In 
The Arab World: Women's Economic Participation, Patterns And Policies. 
London: Zed Books Ltd. 
LaTowsky, Robert J. (1984). "Egyptian Labour Abroad: Mass Participation and Modest 
returns" MERIP Reports, May 1984, pp: 11-18. 
Lockman, Zachary (ed). (1994). Workers and Working Classes In The Middle East: 
Struggles, Histories, Historiographies. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Mabro, Robert (1974). The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Munck, Ronaldo. (1988). The New International Labour Studies: An Introduction. 
London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Nakash, Farida El-. (November 1996). "Nisa' Yataqadamn A1-Sufuf' (Women In The 
Front Rows) AI-Yassar. Vol. 81. Pp: 53-55. 
392 
Niblock, Tim and Murphy, Emma. (Eds) (1993): Economic And Political Liberalization 
In The Middle East. London: British Academic Press. 
Owen, Roger (1983). "Sadat's Legacy, Mubarak's Dilemmmna" MERIP Reports. 
September 1983, pp: 12-18. 
P. E. O. (February 1993). "Dalil Al-Igra'at Wal Irshadat Al-Ama Libernameg Al- 
Hukuma Letawsee' Ke'dat AI-Melkeyya Wa I'adat AI-Haykala Wa Hawafez Al- 
Ameleen Wal Idara. " (General Guidelines And Procedures For The Government 
Program For Expansion Of The Ownership Base And Restructuring And 
Incentives Of Employees And Management). Cairo: Public Enterprise Office. 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. (1991). Workers Against the State: Actors, Issues and 
Outcomes in Egyptian Labour/State Relations, 1952-1987. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein (1993). "Irrational Workers: The Moral Economy of Labour 
Protest In Egypt". World Politics. Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1993, pp. 83-120. 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. (1995). "The Political Environment Of Economic Reform In 
Egypt: The Labor Movement Vs. Privatisation Revisited. " Amsterdam Middle 
East Papers, September 1995, No. 2. 
Pursey, Stephen and James Howard. (1988). "International Co-operation for 
Development, Employment and an End to Poverty: Trade Union Responses to the 
Structural Adjustments of the 1980s" Labour and Society. Vol. 13, No. 3, July 
1988, pp. 229-247. 
393 
Reed, Stanley. (September/October 1993). "The Battle For Egypt" Foreign Affairs. 
Vol. 72, No. 4. Pp: 94-107. 
Richards, Alan and Waterbury, John. (1990). A Political Economy Of The Middle East: 
State, Class, And Economic Development. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Roe, Alan, Jayanta Roy, and Jayshree Sengupta. (1989). Economic Adjustment in 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morrocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 
Sa'id, Rifaat El- (1986). Tarikh AI-Haraka Al-Shuyu'eya Al-Misreya Min 1900 Ila 
1940. (The History of The Egyptian Communist Movement From 1900 to 1940). 
Vol. 1,6th ed. Cairo: Sharekat Al-amal Lil Tiba'a Wal Nashr Wal Tawzee'. 
Safran, Nadav. (1961). Egypt In Search Of Political Community. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Schuurman, Frans J. (1993). Beyond The Impasse: New Directions In Development 
Theory. London: Zed Books. 
Serafy, Attia El- (1983). Askarat Al-Haya Al-Omaleya Wal Naqabeya Fi Misr. (The 
Militarisation of Labour and Trade Unions In Egypt). Cairo: NA. 
Serafy, Attia El- (1992). "Lamahat Min Dor Al-Omal Fil Haraka Al-Ishterakeya Al- 
Misreya "(Glimpses On the Role Of Workers In the Egyptian Socialist 
Movement). Qadaya Fikreya, July 1992, pp: 199-205. 
394 
SFD (February 1993) "Seyasat 'Amal Birnameg Tanaquleyat Al-'Emala Bil Sandtuk Al- 
Igtimay Lil Tanmeya ". (The Program of Work of The Labour Mobility Prot; runt in 
The Social Fund For Development) Cairo: Unpublished Paper. 
Shafei, Omar El- (1993) Workers' Struggles in Mubarak's Egypt. Unpublished MA 
thesis, The American University in Cairo. 
Soliman, Salwa; E1-Ahwany, Nagla; Soliman, Nadia (Feb. 1993) Al-'Ema! a Al-?. atJa F il 
Qita' Al-'Am: Al-Khalfeya Wal Mulabasat Wa Mutatalebat Al-Tarsheed ", 
(Excess Labour In The Public Sector: Background and Requirements fier 
Rationalising) Cairo: Unpublished Paper. 
Soliman, Azza. (1995). Programme Of Economic Reform & Structural Adjustment 
And Its Effect On Egyptian Woman In Labour Force. Cairo: Cairo 
Demographic Centre. 
Sullivan, Denis J. (1994). Private Voluntary Organizations In Egypt: Islamic 
Development, Private Initiative, And State Control. Gainsvilte: University Pre 
Of Florida. 
USAID. (August 1993). Privatisation Project. Report #263-0238. USAID, Cairo. 
USAID/Egypt. (10/1995). Egypt: Employment And Unemployment Trends. Cairo: 
USAID. 
Uthman, Taha Sa'ad. (1982). Muthakerat Wa Watha'ek Min Tarikh Omal stiisr: At. 
Omal Wal Intikhabat Al-Barlamaneya (Memoirs and documents Fro m -1.1c 
395 
History Of Egyptian Workers: Workers and Parliamentary Elections) Book Two. 
Cairo: Madbouli. 
Uthman, Taha Sa'ad. (1983). Muthakerat Wa Watha'ek Min Tarik!. Omal Misr., Kifah 
Omal Al-Nasig (Memoirs and documents From The History Of Egyptian 
Workers: The Struggle of Textile Workers) Book One. Cairo: M adbouli. 
Wahba, Mourad Magdi. (1993). "The Nationalization Of The IMF: The Nature and 
Evolution Of The Official Discourse On Economic Reform In Eggvlu (! Q87 
1991) ". Cairo Papers In Social Science. Vol. 16, No. 3. The Economics And 
Politics Of Structural Adjustment In Egypt: Third Annual Symposium. fall 
1993. 
Waterbury, John. (1983). The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of 
Two Regimes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Waterbury, John. (1993). Exposed To Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise And 
State Power In Egypt, India, Mexico, And Turkey. Cambridge: C: umbriJ c 
University Press. 
Weissman, Stephen R. (1990). "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Insights from the 
Experiences of Ghana and Senegal". World Development. Vol. 1 S. No. 12. 
pp. 1621-1634. 
World Bank. (1990). Arab Republic of Egypt: Economic Readjustment With Growth. 
Report no. 7447-EGT, 3 vols. Vol. 2: Main Report. Washington. D. C. 
396 
World Bank. (1991). Report And Recommendation Of The President Of The 
International Bank For Reconstruction And Development To The Executive 
Directors On A Proposed Structural Loan In An Amount Equivalent To US$ 
300 Million To The Arab Republic Of Egypt. Report no. P-5560. EGT. 
Washington, D. C. 
World Bank. (1995a). Will Arab Workers Prosper Or Be Left Out In The Twerto-First 
Century? Regional Perspectives on World Development Report. Witshington. 
D. C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
World Bank. (1995b - WDR). World Development Report 1995: Workers In An 
Integrating World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zaki, Moheb. (1994). Civil Society And Democratization In Egypt, 1981-1994. Cairo: 
The Ibn-Khaldoun Centre. 
397 
APPENDIX I 
39S 
List of Interviewees 
Engineer Mohamed Adel Abdel Kerim, 
President, Holding Company for Metallurgy and Thermal Industries 
Engineer Adel Zein El-Din 
Previous President of BOM of RACITA company 
Mr. Niazi Abdel Aziz 
President, General Union for Engineering Industries, ETUF 
Dr. Ismail Sabry Abdalla 
Director, Thrid World Forum 
Mr. Osama Abu Ismail 
President of BOM, Maragel company 
Dr. Mokhtar EI-Khattab 
Privatisation Program, PEO 
EI-Nasr Company for Manufacturing Glass and Crustal: 
Engineer Mohamed Adel Kamel 
President of BOM of El-Nasr Company for Manufacturing Glass and Crystal 
Mr. Mohamed All E1-Shafci 
Director, Manual Factory Shubra El-Kheima 
Mr. Mahmoud Abu Bakr 
Director General, Organisation and Administration 
Mr. Fawzi Nawar 
Director General, Industrial Relations Department 
Mr. Ali El-Damallawi 
Director, Personnel Shubra El-Kheima 
Mr. Ahmed Hamza 
Head, Factories Sector Mosturud 
Mr. Abdel Naby Abdel Hady 
Union official, Mosturud 
Mr. Mohamed Sayed Abbas 
Union official, Mosturud 
Mr. Ibrahim Ali Abdalla 
Elected BOM member 
i(h) 
Engineer Gamal Fawzi 
Head, Projects Department 
Mr. Hassan Abdel Aziz 
Elected BOM member 
Mr. Ali Gouda 
Union Official, Shubra El-Kheima 
and Secretary General of General Union in Qalyubeya 
Mr. Ahmed Ismail 
Union Official, Shubra E1-Kheima 
and official at General Union for Chemical Industries at ETUF 
Mr. Adel Helmi 
Union Official, Shubra El-Kheima 
Mr. Saleh Abdel Meguid 
Production Worker, Manual Factory, Shubra El-Kheima 
Political Parties: 
Mr. Fathy Mahmoud 
Head, Labour Secretariat Nasserite Party 
Mr. Abdel Hamid El-Sheikh 
Head, Labour Secretariat Tagamuu Party 
Mr. Abdel Menem El-Gamal 
Union Official, Kanal Contracting Company 
Tagamuu member 
Mr. Essara Ramadan 
Union Official, Kanal Contracting Company 
Tagamuu member 
Mr. Ezzat Ibrahim 
Union Official, Kanal Contracting Company 
Tagamuu member 
Mr. Sayed Abdel Rady 
Union Official, Helwan Iron and Steel Company 
Tagamuu member 
Mr. Kamal Ahmed Ismail 
Tram Driver, General Transportation Company 
41,11 
EI-Sharkia Eastern Tobacco Company: 
Engineer Mohamed Sadek 
President of BOM, EI-Sharkia Eastern Tobacco Company 
Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud 
Head, Administration Sector 
Mr. Hafez El-Shafei 
Director, Social Services 
Mr. Ray Habib Ibrahim 
Head, Legal Affairs Sector 
Mr. Abdel Hakim Mahmoud 
Deputy Manager, Operations Sector 
Mr. Mahmoud Abdel Fattah Mohamed 
Union Official, Giza 
Mr. Farouk Ali Ibrahim 
Union Official, Giza 
Mr. Gamal Ramadan Shafik 
Union Official, Giza 
Mr. Magdy Mansour 
Union Official, Giza 
Mr. Saleh Amin Ashour 
Union Official, Talbia 
Mr. Hafez Mohamed Hafez 
Union Official, Talbia 
Mr. Mohamed Kamel Gad 
Production Worker in packaging, Giza 
; 4)1 
APPENDIX II 
-tai. 
Background to Companies Visited 
El-Nasr Company for Glass and Crystal Manufacturint 
The Company was established in 1932. The company was nati0n: rli: cd in 114 12, It i. 
an affiliated company to the Holding Company for thermal induaric,. At prv-, ent tile 
company has four production branches, in addition to the administrative hcadquartcr. 
in Sherifen Street in Cairo. The four branches of the company are: the Ya%%in t ictoty 
in Shubra El-Kheima which produces glass sheets, drinking gla' c% and a. r., the 
ampoule and bottle factories in Mostunid. the \Vayly branch. and the Alc\andti., 
factory which manufactures fibre glass. toughened glass. as well as glass wool and 
other thermal insulation material. The different branches of the company %kciv 
established at different times. The Yassin branch in Shubra la-Khcitti. i %%.,., 
established in 1932 by Mohamed Sayyed Yassin. an industrialist. The Alcý, u, dra., 
branch was established in 1950, and was the first factory to 1ºnxluce fibre yla., in 
Egypt. The Mosturud branch was established in 1968. with some section% built in 
1970. Finally, the Wayly branch was established in 1991. 
The capital value of the company is LE 60 Million', and the maximum 1ºro lu: tiOtt 
capacity (per year) is 100,000 tons of glass. and 350 million medical : mnnp. ºule, Iii 
1992/93 the output of the company was 84, (XX) tons of glass and 21.1 million tnr. li:. º! 
ampoules. The production value was estimated at LE 112 Million. The nutttt%r q 
employees in 1992/93 was about 6600. As on 30 June 199-1.: ºpprounutely 7'-t º, t 
company employees were women, and 9317t' mien. 'lime following table provide... Ottt; 
details about the number of employees in the company in N'M. 'f'ite total nutend r ýt, º. 
6,482 divided as follows: 
Branch Number of Employees 
Men Women 
Yassin 3,449 178 
Mosturud 2,036 201 
Alexandria 423 17 
Wayly 71 2 
Cairo Headquarters 5-3 51 
Total 6,033 449 
The exchange rate for the Egyptian pound is: l Pound! StCrlint; =5. tß t º; } I+tian ! '. +tiýý,! º 
401 
El-Sharkia Eastern Company 
The company was first established in 1920, but it 
did not staut production until 1')271, 
In 1927 an agreement was made between the British-American 
Tobacco eunip. uny . mdi 
the Matussian family in Egypt who had been in tite tobacco indu. tty since IS )O i 
form the Eastern Tobacco Company. By 1947 the company had taten over SO' i O, t" 
the tobacco industry in Egypt. The company was Egyptianised in 1')5t). after tile 11)5t, 
War, and it was nationalised in 1961. At present the Company i. a 111t+nop ly indlu. tty 
and has eleven branches in different governorates in I: gy-pt, including Girl. 
Alexandria, Tanta, Menoufiia, and Assiout. The company tpruducc. cigarettes and 
various other tobacco products. It is currently producing 1.1 torrign brand, o 
cigarettes by licence as well as Egyptian brands. 
The capital value of the company is LE 400 Million. The cutnpanV produccJ in 
1992/93 about 41 billion cigarettes, 13,177 tons of tobacco for water pipe., 5.036 tons 
of tobacco for pipes, as well as 431 tons of loose tobacco for wrapping eig. uettc+. In 
1992/93 the production value exceeded LE 3.306 Million. In I0o)211), the tramper of 
employees in the company was 13,903. As on 30 July 1999.1 out of a total of I3. >; u 
employees the number of women was 973, and the then 12577. In pCit cnta c%. 
women constituted about 7% of employees in the cutnlýany. l ulluýý ini. %a 
breakdown of the employees by educational qu; tlitic: ºtion': 
Educational Qualification Numht r or E mmmplos e 
ate n 
University degree 7IQ I') I 
Above intermediate (institutes) 132 5-1 
Intermediate (post-secondary) 1.735 . 112 
Below intermediate 1.116 J.; 
No formal education 5,872 . 173 
Total 12,577 97.1 
2 It was not possible to obtain the same sets of MatIStiCý 
IIº+I11 lt% t%%kj C0111'+. x111c% 
visited. 
